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This research puts forward an alternative methodology for the study of knowl-
edge accumulation and innovation production in modern biotech. It presents
the results of a series of thought experiments designed to measure and contrast
the effects of structural differences in the performance of Mexico and Spain’s
modern biotech innovation systems. Borrowing concepts from neoclassical, en-
dogenous growth, and regional systems of innovation theories and supplement-
ing these with empirical data analysis findings, this research introduces a sys-
tems model that helps better understand how technological changes in this sec-
tor are being shaped by the interaction of multiple factors and agents, including
the government.
Findings suggest that Mexico’s modern bio-technology system (MBTS) as
modeled is, in the short term, more efficient than that modeled for Spain, espe-
cially in the creation of new marketable products and services deriving from this
technology. Further analysis, however, determines that the system is deprived
from this advantage in the later mid and long terms and also becomes consid-
erably less efficient than that modeled for Spain in various other areas. When
the model for Mexico’s system is supplemented with specific institutional and
regulatory elements —most which are present in Spain’s MBTS model— its per-
formance improves above that of its current state and beyond that of Spain in
particular key areas, including market creation.
The conclusions obtained in this study help both presenting modern biotech
from a Systems of Innovation perspective and producing a concise list of rec-
ommendations that can serve as reference for the design of policies to assist in
revamping the current MBTS operating in Mexico.
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PREFACE
In one of the most captivating scenes in movie history, the brilliance of direc-
tor Roland Joffe´ depicts the moment when a Jesuit monk, astray from the path
followed by his fellow missioners, roams through the Amazon Jungle. Realiz-
ing he is being followed by local “savage” tribe hunters, unarmed and virtually
helpless, he resolves to use the only object he carries; an oboe. While sitting on
a stone in the middle of a creek below the jungle’s canopy he begins playing a
pleasing musical piece. Allured by the novelty, tranquility, and harmony of the
melody, the tribal hunters —still aiming bows and spears— come out of their
jungle vintage points to congregate —in complete awe— around him. Moments
later, an older and perhaps more prudent tribal hunter emerges from the jungle
and, while vociferating in his dialect, walks up to where the monk is playing
his instrument. Once close enough, he rips the oboe from the monk’s hands and
turns towards the rest of the congregated tribe members, pointing his finger at
them and raising his fist in the air to condemn their tolerance for the intruder.
He then snaps the instrument in two and throws the broken pieces into the
creek, exiting the scene as the rest of the hunters remain gathered around the
stranger. Once gone, one of the tribal hunters collects the pieces of the broken
instrument and tries —to no avail— to put them back together. After failing to
fix the instrument, he hands the pieces to the monk, who simply nods back at
him suggesting there is no way to fix it, let alone to keep playing the melody. As
the scene closes, the camera captures the hunters —along with the missioner—
walking downstream as a single group.
Beyond religious or cultural innuendos, the power of this scene rests on the
successful way it captures art’s ability to transcend human language and un-
derstanding. The piece also points out the fact that art —like science— requires
xix
both artifacts and performers for its expression, suggesting that the absence of
either can curtail its creation and diffusion. Moreover, it displays how easily any
of the processes associated to either —creation, diffusion, and expression— can
fall hostage to ideologies or belief systems within particular social structures.
The way art expression is approached in this scene almost perfectly echoes
the ways in which modern biotechnology has been approached since its incep-
tion in the early seventies; with both awe and fear. Although not all unjusti-
fied or scientifically invalid, many of the attitudes towards the possible conse-
quences of the application of biotechnology have curtailed its full advancement,
in much a similar way as the hunter leader curtailed the monk’s performance
when snapping and breaking the oboe in the previously described scene. Yet, at
this time and age modern biotechnology still lacks a critical mass of bold explor-
ers that can circumvent these attitudes and truly concentrate on the art —not the
doubt—- and become both performers and artifact creators. Furthermore, it yet
needs to witness a rise in the number of leaders that can encourage these en-
terprising attitudes while reducing —in a genuine and prudent manner— fears
and concerns.
These modern biotechnology pioneers appear to develop more easily in
some environments than in others, helping to create sophisticated regional net-
works of both performers (specialized human capital with cutting-edge skills)
and artifacts (like state-of-the-art instruments, laboratories and research cen-
ters). Through a comparative analysis exercise between the systems of inno-
vation for modern biotechnology of Spain and Mexico, this research seeks to
provide more information on the composition and performance of these net-
works and on the factors that can help less developed regions —performer and
artifacts-wise— achieve similar network refinement levels. More specifically,
xx
this study seeks to help develop new ways to acquire transfer, and express
knowledge in the realms of modern biotechnology. To put it differently, it seeks
to add more elements that can help the actors within this technology progress
“downstream” together as a unified group with similar interests and goals.
xxi
INTRODUCTION
This research puts forward an alternative methodology for the study of knowl-
edge accumulation and innovation production in modern biotech. More specif-
ically, it presents the results of a series of thought experiments designed to mea-
sure and contrast the effects of structural differences in the performance of Mex-
ico and Spain’s modern biotech innovation systems.1
Borrowing concepts from neoclassical, endogenous growth, and regional
systems of innovation theories —and supplementing these with empirical data
analysis findings— it introduces a systems dynamics model that helps better
understand how technological change processes in this sector are being shaped
by the interaction of multiple factors and agents, including the government.
Using variations of this model, it further shows the results of evaluating which
alternative institutional set-ups support a stronger dynamic performance of the
sector as measured by a series of response variables. The results of this pro-
cess conclude that, although the response for most variables is greater when the
model is testing Spain’s modern biotech system than when testing that of Mex-
ico, the level of the key variable measuring the creation of marketable biotech
products is more efficient in the short run and only marginally less in the mid
and long runs in the latter model’s test than in the former. Further, this method-
ology suggests that if Mexico’s current structural arrangement —as represented
by the model— is modified into that identified in this research as most response-
inducing, the capacity of that country’s system to promote the creation of these
types of products would increase above that currently estimated for it and pos-
1 Lundvall et al. (2009) suggests that the (national/regional/sectoral) innovation system is
a focusing device aiming at analyzing and understanding processes of innovation (rather than
allocation) where agents interact and learn (rather than engage in rational choice). He further
proposes that the aim of using this device is to find out which alternative institutional set-ups
support strong dynamic performance of a (national/regional) economy or a sector.
1
sibly above that resulting from exclusively adopting elements of Spain’s system
of innovation for modern biotech. A series of policy recommendations for Mex-
ico come forth from these findings as possible paths that can lead to achieve a
higher innovation potential in modern biotech in that country.
Additionally, this study provides more elements to the ongoing conversation
on how to bridge the ‘Systems of Innovation’ approach for explaining regional
knowledge-based economic performance with the methodology and mathemat-
ical modeling technique for framing, understanding, and discussing complex
issues put forward by ‘Systems Dynamics.’ Moreover, this approach opens the
door for future alternative thought experiments designed to achieve a deeper
understanding of how organizations, institutions, market structure, market im-
perfections, trade, government policy, and the legal framework in many do-
mains affect long-run growth, through their effects on economic agents’ incen-
tives to engage in knowledge producing activities associated to modern biotech.
From an academic perspective, this work can be considered a further at-
tempt to gather more information about what happens inside the “black boxes”
to which scientific production and innovation processes are generally associ-
ated with. In doing so, it also seeks to offer more resources towards helping
understand the limits of knowledge accumulation and the role knowledge itself
plays within innovation processes. Lastly, it provides more elements to imply
that the effectiveness of modern biotech innovation systems (or those of any
technology), as measured by the performance of its individual parts, may be in
function of their complexity and —to a lesser extent— of the policies followed
by the actors operating within in these.
2
Structure of the Paper
This document is divided into four chapters: 1) The first chapter defines modern
biotech as a set of technological systems and explains some of the central limi-
tations of various mainstream theoretical approaches to the study of innovation
and their impact on this technology. It also introduces the principles behind the
systems of innovation approach followed by this research; 2) the second chapter
provides a detailed account of the interview processes and the analysis of results
per country (Mexico, Spain), framework (institutional, regulatory), and key sys-
tem components (actors, networks, and institutions; funding sources; research
and human capital; regulation, policies, and planning; and international links).
It closes with a section on general and particular findings that facilitate con-
trasting observations; 3) The third chapter explains and justifies the approach
followed for the design of the systems dynamics model used to test both na-
tions’ modern biotech systems of innovation. It presents a detailed description
of the model and its parts and how these associate —when they do— with the
economics theoretical principles or views and opinions of the various actors in-
terviewed that helped define them. In addition, this section both breaks down
the methodology followed to obtain and assess the response of specific vari-
ables and presents the outcome from contrasting the response levels of selected
variables using different versions of the model; and, 4) the fourth and closing
chapter offers final thoughts and a series of policy recommendations for Mexico
based on the obtained results. It finishes with a number of theoretical recom-
mendations for academics and professionals engaged in the study of scientific
development. Other supporting documents and additional results tables are
found within the document’s multiple appendixes.
In more detail, the opening chapter defines modern biotechnology as a set of
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technological systems and introduces a pair of challenges identified throughout
the new growth economics and technological change literatures as the possible
key factors behind the emergence of institutions and institutional changes as-
sociated to this technology. These challenges are also framed here as inducing
limitations to mainstream economic analysis and thus, viewed as the perfect
excuse for the design of alternative methodologies that can offer a deeper un-
derstanding of their effects on innovation processes. More specifically, 1) the
complexity of defining adequate incentives for basic scientific endeavor, and
2) the difficulty of establishing channels that allow a sustained and efficient
transformation of the results of basic scientific endeavor into technological ad-
vancements and further into innovations, are depicted here as promoting these
institutional changes. Additionally, the chapter explains that such limitations
approach stems from the fact that knowledge, information, and ideas —found
at the core of all scientific endeavors— can be considered as quasi-public goods
due to their non-rival character. This analysis also delves into the specific ef-
fects that these identified challenges —plus knowledge’s non-rivalry— have
on modern biotech, providing a direct analogy between information in elec-
tronic format and genetic material as an example. Finally, it puts forward the
premise that the pace at which innovation systems adjust to this technology’s
rapid advancements has also played a considerable role in defining their struc-
tural composition and performance. The section ends with a brief review of the
economics of the systems approach.
The second chapter presents a detailed description of the elements compos-
ing Mexico and Spain’s innovation systems for modern biotech based on in-
formation gathered on-site and the results obtained from a series of interviews
conducted in both countries. This section also describes their structure, behav-
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ior, and performance and defines them as Modern Bio-technological Systems,
MBTS within more general National Systems of Innovation, NSI. Each NSI is
carefully analyzed to pin down which specific structural arrangements (institu-
tions, policies, and regulations) compose these MBTS, and which of these ele-
ments developed to cope with the above mentioned challenges when these di-
rectly affect biotech locally. The findings of this comparison exercise helps shed
more light on the elements that may be giving Spain’s system an edge over
Mexico’s. It closes with both a general observations section, considering the
most evident differences between these systems (regional economic and geo-
political organization; resource flow; programmatic mechanisms; local views
regarding new technologies; etc.), and a particular observations one, listing the
institutional and regulatory elements of each. The multiple components and
parameters pinpointed in this chapter also assisted in sketching the general sys-
tems dynamics model and its adapted versions for each country presented in
the following section.
The third chapter offers a detailed and thorough explanation of the general
model’s design and sub-systems (research, development, innovation manage-
ment, resource management, R&D policy), making emphasis on the adapted bi-
ological evolutionary process found at its core. It starts with a brief explanation
of how this model helps understanding the structure of both systems and how
the overall exercise provides more data to estimate if Spain’s MBTS truly out-
performs that of Mexico. This chapter’s section also emphasizes the fact that the
model’s objective is not to determine and maximize a production function for
research and development activities, R&D with specific output elasticities be-
tween its inputs. Instead, it puts forward the notion that this approach presents
a model that —by taking into account the interactions between the stochastic
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nature of discovery, the continuous advancements in R&D methods, and the re-
sources available— centers on assessing how the sector’s potential varies over
time. It also explains how this “general” model is altered through a series of
components (“switches” and “sliders”) and initial conditions that allow it to
represent more closely abstract versions of either countries’ system.
This chapter also presents the experiment design, explaining that —instead
of alternative models— variations to the general model’s structure are consid-
ered “treatments” in this analytical process. Therefore, subjecting the general
model to multiple treatments, the response of key variables can be obtained
and compared in a systemized manner for each of these. Treatments are then
presented by rank (best, moderate, or unsatisfactory) based on the effect these
induced on the assessed variables. This segment also offers a first hint of the
overall research findings, showing that the treatment representing Spain ranked
among the best and that of Mexico among the unsatisfactory. Thus, confirming
that alterations to the general model’s structure indeed have an effect on vari-
able response, eliminating the possibility that such variations could be induced
exclusively by changes on the value of the general model’s initial conditions.
The two next sections in this chapter analyze the results of the model when
adapted to represent Spain and Mexico (in other words, when the general model
is subjected to the treatment and its initial conditions changed to represent those
of each counties’ system), also explaining the methodology followed to assess
the response of the 15 selected variables in the short, mid, and long terms.
Each section presents the degree of response and change that each variable dis-
played, allowing to conclude that Spain’s system —as defined by the model—
in fact induces a higher response in most variables than that produced by the
adapted version representing Mexico. However, the comparison concludes that
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the model for Mexico outperforms that of Spain in the production of new mar-
ketable products in the short term and only remains marginally below it in the
mid and long terms. Additionally, it suggests that if Mexico’s current structural
arrangement —as represented by the model— is modified into that identified
in this study as most response-inducing, the capacity to promote the creation of
new markets for products derived from biotech of that country’s system would
increase above its currently estimated levels and possibly above those of Spain.
The fourth and last chapter presents a list of policy recommendations. Es-
sentially, it suggests that Mexico, instead of simply copying those elements that
appear to be making Spain’s system more efficient, it should develop “tropi-
calized” versions of these. This segment also suggests that Mexico should take
more advantage of its geographical location and seek the establishment of re-
gional agreements regarding investment, access to genetic resources, intellec-
tual property rights, IPRs , and venture capital investment within the NAFTA
framework. It concludes with a series of theoretical considerations that can
serve as the basis for future research endeavors.
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CHAPTER 1
MODERN BIOTECH SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION
1.1 Defining Modern Biotech as a Set of Technological Systems
Modern biotech has no defined boundaries. As a scientific process, it has pro-
duced a continuous and fast-paced redefinition of both the scope and borders
of basic and applied research. As a technology, its novelty and wide-range
applicability has altered the conventional limits of law, economics, and other
social structures inducing adjustments to some of the most fundamental prin-
ciples within generally accepted theories of property, economic growth, and
technological change globally. Simultaneously, these changes —developing
within a complex network of agents and organizations— have encouraged the
regional rise and formation of various new institutions, which in some cases
both assist further promoting the advancement of research in modern biotech
and allow the development of derivative technologies, products, and services,
thus, improving the prospect of benefiting from the economic and social welfare
that stems from innovation in this area. Based on these traits modern biotech
can be understood as a dynamic network of technological systems of inno-
vation in which R&D processes for the discovery, application, transfer, and
transformation of new knowledge take place. These processes induce both the
formation of new institutions and organizations and the transformation of exist-
ing ones. However, evidence shows that such technology-induced adjustments
do not occur simultaneously nor at the same rate or pace across all countries
and regions currently engaged in modern biotech activities despite globaliza-
tion and the noticeable advancements in Information Technologies, IT . This has
also made evident both a regional disparity in the adapting capacity of existing
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institutions and of the rate at which this happens as well as a regional variance
in the ability to induce the formation of original pro-modern biotech institutions
and organizations, ergo, reducing the likelihood of achieving higher economic
development and social welfare levels for those regions adjusting at a slower
pace.
1.2 General Challenges and the Systems of Innovation
Many numerous new institutions and changes to existing ones are believed to
be emerging out of the necessity to cope with a series of challenges identified
throughout the new growth economics and technological change literature as
directly affecting the development and management of innovation; theory sug-
gests that these help explain and justify many of the current existing incentives,
behavior and performance of agents working within these systems of innova-
tion and, more specifically, of those within their networks devoted to modern
biotechnology, referred to as Modern Bio-technological Systems, MBTS. A vast
majority of these challenges are recognized as deriving from: 1) the complexity
of defining adequate incentives for basic scientific endeavor (knowledge and
information production); 2) the difficulty of establishing channels that allow
a sustained and efficient transformation of the results of basic scientific en-
deavor into technological advancements and further into innovation (knowl-
edge and information distribution and application). On the one hand, such
a twofold approach stems from the premise that knowledge, information and
ideas —at the core of all scientific activity and especially of modern biotech—
can be considered as quasi-public goods due to their nonrival character (Ar-
row, 1959; Romer, 1990; Jones and Romer, 2009). Based on this characteristic
and due to the fact that their value increases in proportion to the number of
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users, knowledge, information and ideas (information, from hereon)1 also al-
ter feasible and optimal economic institutions (as proposed by neoclassical eco-
nomics) by introducing scale effects. These nonrivalry-induced effects make
both its full appropriation and its optimal allocation, as described within neo-
classical growth models, virtually unattainable. Therefore, profit-maximizing
private entities (who abide to these principles) are induced into shunning most
research-intensive ventures if not allured with compelling incentives not to do
so.2 Further, this particular attribute also points towards the fact that any kind
of interaction that lets someone associate with numerous others like her and
share the information each has discovered is beneficial from an economics and
social welfare perspective; if many are the individuals or entities that can benefit
from such information, then there are efficiency gains to be had from transfer-
ring it and from connecting all possible beneficiaries together so it can be used
everywhere as soon as it is discovered somewhere. No matter how it is com-
municated and reused, nonrivalry by itself creates strong incentives for eco-
nomic integration among the largest possible group of people and the profit de-
rived from it may not become exhausted at any finite population size (Jones and
Romer, 2009). The consequences of these effects —as a result— provide further
evidence of the fact that the institutions of complete property rights and per-
fect competition that work adequately in a world consisted solely of rival goods
1The Oxford English Dicctionary (OED, 2011) defines idea as: “Any product of mental ap-
prehension or activity, existing in the mind as an object of knowledge or thought; an item of
knowledge or belief; a thought, conception, notion; a way of thinking.” The same source de-
fines information as: “The action or fact of imparting the knowledge of a fact or occurrence.”
Although there are fundamental differences between these two concepts, the former can be
identified as contained within the latter, more so when the product of such mental activity re-
sults in the discovery of a natural occurring phenomena or law which, eventually, will become
common knowledge.
2 Jones and Romer (2009) point out the fact that in neoclassical models efficiency in use
dictates price equal to marginal cost. But with the presence of increasing returns, there is insuf-
ficient output to pay each input its marginal product; generally, these models suggest that price
must exceed marginal cost somewhere to provide the incentive for profit maximizing private
firms to create new ideas.
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no longer deliver the optimal allocation of resources in one containing mostly
information (Ibid). Moreover, these also support the notion of an existing asso-
ciation between the free flows of information and people —as in the effects of
globalization, urbanization, and those derived from the IT revolution— and the
extent and formation of markets for new knowledge and innovation.
On the other hand, this approach also emerges from the fact that system-
atically transforming the product of basic research (information) in its purest
forms into the fundamental building blocks of future technologies and innova-
tions (invention) with potential positive economic growth is quite complex a
task. Both information (in its purest forms) and the randomness of invention
are at the core of this transformative tension in modern biotech. The central
economic fact governing the process of research and invention (scientific activ-
ity) is that these activities are devoted to the production information (and of
finding ways to apply it); by its very definition, [scientific activity] must be a
risky process in that the output (information obtained) cannot be predicted per-
fectly from the inputs (Arrow, 1959). As previously mentioned, private profit-
maximizing entities discriminate against investing in such research-intensive
and invention processes in great part due to the absence of devices that can effi-
ciently shift such risks away from them. Further, the design of such risk-shifting
instruments for the particular case of scientific activity from the standpoint of
a central planner becomes quite intricate due to the underlying presence of a
“moral factor” which —if not pondered adequately— may very well hamper
their anticipated enticement purpose.3 This, within a free-market economy, in-
3 Arrow (1959) defines moral factor as the difficulty to distinguish between the state of nature
and a decision by the risk-barer (insured). He suggests that —in general— any device for shift-
ing risks can have the effect of diluting incentives; substitutive motivations, whether pecuniary
or not, may be found, but the dilemma of the moral factor can never be completely removed. In
the particular case of invention (product or process), an insurance against failure could weaken
the incentives to succeed.
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duces the imperfect solution where only large-scale corporations —capable of
conducting multiple small-scale research projects (each costing close to nothing
when compared to their net corporation revenue)— can simultaneously engage
in basic research and serve as their own “insurers” by internally diffusing in-
vestment risks. Within such a framework there are no incentives for the de-
velopment of new start-up private enterprises while existing ones tend to steer
away from such research activities remaining at the margin of production and
access to information and, thus, of generating innovation. Although history
suggests that chance —more than a systemic and staged linking process elicited
on request— brings technological change (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982), the re-
view of these two central challenges provide additional evidence to suggest that
market equilibrium —within the frame of neoclassical theory— would not opti-
mally allocate resources for scientific activity, therefore justifying some form of
policy intervention to reduce these.4. In practice, some of the above-mentioned
paradigm-changing advancements induced by modern biotech have indeed en-
couraged the transformation and rise of multiple institutions aiming at bridg-
ing such information-to-innovation and sector linkage gaps. Furthermore, these
have made more evident the unequivocal association between: a) the evolution
and establishment of new institutions (aiming at reducing the effects resulting
from these challenges); b) the ways in which information and its sources are
produced (this includes human capital formation); and c) the scale of popula-
tion within regions (as the source of both human capital and information). A
closer look at the dynamics and networks existing within these systems of in-
novation, particularly those of Mexico and Spain, provides more information
4Adding even more complexity to the design and planning for institutional change is the
fact that basic research is also carried out for a series of reasons beyond a fundamental quest
for knowledge or applicability, including self-expression, altruism, and prestige (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1982)
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on how these challenges are reshaping the institutional, economic, and social
landscapes and what resulting outcomes appear as better suiting to face these.
1.3 General Challenges and their Effect on Modern Biotech
While these challenges equally affect all areas of scientific endeavor, modern
biotech appears to be more susceptible to these for multiple reasons; as a scien-
tific activity mostly focused on defining and conducting processes of artificial
genetic material manipulation, it operates with and mostly produces informa-
tion from the ubiquitous DNA molecule and its parts. Found within any living
organism, access to DNA is virtually as boundless as it is widespread, turning
most efforts in the direction of claiming exclusive rights over its physical parts
(the nucleic acids composing the molecule itself, its genes and their sequence,
or any other of its components) or the information expressed and contained in it
or in any of its parts quite impractical.5 Conversely, this also makes protecting
and enforcing property rights exerted over any information contained within
it or its parts equally as intricate (I will address this matter shortly). Although
some of these artificially-induced biological alterations and processes may in-
deed create completely new organisms or induce processes not conventionally
occurring in nature, it is both, the methods followed to produce such changes
and the information obtained through them, that could indeed become of par-
tial proprietary excludability under most existing IPRs statues. In most cases,
5Although there are three broad categories of biological molecules —carbohydrates, lipids,
and proteins— the principal determinants of the basic structure and function of any living or-
ganism are the proteins coded for in its DNA (Bohrer, 2007). DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic
acid, the three-dimensional structure containing the basic genetic material that determines the
heredity of all plants and animals and some viruses. A gene can be considered as a stretch of
DNA, which contains the complete set of instructions for the construction of a particular pro-
tein (chain of amino acids with a particular function). In a complex, or multi-cellular organism
—whether an octopus or a human— virtually every cell of any single creature contains exactly
the same genetic information, or DNA, as every other cell of that creature (Ibid).
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however, this is the only subject matter over which IPRs can be filled for, often
more than over the resulting genetically modified organisms, GMOs or living
genetically modified organisms,LGMOs , their altered genetic structure, genes,
or parts of these.6 Furthermore, this information, more often than not, becomes
the single proprietary part of the process displaying the highest economic and
business value.
In addition to information the most frequent outcomes deriving from mod-
ern biotech activities are the previously mentioned GMOs, LGMOs or parts
of these. These novel organisms —now containing the new information in
the form of genetic modifications within their recombined genetic structures—
carry within themselves the results of long and rigorous scientific endeavor.
Like any other living organism, these may still display replicating or reproduc-
ing capacities; having the potential to pass-on such information to their off-
spring without depleting it and with barely no effort.7 This capacity is com-
6From a legal viewpoint this varies regionally. In the U.S. after Diamond v. Chakrabarty (447
U.S. 303 (1980) patents can be issued over living organisms under 35 U.S.C. 101. Yet this was
hardly the end of inquiries into what can be claimed as patentable subject matter in a modern
biotech patent application. The USPTO later ruled over claims over genetically modified multi-
cellular or higher organisms as patentable subject matter, In Re Allen (2 U.S.P.Q2d 1425, Bd. Pat.
App. 1985), which held human multi-cellular organisms could as patentable (op.cit). The ulti-
mate test for the patentability of higher organisms was presented in the claimed invention of a
transgenic mouse, which expressed a cancer-related variant of a gene involved in cell growth or
replication, by Harvard University. The USPTO issued the patent (U.S. Pat.4,873,191) allowing
living organisms, including mammals, which have been genetically modified to be considered
composition of matter and therefore patentable subject matter under 101 in the United States
(Ibid). The EU position is that it will allow patents on methods of genetically modifying animals
as long as the method is not limited to one species. The EU also allows claims to methods of
using genetically modified animals, subject that these methods are applicable to more than one
species. It will not allow patents on a species and some permits can be denied if the genetic
modification is considered to produce suffering to the new organism without any substantial
benefit for men or animal. Additionally, each member state can bar these practices based on
the host country’s law concerning the humane treatment of animals and other ethical concerns
(Ibid). In Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court decided that animals were not patentable sub-
ject matter within the scope of the local regulation. However, in the particular case of the onco-
mouse, claims were allowed to various components and methods used in its creation, allowing
the patent holder some protection against local competition (Ibid).
7A low stability of the genetic modification within the DNA structure of such organisms or
the help of naturally occurring genetic modification processes (such as viral infection) could also
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monly referred to in the economics literature as near-zero transaction costs and
is a highly common trait of information in the contemporary IT Era. Moreover,
such replication ability reduces even more the likelihood of full appropriabil-
ity and containment; more so if these types of organisms (or their parts) be-
come boundless within less restricted access environments or even reach their
way into natural ecosystems. Then again, these effects are somehow analo-
gous to information’s low transaction and transmission costs within open or
less restricted access networks. Such transmission/inheritance abilities —along
with the ubiquitous presence of DNA within all living organisms and viruses—
provide more elements supporting the argument that not only the informa-
tion resulting from modern biotech activities behaves —like any other type of
information— as a quasi-public good, but also that the physical outcomes of ge-
netic manipulation and research i.e. GMOs, LGMOs, or its parts, also somehow
display public good traits.
1.4 New Policies and the Systems of Innovation Approach
Like other areas of science, appropriating information as a basis for future re-
search is much more complex than appropriating its use in producing products
due to the impossibility of knowing its full applicability a priori (Arrow, 1959).8
In addition, theory suggests that such information appropriation reduces the
possibility of creating social and economic benefits deriving from its sharing,
thus, curtailing the formation of channels that promote a sustained and efficient
aid transferring such information throughout vectors and beyond artificially created barriers
originally estimated for its containment (op.cit).
8Arrow also suggests that “the value of information for use in developing more information
is much more conjectural than its use in production and thus more likely to be underestimated,
so that if a price is charged for it, the demand is even more likely to be sub-optimal” (Arrow,
1959).
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transformation of the results of basic research in modern biotech into techno-
logical advancements and innovation in multiple sectors. This observable fact
affects modern biotech more intensely because discovery in modern biotech be-
comes more difficult as barriers to information become more and more sophis-
ticated and better enforced. Although pervasive in nature, limiting access to the
available information existing within the genetic structure of living organisms
(genotypes) will further blur the distinction between property, contracts, and
physical products (Burk, 2004).9 Moreover, if such enclosure happens within
economies closer to the modern biotech technological development frontier, it
becomes easy to estimate that accessing —and producing— such information
will become even harder for emerging economies as time goes by.
Many policies within both the public and private realms have indeed been
designed to reduce the effects of these challenges (i.e. intellectual property
rights protection, direct subsidies, horizontal/vertical organization, etc.). Yet,
most appear as attempting to induce the R&D sector into behaving in a man-
ner that is analogous to the neoclassical economics theory standard definition
of a productive sector. However, these policies seem to overlook the fact that
connections, linkages, channels, and feedbacks are the main components of
these systems (both for general R&D and modern biotech). They have also con-
tributed in the transformation and development of institutions, the creation of
information (as a quasi-public good), and of better ways to manage it. A more
systems oriented approach offers new perspectives on the behavior of the sector
and may well shed more light on how these challenges are being addressed and
how these can be tackled in the future.
9The behavior of this sector from a market perspective is quite analogous to that of the mi-
croprocessors put forward by Segerstrom (2007) in his paper “Intel Economics.”
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1.5 The Economics of the Systems Approach
In economics literature it is generally accepted that scientific endeavor and tech-
nological change are important sources of productivity growth and positive so-
cial welfare. Conventionally, the analysis of these as sources of innovation has
been approached from a perspective based on the presumption that innova-
tive processes can be decomposed into several isolated phases that take place
in a strictly proceeding sequence. Balzat (2006) suggests that in the analysis of
technical change within the economics of innovation literature many of the ear-
lier and more abstract models of technical change and innovation have been
crowded out. In his view “these traditional and usually formal models, being
rooted in mainstream economic theory, a central role has been typically given
to the calculation of optimal decision-making in the context of innovative be-
havior, comparable to the derivation of optimal investment decisions. Techni-
cal change has therefore been treated as an exogenous event, while the specific
features and determinants of real and modern innovation processes have been
largely abstracted from. Precisely in this latter respect, namely in the explicit
consideration of the attributives of real innovative activity on the national level,
the national innovation systems concept possesses a mayor strength.”
Departing from such linear schemes, the more systems-theoretic approach
known as Systems of Innovation (SI) proposes that the analysis of the be-
havior and effects of innovation are better understood when viewed as part
of an evolving system characterized by interdependencies between market
and non-market activities, a variety of actors and multiple surrounding con-
ditions (Balzat, 2006). Derivative and more spatial-specific forms of this ap-
proach are the notions of national (NSI) and regional (RSI) systems of innova-
tion. For Aghion et al. (2009) the terminology also varies “to increase the aware-
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ness of the close linkage between technological change and innovation with ad-
vances in science, on the one hand, and the set of socio-economic institutions
operating in a given context, on the other encoura[ging] the conceptualization
of science, technology, innovation, and growth systems, STIGS as appropriate
subject of policy-oriented research.”
Displaying even more specificity is the terminology of technological sys-
tems, TS which Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) define as “a network or network
of agents interacting in a specific technology area under a particular institu-
tional infrastructure to generate, diffuse, and utilize [a specific] technology.”
For them TS are defined in terms of knowledge and competence flows rather
than flows of ordinary goods and services, consisting of dynamic knowledge
and competence networks. This systems notion of innovation not only has
gained relevance within the new growth economics and endogenous techno-
logical change and innovation literatures and its scientific communities but also
acceptance among decision-makers when these work on defining state-of-the-
art policies to encourage the local performance of research and development
(R&D). Furthermore, this approach offers alternative perspectives to the study
and understanding of the effects of the series of challenges commonly identi-
fied within mainstream economics theory as affecting the fundamentals of R&D
activities mentioned earlier and, consequently, of modern biotech. These chal-
lenges, as suggested earlier, are often singled out to be key motors behind the
fast and continuous redefinition of the institutional composition of MBTS and
—consequently— of systems of innovation globally.
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CHAPTER 2
NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONS OF TWO SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION
2.1 Two Countries, Two Systems, One Technology
This section presents a description of both Mexico and Spain’s MBTS operating
within each country’s NSI to put forward more elements to support the initial
arguments suggesting that: a) modern biotech is redefining the boundaries of
R&D inducing the transformation and creation of new institutions at a much
faster pace than ever before; b) a number of these transformed and newly cre-
ated institutions not only surged to attend a series of challenges that mainstream
economics theory has detected as affecting the performance, management and
planning of R&D but also emanated from the interaction of multiple market and
non-market activities, a variety of actors and multiple surrounding conditions
within a systems environment; c) that a more systems-theoretic approach may
not only help better understand how these new institutions rise and evolve, but
also could provide different perspectives on how to address the identified chal-
lenges and design more ad hoc policies to reduce these; and d) that the difference
in maturity and performance between Mexico and Spain’s MBTS is partially due
to the fact that, when addressing the above mentioned challenges, actors within
Spain’s MBTS and NSI follow a more systems-theoretic approach to develop
policies and plans (as opposed to a more conventional approach mostly based
on mainstream economic growth theory followed in Mexico to do so).
The chapter is divided as follows; the first section consists of detailed infor-
mation about the structure, behavior, and performance of Mexico and Spain’s
NSI supporting such description with data and the views of various key actors
within these systems collected during fieldwork in both countries. Here each
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NSI is dissected as carefully as possible in order to pin down the elements within
these also composing their local MBTS. This description identifies what specific
institutional arrangements (institutions, policies, and regulations) within both
MBTS and NSI have developed to cope with the previously mentioned chal-
lenges when these seem to be directly affecting the advancement of modern
biotech as a sector locally. This exercise also aims at detecting what factors and
environments at the national and regional levels facilitated their rise and estab-
lishment. In the second section these results are contrasted in a further attempt
to recognize elements that may offer more light on why Spain’s MBTS appear
as evolving faster and displaying more efficiency traits in promoting modern
biotech than Mexico’s. A final part presents a comparative list of components
and parameters that helped sketching a systems dynamics representation of
each country’s MBTS (specifying their main components, behavior, and inter-
actions within these) presented in the following chapter. This modeling exper-
iment will allow contrasting at a more tangible level what instruments and/or
institutions, links between these, and other factors seem to have allowed Spain’s
MBTS a more effective development than that of its Mexican counterpart as well
as shed additional information on how realistic can the possibility of fostering
the formation of analogous versions of such institutions in the latter country be.
2.2 Two Systems of Innovation: The Cases of Mexico and
Spain.
National and regional systems of innovation are generally compiled by both
elements and initiatives stemming from both the private and the public sec-
tors. Identifying these central elements —and those within these composing
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both systems’ MBTS— is the most logical starting point for this analysis. To
do so, I mainly rely on collected data describing how these two NSI operate as
well as the results of the analysis of a series of interviews with key actors cur-
rently working within both systems at the MBTS level, which I gathered over
the time span of three years (2008-2010). This section opens with a brief account
of how I collected and organized the information, and then turns to the thor-
ough description of the institutional and regulatory frameworks for each NSI
and MBTS.
Actors
The selection of participants whose views supplement this analysis was a com-
plex one. While trying to balance the representativeness of each tentative par-
ticipant, I also tried estimating their relative influence and weight within each
of their areas of expertise, making sure their views and opinions would add
value to this study. Additionally, I classified my selection of actors within four
general sectors (government, private sector, research, and NGOs) where these
most commonly operate and which are clearly identifiable in both countries
(see table 2.1). Although I have previously met some of these actors in per-
son —particularly those from Mexico— I had to work my way into scheduling
interviews with many whom I have never met nor have had any form of con-
tact with before. In various occasions their names were referred to me by other
actors during interview sessions; most I identified while engaged in literature
review, and others were accompanying interviewed actors during our session
and later decided to participate in the research as well. In the end, I identified a
total of 25 individuals from both countries —15 Mexican and 10 Spanish— that
filled the key actor requirements (representativeness, top institutional rank, ver-
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Table 2.1: Number of Actors by Country and Sector
Country Sector
Government a Private b Research c NGO d Total
Spain 2 2 3 2 9
Mexico 3 3 4 2 12
Totale 5 5 7 4 21
a Includes federal, state, and regional.
b Includes financial sector.
c Includes both public and private.
d Includes environmental and other.
e Some actors are allocated into more than one category.
ifiable contribution to her area of expertise, etc.), from which only 16 (6 and 10,
respectively) finally agreed to participate in the sixty-minute interview session.
While the sample can be considered relatively small and the outcome gave
a low 64% response, the fact that five out of the 16 participants requested be-
ing considered in more than one category (government-research, private sector-
research, research-NGO, or NGO-research) and agreed to answer the same
questions from either perspective boosted the total to 21 independent inter-
views, a figure closer to my initial target of 25. In addition, each participant’s
corroborated top rank position and solid reputation within their organization
or institution, as well as tangible contribution to their field and area of expertise
through papers, opinion, or political or entrepreneurial activities in their respec-
tive countries added validity to the final concise but acceptable outcome. To
maintain the actors’ anonymity each was assigned a particular code composed
by either the capital letter “S” or “M,” depending on their country, and a ran-
domly generated number between 1 and 9 (for Spain) or between 1 and 12 (for
Mexico). Furthermore, to provide more context between the views expressed
and these actors, these resulting codes are also arranged within the four sectors
Government, Private, Research, and NGO (see table 2.2). Each of the codes is
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Table 2.2: Actors by Country, Sector and Code
Country Sector
Government Private Research NGO
Spain S5, S7 S1, S9 S3, S4, S8 S2, S6
Mexico M2, M5, M11 M1, M7, M9 M3, M4, M10, M12 M6, M8
also composed by the initial letter of the sector in which the actor offered to
provide viewpoints (G, P, R, or N). Lastly, two different codes were assigned
to those actors who agreed to provide views from the perspective of more than
one category.
Frameworks
As mentioned earlier, the initial section sought to describe the key elements
within the institutional and regulatory frameworks of each MBTS within both
nations’ SI. To do so, I developed a table containing the features estimated as
most generally composing both frameworks, which could easily be identified
in both nations. The table is mainly divided into two framework categories: a)
institutional, and b) regulatory, each having particular key elements, such as ac-
tors, actor-networks, funding structures, as well as research and human capital
formation for the former, and regulation, policies and planning, and interna-
tional links for the latter. This also allowed complementing the information
more systematically with the views of the interviewed actors while also provid-
ing identifiable and easier to contrast traits for each system (see table 2.3).
2.2.1 Institutional Frameworks
Reviewing in more detail the institutional components of both NSI and MBTS in
each country provides information on their nature and that of their networks,
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Table 2.3: Frameworks and Key System Components
Institutional Regulatory
Actors, Networks, and Infrastructure Regulation, Policies and Planning
Funding Sources International Links
Research and Human Capital
how these came to be the way they currently are, how their elements operate
within them when defining and applying policies, and how they seem to be
evolving.
In this initial delineation of the institutional components of both sets of sys-
tems I start by describing the actors and networks compiling these and working
to define each. I focus more on the institutional actors —as opposed to indi-
viduals or persons— and their role within an ever-changing system of systems
as these come into play and evolve in a quest to retain their validity. I then
describe the framework’s central elements committed to creating information
and its sources through research and human capital formation activities, as well
as aiming to form a solid infrastructure for these investigative and formative
activities to take place. Lastly, I point out what international links and decision-
making processes have also helped shape these structures in both nations.
2.2.2 Mexico
Actors, Networks, and Infrastructure
In Mexico there are two central institutional actors heading the intricate regu-
lation and promotion instruments within the local NIS and MBTS: the National
Council for Science and Technology, CONACyT and the Inter-secretarial Com-
mission on Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms, CIBIOGEM . In par-
ticular, CONACyT promotes the advancement of biotech as part of the general
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sciences, developing exclusive policies and programs aiming at this goal and
at creating human capital and inducing linkage with other productive sectors.
On the other hand, CIBIOGEM coordinates those policies oriented to the safe
development and use of GMOs and orchestrates their application by its multi-
ple executive federal secretariats members. The commission —composed by the
heads of the Health, Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and
Food, SAGARPA; Environment and Natural Resources, SEMARNAT; Finance
and Public Credit, SHCP; Economy, SE; and Public Education, SEP, secretari-
ats as well as the General Director of the CONACyT— also engages in promo-
tional activities mostly through various specialized committees; these multidis-
ciplinary forums aim at facilitating the interaction between actors and experts
representing different areas of knowledge easing their engagement in activities
that range from defining terms of reference and rules for research collabora-
tion to issuing recommendations for particular cases. It also harmonizes federal
policies with state and local policies and collaborates with their authorities in
their implementation. Furthermore, it manages information on all GMOs and
LGMOs as well as authorizations and permits issued for these and their use. It
also participates in technical assessment and decision-making processes regard-
ing these organisms —including the establishment of GMO-free zones and ex-
perimental areas— through various sub-committees. For many actors the com-
mission is the most salient element composing the current system as enclosed
within the opinion of actor M3-R:
Even before having juridical character, CIBIOGEM helped promote
the enacting of the current biosafety and modern biotech regulation.
Serving also as model for other developing nations pursuing the ad-
vancement of these technologies it eagerly participated on the draft-
ing of the law’s by-laws (Reglamento), its internal operation rules, and
will certainly continue to play a key role in the drafting of all future
norms and standards operating over this highly complex area.
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Depending on their use, the secretariats of agriculture, environment, and
health play more executive roles when dealing with the biosafety of GMOs and
the safety of products made with or containing these. On genomics, the roles
vary depending on the type of information dealt with; the health secretariat
has a lead role when studies on the human genome are conducted, commonly
assisted by a series of bioethics committees. Research and the management of
animal or plant genomics fall in the hands of agriculture and environment sec-
retariats, assisted by CIBIOGEM and its various subcommittees. More special-
ized institutions within this structure are localized in several of the previously
mentioned three central sectors. Within agriculture, the core institutional ac-
tors composing the system are the National Service of Agro-alimentary Health,
Safety, and Quality, SENASICA; the Mexican Fishery Institute, IMP; nomencla-
tureIMPMexican Fishery Institute the National Fishery, Agriculture, and Live-
stock Research Institute, INIFAP; as well as the Post-Graduates College and
the Autonomous University of Chapingo. Although having a quite robust role
within the local modern biotech institutional framework —ranging from basic
research activities and high-end human capital formation to the safety assess-
ment of derived products— actor M11-G consideres that the sector still requires
more coordination between the existing institutions and better fine-tuning of its
general strategies.
Addressing modern biotech from the perspective of environmental protec-
tion are the National Ecology Institute, INE; the Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, PROFEPA; and the National Commission for the Knowledge and
Use of Biodiversity, CONABIO. Although being highly specialized and highly
technical, actors M5-G and M12-R consider it as one of the weakest links of this
institutional framework. In their view, this is due to the common misinterpreta-
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tion that risk and uncertainty reducing and management procedures followed
for some of the outputs of modern biotech —especially those that could have
consequences affecting public goods of the caliber of the numerous local ecosys-
tems and native varieties of plant and animals— appear as curtailing the flow
of science and business activities. For actor M5-G:
One of the system’s biggest flaws has to do with the disconnection
between modern biotechnology and biosafety; I am convinced that
—in Mexico— there is no political will to advance biosafety. This
creates a disconnection between these two intimate associated ar-
eas. For me, biosafety means engaging in modern biotechnology
activities in a safe and responsible way —it is the reduction of risk
to inconsequential levels—. For other actors, this means curtailing
the advancement of science and, thus, the possibility of engaging in
business development. Difficulties will continue surfacing as long
as this perception prevails, creating a slippery slope for the overall
advancement of this technology locally.
The most robust segment of this institutional configuration appears being
that pertaining to health and human services. Within this sector, the Federal
Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk, COFEPRIS, and other de-
partments within the health secretariat dealing with consumer products pro-
duction standards, advertisement, and distribution, as well as those focusing
on research relative to human health play pivotal roles in ensuring the safety,
use and manufacturing of modern biotech derived products, especially phar-
maceuticals. Some of the most recent additions to this intricate institutional
network aiming at linking science and other productive sectors associated to
modern biotech also fall within the human health part of the system’s institu-
tional frame; On the one hand, and mainly targeting human health services and
products these newly formed institutions are in charge of the promoting and
regulating human genomics in Mexico. On the other hand, these coordinate
and engage in basic research in these areas through the Genomic Medicine In-
stitute, INMEGEN —one of the most recent members of the Highly Specialized
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Hospitals System known as the National Health Institutes, INS—. In charge of
coordinating the entire INS’ network efforts and policies, while —at the same
time— having the general role of producing and implementing public policy
strategies in health, including areas related to modern biotech and genomics, is
a commission composed by expert members from within the health network.
The network’s central objectives are advancing project linkage at the various
levels of federalism (national, regional, state, etc.) and developing more effi-
cient managerial and project funding schemes. Of recent formation and key
institutional player is the National Bioethics Commission, CNBio whose gen-
eral objectives aim at advancing a more bioethics-aware culture in Mexico. Its
more specific role aims at defining national policies, establishing those related
to bioethics in public health, and acting as the national advisory body to the
government on this area. As part of these efforts, the commission promotes the
establishment of bioethics commissions in every state, issues recommendations
in topics like cloning and property over genetic material, and promotes public
participation through various forums. In 2004 the commission incorporated the
functions of the National Human Genome Commission whose objectives over-
lapped with those of the CNBio.
Having the capacity to ratify international treaties and delineate the regula-
tory framework affecting modern biotech and any of its derivative products and
services and lines of research, the senate and the chamber of deputies are two of
the most active players in this system. Through its multiple congressional com-
missions operating in both chambers, the legislative branch is in charge of re-
viewing and putting forward regulatory and promotional instruments that can
affect the development of modern biotech in much higher degree and in a much
faster way than any other institutional actor within this framework. Mainly, the
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members of the science and technology, environment, agriculture, health, rural
development, and trade and industry commissions of both chambers have in
their hands the capacity to alter the path and pace at which this new technology
develops locally. These processes, however, are often prone to distortion; per-
meated by a variety of political and economic views and interests, discussions
within these committees often end up too politicized. Actor M9-P pointed out
this fact by saying:
It gives me the impression that some groups, from within a specific
political stance, believe that the pace at which modern biotech is
moving is way too fast. Maybe because they sense that some of the
new paths it could follow could hinder their political career or affect
their personal interests or those of their constituencies. When the
local private industry engaged in basic research in Mexico offered
a feasible project for the promotion of agricultural modern biotech,
[the project] was shot down immediately based on the argument that
“national sovereignty was being affected.” It seems as if some poli-
cymakers do not want to pass —or even ponder— any proposal com-
ing from the [local or international] private sector; it appears as if
they would rather have proposals exclusively developed by or com-
ing from the local public sector. In my view, this is quite the opposite
of promotion, inducing negative effects —ranging from low incen-
tives for private investment to a drought in research coming from
the private sector— affecting areas closely associated to the private
industry and the development of the country in general.
From her observation it is easier pointing out the roots of some of the ele-
ments encouraging a disconnection between the public and private sectors as
well as grasping how simple it is for discussions on policies for new technolo-
gies to become entangled within political whirlwinds.
Other areas of the system —like those addressing economics and
education— will become more involved and play more active roles in decision-
making processes when norms and standards for specific products and services
are established and new areas of knowledge coming from modern biotech be-
come formalized and introduced into the national education curricula in the
29
near future. At the present time, the secretariat of economics does have an
important role when dealing with trade issues associated to modern biotech-
derived products —mostly when these come in the form of products and
services— and has a key role in intellectual property rights. Through the Mexi-
can Industrial Property Institute, IMPI localized within its jurisdiction, the sec-
retariat of economics is in charge of reviewing and issuing all modern biotech-
related patents nationally. The foreign affairs secretariat —which ratifies all in-
ternational treaties— and the secretariat of treasury also play less essential roles
within the system.
Funding Sources
The majority of scientific research in modern biotech conducted in public in-
stitutions in Mexico is possible due to resources coming from CONACyT. As a
central government body it makes federal funding available for basic and ap-
plied research projects at the national, state, and local levels, and serves also as a
link between projects in need of resources and other private and public institu-
tions that can provide them. The Council also manages a series of sector-specific
funds aimed at making resources available for particular projects and for indi-
vidual researchers who are members of the System of National Researchers,
SNI. On the Council’s system operation, actor M3-R pointed out that:
[Resources are made available to individual researchers] based on
parameters like: number of publications and impact of these, previ-
ous projects, etc. In 2007 around 13,7000 researchers from a wide
range of levels and sectors were currently accessing these funds
by acquiring membership to the SNI, this number, however, barely
reaches 0.7% of the economically active population of the country,
missing the council’s goal of reaching at least 15,000 by the end of
the decade.
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In his view, this particular process displays a considerable weakness partic-
ularly affecting the approval and funding of modern biotech projects:
A researcher applying for funding (in addition to requiring member-
ship in the SNI) needs to disclose the line and depth of her research
when submitting proposals for consideration. Ad hoc committees
composed by other SNI members with congruent expertise, some
which oftentimes have conflicting interests with the applicants and
the projects, then evaluate these. As a result, a number of viable
projects are turned down.
Accessing resources from some of the most recent sector-oriented funds es-
tablished by the Council appear to be less rigid offering a wide range of options
for new researchers and institutions within the National Scientific and Techno-
logical Industries and Institutions Network, RENIECyT. These funds are more
oriented towards applied research and to promoting a research culture among
new graduates with little or no expertise in proposal development and inde-
pendent research. Additional sources of public funding for basic research come
directly from state and municipal science and technology councils and federal
and local secretariats, which offer limited funding aimed at more specific areas
of local interest.
A number of public and private universities also engage in basic research ac-
tivities often taking advantage of these sector-specific funds. Yet, most of these
projects are perceived by high-ranking scientists within the SNI as “less rigor-
ous” than those being conducted by more experienced applicants. On this actor
M3-R commented:
These activities allow future researchers to acquire experience and
methodological structure that may allow them to comply with the
(Council’s) standards at some point in the future. [At the university
level] funding for research also comes from the education secretariat,
which makes resources available for less formal forms of research
and for projects not intended for global circulation aiming at com-
pleting more short-term academic goals, like honor thesis or class
projects.
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Regarding the government’s total investment in basic research the expert
mentioned that two presidential terms (12 years) ago the percentage allocated
for basic research was 0.70 of the GDP being down to 0.35% in 2007. He contin-
ued by stating that:
Although the science and technology law originally required that
the federal government invested at least 1% of the GDP in basic re-
search, an ambiguous addendum was recently passed in congress to
modify its text in order to make this percentage just a suggestion
—a tendency— and not a requirement. Furthermore, if we com-
pare this tentative investment percentage to that of other similar-
size economies of Latin America —like Chile— we become aware
that Mexico is lagging behind; these indeed have reached invest-
ment levels of at least 1%, not to say other developed countries —
like Germany or the United States— which have reached investment
levels between 2 to 4% of their GDPs. The biggest problem, how-
ever, is a lack of both political will and direction in these areas; while
laws pretend to further promote investment in research, there is no
way of knowing exactly what and how much the government is re-
ally willing to compromise. It has become fully discretional and [the
amounts of funding] change each time the government representa-
tives change.
From his perspective, four specific and objective policies in Mexico are
needed in order to achieve those levels of public investment: science, biotech-
nology, biosafety, and intellectual property, making sure these are clearly con-
nected to each other and to a general science policy beyond the one already
existing. In his words:
This central science policy has to be written in non-equivocal lan-
guage, clearly defining the yearly levels of public investment to be
allotted for basic research as well as stating how much these funds
will increase over time. Not until a policy stating this is drafted —
one going beyond governmental terms — will Mexico see a constant
flow of resources or a well-structured national research system. This,
however, does not mean there are no qualified scientists conduct-
ing high-level research in this country; their research and results are
mostly exceptions to the rule.
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Actor M11-G also stated that the vast majority of research in Mexico is
funded by the public sector through its multiple education and research institu-
tions, being CONACyT the largest and most structured source:
Basic research mostly takes place within the public universities and
institutes, and it is possible due to federal funding (from CONA-
CyT) and —in a lesser way— to their own resources. In general,
research is rarely conducted within private universities; the private
sector at this level is not really involved in research in Mexico. It
becomes evident that research mostly takes place in the campuses
of national and state universities (the National Autonomous Univer-
sity, UNAM; the National Polytechnic Institute, IPN, etc.); research is
also conducted —at a less significant capacity— within the research
institutes and organisms of or dependant of the federal secretariats.
Most research on processes and applications in agricultural biotech
and genomics takes place at the National Institute for Research in
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery, INIFAP, within the agriculture
secretariat. Other institutions like the Post-graduate College, the
Autonomous University of Chapingo, and the Veterinary Medicine
Faculty within the UNAM, target modern biotech and genomics re-
search in veterinary medicine, microbiology and other related areas.
With respect to the percentage of public investment in research he almost
echoed the statement provided by M3-R saying that:
It is appalling to realize that investment in basic research does not
account for more than 0.4% of the GDP when the current regulation
states it should be at least 1%. We have witnessed the positive effects
of increasing public investment in research and science and technol-
ogy, S&T in countries of similar economic size —like Brazil, India,
and Korea— where benefits are becoming more noticeable through-
out their economies.
On resource allocation for basic research in public institutions and universi-
ties actor M1-P appeared being less enthusiastic stating that:
The research conducted in these institutions more often than not ap-
pears to be disconnected from the markets needs and wants; these
[institutions] plan, design, and perform their research agendas based
on their individual priorities, without actually exploring market op-
portunities, or by choosing convenient research topics to which ac-
cess to public funding is easily obtained. This neither coincides with
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nor it works in function of creating new markets and the benefits that
stem form these.
The private sector’s contribution to basic research appears to be quite limited
unless when conducted within the facilities of large multinational or local indus-
tries. With few exceptions, public research centers or universities are elicited for
projects or receive resources from the private sector for open-ended research.
On the private sector’s contribution to basic research M10-R stated that:
Although private investors are beginning to show more interest in
basic research projects, their contribution so far has been marginal,
often exclusively targeting projects that are closer to completion,
time at which resources are less vital. Private investment is tradi-
tionally made available for research projects in areas like medical
and chemical biotech —like drug and therapy development and bev-
erage proofing, respectively—. It is obvious that the higher levels of
investment in these areas will not come exclusively from the public
sector; there will be a need to work in tandem with the private sec-
tor in order to create schemes that strengthen, favor and increase the
flow of private investment in these areas. These should aim at in-
ducing the allocation of resources into less developed research areas
and, ultimately, at helping create a considerable-size resource pool’
that continues attracting further private investment.
An argument on why private investment has been so limited, provided by
actor M7-P, is that the private sector needs to become more aware of technolog-
ical applications —or research— that could aid in the betterment of their prod-
ucts and production processes. This awareness could then be used to induce
more investment in specific areas helping create new markets for products and
services.
The private industry currently engaged in the sector seems to be completely
aware of what can be done and what not with modern biotech in Mexico. Actor
M9-P added on this:
Regarding modern biotech, the private sector has said quite clearly
what it wants to do and what it cannot do in Mexico. One of the
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main reasons for this lack of both human capital and financial in-
vestment is due to a completely unarticulated regulatory framework
for modern biotech, making investors rather engage in these activi-
ties abroad.
Although some companies have established state-of-the-art research center
in southeast Mexico in his view such centers cannot engage directly in modern
biotech activities due to flaws in the regulatory system:
Researchers using modern biotech developed a pest-resistant pa-
paya in these facilities. They had the genetically modified plant
within a greenhouse ready for its open-field tests and could not
move forward in our research without doing so. However, due to the
absence of adequate regulation, the product was never tested on the
field and the project had to be terminated. According to the existing
regulation at the time they could only engage in biological pest con-
trol research but not with the use of modern biotech, because there
was no such thing as a field-testing permit for LGMOs.
This particular case was based on the argument that allowing the open-field
testing of the genetically modified type of papaya could be too risky for the local
papaya species, more so since Mexico is the center of origin for a particular
type of papaya prevalent in that region. Today the Biosafety Law’s by-laws
or Reglamento establishes in its Article 16 the requirements and procedures to
obtain open field-test permits which, in the view of actor M9-P, are still quite
rough and draconian.
Another argument proposed to assure public investment and continuous re-
search in modern biotech with applications in agriculture in Mexico is a further
revision of the intellectual property rights dealing with the access to genetic re-
sources. On this M9-P commented:
I believe that the current Biosafety Law should address IPRs more
explicitly. So far it does in such a cursory way that it cannot guar-
antee that the rights of those researchers and investors involved in
particular projects will fully be respected.
35
In quite a similar perspective, actor M6-N suggested that the absence of a
concrete regulatory frame and a well coordinated policy on modern biotech has
kept the private investors at the margins of these technologies, often confronting
them with users and consumers:
What the industry requires is a strong position by the government
in support of modern biotech. The moment when such a position
is adopted —going beyond all political pressure from the various
NGOs and left-wing politicians— the industry and private invest-
ment in biotech will thrive. This will allow investors to look at agri-
culture as an investment opportunity, guaranteeing that financial in-
stitutions —such as the government-run trusts for agriculture, FIRA,
the shared-risk trust, FIRCO, the rural capitalization and investment
fund, FOCIT, or the national support fund for Solidaridad enterprises,
FONAES— will now be able to promote the use of genetically engi-
neered seeds and processes. Without this assurance private invest-
ment and all industrial and production linkage will not be achieved
in this country.
Other sources of funding available for basic and applied research in Mex-
ico come from joint ventures between the public and private sectors as well as
from international sources. The most relevant international initiative derives
from the International Research and Development Cooperation Fund, FON-
CICyT, which in the fall of 2008 allocated 20 million euros for basic research
—including projects in modern biotech— in Mexico. The funding, managed
through CONACyT, apportions resources provided by the EU (mostly coming
from Spain, the United Kingdom and France) and Mexico on a 50-50 basis.
Some research centers located in Mexico engage in activities partially or en-
tirely funded by international institutions. Such is the case of research con-
ducted within the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, CIM-
MYT, or those projects funded through the Inter-American Institute for Cooper-
ation in Agriculture, IICA, or operating within the framework.
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On the multiple schemes that bring the private and the public sectors to-
gether actor M9-P commented that the industry as investor works exclusively
within the market framework mostly taking care of its own needs. These re-
search schemes are usually based on the industry’s particular necessities, aim-
ing at linking basic research with development and production, also suggesting
that most private basic research is conducted “in house.” He described a partic-
ular case between the private industry and researchers from the UNAM:
There are large size companies, like Nestle, making funding avail-
able for public institutions engaged in basic research in Mexico.
However, these companies engage in such activities with local insti-
tutions in a more ‘altruistic’ fashion than just for the need of results
or to conduct vital long-term research; in some cases these engage
in short-term projects —some of which last no longer than four to
six months— with universities and research centers because the lo-
cal branch requires secondary information in, say, lactose pathogens.
The results coming from these local ventures are of moderate value
since the research with real industrial value is being conducted in
places like Switzerland or Germany.
Those institutions and researchers that require of them know little (or noth-
ing at all) of these resource-providing institutions and entities. Figures serving
as connectors between these actors come then into picture. On the specific in-
stitutions linking the public and private sector in Mexico M9-P suggested that,
more than associations functioning as bridges between basic research and the
industry, there are individuals looking for attractive projects. Most of these in-
dividuals have access to funds from public, private, and international sources
ready to be invested. For him one of the problems these individuals face is the
fact that there are not many attractive [basic research] projects. In his words
sometimes it happens to be the case that resources are available but there are
not interesting enough projects:
Many are the projects focused on areas that appeal little to the pri-
vate investor —such as forestry— as opposed to those focusing on
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areas with industrial application. There are not as many research
projects as desired by the [private] sector, basically because in Mex-
ico a business mentality is not encouraged.
The few examples of public-private joint venture funds offered by him were
a number of funds managed by CONACYT and a couple of private or semi-
private associations working in agricultural biotech.
Since the establishment of the Mexican Council for Sustainable Rural De-
velopment, CMDRS, the secretariat of agriculture began opening more towards
public and private basic research institutions and producers associations includ-
ing those in areas related to modern biotech. Actor M11-G expanded on this:
[Within the CMDRS] there is a specific office linking the secre-
tariat with technology producing institutions, which uses govern-
ment funds, resources from the public-private PRODUCE1 trusts,
and those from the National Research and Technology Transfer Sys-
tem for the Sustainable Rural Development, SNITT.2 Additionally,
various areas within the agriculture secretariat have sector-specific
funds managed by CONACYT, that operate using federal resources
from CONACYT itself and the PRODUCE foundations, allowing
[the secretariat] to better attend priorities and to direct resources
more tactically.
Venture capital as a source of funding for modern biotech (or any other area
of research) is quite limited in Mexico. Generally, there are two clear types of
1In 1996 when Mexico’s Programa de Alianza para el Campo came into force, the Produce foun-
dations were created in each state. These organizations are in charge of following all actions
deriving for this research, evaluation and technology transfer program currently known as: Pro-
grama de Soporte, en el marco del Componente de Investigacio´n, Validacio´n y Transferencia Tecnolo´gica.
Each of these foundations funds research, evaluation and technology transfer projects in each
state, with resources from the federal, state, and private producers from each state. The 32 Fun-
daciones Produce are grouped within a national coordination office, COFUPRO, which integrates
offices from the five regions of the country with similar interests in agriculture, fishery, forestry,
aquaculture and livestock. Its actions are to develop a permanent strategy on technological in-
novation in order to promote and keep the competitiveness of the local production chains at the
regional levels (COFUPRO, 2011).
2The National Research and Technology Transfer System for the Sustainable Rural Develop-
ment, SNITT is an auxiliary body to the Inter-secretarial Commission for Sustainable Rural De-
velopment. The system’s main role is to delineate a strategy allowing a permanent generation of
innovation, technological transfer, and innovation to achieve and maintain the competitiveness
of the rural sector (SNITT, 2011).
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private investors engaged in basic research investment activities in biotech: in-
dividual venture capitalists —like those previously described as having a mar-
ket idea but no investment expertise in these areas— and large corporations
—like Monsanto and Dupont— with full expertise and a complete portfolio of
pre-developed biotech products. In the view of actor M2-G there is a clear dif-
ference between these two types of investors:
The local venture capitalist has a short-term view targeting a particu-
lar product with the objective of accessing a high investment return
rate —which impacts local basic research briefly— while the latter
has a more structured and rooted view of the particular products it
wants to market and has conducted most of its research abroad.
These views not only confirm that the vast majority of basic research projects
in modern biotech take place within public institutions mostly funded by re-
sources also coming from the public sector, but also that applied research and
venture projects are generally conducted within large corporations that can ab-
sorb any loss. With few exceptions, basic research projects conducted within
public institutions and research centers receive support from private investors.
Furthermore, institutions linking basic research activities with potential private
venture capitals are clearly absent within both the overall NSI and the local
MBTS, heavily curtailing the prospect of creating new markets from innovation.
Research and Human Capital Formation
With respect to research and human capital formation CONACyT also plays a
pivotal role in this framework. By law, it establishes and coordinates a series
of funds (joint and sector-specific, international cooperation, and institutional)
designed to support R&D and innovation activities, projects, as well as human
capital formation and the consolidation of research groups and centers. A con-
siderable percentage of the high-end research and specialized human capital
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formation associated to modern biotech takes place within the network of re-
search institutions ascribed to the council’s Public Research Center System. The
system is composed by 27 R&D+i institutions located throughout the country
and organized in three areas depending on their scope: 10 in the natural and
exact sciences; 8 in the social sciences and humanities; 8 more specializing in
technological development and innovation; and one in post-graduate funding.
In particular 7 of these centers address topics related to modern biotech: the
Food and Development Research Center, CIAD; the Northwestern Biological
Research Center, CIBNOR; Scientific Research and Higher Education Center of
Ensenada, CICESE; Scientific Research Center of Yucatan, CICY; the Ecology In-
stitute, INECOL; the Potosinian Scientific Research Institute, IPICYT; and the
Technology and Design Support Research Center of the Sate of Jalisco, CIATEJ.
CONACyT also coordinates the SNI —network composed of 14,000 renowned
local researchers— whose objective is promoting a culture of excellence in
scientific research in Mexico. Issuing membership to Mexican researchers of
renowned trajectory, the SNI offers additional incentives to those scientists en-
gaged in academic work and research as well as assists —through a series of ad
hoc committees formed by its members— evaluating the efficiency and quality
of the research in Mexico.
The net of public universities, research centers and professional and aca-
demic associations also have a fundamental position in this institutional frame-
work. Most members of CONACyT’s RENIECyT —research centers like the
National Autonomous University’s Biotech Institute, iBt-UNAM, the National
Polytechnic Institute’s Advanced Research and Studies Center, CINVESTAV-
IPN, and its Genomic Biotech Center, CBG— also engage in producing the most
modern biotech-related research and human capital locally.
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Associations of academics of the caliber of the Mexican Academy of Sciences,
AMC, also participate in setting research and human capital formation policy
and standards at the national level. Particularly, the AMC —a non-profit asso-
ciation of regional and state researchers and scholars— plays two key roles in
this institutional network; first, it aims at converging the views of an intricate
network of scientists and professionals on modern biotech-related issues; and,
second, through a multidisciplinary biotech committee composed by various of
its experts, it serves as political and regulatory advisor for the federal govern-
ment when it needs to define policies and standards. Through these instruments
the AMC helped outline the current central regulations on the management of
GMOs and have produced a series of important documents offering recommen-
dations on how to consolidate modern biotech in Mexico.
Most higher education institutions, both public and private, engaged in hu-
man capital and labor hand formation in modern biotech are found within
the National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions,
ANUIES. The association is composed by 154 institutions throughout the 32
states and follows a series of strategic actions that range from teacher’s training
programs, industry and higher-education linkages, professional development
support programs, long-distance learning, and evaluation certification, and ac-
creditation of higher-education institutions. While part of the professional hu-
man capital formation and member of ANUIES, most private universities and
research centers engaged in modern biotech human capital formation play less
central roles within this network. To some extent, not having a solid system
to produce research and human capital formation in modern biotech coming
from private universities is yet another deficiency of the system. The local pri-
vate higher education sector —highly oriented towards the business-side of ed-
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ucation and research— has traditionally remained at the margin of basic and
applied research in general as witnessed by actor M10-R:
Basic research is mostly being conducted within the public univer-
sities and institutes. In general terms, research [in modern biotech]
is almost never conducted within private universities. The private
sector —at the higher-education level— is not really involved in re-
search activities in Mexico, let alone in modern biotech.
Some private universities, however, are developing a legitimate interest in
areas related to modern biotech, like genomics, and bio-informatics, and agri-
cultural biotech due in part to what some actors consider as “appropriate mar-
ket conditions” for individuals with these type of skills. There are a grow-
ing number of private universities of the caliber of the Technological Institute
of Monterrey, ITESM —one of the most respected and academically rigorous
higher education institutes in Mexico— now offering various degrees related
to these New Life Sciences, NLS areas in many of its campuses. These few
cases, along with increasing yearly enrollment rates in these areas, display more
awareness of modern biotech’s relevance locally. For some actors like M8-N and
M9-P, there is a need to begin thinking about creating the jobs these graduates
will be ready for in the near future. Actor M8-N suggests:
At this point in time the higher education system in Mexico is devel-
oping a network of researchers and professionals at various levels
(bachelors, masters, doctorate), creating a critical mass of knowledge
[and human capital] that might help develop the next generation of
biotech-derived products and services. Yet, opportunities for them
are not being created at the same pace.
Adding to this effect is also the fact that the majority of large research centers
and universities —either public or private— offering specialization in modern
biotech-related areas are mostly in or near larger urban areas as accounted by
actor M11-G:
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It also becomes evident that research is highly concentrated in the
large urban areas where the main campuses of the national uni-
versities are located (the UNAM, IPN, and most state universities).
Though some of their research centers and a number of research in-
stitutes and organisms attached to federal secretariats are situated
in more rural regions, the majority of scientific activities conducted
within these is much less significant in size and relevance than those
being produced in centers near or within larger urban areas.
Although most of these research and human capital formation institutions
are indeed localized in high-density urban areas, the levels of coordination be-
tween them is extremely low or simply not existing. Furthermore, this effect
may be promoting the atomization of research populations in such areas and,
consequently, forcing individuals in rural regions seeking to engage in these ac-
tivities to migrate into larger urban centers. Moreover, there are no immediate
signs of initiatives emanating from the public sector promoting the formation
of clusters or inducing regional coordination between the major modern biotech
research centers at the levels observed in Spain nor the establishment of regional
networks linking such rural research centers with more urban-located ones.
The absence of a general policy aiming at establishing connection and coor-
dination between research institutions is for some actors considered as an ad-
ditional defect of the local R&D system affecting the development of modern
biotech. Such lack is considered by some as having greatly eroded the possibil-
ity of defining and establishing more solid conduits to connect the public and
private sectors, especially in this multidisciplinary area of the natural sciences.
As actor M6-N states, this is a central system’s flaw that has kept the private sec-
tor from taking a more active role in the promotion of modern biotech locally:
Channels aiming at linking public basic research with private de-
velopment are the least developed within the system; there are no
institutional channels in place to do so. The local and international
private industries doing modern biotech in the country develop their
own plans of action from scratch according to their particular ne-
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cessities and without consulting anyone locally. These conduct all
research “in house” and oftentimes abroad and —with very few
exceptions— never solicit or look forward to connecting with re-
search being performed within local research centers.
While the federal government does not actively promote plans that advance
clustering into scientific parks or regions, one such a scheme at a national level
comes from the private sector in the form of the Mexican Biotechnology and
Bioengineering Society, SMBB. Although not exclusively focusing on modern
biotech, the non-public institution definitely has a preponderant role in the ad-
vancement of this technology and a solid status in the general institutional sys-
tem. The organization —grouping professionals and students of sciences related
to modern biotech in Mexico— has among its various functions promoting sci-
entific and productive sector linkage, technology transfer between and within
public and private sectors, human capital formation, and helping in the design
of regulations affecting areas of knowledge associated to modern biotech.
At the state level, however, there seems to be a more vivid initiative towards
cluster formation and sector linkage. In the mid-western state of Jalisco the Bio-
cluster de Occidente is one of the first of its kind in Mexico, association composed
by basic and applied research institutions as well as by the local industrial sec-
tors in areas of pharmaceuticals, veterinary medicine, and agricultural products.
So far, its technology transfer efforts aimed at business starts-ups have created
a few local small businesses. Another example can be found in the northern
state of Nuevo Leo´n where the 25-member “Northeast Bio-Cluster” has man-
aged to include key academic institutions like the Universities of Nuevo Leo´n,
Monterrey and Montemorelos, and the private ITESM. Public sector participa-
tion is represented by CONACyT, the Secretariat of Education and Monterrey’s
International City of Knowledge, and other local industry representatives. The
focus of this Northeastern bio-cluster is to further develop R&D and foster part-
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nerships between government and industry at the regional level. Yet another
initiative along the same lines is the Mexican Life Sciences Alliance, formed by
the two previously-mentioned clusters as well as CINVESTAV-Irapuato, and
the UNAM’s iBt. The central objective of this initiative is bringing together the
four frontmost regions in the country as represented by four states —Nuevo
Leo´n, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Morelos— where initiatives aiming at develop-
ing cutting-edge innovation in areas of the life science-related have emerged.
By joining forces across a national network, the alliance also aims at providing a
large array of technologies and services to the global biotechnology market. The
alliance has also managed to develop a strategic partnership with the Univer-
sity of California, San Diego, benefiting from its expertise in tech transfer and
coordinated research initiatives. This initiative has yet to display results and by
no means is comparable to the efforts witnessed in Spain.
Playing a central role within the existing system and also a key representa-
tive from the private sector is the civil organization AgroBio Mexico. Although
targeting exclusively agricultural biotechnology, this association of large multi-
nationals collaborates in policy making representing the industry, promoting
sector linkage, and aiming at creating a positive environment for the advance-
ment of agriculture modern biotech in Mexico. As part of its basic research
promotion activities it recently established a prestigious and nationally recog-
nized yearly award for basic research in agricultural biotechnology in Mexico.
However, the organization has often been portrayed as lobbyist for its multina-
tional associates before both the executive and legislative branches influencing
on decisions dealing with the regulation of agricultural modern biotech. This
perception has added hurdles to the establishment of links between public re-
search and large private industry projects as corroborated by the view of actor
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M9-P:
When the discussions over the biosafety bill took place before
congress, some of the top researchers [within public biotech insti-
tutes] in Mexico —scientists deemed as central figures in basic re-
search in modern biotech and a prominent advocates of agricultural
biotechnology— were always sure of stating during these meetings
that, although in favor of the technology and convinced of its safety,
their researches were not funded in any way by the private indus-
try, as implying that the views and results they expressed were not
distorted in anyway by the interests of the private sector. This feel-
ing still permeates the scientific community doing research in mod-
ern biotech in Mexico, as if being associates with projects funded by
the private sector —especially large multinationals— could some-
how hinder your scientific reputation.
Still, companies like Monsanto, Syngenta, Dupont, Bayer, Dow, Novartis,
and the local Savia —most members of AgroBio Mexico— are often the only
promoters of large and expensive cutting-edge basic research projects in agri-
cultural biotech in Mexico and originators of several collaboration agreements
with local public research centers.
Views regarding what additional institutional actors or representatives of
these should be part of this system are contrasting. All interviewed actors
operating within more technical institutions considered limiting participation
for non-experts and associations of these when defining the terms of reference
and guidelines for highly technical areas —like biosafety or risk assessment.
Conversely, others representing the industry suggested that user and consumer
associations (less technical actors) should play more central roles in defining
policies and guidelines aimed at reducing possible negative externalities from
modern biotech products. Lastly, actors closer to the agriculture sector recom-
mended the inclusion of representatives from the diverse producer and distrib-
utor organizations in the setting of guidelines and standards for production and
distribution of modern biotech-derived agricultural products.
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2.2.3 Spain
Actors, Networks, and Infrastructure
I now turn my focus to the analysis of Spain’s NSI and MBTS institutional
frameworks. Being a member of the EU and due to its organization in re-
gions and Autonomous Communities, the institutional framework of its NSI
and MBTS is quite complex.3 However, Spain’s intricate institutional frame-
work for the advancement of modern biotech from the public perspective is
somehow similar to that of Mexico, in that it is mainly headed by both the cen-
tral R&D institutional body —the newly created Ministry of Science and Innova-
tion as chief of science policy— and an inter-ministerial commission regulating
most activities with GMOs. Also composed by organisms whose jurisdiction
range from continental to regional and district, this intricate system has in re-
cent years been the subject of intensive institutional revamping. One of the most
significant changes has been the establishment in 2008 of the Ministry of Science
and Innovation, MICINN. The new structure now concentrates all governmen-
tal R&D efforts within a single structure and took over the roles of institutions
and areas within other ministries previously engaged in the promotion of R&D
and innovation like the Science and Technology Inter-ministerial Commission
and part of the Ministry of Education and Science. Now being the single author-
ity in charge of defining S&T national policy, it also became the “single window”
for most R&D-related projects requiring funding from the central government.
Among its central roles are applying the current national S&T Law, developing
the National Research, Development and Innovation Plan, PNI&D+iand man-
aging and coordinating all public research organisms. Through its secretariats
3Although I address Spain’s NSI and MBTS at the national level, I mostly concentrate this
analysis on the two most modern biotech-prominent regions of Catalun˜a and Madrid.
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and divisions the ministry manages both national and international R&D and
innovation programs operating throughout Spain and harmonizes these with
regional and local policies.
In 2003 Spain established the Inter-ministerial Council for GMOs, CIOMG,
a collegiate organism part of the central administration whose main role —in
contrast to that of Mexico’s CIBIOGEM— is authorizing the commercialization
of GMOs or products containing these; so as all pre-commercialization deliber-
ate release trials and trade (import and export) of such organisms or products
containing them. Also within its authority is the confined use and deliberate
release of GMOs and LGMOs for the production of human and animal medical
products; as well as approving the deliberate release of these within the national
research program frame and of those activities associated to the inscription of
such organisms into the commercial varieties registry.
The council —ascribed to the Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and
Fisheries, MMA— is chaired by the MMA’s environmental quality assessment
director and composed as follows: One representative from the Ministry of Inte-
rior, MI; two from the MMA; three from the Ministry of Health and Social Policy,
MSC; one form the Ministry of Economics and Treasury, MEH; one from Indus-
try, Tourism, and Commerce, MITYC; and one from the Ministry of Science and
Innovation, MICINN.
The National Biosafety Commission, NBC also a collegiate organism local-
ized within the MMA, works closely with the CIOMG by informing the general
public about the permits issued and requested for the confined use, voluntary
liberation, and commercialization of GMOs. Also Chaired by the MMA’s envi-
ronmental quality assessment director, the commission is assembled by mem-
bers of the MICINN, MSC, MITYC, and MI. Also members of this commission
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are a group of experts directly appointed by the collegiate members, a group of
specialized experts, and representatives from the health, agriculture, environ-
mental protection, and research sectors within the Autonomous Communities.
In other areas, the MSC, and its analogous Autonomous Community au-
thorities regulate medicines for human and veterinary use derived from mod-
ern biotech processes in coordination with the European Medicines Agency,
EMA. In tandem with the European Food Safety Agency, EFSA, the MSC, along
with the MMA, supervise all industrial biotech. Intellectual and industrial
property is protected by the European Patents Office, EPO, while at the local
level biotech-related inventions —including gene sequences— is enforced by
the Spain’s Patents and Trademarks Office, OEPM. The Community Plant Vari-
ety Office, CPVO, on the other hand, supervises plant varieties.
In particular, the Spanish Medicine and Sanitary Products Agency,
AGEMED, within the MSC supervises pharmaceuticals, medicines, and other
product for human health use. Environmental related issues are addressed by
the European Environment Agency, EEA and the MMA. At the Autonomous
Community level, the Catalan Agency of Food Safety, CAFS —which polices
over topics related to GMOs and animal cloning— and Madrid’s local Sanitary
Service, SSM also engage in these activities. On this sanitary framework actor
S1-P commented:
The scheme works adequately for the safety and innocuousness as-
sessment of biotech-derived medications; however, it lacks a section
devoted to promote the advancement of biopharma in general. Over
the past years the European biopharma has not been immune to the
product drought faced globally by the sector. Aware of some of
the main issues curtailing its expansion, [the private sector] took a
more pro-active role in policymaking and planning by co-founding
with the EU an ambitious continental project labeled the Innovative
Medicine Initiative, IMI. The initiative —part of the European Tech-
nology Platforms— focuses on reviewing every stage of the discov-
ery and development processes, as well as within the clinical and
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post-market trials, in order to come up with more adequate plans
and policies to stimulate the sector’s expansion.4. More specifically,
the initiative looks closely at ways to improve safety, efficacy, re-
duce costs, and increase speed production of drugs —many of which
are developed using modern biotech. To accomplish the initiative’s
goals, experts working within its framework rely on state-of-the-art
techniques and processes like bioinformatics, advanced lab training,
biomarker development, and many more doing an unbelievable as-
sortment of actions to boost the sector being done at very large scale.
Particularly, the Fundacio´n Genoma Espan˜a —a government-run organiza-
tion whose leading trustee is the MICINN, and whose central focus is tech-
nology, innovation, and entrepreneurship transfer in areas of biotechnology to
the business sector— has played an important role in designing the guidelines
and funding allocation principles of the Strategic Action Program for modern
biotech found within the National Research, Development and Technological
Innovation Plan.5 In the opinion of actor S5-G:
4The 7th Research Framework Programme, FP7 identifies Joint Technology Initiatives, JTIs as
a means to support transnational cooperation in areas where R&D development can contribute
to continental competitiveness and quality of life. More specifically, the JTIs are proposed as
instruments to implement the strategic research agendas of a limited number of European tech-
nology platforms. The Innovative Medicine Initiative, IMI is one of the six initiatives identified
in the FP7 “Cooperation” Specific Programme with the objective of reinvigorating the Euro-
pean Biopharmaceuticals industry. The main challenges identified by the industry are: 1) In-
sufficient R&D investment; 2) Technological complexity; and 3) Research in Europe being too
fragmented and being located elsewhere. To tackle these challenges, the platform developed a
multi-annual plan which identified principal research bottlenecks affecting the biopharmaceu-
tical R&D process and sets forth recommendations to overcome these by focusing on research in
four areas: a) Difficulty in predicting safety; b) Difficulty in predicting efficacy; c) Poor knowl-
edge management; and d) Gaps in education and training. The platform was launched during
the 6th Framework Research Programme developed under the lead of pharmaceuticals indus-
try, involving all stakeholder groups (academia, represented by universities and other public
research institutions; biopharmaceutical companies and small and medium enterprises, SMEs;
healthcare providers and clinical centers; regulators and patient organizations). In 2009 the IMI
priorities stood on two pillars: 1) Efficacy —targeting areas like: cancer, infectious diseases and
inflammation chronic immune mediated diseases; and 2) Knowledge management —focusing
on standardization, free access, interoperability and exchange of data relevant for drug discov-
ery and development, including databases for drug and disease models and small molecules
and a frame for access and exchange of clinical and healthcare data (EC, 2011a; IMI, 2011)
5The MSC, MMA and MITYC as well as the regional governments of Navarre and Andalu-
sia also provide resources to the foundation. Various other local organizations collaborate with
Genoma Espan˜a to fully implement mechanisms and approaches that promote the advancement
of modern biotech. Among these are: ADER —the economic development agency for La Rioja
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Genoma Espan˜a has played a pivotal role in the design and orga-
nization of many of the consultative actions through which actor
groups —scientists, medial practitioners, industry representatives,
and members of society— exchange ideas that have helped shape
the policy principles behind R&D in modern biotech. Although the
foundation is considered a small-size institution highly dependent
on both governmental and non-governmental patrons, it is regarded
as quite influential within the design process of instruments and
strategies to assist promoting this and other related areas (genomics,
bioinformatics, biosafety, sector linkage, etc.). It is one of the few
dedicated exclusively to the advancement of this sector in Spain.
Although ascribed to the MICINN, it has a degree of autonomy that gives it
more mobility and access to areas than some exclusively public institutions as
mentioned by the same expert:
Being in contact with so many different organizations interested in
the use of biotechnology, without being exclusively affiliated with
one in particular, allows it to have a more thorough view of the sec-
tor, while also being of more assistance to the national and regional
governments.
While many agree that basic research in public centers appears as being
fairly funded, there is still much to do for innovation. In the perspective of
actor S9-P:
[With respect to modern biotech] the public sector’s will is enor-
mous; politicians may change and plans may vary, but there is al-
ways common agreement on the importance of biotech and its need
of subvention. Yet, the government cannot do it all; there seems to be
a need to engage more actively [as private sector] in actions that cre-
ate the growth-inducing environments for the business and finance
components of innovation in the sector.
region; Agencia IDEA —the agency for innovation and development of Andalucia; the Span-
ish association of bio-enterprises,ASEBIO; Barcelona Activa —the development agency for the
city council of Barcelona; BIOANCES —the Spanish association for European business and in-
novation centers; BioCat —the bioregion of Catalonia; Fundacio´n OPTI —the observatory for
industrial technology foresight; the Spanish institute for foreign trade; the national agency for
attracting foreign investment to Spain; the economic development agency for Madrid; the Ca-
nary Island agency for economic development; the Spanish society for biochemistry and molec-
ular biology; and the Vita-Aidelos project, among others (Geno´ma Espan˜a, 2009).
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In a similar tone, actor S3-R suggested that there is still a need for programs
that induce the local industry’s involvement in basic research planning:
Although government’s efforts to link these two sectors are mov-
ing in the same direction, there is still much to do to connect basic
research conducted within the organization of public institutes and
universities system with the needs and wants of the industry. One of
the main reasons for this, however, is the fact that the [local] industry
has limited knowledge and understanding of the currently existing
channels available to do so.
At the regional level, both Catalun˜a and Madrid —along with Valencia, An-
dalucia, and Pas Vasco— have engaged in developing innovative promotion
and managerial schemes for the local advancement of modern biotech known as
Bioregions. An important part of the regional modern biotech network, many
policies operating at that level emanate from within these novel institutions.
Catalun˜a’s pioneering Bioregion —BioCat— originated primarily from the ex-
isting sector’s collective initiative later endorsed by the Catalan government, as
accounted by actor S7-G:
The concept —which initiated within the region— stems from a col-
lective awareness about the importance of creating a formal biotech
sector for Catalun˜a. The EU guidelines —which promoted an envi-
ronment favoring the establishment of similar Bioregions through-
out Europe— also encouraged the idea. Yet, one of the most impor-
tant factors allowing this project to consolidate was the fact that nu-
merous key actors within the local sector, who not only understood
its potential but were also able to read what was happening through-
out the continent regarding the future of biotech, had the ability to
translate all this into the decision-makers’ language, making the ini-
tiative appealing and plausible for them.
In her opinion, most of these ideas came from within the Barcelona Research
Park, PCB, where several stakeholders —most which are still part of the sector’s
regional and national networks— were able to generate the sufficient synergy
and necessary environments for it to germinate.
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In spite of all local efforts, its establishment and initial operation were not
necessarily smooth. Although the Bioregion was formally established in 2006,
it was not until 2008 when it actually became fully functional and began mak-
ing its significance evident. The many political changes the country was go-
ing through at the time of its conception, along with an initial executive man-
agement not aware of the economic and social realities of the region, made its
first year-and-a-half of operation less than productive. Restructuring and fur-
ther planning helped make multiple programs and projects from which the re-
gional sector now benefits possible. Designing these new policies requires going
through various stages, as explained by actor S7-G:
First, stakeholders engaged in regional research to identify the needs
of the overall sector; then came up with a series of possible ways to
tackle such deficiencies; and, last, they made formal recommenda-
tions to the different levels of government acting within the region.
Being these institutions and their network of rather recent establishment,
most of their policies have yet to be translated into quantifiable results that can
later be properly assessed and verified systematically. At the time of this in-
terview there were already a series of strategic guidelines in place coming from
BioCat as well as a number of additional formal proposals about to be presented
before policymaking authorities for consideration within the local budget plans
and legislation. Expert S7-G added:
At this point, we do not know if these new recommendations will
become part of the regional or national policies, but am sure these
will help advancing the sector.
Although the BioCat concept mostly arose from the academic, research, and
private sectors —and can be considered the umbrella from which most public
and private modern biotech initiatives hang in Catalun˜a— the decision for its
establishment was entirely made by the regional government (being the region’s
53
ministries of health, presidency, economics, and universities permanent mem-
bers of its board of directors). Yet, simply by reviewing in detail its composi-
tion, the leverage it has acquired over policymaking and planning in Catalun˜a’s
modern biotech sector becomes quite evident.6
In the words of actor S5-G:
Among the central entities [within the Bioregion] are science parks,
like the Barcelona Biomedical Research Park, PRBB —which has
promoted the formation of highly skilled and competitive research
groups —and the pioneering PCB— that not only hosts several top
high-tech scientific platforms in Europe but also an operative and
highly successful industry incubator. In particular, this science park
displays the three central elements —research, infrastructure, and
incubator— deemed as necessary to connect basic research with de-
velopment and innovation in novel areas of research like modern
biotech and genomics.
These Bioregions have induced throughout Spain the creation of multiple
public-private initiatives as well as established the parameters for “friendly”
competition among these in order to attract both public and private funding,
human capital, and other resources. Many will be the initiatives from the local
governments emanating from these regional clusters.
At an even more localized level are plans to link the development of indus-
trial clusters with urban renovation and economic growth. A particular example
at the city level is the 22@Barcelona district, which transformed an area of nearly
200 hectares within the old industrial area of Poblenou into what acknowledges
as being a high-quality environment for working, living and learning.” The
project — considered one of the most ambitious of its class in Europe — aims at
concentrating knowledge-based activities while creating urban, economic and
social refurbishment. Although no specific project or company associated with
6BioCat is composed by 12 science parks —nine of which are devoted exclusively to biomed-
ical and agri-food R&D activities; a network of 145 research centers of excellence, with 400 re-
search groups in the life sciences; an R&D plus i budget that accounts for 1.44% of Spain’s GDP
and state-of-the-art research support infrastructures, among other elements (BioCat, 2009).
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modern biotech composes the cluster yet, many developments — including sev-
eral emanating from the nearby PRBB — are planning on moving within the
district as declared by actor S4-R:
The PRBB is closely working with 22@Barcelona to launch a mod-
ern biotech area based on projects emanating from this and other
regional scientific parks. At this point, [the park] is no longer look-
ing to expand its scientist base within its facilities; rather, the current
expansion stages aim at establishing a basic research/private indus-
try connection in Catalun˜a by extending it operations within multi-
sector clusters like the near-by 22@Barcelona.
Many of these regional initiatives derive from a necessity to depart from
rigid and centralized structures —especially those affecting hiring and project
selection processes— highly predominant within both the public universities
and the local research centers, commented actor S8-R:
Breaking away from traditional structures, these new configurations
facilitate accessing funding and issuing more expedited decisions on
hiring and research projects. One of the benefits of this goes hand-
in-hand with the inclusion of Spain in the various EU programs
which have allowed researchers from all over the globe to become
part of these regional centers in benefit of the local human capital.
In my view, when you find yourself working with some of the best
researchers worldwide, your quality as researcher increases. Fur-
thermore, these schemes also facilitate the flow of information and
reduce the time and red tape required to access it.
For him this also allowed further and timelier coordination with other re-
gional centers working in these areas within or outside Spain:
Some equipment acquired by these Centers requires highly special-
ized expertise for its operation; for this reason the timely hiring of
experts required is key for specific projects. More so because these
instruments become obsolete at a faster pace, which considerably re-
duces the time to create the required expertise in-house.
At the moment of the interview he estimated that at least 30% of non-
Spanish researchers —mostly coming from other EU countries, the U.S. and
South America— were group leaders within the Center.
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Finally for the case of BioCat, one less structured segment within the Biore-
gion is the association of hospitals, which just recently began organizing groups
targeting specific areas of interest. As actor S7-G pointed out:
There are basically no novel institutions targeting these associations,
assisting them in their research and prioritization efforts. Many are
still the gaps in need of filling in order to attach this sector to the
BioCat network. Yet, there is no doubt of their need for instruments
that allow a systematic engagement of patient groups in the policy
and planning processes of new pharmaceuticals and therapies de-
riving from modern biotech processes. Such schemes will not only
allow the formation of stronger links between research at the uni-
versity and scientific park level and the various levels within health
care sector, but also facilitate designing more inclusive bottom-to-top
policies.
Additionally, the region also has a conglomerate of bio-industries within the
association Catalonia Bio, which actively engages in public policy making and
sector linkage activities associated to the business and industry sectors in the
region. As part of the sector-boosting efforts, additional initiatives emanating
from BioCat promote and support start-up companies and mid-size existing
ones by providing services such as: business plan writing, project planning
and access to funding within the EU’s Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development, FP7 (now at its 7th installment) structure, spe-
cialized training and access to innovation.7 Some of these recent policy initia-
tives suggest establishing an alternative stock exchange market exclusively for
start-up firms and spin-off firms, as well as endorsing the central government’s
initiative to allow research-intensive start-up companies as Young Innovative
7The 7th European Framework Programme groups all EU research-related initiatives under
a common roof. Along with a recently created Competitiveness and Innovation Framework
Programme, Education and Training programmes, and Structural and Cohesion Funds for re-
gional convergence and competitiveness, FP7 is aimed at helping to put into effect one of the
EU’s main goals of increasing the potential for economic growth and of strengthening European
competitiveness by investing in knowledge, innovation and human capital. It is also a key pillar
for the European Research Area, ERA (EC, 2011a).
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Company Status, YICs 8 in order for these to gain easier access to particular
types of funding. As a result of the latest policies about 250 companies working
within the bioregion are now considered to be associated with either biotech
or biopharma. BioCat also estimates that at least 60 of these target biotech ex-
clusively, while about 120 are partly dedicated or just associated to biotech by
using biotech or providing services for the biotech industry. Among those fully
engaged in biotech, nearly 65% target medical research, splitting up their efforts
between drug development and diagnostics at an almost 3:1 ratio.
Madrid’s bioregion is also formed by a rich network of academic, research,
and industrial centers. Geographically being the hub for Spain’s central govern-
ment, the cluster is composed by various Ministries of the regional government,
biotech companies, public and private research centers, hospitals and univer-
sities. Madrid also has both a Regional GMO Control Office and a Regional
Biosafety Commission, which supervises the application of all regulation rela-
tive to these types of organisms. In particular, the region is considered the leader
in academic and research activities —generating 31.1% of the national scientific
publications in biosciences and a yearly research investment in these areas of
the vicinity of 400 million euros.
Among the numerous institutions located within the region are some within
the National Research Council, CSIC —like the National Biotechnology Center
and the Biological Research Center; Clinical research centers like the Carlos III
Health Institute and the Ramo´n y Cajal University Hospital; the National Insti-
8According to the European Association for Bioindustries, EUROPABIO, a young innovative
company must: 1) Spend at least 15% of resources on R&D; and 2) Be less than 15 years old.
The main fiscal measures from the YIC scheme are: 1) Provide incentives for companies by
a) Reducing social costs (social security, unemployment and pensions) by 100% for the first
15 years; and b) Not taxing revenues for the first 3 profitable years, 50% reduction over the
next 5 years and 35% reduction over the next 7 years. 2) Provide incentives for investors by
a) Not taxing capital gains on shares or stock options that have been held for a minimum of 3
years (EUROPABIO, 2007).
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tute for Agrarian and Food Research and Technology, INIA, targeting agricul-
tural biotech; and the Complutense and Autonoma Universities and Polytechnic
institutes engaged in basic research in biotech. Further, Madrid also has scien-
tific park mainly composed by the initiatives of the two previously mentioned
universities and supported by CSIC, Spain’s Environmental and Technological
Research Center, CIEMAT, the local chamber of commerce, Banco Santander, and
both the city and district governments.
The previously mentioned Fundacio´n Genoma Espan˜a, now depending di-
rectly from the Ministry of Science and Innovation, is also located within the
perimeter of this extensive bioregion. However, a fundamental difference be-
tween Madrid’s bioregion and BioCat is its closeness to the central government
giving the impression of having less autonomy. Actor S2-N expanded on this:
Most of the actors composing Madrid’s Bioregion are highly depen-
dent on the ministries; although their decision-making and operative
guideline design processes is completely autonomous, all final deci-
sions are passed through and negotiated with the national Minis-
eries. Ultimately, these still have a high hand in the biotech policy-
making process in Spain.
The arrangement of enterprises associated with modern biotech and the new
life sciences within Madrid’s bioregion is also highly dense; mainly two of the
most influential assemblages in the sector in Spain —ASEBIO and Madrid’s
Region Association of Biotechnology Companies, BIOMADRID— are located
within this frame. In particular, ASEBIO operates more like an association of
enterprises bringing together an array of institutions undertaking activities re-
lated to biotechnology throughout Spain —such as universities, other founda-
tions, and technology and research centers— within its umbrella. Since 1999,
the association has served as a meeting point for such actors, working closely
with the various levels of government to promote the expansion of the sector. Its
existence is mostly due in part to the fact that it belongs to and receives support
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from EUROPABIO, and its membership to wider-scope Spanish Confederation
of Business Organizations. On the influence the association has on policymak-
ing and the closeness of this bioregion with the central government, actor S5-G
mentioned that:
ASEBIO also has a predominant role within the policymaking pro-
cess in science and biotech in Spain. In fact, its previous president
is now Minister of Science and Innovation, while the President of
Grupo Zeltia took over as chief executive officer.
On the other hand, BIOMADRID is a biotech company association working
towards promoting the sector within the Autonomous Community. Its central
objectives are also establishing more sophisticated communication channels be-
tween the multiple social and economic agents involved in biotech and related
areas —like bioinformatics, clinical genetics, agricultural biotech, etc. Thus far,
the association has 53 members, most of which fall within the SME status and
devote a large part of their resources to R&D activities.
As in the case of Mexico, no initiatives emanating from the central Spanish
government encouraged the creation of these regional biotech clusters. Yet, var-
ious recent central government measures encouraging coordination and collab-
oration between the national ministries and the elements composing the Biore-
gions are beginning to shape up.
At the continental level the European Federation of Biotechnology, EFB
whose central office is located in Barcelona, is one of the most influential in-
stitutional policymaking institutions targeting biotechnology closely working
within Spain. The EFB is a non-for-profit federation of national biotechnology
associations, universities, research institutes, biotech companies and individu-
als working in the field aiming at promoting biotechnology throughout Europe
and the globe. Through its 13 regional branch offices in Europe it supports ac-
tivities in the various areas of biotechnology promoting research and innovation
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as well as the safe and sustainable use of biotech. As commented by actor S6-N
its composition is quite complex and has an influential voice over policymaking
and science promotion throughout Europe:
Currently the EFB has 225 Institutional members from across Eu-
rope and over 6,000 personal members from 56 countries, most of
which are scientists. It essentially represents the voice of science in
biotechnology in Europe. Although the association has limited fund-
ing, it does have a relatively influential voice at the policymaking
process throughout the continent. In recent years the EFB has im-
pacted changes on small but influential directives like those relative
to limiting the amount of ownership in a company any public sector
employee can have. This overturned the requirement that university
professors could not have more than 10% of any company associated
with the products of their research, a requirement that turns many a
researcher away from the idea of starting biotech companies in Eu-
rope.
At the time of the interview actor S6-N suggested that the establishment
of an association of bioregions —along with the existing regional industry and
academic clusters— could help create even more leverage for policymaking:
A cluster [of bioregions] could help joining forces in the design
of more adequate communication and participation channels, since
many of the topics related to the development of products derived
from biotech — animal testing, field release, biosafety, etc. — are
still quite controversial and need to be addressed in a more collec-
tive way.
It becomes evident that the level of coordination in policymaking and insti-
tutional operation of these is quite intricate not only in Spain but throughout the
EU. Such levels of cooperation and coordination are clearly absent in Mexico or
even North America.
Funding Sources
At the EU level, the European Commission established the European Research
Council, ERC, to support researcher-driven frontier research and to define the
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strategies and methodologies that stimulate scientific excellence in Europe.
Through its executive agency the ERC implements and applies these in the
management and operations of its $7.5 billion Euro budget (2007-2013) for ac-
tivities within the legal context of the FP7, including those related to mod-
ern biotech under the IDEAS specific programme (EC, 2011a). Since 2007 all
funds for research coming from the central government (including those for
modern biotech) are managed through a “single window” system within the
newly created Ministry of Science and Innovation. Before the establishment of
this scheme funds for modern biotech were assigned to individual projects and
plans though the various ministries and by the Fundacio´n Genoma Espan˜a. On
this, actor S9-P stated that:
Authorities supervising scientific and technological development in
Spain were highly dispersed throughout the ministries making their
service provision quite inefficient. The levels of bureaucratic bur-
den and the red tape required to access resources made applying for
research funding too complex a task. Before these changes anyone
applying for federal funding —whether for a new bridge in a remote
region or for a small modern biotech research project— required go-
ing through a long bureaucratic process involving various ministries
and regulatory offices. The process has now become much more ef-
ficient and fluent.
Over the past decade public funding for modern biotechnology in the form
of governmental subsidies has displayed a considerable expansion —increasing
almost 330% from the year 2000 benchmark level— reaching an investment of
507 million euros by 2008. Such growth implies a yearly average investment
expansion of 22% in research, development and innovation projects, and infras-
tructure in modern biotech. Allocation decisions are now based on the priorities
and strategic areas of science as defined within the National Research, Develop-
ment and Technological Innovation Plan, within which modern biotech has its
own strategic action program. On the other hand, public credits for innovation
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and infrastructure in modern biotech research reached a maximum of 116 mil-
lion euros in 2007, only to decrease to 95 million by 2008. Reduction that is due
in part attributed to the termination of the Scientific Research Promotion Pro-
gram, PROFIT in the year 2007. Overall, the total public investment in biotech
projects (subsidies plus credits) in Spain reached 602 million euros.
Funding for research and development for business related modern biotech
projects —in addition to that coming from Genoma Espan˜a— comes from the
Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology, CDTI. The Centre serves
as a public organization within the Ministry of Science and Innovation whose
role is bridging the research-industry gap and aiding in technology transfer and
cooperation within Spanish companies and between these and international en-
terprises.9 Through the National Strategic Technical Research Consortiums Pro-
gram, CENIT —which allocated 200 million Euros per program only in the year
2009— the Centre promotes R&D+i business projects and facilitates technology
transfer in modern biotech. As actor S3-R stated:
The program echoes that of the European Union for general R&D+i
projects; it now allows accessing funds at levels not previously seen
in Spain (between 20 to 50 million Euros per project).
However, the program has a fundamental shortcoming; one of its main prin-
ciples requires that at least 25% of these funds allotted go towards basic research
conducted within public research centers throughout the lifetime of the project.
On this he mentioned:
The issue arising from this requirement is the difficulty to deter-
mine a clean-cut investment percentage for basic research in public
9The Centre, formed by over 250 high-end professionals and researchers, with headquar-
ters in Madrid is composed by a network of offices and representatives in over 10 courtiers of
Europe, Asia and America. The center is governed by private Law in its relation to third par-
ties, allowing more flexibility in its supporting tech-transfer roles. It provides access to its own
funds and facilitates the access to those of third parties or other private institutions (including
those emanating from the European Union) for both national and international research, devel-
opment, and innovation projects conducted by Spanish researchers (CDTI, 2011).
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centers that applies to all projects at every stage. This percentage
varies greatly based on each project’s necessities. For example: some
projects initially require investing 80% of the funding provided to
basic research and only about 10% at their final stages. As part of the
industry sector companies have expressed their concerns and have
proposed changes to the program’s rule. Furthermore, the sector be-
lieves there is a need to create more awareness from behalf of the
industry about projects currently being conducted within these cen-
ters. Otherwise the industry —instead of having incentives to create
partnerships— simply leases the services offered by these public re-
search centers and pays for these below market optimal levels.
Various researchers believe that the overall investment resources available
for R&D+i are still too dependent on public resources. In the view of actor S4-R:
While the percentage of private investment in research and devel-
opment in some countries within the E.U is between 60% and 70%,
in Spain barely reaches 50%. If the private industry is not drawn to
play a more active role, the country will never reach the [investment]
levels expected from any top-tier EU member.
In his opinion, investment should be more focused on what he defined as
the ‘second step’ where basic research is channeled into applications and into
technology transfer, leaving investment in applied research mostly in the hands
of the private sector.
On other issues, he suggested that the biggest setback of engaging in applied
research from within a public research center is having to go though all the red
tape and bureaucratic burden associated to it:
A researcher engaged in a project requiring a state-of-the-art device
needs to jump numerous bureaucratic hurdles and ultimately wait
for a public auction to be conducted in order to engage in research.
By the time he gets the equipment, the project is either outdated or
the investors who elicited have taken [the project] somewhere else.
From the standpoint of actor S8-R, the central reason for this disconnection
is because the industry —due to its for-profit nature— rarely engages in basic
research. Channeling most of its resources to applied research or development,
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it forces public centers and universities engaged in basic research to compete
against each other to access public subvention:
The real problem is not that centers like [the genomic research center]
dependent too of public funding; the real issue is that the availabil-
ity of these funds is subject to political wavering. In other words,
funding is never guaranteed; nobody really knows what the levels
of funding will be the in upcoming government cycle, making long
and mid-term planning almost an impossible task.
In his view designing policies that allow keeping S&T programs unaffected
from political change and, thus, allowing for long-term planning is fundamental
for the advancement of local and regional basic research:
Genomics and epidemiology-related projects —which oftentimes
require between half or a complete decade of constant flow of
resources— are frequently put aside due to this imperfection, while
those that do go on constantly face resource shortages and default
deadlines. This also provides more insight on why the indus-
try avoids investing their resources on basic research; incomplete
projects display few or no results.
Yet, Spain has indeed witnessed a growth in investment since the establish-
ment of the Bioregions network, RBR.10 These associations — mostly composed
by regional industries and research centers — have promoted an increase of all
sources of funding, especially those coming from the private sector. A clear ex-
ample is the recently formed Madrid Biocluster, which in 2008 —its first year
of operation— committed 62 million euros, action without precedents in that
region. On the other hand, the recent establishment of public ‘soft money’ allo-
cating agencies is not viewed as the best of ideas for some actors, adding to the
negative effects of politics behind public financial resource allocation for mod-
ern biotech. On this, actor S1-P stated that:
10Composed by five regional clusters (Madrid, Catalun˜a, Valencia, Pas Vasco, and Andalu-
cia), the Bioregion network, RBR serves as a platform for cooperation and coordination among
regions as well as a forum for best practices. Other areas like: Canarias, Extremadura, Aragn,
Navarra, and Baleares will join the network in the near future (BioCat, 2009).
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These agencies or newly formed areas within existing ones are sup-
posedly helping the sector by creating investment funds composed
by —say— two or three million euros for their use in modern biotech
projects. Following a political agenda, these funds are then invested
in a significant number of start-up companies, stretching the re-
sources as much as possible. Basically what is happening is that
these agencies give the start-ups enough funding to make absolutely
nothing. The policy behind these actions is to create the illusion of
remarkable results; since many companies are previously reviewed
and granted funds, these resources are believed to be efficiently allo-
cated and, thus, benefiting the sector. However, due to the scarcity of
the resources ultimately granted to each company or start-up (and to
their high dependency on public funding), most of these companies
never get to reach their fully developed stages, let alone produce
a single marketable item or service. Five years later, none of these
will probably still be around. This issue, however, is not exclusive to
Spain. This is happening all over Europe and in the US as well. In my
opinion, one way to steer away from [this model] is to promote the
rise of professional investors, the kind of individuals having carried
interests (such as the dividends a venture capital investor gets when
a project becomes successful) within specific projects. The logic be-
hind this is that, if these are to make money, they are going to be
making a lot of it, and that is what is going to motivate them. As
for their salary [as professional venture capital investors], it is fair to
say that —in the short term— these would make less than what they
would do if they were investment bankers. Yet, they would have to
work much less and, by the end of the cycle (when the fund closes
and pays its returns to investors), there is a high probability they
become millionaires over night.
Private investment is perceived by all interviewed researchers as a much
more efficient and easier to access source of funding than that coming from the
public sector. Yet, in the opinion of actor S4-R, accessing funds from the private
sector has both benefits and risks:
Although funding is granted faster and with fewer complications,
there is always a risk that the investor —usually a company or asso-
ciation of these— decides to terminate the project prematurely. This
usually happens to be the case when the project is within a specific
timeline too hard to meet by an outsourced research team or simply
because there is no longer invested interests in the project. These
funds are in function of the investor’s time frame
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In Spain most of the private investments flowing into modern biotech comes
from corporate groups putting together specialized funds and searching for spe-
cific projects. Following this point actor S1-P mentioned that:
In Spain this is a fairly new model, which has demonstrated suc-
cess throughout Europe. Another [model] becoming highly pop-
ular is the one that encourages Spanish business people to come
back to their homeland, especially those who are engaged in creating
this types of VC funds abroad and have a track record, so they can
come back and raise local funds and persuade some of their partners
abroad to also do so.
This last type, however, is just starting to become more popular as a number
of funds for modern biotech are beginning to shape. As an example he men-
tioned the case of a Swiss-Catalan biotech entrepreneur who is putting together
various biotech funds for Spain, which will end up being the first real series of
specialized biotech funds created by a national locally:
Everyone will dispute the fact that these are indeed the first funds
targeting these areas. However, neither someone with such a suc-
cessfully international track record in the biotech investment, nor
someone with such a structured series of funds have ever engaged
in putting together a series of funds and investing locally. The most
significant difference between these funds and other S&T-oriented
funds is that a committee truly conscious of the realities of the
biotech sector professionally manages these.
Some local industries have also taken advantages of the stock market and
raised funds directly by issuing stock. In the words of actor S9-P this has been
the case for a number of subsidiaries derived from the local pharmaceuticals
giant Zeltia requiring funding for basic research:
Research funding for its subsidiaries engaged in modern biotech
projects —especially those using oceanic biological resources— come
from within the company through various public stock offerings.
One of the most widespread joint venture funding models seen throughout
Europe is the consortium composed by the public, research, and corporate sec-
tors. These associations join efforts by putting together a steering committee
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and a series of funds to support basic research projects in various strategic ar-
eas —including modern biotech. A number of large successful projects like the
PCB and the PRBB— fall within this category. As previously mentioned, these
initiatives have had trouble bringing back some of Spain’s prime investors who
are still working abroad, making it difficult to create locally run private funds
for these specific modern biotech-related areas. Yet, initiatives moving in that
direction are clearly beginning to take shape.
The public-private consortium scheme emanates from the previously men-
tioned EU’s Framework Programme for Research and Technological Develop-
ment, FP7, which among its main objectives puts forward the notion of focus-
ing on results and coordinating efforts under a single structure. Most funding
for these consortiums comes precisely from the Programme’s multiple research-
oriented funds and other more modest sources as corroborated by actor S1-P:
The EFB foundation also engages in providing funding for small
modern biotech projects —either those being conducted within
these consortiums or independently— as well as in matching these
projects with additional sources of private funding.
In his view the agency’s resources are quite limited, providing an average
of 200,000 euros to four or five projects per year —observation supporting the
previously expressed views suggesting that a number of newly created orga-
nizations oftentimes provide limited funding for new companies. Yet, he sug-
gested that the agency also engages in other more significant roles than sim-
ply providing direct funding, which can be considered of more assistance for
starting-up companies, such as connecting projects with other fund sources, as
well as helping gaining access to information and creating research collabora-
tion among various regional centers. From the perspective of other specialists
national and regional investment and growth levels in R&D+i also require of
the private sector’s cooperation; actor S4-R suggested this:
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If ‘attachment free’ funding coming from the private sector was as
available as that coming from the public sector, basic research in
modern biotech would be at a different stage of development. To-
day, most of the financial resources coming from the private sector
are either allocated on projects in which the funding party has a stake
(which are usually short-term and small in size) or have been (or will
be) disbursed under highly rigid legal terms. To induce better bene-
fit and information sharing will require more sophisticated tax incen-
tives and benefit-sharing schemes, among other structures, designed
jointly by the industry and the government.
Other international initiatives aiming at increasing resources for research in
modern biotech emanate from a series of strategic support actions —such as
round tables and multi-sector participatory exercises— in which issues on how
to create incentives for investment growth in early stage modern biotech re-
search throughout Europe are addressed. On this actor S1-P stated that:
A series of recommendations and suggestions for decision makers
derive from many of these exercises —activities directly funded by
the EU commission— which then become part of local or regional
policies. Yet, the most significant contribution stemming from these
initiatives are the various entrepreneurship and business-related
programs aiming at researchers and scientists; these coach them on
how to address VC investors, present programs before them, and
raise capital for their individual projects. Basically, these teach them
how to become entrepreneurs.
For him, another essential element of these internationally funded initiatives
are the numerous fairs and conventions where researchers, scientists and VC
investors, and other actors, network and engage in various activities to raise
resources and promote collaboration:
These events aim at putting together multiple actors from within
the multidisciplinary spectrum of modern biotech for a brief pe-
riod of time. As these became more popular and began display-
ing more positive results, the private sector’s interests on these also
began growing. Many of the now established initiatives started as
small 200,000 euros projects aiming at organizing two or three small
venues over a three-to-four year time period. Today, there is not a
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single month of the year when at least one of these events focusing
on biotech is not scheduled somewhere in Europe —many of which
are hosted by Spain.
An innovative funding scheme emanating from the international arena cur-
rently being explored in Spain is the previously mentioned Young Innovative
Company Status, YICs. The special category (initiative of the European Associ-
ation of Bioindustries, EuropaBio), allows research-intensive start-ups to access
specific state aid through tax incentives a explained by expert S1-P:
Although, in theory, some of these companies may be considered
within the SMB category, in practice, these share more traits with
larger companies due to their size and resource investment levels.
The YICs idea tries to take into account multiple traits generally
overseen by more conventional start-up funding schemes (such as
the resource ratio differential between early and later stages or the
number of years these companies have been established for). This
has improved the overall fiscal treatments applied throughout Eu-
rope for these types of companies; today there are a number of EU
fiscal policies allowing the reimbursement of investments in R&D up
to a certain percentage due in part to this initiative. Yet, neither every
country is doing it, nor most companies know about this possibility.
If more researchers knew about it, the number of start-ups would be
by far larger than the current.
Although most of the R&D funding initiatives within the EU emanates from
the previously mentioned FP7 funding is much more fragmented than in other
parts of the world as corroborated by expert S1-P:
Funding granted at the European level comes from a series of frame-
work programs of which numerous possible users oftentimes do not
know about (or know of ways to gain access to). Moreover, the EU
Commission oftentimes provides funding for break-through projects
that never reach applied levels, unaware that they are shifting the
central objectives of many of these programs from expanding invest-
ment in tech-transfer activities to promoting basic research funding.
International funding coming from other regional associations is quite lim-
ited, and has to be allocated strategically. Some organizations —like the Euro-
pean Federation of Biotechnology, EFB— provide significant input on where
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funding for research in modern biotech coming from the various EU pro-
grammes should be allocated. On this, expert S6-N declared:
The EFB makes sure that important areas of biotech are not being
excluded from funding; that funding is not exclusively poured into
projects that —truthfully— can be considered as outdated; the feder-
ation also aims at assuring that the EU Commission becomes aware
of the potential of certain areas of technology as well as creating an
awareness of the funding opportunities for all its members, while
also promoting their active involvement in participatory and net-
working processes.
Venture capital (VC) in modern biotech in Spain has displayed a somewhat
inconsistent behavior over the past decade. From 2005 to 2008 the total VC in-
vestments reached 122 million euros, which represents a five-fold increase when
compared to the investment levels accounted for the 2000 to 2004 period. Ven-
ture capital investment in biotech accounts for 1% of the total VC investments
in Spain, while in the group of 15 most advanced countries within the EU (EU-
15), it reached an average of 2.7%. It was only in 2006 —when various local
biopharmaceuticals engaged in a series of VC investment operations— that the
local average VC investment levels in biotech were above those of the EU-15,
reaching 2.8%.
For a number of actors the reason why VC investment (and locally devel-
oped funds) for modern biotech is so scarce has to do with both, the improper
application, and the lack of understanding of the current IPRs system. On this
actor S4-R stated that:
Many of the local institutions and research centers turn their eyes
to MIT or Stanford and think they can generate patents that li-
cense just as those coming from those institutions. However, they
seem to overlook the fact that that, for each financially successful
patent those institutions have, these also produced hundreds (that
may or may not be licensed) which produce no substantial returns.
Here is where the motivation —for both researchers and venture
capitalists— begins curbing.
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Adding to this problem is the lack of experienced patent law firms, as ex-
pressed by actor S1-P:
There is a shortage of firms fully understanding the sector’s IPRs and
patenting at the global level —the kind of firm that knows the sector
so well that it does not to have to redo the patent every three years.
Additionally, these are not fully knowledgeable of licensing terms,
oftentimes scaring away possible licensees and investors.
This apparently simple issue turns into a destructive cycle that has threaten
to stall the growth of modern biotech sector throughout Spain and Europe. As
explained by actor S1-P, this sequence consists of the following stages: a) a local
research institution finally licenses a patent (or a number of these), which then
become the basis of a spin-off or a start-off industry; b) these small companies
attract initial local funding managing to stand afloat and move forward for a
year or two, catching the attention of professional biotech VC investors; c) when
these approach the company to determine if it is investment-worthy, these then
realize that the terms of the licensing are not quite what they wanted to see
(either because these are not clean enough, the percentages to the research unit
are too high, the risk-sharing is not quite appropriate, etc.); and, finally, c) due
to this, the company never reaches maturity and eventually disappears.
On other aspects related to VC investment, actor S9-P suggested that one of
the mayor factors determining whether this type of investment will flow into
new companies is the time that these take to consolidate. In her view the time
these take to go from start-up to a mid-level industry is fundamental for attract-
ing VC investment:
In the modern biotech sector, companies taking too long to consoli-
date or not engaging in mergers with other start-ups at the precise
time often appear unattractive for venture capitalists. Furthermore,
if the vast majority of these new companies within the biotech start-
up network system stay too long at an embryonic stage, VC investors
will remain skeptical of the entire system.
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For most forms of resource investment, a solid venture capital system for
modern biotech requires a fine balance between the benefits of the prospected
outcomes, time to maturity, and a neat environment that provides sufficient
guarantees that investors will actually see returns. In Spain (as in most of the
Europe) this system has yet to be perfected.
Research and Human Capital Formation
As previously mentioned, the central figure promoting modern biotech and sci-
ence in general in Spain is the newly revamped Ministry of Science and Inno-
vation, MICINN. Through its secretariats and divisions, the ministry manages
both national and international programs operating within Spain and coordi-
nates these with regionally and locally developed policies. So as in Mexico,
most basic research is produced at the various public research centers and foun-
dations affixed to the ministries, being the Genoma Espan˜a the most directly en-
gaged in activities associated with modern biotech. Other entities partially en-
gaged in modern biotech research projects are the previously mentioned Health
Institute Carlos III; the National Agriculture and Food Research and Technology
Institute, INIA; the Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology, CDTI;
and the Energy, Environmental and Technological Research Center, CIEMAT.
Public universities also operate as central agents of scientific promotion as well
as producers of a large percentage of the local science. Additionally, most tech-
nology transfer offices, OTRIs, which advise scientists in areas like patenting
and licensing as well as in scouting for resources for start-ups or spin-offs, are
located within these.
Considered the most important public research organism is CSIC whose
objectives of promoting, coordinating, developing, and diffusing multidisci-
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plinary basic research encourage the advancement of basic research throughout
Spain. Additionally, the center is the chief figure in human resource formation
and allocation in all areas of basic research. Most of Spain’s public research
is conducted within its 126 research centers and 145-affiliated research units
located throughout all Autonomous Communities and regions; numerous of
which —like the National Biotechnology Center; the Agro-biotechnology Insti-
tute; and the Biomedicine and Biotechnology Institute of Cantabria; the Agro-
genomics Research Center; the Cinegenetic Resources Research Institute— are
directly engaged in biotech-related research.
The vast majority of these centers are located within the regions of Catalun˜a
and Madrid, followed by both the Andalucia and Valencia. The concentration
in these territories is mostly attributed to the development of successful pro-
grams within these regional research centers as well as to the successful policies
to repatriate Spanish scientists currently working abroad. These have created
alluring environments for local and international scientists engaged in basic re-
search in these areas.
Spain has developed a quite sophisticated technology transfer scheme, of
which the central instruments are the S&T parks and clusters and the network of
the abovementioned OTRIs. These serve as connectors between basic research
and the industry and have consistently helped bridging the gap between ba-
sic and applied research throughout Spain. Additional instruments supporting
this linking venture are the multiple national and regional Technological Cen-
ters, CTs and the Supporting Innovation Centers, CAITs, which have the spe-
cific task of assisting the private sector in the application of basic knowledge for
innovation, including that produced within the OPIs and scientific parks and
clusters. Both CTs and CAITs now have achieved legal status through the Real
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Decreto 2093/2008 and are part of a national registry and list, also created by the
same legal instrument. Other more conventional instruments (targeted tax in-
centives, subsidies, platforms, etc.) are also part of the array of promotion tools
available in Spain aiming at connecting sectors and bridging the gap between
basic and applied research.
From within the scientific network there appears to be a notion that a num-
ber of these successful policies and plans (more specifically those that have de-
rived into tangible projects) stemmed from initiatives and efforts of influential
scientists, including those that have been contacted abroad and repatriated. In
the view of S9-P:
During the 1990’s a group of local scientists had the vision to engage
in policy and planning through various initiatives aimed at bring-
ing back some of Spain’s most valuable human capital; one of the
first successful cases was that of Mariano Barbacid —Spanish re-
searcher whose work led to the isolation of the first human onco-
gene in the Spring of 1982— who spent over 20 years abroad before
returning to Spain in 1998 to create and direct the National Cancer
Research Center. Another case is that of the current director of the
Barcelona Biomedical Research Park, PRBB —Jordi Camı´ Morell—
whose initiative not only helped create the park and many of its
research units —like the Centre for Genomic Regulation, CRG and
the Centre for Regenerative Medicine, CMR— but also helped estab-
lishing the Health and Life Sciences Studies department within the
Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. Furthermore, he developed a
“Code of Good Scientific Practices” that has been adopted and fol-
lowed by all scientists working within the PRBB’s research centers
since 2001.
In his opinion many of these initiatives were —in addition to the efforts of a
particular scientist or a cluster of these— feasible due to the fact that Spain was
able to access funds for infrastructure improvement coming from the EU at a
time when these were vital. Yet, he suggests this has changed lately:
In recent years this has become less viable; by expanding its R&D+i
sector Spain has reduced it standing as a recipient of such pro-
infrastructure development funds, turning projects of the caliber of
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the PRBB into much more difficult endeavors to consolidate. Now,
promoting new initiatives requires —in addition to resources mostly
generated locally— meticulous and structured planning and actions
to coordinate all actors involved.
Presently, top-to-bottom plans emanating exclusively from the government
are often received with skepticism by the scientific community and are more
often than not considered as lacking the necessary depth. It has become more
common to witness how commissions —led by local scientific leaders— engage
in dialog with different levels of government and request advice from various
interested actor-networks when looking forward to implement large-scale plans
as suggested also by actor S9-P:
Politicians are less informed about the projects’ objectives than any
of the scientist or scientific leaders working within these, making
them less capable of framing such initiatives. [For these projects to
move forward], either we have to wait for politicians who are will-
ing to learn, listen, and trust the views of experts —something that
is highly improbable— or we engage in actions for better informing
them about the sector — which is highly complicated. Efforts to bet-
ter inform politicians should always be a priority within the agendas
of these scientific commissions and the scientific parks behind them,
something that could be accomplished more efficiently if these re-
search centers established government-scientific community liaison
offices that could perform such activities.
Since their first days these clusters have altered the ways science and gov-
ernment collaborate and interact also having new levels of influence in the way
science-related policies are defined and established in both Spain and Europe.
These have also allowed a more active role for institutions conventionally fo-
cused exclusively on scientific production and human capital formation (pri-
vate research centers and universities) as well as for those scientists and experts
working within these.
As explained by actor S9-P, these size projects require large government sub-
vention during most of their initial stages. Nevertheless, he points out that for
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many researchers this association has to evolve at the pace at least as fast as that
at which these clusters develop otherwise government control nullifies their ob-
jective:
Recognizing when a cluster has reached a point where governmental
intervention is not required as much as it was during its embryonic
stages is of the utmost importance; not doing so could result in two
distortions: too much political control over research being conducted
within its multiple centers, and the use of the cluster for political
purposes. Politicians more often than not care less about science as
opposed to the tangible things emanating from these parks —like
the number of jobs, patents or enterprises created— since these are
easier to translate into their political platform and language.
On the other hand, for him these clusters are viewed as development agents
actively participating in the advancement of yet additional social structures
linked to scientific development, industrial processes, and policy-making:
These parks are not only at the forefront of research but are also
ahead in areas like: new enterprise creation, definition and man-
agement of IPRs, innovative managerial processes, etc. Yet, in the
particular case of the PRBB, although being fully aware that keeping
up with these technologies is quite difficult, it looks forward to the
next challenge; while others emulate or try imitating other successful
models, [the PRBB] defines its own solutions, otherwise it would al-
ways be one step behind. The park has such long-term vision that
at this point it has no intention of competing with clusters or re-
gions more oriented towards finding applications for basic scientific
discoveries; if it came up with something that can be turned into a
product following the Boston model, it would be better-off making
it available for them to develop; [the PRBB’s] research teams are en-
gaged in creating never-before-seen processes and developing new
research techniques, not just trying to emulate some other model
just because it appears as being more successful. They are looking
forward to establish the basis for basic research processes and then
target the connectors with development.
For many a scientist in the regions of Catalun˜a and Madrid various are
the reasons why these novel structures can be considered as a great leap to-
wards achieving a more efficient science and research production models. These
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schemes have allowed Spain’s research in biotech and the life science to reach
international standards, providing more autonomy for local research and in-
ducing the rise of novel research collaboration schemes. For actor S8-R, these
structures have allowed for multiple research groups to form simultaneously
—as opposed to inducing the formation of only a couple before their establish-
ment. In addition to being competitive enough to stand out internationally, this
has happened in a relatively short period of time and much more intensely than
in many other countries in Europe. He continued by saying:
Although these groups could be pursuing completely different lines
of research, these collaborate with each other through personnel and
information sharing within the park. The most successful projects
stemming from both the Catalun˜a and Madrid regional parks are
those who have succeeded in cutting the red tape and have been able
to hurdle through the bureaucratic obstacles mostly set by the Span-
ish university system and the CSIC as well as those that have timely
adapted themselves to the impetuous changes of these technologies.
Yet, in the opinion of actor S1-P, these efforts can still be further fine-tuned:
The biggest downside of these regional efforts is their lack to attain
sufficient resources from the private sector, especially for modern
biotech. All efforts should be aiming at attracting investment and not
just scientists; there is a need to keep in mind that research is turn-
ing resources into knowledge, while innovation is turning knowl-
edge into resources. Although the levels of research being conducted
within these centers has reached —or even surpassed— international
levels of excellence, there is still a shortage of funding for projects, in-
ducing researchers abroad to think twice before coming back home.
However, this is not as salient as the scarcity of funding for innova-
tion, which is what ultimately curtails the development of a more
formal and structured biotechnology-based sector.
As also mentioned previously one of the most significant initiatives to reduce
these effects is the Bioregions system operating throughout Spain.
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2.2.4 Policy and Regulatory Frameworks
In this section I provide information on the nature and elements composing the
political and regulatory frameworks of both Mexico and Spain R&D systems
also looking into how its central actors —both public and private— interact and
set the rules followed within these. Just as the previous sections, this part is
complemented by the views of multiple individual actors supplying more in-
formation on the system’s composition, politics, and links to international insti-
tutions assisting in its general performance and the formation of these environ-
ments.
2.2.5 Mexico
Regulation, Polices and Planning
There is a generally accepted notion among scientists that science is to be pro-
moted not regulated. Furthermore, when aiming at balancing the advancement
in research, the proper management of risks, and the economic implications de-
riving from new technologies, defining policy strategies and estimating their
outcomes oftentimes goes beyond economic, scientific, or technological deter-
mination; politics, consequently, come into the picture playing a more deter-
minant role in these actions. Regulation, in this context, displays distinctive
national traits, making evident the different timings, priorities, forms, and strin-
gency of interventions (Jasanoff, 2005). These protocols consider creating incen-
tives and increasing the connectors that can induce an advancement of R&D
and, thus, create suitable environments for the different competitive frame-
works shaping potential technology markets to thrive.
Based on these premises an efficient structural framework for scientific ad-
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vancement should be composed of a balanced mix of these elements. This
somewhat describes the approach followed by the Mexican government for
the setting and design of policies and regulations affecting modern biotech. In
the current regulatory landscape, two are the central instruments affecting this
technology: at the NSI level the Science and Technology Law, LCyT and The
Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms Law, LBOGM, at the MBTS level.
As a scientific activity modern biotech is promoted using the legal instruments
defined within the former, and due to its direct association with biosafety, the
latter mostly regulates basic and applied research and innovation activities with
GMOs.
By and large, the scope of the central biosafety instrument focuses on three
ambits: 1) GMO management, establishing permits, notifications, and autho-
rizations systems as well as risk management procedures; 2) information man-
agement, establishing a national biosafety information service and a GMO reg-
istrar system; and 3) restricted area management, determining GMO-free zones
and environmentally protected areas. In addition, this law makes two impor-
tant adjustments to the previously existing framework; by establishing its oper-
ation rules within its body it gave legal character to the already existing CIBIO-
GEM, and clarifies more the role of each of the secretariats directly dealing with
biosafety, primarily those associated to agriculture, environment, and health
sectors.
Yet, the feeling that this regulation is optimal is not universally shared
throughout all sectors; to some of the actors within the biosafety realm inter-
viewed, the regulatory instrument still does not properly clarify the roles of all
sectors and —since it increased the regulatory burden— some are now the tar-
get of applicants’ criticism —especially from those representing the scientific
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and research sectors. On this actor M4-R suggested that:
The law still displays various loopholes, mostly regarding author-
ity roles and operation rules. It is, however, a first step requiring
various follow-up stages. And as any regulatory process, this frame-
work has two sides; the applicants have almost as much responsi-
bility [as authorities] in these processes; it is up to them to present
complete and fully complying applications, which result in prompt
approvals. All applications not complying with every single require-
ment —however trivial— established by this new law have to be
declined. This shared responsibility also affects the timely advance-
ment of this science. To some, this is exclusively [environmental au-
thorities’] fault.
The novelty of these processes and, conversely, the applicants’ lack of ex-
perience in complying with all regulatory requirements is often perceived as
dampening the oftentimes timely-contingent life span of these researches and
innovations. Yet, as witnessed in the previous sections, mechanisms such as
specialized technology support offices, helping with filing procedures, and sec-
tor linkage processes, like creating clustering research and development where
such specialized offices thrive (readily available in Spain), can help reduce or
even reverse these effects.
On the importance of this instrument and the overregulatory burden it may
represent the private sector’s perspective actor M9-P suggests that:
Although the guidelines set [by the law] can be considered complex,
it is easier having a regulation that you can later simplify, better, or
update than not having one at all. More substance should have been
given to the Reglamento and subsequent norms and standards than to
the law itself. I have the notion that thick laws are harder to reform
and slower adapting to changes than their by-laws. This regulation
has precisely this disadvantage.
On other topics, the legal instrument steers away from regulating human ge-
nomics and any type of conventional biotechnology or even derivative products
or processes —including pharmaceuticals— using GMOs as inputs. The man-
agement of these activities fall within the scope of either health or agriculture
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regulation (or both) or to international treaties depending on the particular case.
Additionally, it also does not regulate the access to genetic resources as well as
the intellectual property behind biotechnological products and processes, dele-
gating these activities to environmental and intellectual property rights regula-
tions or also to international treaties on these areas to which Mexico adheres.
Deriving from the Biosafety Law is its Reglamento or by-laws. These describe
in detail the requirements and procedures for permit and authorization issuing
(including those for imports), and delineate the operation and composition of
the internal review commissions for biosafety —outlining operation rules and
guidelines— and the technical scientific committees helping in the permit and
authorization review processes. Furthermore, these define the operation rules of
the national biosafety information service and its registrar system as well as the
guidelines to determine restricted areas and genetic diversity and origin centers.
Moreover, these describe the management of lists for both authorized GMOs
and permitted activities using these; set inspection and emergency principles
and specify sanctions; and spell out a regime for the protection of local maize
varieties.
On scientific promotion, and as mentioned earlier at the NSI level, this regu-
lation states that the federal government —mainly though CONACyT— is in
charge of promoting and strengthening scientific and technological research
in modern biotechnology through the application of those guidelines defined
within the Science and Technology Law. It also establishes that such actions
shall take place through a series of policies and instruments oriented towards:
1) promoting research, development, and innovation projects; 2) human capital
formation; and 3) the strengthening of university and research center infrastruc-
ture.
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At a more general level, the Science and Technology Law confers CONACyT
the responsibility of putting together a general science and technology council.
This group is in charge of defining the policies and establishing the guidelines
for the promotion of all publicly supported science activities in Mexico.11 The
law also states that every four years the council will define a Science and Tech-
nology Special Program, STSP, to implement these actions and strengthen the
national S&T sector.12 Serving as chief science and technology advisor to the ex-
ecutive and as central science policy planner, CONACyT is in charge of orches-
trating and implementing all instruments defined within the Plan to promote
the advancement of science, including those relative to modern biotech.
Modern biotech is also addressed within more sector-specific regulations. In
agriculture, four regulations make reference to agricultural biotech, GMOs and
biosafety: Plant Health; Seed Production, Certification and Trade; Organic Prod-
ucts; and Sustainable Rural Development laws. The Animal health Law and its
newly enacted Reglamento oversee aspects of biotech associated to animal health
and feed. Within the environmental protection realm, the General Environment
and Ecological Balance Protection Law and its Reglamento, and the Forest Sus-
11Article 5 of the Science and Technology Law establishes the role, reach, and composition of
the general council. The permanent members of the council are: the President, nine state secre-
taries (foreign affairs, treasury, economics, energy, health, education, agriculture, environment,
communications and transports), CONACyT’s general director, the science and technology con-
sultative forum coordinator, and the heads of the Mexican academy of sciences and the national
universities and higher education institutions association. Three additional non-permanent
members selected by the president —either from the science and technology consultative fo-
rum or independently from the scientific, technological, or productive sectors— serve also as
active members with voice and voting faculties. The President has the faculty of inviting addi-
tional participants to the general council’s sessions. These will have voice but no vote (EUM,
2002, 2010a).
12On June 12, 2009, a bill proposing a series of amendments to the Federal Science and Tech-
nology Law was passed by congress. These alterations basically revamp the science and tech-
nology protocol followed by Mexico, establishing policies to coordinate federal and local initia-
tives, as well as to link basic and applied research at any level of federalism with the productive
sectors. Among many changes, these reforms amended its articles 21 and 22 relative to the de-
sign and implementation of the Science, Technology and Innovation Special Program, which
includes topics on biotechnology and biosafety (EUM, 2009a).
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tainable Development Law attend to topics related to biosafety and their possi-
ble environmental impact. When concerning human health, modern biotech is
approached through five Reglamentos affecting the General Health Law: Prod-
ucts and Production Processes; Product and Services Sanitary Protection; Health
Inputs; Publicity; and Research on Human Health. This last regulation sets the
biosafety guidelines for research with recombinant DNA, aiming at reducing
risks to human health or possible adverse environmental effects from it. These
also specify the general guidelines for research and development of products
and processes for human use, also affecting the outcomes of genetic engineer-
ing processes.
The Mexican Penal Code also addresses modern biotech allocating responsi-
bility and specifying both monetary and punitive fines for faults to all the above-
mentioned regulations dealing with the biosafety of GMOs generated through
these techniques.
Within the latest version of the National Development Plan, PND 2007-2012
topics on biosafety of GMOs are cursory addressed as part of a series of strategic
lines on the establishment of centers of origin and biodiversity protection from
both an agricultural and environmental perspective. However, although these
points introduce to national policy topics associated to modern biotech, their
briefness and cursory nature gives the impression of not been proposed and
written by up-to-date officials or scientists experts in these areas but instead by
less informed politicians —or even private consultants. During one interview
session this was pointed out to me by actor M12-R who stated that not includ-
ing current regulatory actors in the policy defining processes —especially when
drafting national policy plans— adds to feeling of low coordination often felt
within modern biotech’s regulatory framework:
PROFEPA is aware of its institutional role beyond that defined
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within the PND, more so when it comes to modern biotech’s
biosafety with respect to biodiversity protection. Yet, it is not too
clear if its counterparts in charge of biosafety in agriculture and hu-
man health are as aware of theirs. If public officials active in these
areas had written these policies, everyone would be well aware of
their role.
Creating more awareness on policymakers through the involvement of sci-
entists and developers as part of the advisory groups helping in the drafting of
these national policies and plans addressing modern biotech is considered of
great importance for the sector. From the perspective of actor M3-R:
[Scientists and developers] should participate more actively in the
definition, establishment and application of biotech biosafety regu-
lations. This would also help reducing the politics behind these pro-
cesses as well as providing more public awareness on the direction
towards which science is moving.
The success of scientific advisory groups within policymaking processes not
only depends on the qualifications of the experts composing them and the objec-
tivity of their views, but also on the unambiguous notion that any views offered
are provided with total independence and completely scientifically-based. Es-
pecially when the subjects of discussion are considered politically volatile, sci-
entific advisory bodies require being entirely autonomous and transparent to
public scrutiny.
International Links
The international regulatory and technology policy landscapes also exert influ-
ence over the development and evolution of the Mexican biotech regulatory,
policy and planning framework. On the regulatory side, rules and principles
emanating from the multiple international organizations to which Mexico ad-
heres (UN, WTO, NAFTA, EUFTA, WIPO, among other) affect the advancement
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of modern biotech in areas like biosafety, intellectual property rights, and hu-
man health protection. These serve as reference guidelines for the design and
setting of local rules and standards and the reshaping of the regulatory and in-
stitutional scenario. On the technology policy side, the quick advancement of
information technologies at the international level has provided modern biotech
with access to global tendencies and forums where these topics are discussed in-
ternationally, facilitating the expansion of these with areas relative to technology
transfer and human capital formation. The influence that international regula-
tory frameworks exerts over the Mexican modern biotech regulatory landscape
and the relative low maneuvering margin left for local policymakers is captured
in the opinion of actor M2-G:
In a global world, local regulation attends to those international in-
struments to which a country adheres. Unfortunately, Mexico is
more of a follower than a leader regarding international guidelines
in these areas. Although having a considerable important voice and
vote in several of these international [standard setting] forums, Mex-
ican representatives usually end up abiding to other’s decisions or
yielding to specific group’s pressure. Within these commissions our
representatives more often than not take positions that do not reflect
our national priorities.
The majority of international agreements addressing topics related to mod-
ern biotechnology to which Mexico adheres emanate from either the United Na-
tions system or from the World Trade Organization structure; The Convention
on Biological Diversity, derived from the UN Environment Program, UNEP is
one of the central international guidelines on biodiversity protection. As a mem-
ber party to the Convention, Mexico adheres also to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety. The protocol —considered an international agreement by the Mexican
congress and therefore at the same status as a local law— establishes regulatory
mechanisms for the trans-boundary movement of living genetically modified
organisms, LGMOs and has highly influenced the guidelines set within the lo-
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cal biosafety regulation. Through a system known as the Advance Informed
Agreement, member countries have the capacity to deny access for commercial
shipments possibly containing undisclosed LGMOs without incurring commer-
cial sanctions. Through this mechanism the protocol promotes a ‘precautionary
approach’ for environmental protection among member countries. However,
this mechanism applies only within the network of protocol members, mak-
ing it easy to incur in trade sanctions if applied to non-member parties. Fur-
thermore, the protocol’s text states that once it came into force —and in the
absence of specific local regulation— all member countries were to apply its
guidelines. This meant that the Protocol’s guidelines would serve as temporary
central biosafety regulation for the trans-boundary movement of LGMOs while
each member country developed its particular set of guidelines.13 This point
greatly influenced the timely drafting of many a national biosafety regulation
—including Mexico’s— as corroborated by the opinion of actor M3-R:
The international principles set by the Convention on Biological Di-
versity and its biosafety protocol created an avalanche of guideline
and regulation drafting in Mexico that reached its pinnacle with the
passing of the Biosafety Law in 2005. Since 1988, Mexico has been
engaged in norms drafting, even establishing rules for the environ-
mental release of experimental GMOs before many more industrial-
ized nations did. Yet, the drafting of these guidelines created friction
between the industry and the government; the former faced a series
of shortcomings in the existing regulation impeding investment ex-
pansion, while the latter was still figuring out the appropriate risk
reducing principles in needed of establishment.
13Due to the fact that the United States is Mexico’s largest commercial partner and not a
member of the protocol, developing alternative guidelines for the movement of these organ-
isms became an issue of great importance requiring immediate addressing. On October 2003
a trilateral agreement between USA, Canada, and Mexico for the implementation of the pro-
tocol’s Article 18.2(a) on the trans-boundary movement of living modified organisms intended
for food, feed, and processing was signed, terminating the possibility of creating trade disputes.
The document —setting the minimal standards and biosafety procedures that such commod-
ity movements should follow— also serves as example of the influence that international links
have over the biotech regulatory landscape in Mexico (Canada, 2011).
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Another international area of relevance to local policy is that of sanitary mea-
sures related to food safety. On this, the Codex Alimentarius, emanating from the
World Health Organization, puts forward a series of guidelines and principles
on how to assess product innocuousness, including those guidelines for the la-
beling of products containing GMOs. Although not binding, these international
guidelines have encouraged the drafting of a series of propositions and bills
on this last topic, some still circulating within congress. These guidelines will
continue influencing the current Mexican modern biotech landscape in the near
future as applications from these technologies keep moving forward into the
realm of consumer goods.
As for establishing links with international institutions, many are the local
scientist and developers organizations that have developed these. The Inter-
American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture, IICA is considered one of
the most influential international links promoting biotechnology currently op-
erating in Mexico helping develop programs covering specific necessities as de-
fined by the local users. The International Maize and Wheat Improvement Cen-
ter, CIMMYT was also mentioned by several interviewed actors as having close
links with local developers. The center —which emerged from a pilot program
funded by the Mexican government and the Rockefeller Foundation— engages
in cutting-edge research in both genetic engineering and genomics through its
multiple research programs and units. Directed and composed by both local
and international researchers, its genetic resources program, seeds inspection
unit, applied biotechnology center, and germoplasm bank —among other units
and programs— are considered top-notch within the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research, CGIAR network. Lastly, within the frame
of NAFTA is the North American Biotechnology Initiative, NABI serving as a
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forum for the exchange of information in technical areas, such as technology
transfer and previous experience sharing between Canada, the U.S. and Mex-
ico.
2.2.6 Spain
Regulation, Polices and Planning
The current general regulation on S&T in Spain is the formerly mentioned Sci-
entific Research and Development Promotion and General Coordination Law
or Ley 13/1986. This regulation establishes the PNI&D+i as the State’s pro-
grammatic instrument for research, development, and innovation. Required by
law, the plan establishes all medium-term priorities, specifies the instruments to
achieve these goals, and defines ways for its enforcement. Recently revamped
in format and scope for the period 2008-2011, the plan is now divided into four
strategic areas: 1) Knowledge and Capacity Building in S&T; 2) Cooperation in
Development and Innovation; 3) Sectorial Development and Innovation; and,
4) Strategic Actions. In addition to these strategic actions and related plans the
program follows a number of instrumental guidelines and national programs
already existing at various state organizational levels —ranging from human
resource formation to institutional strengthening and coordination.
The plan is further divided into five Strategic Action Programs, one of which
is modern biotech, due to its multidisciplinary character. These five actions aim
at transforming basic research into economic value-added processes, products,
and services by concentrating all governmental R&D+i resources and instru-
ments towards actions that encourage sector linkage.
Also at the programmatic level, the INGENIO 2010 initiative has served as
a cornerstone for S&T in Spain. Through further expanding public resource
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allocation the implementation of multiple strategic actions that aim at linking
research and industry sectors, the initiative puts forward a set of guidelines for
Spain to achieve its goal of converging its local R&D+i investment levels with
those set by the EU.14
Along these lines, another instrument for the promotion of science is the Na-
tional Science and Technology Strategy, ENCyT. This document puts forward
the guidelines and central objectives that, from the views and perspectives of
key actors within the national and regional systems of innovation, should de-
termine the central public policies for S&T locally. Its current 2007-2015 version
expands on efforts to implement the National Development Plans and the IN-
GENIO 2010 initiative.
Almost at the same point in time when the initiative that created the new
Ministry of Science and Innovation was proposed, a bill putting forward a new
S&T law to replace the then current S&T law, Ley 13/1986 was also introduced.
By the end of 2009 the draft reached substantial consensus and successfully
underwent a collective participatory process to obtain further views and com-
14The INGENIO 2010 program central objectives are: a) Increase the investment levels in
R&D+i; b) Aim resources at strategic actions; c) Promote legal reform that encourages R&D+i
activities; and d) Establish and implement a follow-up and policy review system. Addition-
ally, its goals also are promoting regional/territorial coordination, reducing resource disper-
sion, increasing the effectiveness of public investment in R&D+i, and aim at reducing the intra-
territorial investment deficits. Among the instruments and programs emanating from it are: 1)
CONSOLIDER Program, offering funding for mid to long-term projects managed by large re-
search networks in any scientific area; 2) RETICS and CIBER Projects, promoting the formation
of stable research structures within the frame of the National Health and National Science and
Technology Systems through funding for biomedicine and health sciences projects; 3) PLAN 13,
which promotes the inclusion of local and foreign researchers within the National Science and
Technology System; 4) Strategic Fund for Scientific and Technological Infrastructures, promot-
ing the formation of research parks associated to universities or public research centers as well
as equipment and infrastructure renewal; 5) CENIT Program, to stimulate coordination and col-
laboration between the government, industry, universities, research centers and scientific parks
engaged in R&D+i projects; 6) Torres Quevedo Program, which facilitates the inclusion of pub-
lic researchers into the private sector; 7) NEOTEC Fund, consisting in venture capital funds to
help create start-ups and spin-offs; 8) AVANZA Plan, aiming at converging local IT capacity
with that of the E.U.; 9) EUROINGENIO 2010 Program, aiming at gaining a higher returns per-
centage from funds provided by the E.U. through its VII European Union frame Program for
R&D+i (MICINN, 2011a).
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ments. According to several interviewed actors, numerous social agents —such
as representatives from all Autonomous Communities, various actors speaking
on behalf of scientific communities and associations, university representatives,
and numerous independent experts and interested citizens— had the opportu-
nity to offer their views and recommendations through such participatory exer-
cises. Numerous of these proposed amendments were included in the complete
an agreed text approved by the Council of Ministers before being sent to the
Chamber of Deputies for its enactment as Law on 7 May 2010. This bill came
into force on 12 May 2011 as Ley 14/2011 derogating all previsions set by the Ley
13/1986. This regulation aims at strengthening the State’s organizational and
planning abilities as set by the current lay (which consist on the development
and implementation of the central National Scientific Research and Technologi-
cal Development Plan). It also puts forward a more dynamic S&T promotional
system that considers: a) the Autonomous Communities’ capacity to define
R&D+i instruments, policies and funding schemes; b) Spain’s full integration to
the EU; c) the demand for more innovative administrative and funding schemes
(through the establishment of a State Research Agency); d) the expansion of the
local scientific community and the absence of a well defined science-oriented
career path; and e) the Spanish S&T System’s need for integration and full mo-
bility within international schemes. It further puts forward the establishment of
a Research Ethics Committee to monitor and issue recommendations on princi-
ples and best practices regarding scientific endeavor. Although modern biotech
is not explicitly mentioned within its text, both the administrative and institu-
tional schemes proposed in this new regulation will continue affecting its local
development (MICINN, 2011b).
Ranging from Laws and Royal Decrees down to Orders and Communica-
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tions, rules and regulations affecting modern biotech have a hierarchical degree
in Spain, in a similar way to that followed by the EC. The central regulatory
instrument in this area existing within Spain is the Ley 9/2003, which establishes
the framework for the confined use, voluntary release and marketing of GMOs.
The Law defines the role and composition of each of the institutional members
within the authorization, review and supervision procedures, as well a the role
played by the Autonomous Communities in the each of these processes. It fur-
ther specifies the guidelines for each of the three cases as well as the general
norms regarding new risks, confidentiality and public communication, emer-
gency situations, and labeling of products containing these organisms. Finally,
it establishes authority fees as well as sanctions and policing systems.
The law’s implementation is detailed within the Real Decreto 178/2004, which
delineates the operation rules for the complete regulatory framework and estab-
lishes all biosafety and risk assessment/risk management procedures required
to obtain authorization for each type of activity. The decree also both launches
and provides legal character to the Inter-ministerial Council for GMOs and the
National Biosafety Commission.
In the area of genetically modified seeds and plants the Ley 30/2006, relative
to the treatment of seeds and greenhouse plants and fitogenetic resources, puts
forward the rules for monitoring these type of organisms and establishes a reg-
istry for both plant varieties and seeds. Furthermore, it defines the requirements
and procedures for their production and marketing and sets rules for the import
and distribution as well as control and certification of these. It introduces guide-
lines for the access to genetic resources, as well as key specifications about how
to gain access to these when used in research, betterment, and to promote sus-
tainable use and conservation activities. Organizations and individuals outside
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Spain requesting access to these resources will have to abide to the specifications
set by the EU directives on this matter and will only be able to do so if their coun-
try or state have previously signed agreements with Spain on the transfer and
exchange of these materials. Moreover, it reinforces the Autonomous Commu-
nities’ faculty to define independent rules for the access to resources endemic to
their regions. As for the receptors’ responsibilities, the statute makes clear that
these cannot claim intellectual property rights on any parts if such claim can re-
strict the access to these resources for agriculture and food uses, as found in their
natural state (or as these were when access to these was granted to the patent
filling party). Receptors cannot transfer these to third parties without explicit
consent of the granting authorities, and are required to report every two years
any application or discovery stemming from research and use of these recourses
(with the exception of strictly confidential information, as defined within inter-
national IPRs guidelines) for a period of twenty years. Lastly, those individuals
or entities marketing products which incorporate genetic material derived from
these resources are required to allow unrestricted access to such products to any
individual or institution within Spain that intends to engage in further research
and/or genetic betterment activities using these, also abiding to existing inter-
national IPRs guidelines.
Expanding on this topic, the Ley 30/2006 establishes the National Program
for the Sustained Protect and Collection of Genetic Resources for Agriculture
and Food. Based on the principles defined within the international treaty of the
same name, this program: a) promotes a responsible and appropriate use and
protection of these resources; b) creates the National Collection Network, serv-
ing as data and seeds bank; and c) establishes the National Center for Genetic
Resources, which serves as expert advice provider for regulatory authorities.
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Detailing with the enforcement of this Law is the Real Decreto 1891/2008,
which approves the Reglamento or rules for the authorization and registry of
seeds and greenhouse plants producers and the rules for their inclusion within
the National Producers Registry. These by-laws define the producer’s classifica-
tion as well as the operation rules these need to follow to achieve registration.15
On animal health the central regulation with implications on modern biotech
is the Ley 8/2003. This regulation sets the parameters for disease prevention,
control, and eradication as well as the guidelines for animal export/import
practices. It sets a national emergency system and a network of laboratories
engaged in research on disease prevention and the development of veterinary
products. It further sets the rules for the production and commercialization of
veterinary medicines and other zoo-sanitary products, as well as for feed prod-
ucts. Additional regulation on the authorization, marketing, and use of zoo-
sanitary products is given by the Real Decreto 488/2010, which includes aspects
of public safety of those veterinary products not regulated by the previously
mentioned animal health Law. Lastly, the Real Decreto 1201/2005, sets guidelines
for the protection of animals used in research; including those that are geneti-
cally modified or which are used in research using GMOs.
Medicines and sanitary products are regulated by the Ley 29/2006, on the
guarantees and uses of medicines and sanitary products. This statute develops
a general regulatory framework for medicine production, ranging from rules for
basic manufacturing to traceability and labeling, as well as one for substances
and materials used in these production processes. Advanced therapies based on
15Other regulations associated to vegetable and plants affecting modern biotech are the Ley
3/2000, establishing the regulatory framework for the protection of new vegetable varieties; the
Real Decreto 289/2003, on the marketing of forestry reproductive materials; The Reglamento for
the registry of commercial vegetable varieties; Orden ARM/405/2009, establishing the Reglamento
that sets the technical rules for the control and certification of seeds for feed plants; the Real
Decreto 929/1995, setting the technical rules for the control and certification of greenhouse fruit
plants; and those setting specific rules for particular crops like corn, soy, potato, etc. (EC, 2011a).
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modern biotech and those being produced with GMOs are also reviewed within
these rules.
Defining the particulars of authorization, registry, and disbursement of in-
dustrially manufactured medications for human use —and addressing modern
biotech outputs in a more direct way— is the Real Decreto 1345/2007. As a sup-
plement to Ley 29/2006, this statute specifies the necessary steps required for
sanitary products to reach commercialization, including those produced with
GMOs. These rules establish the biosafety guidelines for medicines using or
being produced with GMOs. Depending on their use and type, these prod-
ucts require environmental risk assessment before commercial authorization is
granted. Further risk evaluation to estimate possible side effects of these organ-
isms on the receptor individuals are compulsory in the cases when these are
used to produce or are themselves part of human advanced therapy medica-
tions. The risk management procedures required by this decree rely heavily on
the parameters set by the Ley 9/2003 and Real Decreto 178/2004. Rules for the
management of genetically modified animals, when these are the originators
or carriers of genetic modification tissue, cells, or parts of these to be used for
these therapies, also falls within the scope of this statute, complemented by the
previously mentioned Real Decreto 1201/2005.
Veterinary medicines using GMOs as inputs or parts of these also fall within
the framework of the Ley 29/2006. The particulars of their management are
detailed within the Real Decreto 1246/2008, on the authorization, registry, and
overview of industrially produced veterinary medicine and the Real Decreto
109/1995, on veterinary medications and general rules for veterinary medicines.
The main regulation on biomedical research is the Ley 14/2007, which lays
down the principles and guidelines for biomedical research within Spain. It
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addresses issues regarding human subject’s informed decisions and the ac-
cess/protection of private information; discrimination; traceability and medical
biosafety procedures (including those with stem cells and any other type of em-
bryonary cells and tissues); sets limits to research and procedures using genetic
engineering techniques; and, establishes the Research Ethics Committees super-
vising these activities. Furthermore, it defines both the National Cellular Line
Bank and the National Bio-bank Registry, to help manage the dissemination
and use of human genetic resources. The statute, which has had great lever-
age in the promotion of the current basic research system, also puts forward
multiple guidelines to help establish coordination between the National Health
System and private medical and research institutions (public-private coopera-
tion). Likewise, it defines guidelines for human capital formation in biomedical
areas and the establishment of funding schemes for basic research.
Treatment of cells and tissues within biomedical research —including stem
cells and any other type of cell that has been genetically modified or enhanced—
is defined within two statutes: The Real Decreto 1301/2006, setting the quality
and safety norms for the donation, access, evaluation, processing, preserving,
storing, and distribution of cells and human tissue; and the Real Decreto 65/2006,
that establishes the requirements for the import and export of biological sam-
ples. When engaging on clinical essays or any other type of research using
GMOs, biosafety rules and other compulsory contentious procedures are fur-
ther detailed by the Spanish Medicine and Sanitary Products Agency, based on
principles set within both Ley 9/2003 and Real Decreto 178/2004.16 Specifically
16Other regulations affecting GMOs associated with the production of medications and san-
itary services, clinical studies and other pharmaceuticals are the Real Decreto 824/2010, regulat-
ing pharmaceutical laboratories, pharmaceutical input producers, and the international trade of
medicines and research medications; Real Decreto 223/2004, providing guidelines for clinical es-
says with medicines; Real Decreto 1277/2003, establishing the general bases to authorize sanitary
centers, services, and establishments; Real Decreto 1591/2009, regulating sanitary products; and
Orden SAS/3470/2009, publishing the guidelines for observational post-authorization research of
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sanctioning faults on human genetic manipulation is the Ley 14/2006, on assisted
human reproduction techniques.
From the perspective of intellectual property modern biotech is addressed
within the Ley 10/2002, which introduces to the current patent law (Ley 11/1986)
rules for the access and deposit of biological material, guidelines on the scope
and range of patentability, and terms for compulsory licensing. Echoing its EC
counterpart, this regulation only fine-tunes the existing framework on IP and
avoids creating a parallel framework exclusively for modern biotech discov-
eries. One additional regulation affecting IPRs is the Real Decreto 55/2002, on
the exploitation and concession of inventions generated within the national re-
search centers. This ruling establishes —much in a similar way to the Bayh-Dole
act in the United States— how the rights over inventions (patents and other con-
tracts regarding these) discovered within public research entities are designated
and how capital returns emanating from these are distributed among these en-
tities and the actual inventors. In general, the regulation establishes that the
national research entities where these inventions took place can either retain or
resign to the full entitlement of these rights. In the former case, any benefits em-
anating from these inventions will be divided one third for the institution, one
third for the actual inventor or inventors, and the last third as decided by the
institution’s directive body. In the latter case the inventor(s) retain most of the
rights, providing a free, non-exclusive, non-transferable license to the research
center plus 20 percent of any capital returns deriving from these. Finally, this
decree also establishes the rules for the case were these inventions where made
within the frame of a contractual agreement or a collaboration agreement, cases
where the guidelines are virtually the same as those followed when the research
human use medications; Real Decreto 2070/1999, regulating donation and clinical use of human
organs and coordinating the territorial organ and tissue donation and transplant (FSS, 2011).
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entity retains all rights.
Lastly, a recently proposed bill to define a Sustainable Economics Law has
introduced a series of reforms with direct implications on the sector’s growth
capacity. The proposals, which have been well received by the industry —in
particular by ASEBIO— puts forward a series of reforms that have an effect
on: a) Public contracts, by suggesting new rules for these and for government
procurement; b) Public-private collaboration and technology transfer, clearly
delimiting rights over inventions developed using public resources; c) IPRs, by
proposing —among other things— a reduction in filing costs and promoting
communitarian filing procedures; d) Fiscal measures, by reducing red tape and
facilitating investment at initial stages of research and; e) on Human capital
formation, by increasing the level and quality of local modern biotech research
personnel.
As mentioned previously, the Autonomous Communities can also define
guidelines supplementing regulations set by both the EC and the Spanish cen-
tral government. In general, few are the rules directly affecting modern biotech
at these levels of federalism, and those existing only detail the supervision and
control of activities regulated by state and continental laws, as well as define
and issue the applicable sanctions in case of infringement. In Catalun˜a, the
Decreto 109/2000 sets a regulatory framework for the confined use and volun-
tary release of GM vegetables, while Madrid established it though its Decreto
109/2000, both a Regional GMO Control Office and a Regional Biosafety Com-
mission. Additionally, the Autonomous Communities of Andalucia, Arago´n,
Asturias, Baleares, Castilla La Mancha, Castilla y Leo´n, Extremadura, Navarra,
and Valencia also have developed local regulations regarding the use and ap-
plication of GMOs.
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International Links
The EC is the central pillar within the EU’s regulatory framework with rights
and obligations under international law and allowed to pass laws and adopt
treaties.17 The central regulatory frame for the EU in R&D is the Council Regula-
tion (EC) 723/2009 establishing the community legal framework for a European
Research Infrastructure Consortium, ERIC. This framework was established to
develop the European Research Area, as well as to promote competitiveness, a
legal framework for this type of infrastructure, which will compensate for the
absence of appropriate national or international regulations, when necessary.
As a member of the EU, Spain’s policies and plans promoting the advance-
ment of S&T (in general) and regulating modern biotech (in particular) are those
set by the EC Commission. In particular, those supporting the advancement of
S&T derive from the principles set by EU’s FP7. As mentioned earlier, the Pro-
gramme —which implements the EU Council’s Lisbon Strategy18 and aims at
17It is important to explain the way regulation within the EU is structured; Article 282 of the
EC Treaty confers upon the EC “the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons”
under the national laws of the Member States [to the EU]. The EU does not have such status.
For this reason any active law within the EU should be referred to as “EC law” and not as “EU
law.” Until November 1993, when the EU Treaty came into force, the EU’s Official Journal,
EUOJ references were to ‘EEC’ law. Since 1993 the EUOJ has used ‘EC’. The EUOJ distinguishes
between EC laws and Police/Judicial Cooperation Decisions, CFSP which are Second and Third
Pillar (EU) instruments. For example (and in order of legal weight), a Council Regulation is
written as ‘Council Regulation (EC) 850/2005’ in the Official Journal; a Commission Directive
is written as ‘Commission Directive 2005/37/EC’ while a CFSP Decision is written as ‘Decision
2001/496/CFSP.’ It is imperative to point out that many journalists, politicians, academics and
lawyers currently refer to regulatory instruments as ‘EU law’ when in fact the technically correct
term is ‘EC law’ (Miller and Clark, 2011).
18The Lisbon Strategy was launched during the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon
(March 2000), by the heads of state or government aiming at making the EU the most competi-
tive economy in the world and achieving full employment by 2010. This strategy rests on three
pillars: 1) an economic pillar preparing the ground for the transition to a competitive, dynamic,
knowledge-based economy. Emphasizing the need to adapt constantly to changes in the infor-
mation society and to boost research and development; 2) a social pillar designed to modernize
the European social model by investing in human resources and combating social exclusion —
expecting member states to invest in education and training, and to conduct an active policy
for employment, making it easier to move to a knowledge economy—; and 3) an environmental
pillar drawing attention to the fact that economic growth must be decoupled from the use of
natural resources (EC, 2011b).
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turning the continental region into the most dynamic competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world— bundles all research-related initiatives within a
single program, playing a crucial role as instrument to achieve growth, com-
petitiveness and employment goals. The initiative puts forward an assortment
of plans and programs in areas related to modern biotech (biopharmaceuticals,
agriculture, the environmental protection, industrial processes, etc.) using a col-
ors nomenclature to differentiate between these.19 Other rules put forward by
the plan are those associated to the operation of multiple structures engaged
in the implementation and further policymaking and planning in these areas at
the continental, national, and regional levels.
The central regulatory instrument defining guidelines mostly for “green”
and “blue” modern biotech is Directive 2009/41/EC on the contained use of ge-
netically modified microorganisms. This legal instrument is oriented towards
ensuring the safe handling and disposal of GMOs and parts of these at the ear-
lier research and development stages, especially when these require experimen-
tal release or before these can become marketable. More specifically, it does so
by setting the guidelines for environmental risk assessment in accordance with
the precautionary principle defined within the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
These lead to the classification of the contained uses, dividing them into four
19As in most EU member countries in Spain modern biotech is commonly differentiated using
a color terminology developed within the 12th European Congress on Biotechnology (August
2005 Copenhagen, Denmark) organized by the European Federation of Biotechnology. Accord-
ing to this terminology modern biotech can be divided into four general categories (or colors)
depending on its focus: white (industrial biotech); red (medical applications); green (food and
feed related); and blue (environmental). Policies and regulations promoting the development,
use and diffusion of modern biotech contained within the legal framework emanating from the
EU Commission and locally enacted can be classified following this color arrangement. Some
of these terms have evolved to accommodate more direct associations, even adding new colors
to describe less conventional sectors and applications. In particular, blue has been associated
to modern biotech associated to the sea and marine species and white (industrial biotech) of-
tentimes is referred to as gray. Other colors —like brown (biotech related to arid zones); black
(bio-terrorism and warfare); gold (bioinformatics, nanobiotech); and grey (classic fermentation
and bioprocesses technology)— are among the additions (DaSilva, 2004).
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classes, each having individual control levels.20 These rules also establish emer-
gency containment plans and measures for cases when safety becomes an issue
or when unintended negative effects arise. This legal framework is comple-
mented by standards provided in Directive 2000/54/EC on the protection of
workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work.
The legal framework used to ensure adequate levels of protection for hu-
man life, health and welfare, as well as for environmental and consumer interest
protection is Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed.
The main objective of this law is to reduce risks from the use of GM food and
feed, while inducing the least possible distortion to markets for these products.
In particular, this regulatory instrument is complemented by both Regulation
(EC) 1830/2003, which guarantees traceability and labeling of GMOs or parts
of these already in the market as products, and by Directive 2001/18/EC on
the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment, which details the princi-
ples and stets the rules for the experimental releases and placing in market of
GMOs within the EU. These also introduce guidelines on restrictions and veto-
ing of GMOs harvesting activities in their territory, for food and feed labeling,
as well as those regarding the threshold for the presence of GM material that is
adventitious or technically unavoidable in products. Together, these three regu-
latory instruments (along with Directive 2009/41/EC), relying on the European
Food Safety Authority, EFSA, define the EC’s general authorization procedure
for products and activities using GMOs.21
20The Community and its Member States signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity in 2000. The Council Decision 2002/628/EC (5) to conclude
the Protocol, on behalf of the Community, was taken on 25 June 2002. It entered into force on 11
September 2003 (EC, 2011c).
21On July 13, 2010 the Commission adopted a proposal that provides more freedom to Mem-
ber States on issues related to GMO crops and their treatment. Although the EC’s science-based
framework remains unaffected, the proposal provides for non-binding guidelines that better re-
flect the possibilities already available for Members States when adopting measures to reduce
unintended presence of GM varieties within conventional or organic crops. This new package
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Although the European part of this policymaking system performs effec-
tively, it does not go without its share of politics. From the perspective of actor
S1-P:
Even when the EFSA displays almost complete autonomy in
decision-making, always supporting its conclusions and assessment
exclusively on scientific evidence and never just on third-party
findings or studies, its resolutions are often restrained by exter-
nal political influence; this pressure induces it to follow an even
tighter precautionary principle approach when reviewing modern
biotech-derived products and processes, often delaying —or even
negating— approval for new products even when its associate ex-
perts find these to be completely safe. This behavior stems from the
fact that GMOs are still somewhat controversial throughout Europe.
Regarding the protection of fitogenetic material Regulation (EC) 870/2004
establishes a Community programme on the conservation, characterization, col-
lection and utilization of genetic resources used in agriculture. When GMOs are
in the form of seeds these are required to obtain authorization by following the
principles set by Directive 2001/18/EEC before being included in the Common
Seeds Catalogue and marketed within the EU. If these are intended for food,
these also require authorization in accordance to Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on
GMO food and feed.22
includes a commission recommendation on the co-existence of GM crops with conventional
and/or organic and provides them flexibility to define lower than the 0.9% unintended GMO
presence threshold for labeling (EC, 2003).
22In addition to the authorization for market placement, genetically modified varieties also
need to comply with the requirements of EU legislation on the marketing of seed and plant
propagating material, as set out in particular in Council Directive 66/401/EEC (June 14 1966)
on the marketing of fodder plant seed, Council Directive 66/402/EEC (June 14 1966) on the mar-
keting of cereal seed, Council Directive 2002/53/EC (June 13 2002) on the common catalogue of
varieties of agricultural plant species, Council Directive 2002/54/EC (June 13 2002) on the mar-
keting of beet seed, Council Directive 2002/55/EC (June 13 2002) on the marketing of vegetable
seed, Council Directive 2002/56/EC (June 13 2002) on the marketing of seed potatoes, Council
Directive 2002/57/EC (June 13 2002) on the marketing of seed of oil and fibre plants, Council
Directive 68/193/EEC (April 9 1968) on the marketing of material for the vegetative propa-
gation of the vine, Council Directive 98/56/EC (July 20 1998) on the marketing of fruit plant
propagating material of ornamental plants, Council Directive 99/105/EC (December 22 1999)
on the marketing of forest reproductive material and Council Directive 2008/90/EC (September
29 2008) on the marketing of fruit plant propagating material and fruit plants intended for fruit
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The trans-boundary movement of GMOs is ruled by Regulation (EC)
1946/2003, requiring Community exporters to ensure that all requirements of
the Advance Informed Agreement Procedure, as set out in Articles 7 to 10, 12
and 14 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, are fulfilled.23
Rules for medical products for human and veterinary use derived from mod-
ern biotech are put forward by Regulation (EC) 726/2004, which lays down the
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medical prod-
ucts for human and veterinary use and establishes the EMA. For various inter-
viewed actors this regulatory instrument has been quite useful as expressed by
actor S9-P:
Experience gained during the twenty-something years since the
Council adopted its first directives on marketing high-technology
medical products —specially those derived from modern biotech—
made evident the need for a centralized authorization procedure that
is compulsory for these types of products. Thus, justifying the estab-
lishment of the EMA. Furthermore, this now centralized evaluation
procedure is helping establish higher levels of scientific evaluation
for these new products within the EU, especially at a time when
the perception and confidence in the evaluation process of patients
and medical professionals organization is key for their success and
prompt approval. Moreover, EMA can now supervise the operation
of the pharmaceutical sector more effectively, as it is becoming the
motor behind new gene and cell therapies throughout Europe.
Advanced therapies and other emerging medicines mostly based on modern
biotech are monitored through Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 on advanced medic-
production. Among them Directives 2002/53/EC and 2002/55/EC contain provisions, which
allow the Member States to prohibit, under certain well-defined conditions, the use of a variety
in all or in parts of its territory or to lay down appropriate conditions for the cultivation of a
variety (EC, 2011d).
23Due to the complexity of this requirement, the EC has been engaged in substantial research
regarding the possible impacts of ‘asynchronous authorizations’ (which means that a certain
GM crop has already been authorized within an exporting country but has yet to be authorized
by an importing one). The conclusions of the EC’s latest and more extensive study on this
suggest that the presence of non-approved GMOs would become an increasingly important
factor that will especially limit future animal feed imports, perhaps leading to further problems
regarding the import of non-feed products to the EU (op.cit.).
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inal therapies. This law is designed to guarantee the free movement of new
therapeutic products within the EU and to facilitate their access into local mar-
kets, while also fostering the competitiveness of Europe-based biotech compa-
nies and guaranteeing higher levels of health protection for patients. The central
elements of this regulation focus on: a) creating a centralized marketing autho-
rization procedure; b) forming a new multidisciplinary expert committee within
the EMA, to assess advanced therapy products and follow their scientific devel-
opment; c) setting technical requirements adapted specially for the particular
characteristics of these products; and d) creating special incentives for SMEs
producing these.24
A series of guidelines affecting the manufacture, characterization and con-
trol of drug substances and drug products deriving from modern biotech are
also put forward by EMA. Among these are rules for environmental risk assess-
ments for medicinal products containing, or consisting of GMOs; production
and quality control procedures for medicinal products derived by recombinant
DNA Technology. Also a number of guiding principles on quality of biotechno-
logical products and processes such as those relative to principles for the deriva-
tion and characterization of cell substrates used for production of biotechnolog-
ical/biological products; the analysis of the expression construct in cell lines
used for production of rDNA derived protein products; gene therapy product
quality aspects in the production of vectors and genetically modified somatic
cells; use of transgenic animals in the manufacture of biological medicinal prod-
24Further regulations affecting modern biotech pharmaceutical and medicinal products are:
Regulation (EC) 1234/2008 concerning the examination of variations to the terms of marketing
authorizations for medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products; Direc-
tive 2001/82/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use; Direc-
tive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating medicinal products for human use; Directive
98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical
standards and regulations; Directive 2004/23/EC setting standards of quality and safety for the
donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage, and distribution of human
tissues and cells; Directive 2001/20/EC; among other (Miller and Clark, 2011).
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ucts for human use; and production and quality control of cytokine products
derived by biotechnological process, among various other.
The protection of intellectual and industrial property associated to modern
biotech is specified by Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechno-
logical inventions. The instrument, more than creating a separate body of law
for these types of inventions, puts forward a series of revisions to the existing
IPR guidelines that allow treating modern biotech-derived inventions like any
other industrial innovation. It also serves as reference for the harmonization
of rules on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions among member
states, especially those areas regarding patentability of living organisms and
basic biological processes as well as on issues regarding discrepancies between
discovery and invention, and on the principles behind patentability criteria.
As mentioned earlier, these communitarian regulations establish the general
rules for modern biotech in all EU members, setting the framework from which
all local regulatory instruments are hanged from. Local regulations are then
designed (or revamped) to detail their implementation at the state and regional
levels.
2.2.7 Contrasts and Findings
General Observations
There are palpable differences between the systems of innovation and technol-
ogy operating in these two countries. The most obvious stem from their re-
gional economic and geo-political organization; while Mexico benefits from be-
ing neighbor to the largest global economy and from the economic opportuni-
ties derived from NAFTA, by no means has it gained from this as much as Spain
has from being a member state to the EU. As such, Spain has had access to in-
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stitutional resources that —to this date— continue assisting in the consolidation
of its modern biotech sector. It also has benefited from the adoption of sophisti-
cated communitarian regulations that have as well helped setting the proper en-
vironments for this sector to bloom. Furthermore, planning at a communitarian
level has promoted the establishment of a general institutional and regulatory
structure throughout Europe that operates as a single system, allowing multiple
other resources (i.e. information and human capital) to reach all members and
regions and for these to collectively benefit from them, something that has also
worked in favor of the Spanish modern biotech sector.
In Mexico, on the other hand, the flow of resources to sectors associated
to modern biotech has been limited and the existing regulatory and political
frameworks promoting these have yet to produce alluring enough incentives for
private investors. The absence of a general programmatic mechanism that en-
courages the formation of technological systems (actor-networks) and the chan-
nels that could help taking advantage of its closeness to the US and Canada
seem to have also assisted in delaying not only the rise of a local modern biotech
sector, but the advancement of R&D in general. Few —if at all— are the inter-
national institutional resources assisting in the expansion of the local modern
biotech sector, and no initiatives to develop any within the NAFTA framework
appear being in sight.
Although Mexico has membership to various international agreements and
organizations that help define global guidelines on issues related to modern
biotech (UN, WTO, OAS, etc.), the absence of a factual reference point to look
up to when defining these at the local levels has also added to the sector’s struc-
tural drought. At times, local regulators have to choose between following the
approach displayed by the US for these or the more precautionary one proposed
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by the EU when drafting these rules.
It will require much political maneuvering to encourage a revamping of the
current MBTS in Mexico in order to establish novel and functional rules that let
it perform in ways similar to the systems-oriented approach observed in Spain.
As witnessed during the enactment of the Biosafety Law, segments of the local
policymaking system do not seem too elated by the notion of setting (or reduc-
ing) rules that encourage a more active role of the private sector in these areas,
especially when these are closely associated to areas like the access to genetic
resources and IPRs on these. Yet, rules for these areas appear to be long over-
due —as corroborated by the multiple views captured in the previous sections.
Furthermore, additional frameworks might also require substantial reform (in-
vestment and funding, education, fiscal and other public incentives, etc.) to
guarantee the local formation of environments analogous to those that helped
fostering entrepreneurship in modern biotech in Spain.
As part of a larger system, Spain has developed more stylized (and some-
times too intricate) networks than those currently operating in Mexico. In
Spain, the composite associations between individual and/or institutionalized
actors appear to both facilitate the information and resource flows within these
network-systems and to induce the development of multiple informal guide-
lines that —generally— become the basis for future formal rules. This is basi-
cally the cycle that has allowed the sector to move forward. Examples of these
are: the principles behind the interaction between patients and drug developers;
guidelines for data use and access among different research teams within a sin-
gle cluster; and those developing between same-project public and private in-
vestors. Even before reaching considerable levels of formality these tacit agree-
ments help defining the systems-network’s boundaries and pinpointing new
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actors and institutions.
Although Spain has successfully managed to shape for modern biotech an
environment that guarantees collaboration and coordination between sectors,
promotes research, and generates high-quality products and services, one of the
most serious challenges it still faces is finding ways to further encourage private
investment in basic research activities. As mentioned in the opening section of
this chapter, this lack of interest mostly appears to be due to the difficulties of
determining beforehand the possible findings and applications that may result
from such research endeavors. As a consequence projects not carried within the
in-house’ labs and research centers these investors control generally struggle
harder for private resources.
Aware of this shortage, there has been a rise within the Spanish network
of systems of a particular type of bridging figure; a type of connector or
“match-maker” serving as link between venture capital investors and promis-
ing projects. Some of these actors also help projects become more attractive for
investors by sharing cost with them or by facilitating the access of these to the
enormous array of R&D funding schemes for basic research emanating from
the EU and other national frameworks. Although this novel approach, thus far,
has displayed modest benefits for basic research projects and it is often cited as
insufficient to completely bridge the gap between basic and applied research,
its principles have become the source for numerous other initiatives (i.e. biore-
gions, non-for-profit organizations, scientific clusters, etc.) aiming at the same
bridging objectives. These have taken more active roles finding novel ways to
encourage the formation of links between actors, groups of these, institutions,
and sectors (i.e. basic and applied research, private investors, the public sec-
tor, particular interest groups, international organizations, etc.), creating further
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network-inducing mechanisms and adding to the set of informal guidelines that
define and expand the overall system. Furthermore, IPRs regulation in Spain is
ahead to that of Mexico by establishing clear guidelines for benefits distribu-
tion among private and public actors derived from inventions produced within
public research institutions or within the scope of public-private agreements.
Particular Findings
A closer analysis of both nations’ approach towards the promotion of R&D and
modern biotech shows that the richer network of systems operating in Spain
has encouraged the rise of key actors and associations that help further promote
the advancement of the sector. It also provides more evidence to suggest that
Spain’s particular regional and socio-political conditions may have had a higher
hand in the development of the environments necessary for these systems to
rise and flourish than previously estimated. This has also lead to consider that
a series of further structural and institutional reforms beyond those exclusively
targeting R&D and modern biotech promotion will be necessary in Mexico be-
fore the development of many of the essential elements that could help shape
a comparable system to that of Spain takes place. Further, it suggests that a
number of factors that allowed the development and expansion of the sector in
Spain may not yet be available in Mexico, and that a simple adaptation of the
resulting institutions could not be the finest path of action.
To finalize this section and chapter the most relevant elements composing
each system are presented in table 2.3. The next chapter I will formalize this
analysis through the use of systems dynamics modeling techniques to further
elaborate on this comparison.
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CHAPTER 3
DYNAMICS OF TWO MODERN BIOTECH SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION
3.1 Modeling Spain and Mexico’s Modern Biotech Systems
As suggested by the findings presented in the previous chapter, the modern
bio-technological systems of innovation operating in Spain and Mexico display
both differences and similarities; while some of these seem to be deriving from
regional integration and global economic flows, others appear stemming from
political principles and methods well rooted within the actors and institutions
composing them. A closer review of these results as well as the analysis of mul-
tiple studies on the economics of scientific development and on the structure
of systems of innovation allowed sketching a general bio-technological systems
of innovation model (general model from hereon) which displays components
commonly found in both systems.
It is important to emphasize that the structure of this “generic” model was
mostly developed borrowing concepts (assumptions, variables, parameters,
logical relationships, etc.) from neoclassical, endogenous growth theory, and
system dynamics models as well as from principles found within the regional
systems of innovation literature. When findings from the interview analysis
process help further explain this general model’s structure or behavior these are
modeled and introduced into particular sections of it. In cases when findings
explain traits specific to either system, these are modeled and introduced into
later model versions used to assess the effects of such structural and regulatory
variations. In other words, particular traits are introduced to the general model
when it is set to represent either of the systems under scrutiny. Albeit these
considerations, the overall design of this general model ultimately rested on my
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personal conjectures regarding the layout of a modern biotechnological system
of innovation.
This general model, developed using specialized system dynamics model-
ing software, not only provides a broader view of the key institutions, policies,
actors, and connectors composing both systems but also helps to explain the
interaction and dynamics of these when engaged in knowledge and innova-
tion processes. Furthermore, its design permits switching “on” or “off” some of
its parts in order for it to resemble and perform more similarly to either of the
biotech systems analyzed. Additionally, a number of variables in each ’adapted’
version can be calibrated using data from each country to set the initial condi-
tions that allow it to behave more consistently with the system it is set to repre-
sent. This comparative exercise allows a straightforward contrast between these
systems’ structural composition and performance over time. Moreover, when
checking for sensitivity to changes in aspects associated to regulation (IPRs,
biosafety, health safety levels, etc.), policy planning (government funding to
R&D, taxes, international funding, etc.), or innovation management (technol-
ogy transfer, clustering, venture capital investment, etc.) sufficient information
can be obtained to define a series of policy recommendations on how to further
advance the performance of Mexico’s MBTS as represented by the model. Over-
all, based on the assumptions and principles defining the general model, this
exercise offers additional elements to help support the hypothesis that Spain’s
MBTS performs more efficiently than that of Mexico. Lastly, the findings also
help suggest that the Latin American country could learn from the European’s
positive experience when designing future policies to promote the creation of
markets for products and services derived from the use of modern biotech. The
following sections present a general overview of the methodology followed to
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define, calibrate, and validate the results obtained as well as a highly detailed
account of the design of the models considered.
3.1.1 Discussion of Methods I: Overview
This segment provides a brief step-by-step outline of the methodology followed
to design and assess the computer-based formal systems framework for con-
ducting thought experiments about science and technology policies that rests
at the heart of this project. It serves as an overview for the more detailed de-
scription of the methods for this section presented later in the chapter. This
first introduction, more than delving into the design of the various model ver-
sions and its parts, summarizes the series of steps followed to calibrate and
validate each part as well as those to produce and validate their results. It also
describes how comparisons between model versions was performed and how
some of these models were determined to perform better than others and, thus,
how the conclusions for the various experiments performed were reached. It
is important to say that the overall methodology described here is based on
that originally proposed by Milling and Maier (1993); Maier (1998); Milling and
Maier (1996, 2001); and Milling (2001, 1996) in which modeled systems link cog-
nitive processes to computer routines and allow insights into the true behavior
of particular systems of innovation. Yet, the use of the approach here presented
allows concentrating more on the performance of the systems as these change
over time as well as on how specific structural variations alter their behavior.
Essentially, this approach can be considered as one that combines theory-based
investigation and the practical research of laboratory experiments and consti-
tutes, as Milling suggests, a third pillar for rational decision making in R&D
policy.
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Defining a General Model
The first step in this process was to produce a “general” MBTS model that bor-
rowed elements from various existing models currently used to explore the
economics of innovation (Arrow, 1959; Caballero and Jaffe, 1993; Lucas, 1993;
Milling and Maier, 2001; Romer, 1990; Segerstrom, 2007; Shone, 2001); captured
behavioral assumptions from multiple economics and systems of innovation
theories (Aghion et al., 1998, 2009; Balzat, 2006; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982;
Freeman and Polasky, 1992; Lundvall, 1985, 1988, 1992, 1998; Lundvall et al.,
2009; Romer, 1994; Solow, 2000); and was able to display the behavior of a sys-
tem of innovation using a system dynamics approach (Forrester, 1961; Legasto
et al., 1980). For this design it was also necessary to consider the more refined
understanding of the interactions happening within the areas composing these
systems provided by the various key actors interviewed in both countries.1 The
resulting general model comprises five inter-linked modules: 1) Research; 2) De-
velopment; 3) Innovation Management; 4) Resource Management; and 5) R&D
Policy.2
This comprehensive model introduces factors associated to the behavior of
the economic agents and the institutions behind innovation processes and ex-
plores their role in what some authors define as knowledge-based growth (Free-
man and Polasky, 1992; Loasby, 1999). It also examines how the dynamics be-
tween these actor-networks and institutions and changes to the system’s overall
structure affect the performance of its individual parts (Malerba, 2005).
1In upcoming sections it is clearly signaled where the views and opinions of these experts
were considered to define the structure and behavior of the multiple model versions.
2Each of the modules are described from inception to performance in the following sections.
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Initial Experiment: Treatment Ranking
The initial experiment using this model allows comparison of the effects that
change to a number of “control factors” have on its performance as measured
by the behavior of selected response variables.3 These factors are five struc-
tural elements that can be either switched “on” or “off” and the level of two
parametrical variables that can be either reduced, kept constant, or increased
within the modeled system.4 Individual changes to these controlled factors or
combination of these are defined as ‘treatments.’5 In order to measure the true
effects that these treatments have on the general model’s variables, each is ap-
plied while keeping all of its initial conditions constant.6 Therefore, this process
3The selected response variables are: 1) new research (new knowledge); 2) research poten-
tial; 3) new development (new innovations); 4) development potential; 5) to market (new mar-
ketable products); 6) patented knowledge; 7) open access knowledge; 8) research infrastructure
capacity; 9) development infrastructure capacity; 10) government income; 11) venture capital to
research; 12) venture capital to development; 13) level of existing genetic resources; 14) biosafety
level; and 15) health safety inspection level. Although the model displays other response vari-
ables, these were not assessed in this process. Among these are: resources to research coming
from tech transfer to research; resources to research coming from tech transfer to development;
R&Ds savings and expenditure level; and labor hand going to research and development.
4These structural elements that can be switched “on” or “off” capture the presence of venture
capital investment (including international venture capital); the ability of the system to allow
research and/or development clustering; labor mobility between research and development;
and a “royalty-sharing” rule that defines how the results of publicly funded research is allo-
cated. The two parametric factors, on the other hand, affect the behavior of IPRs by extending,
reducing, or keeping constant the length (25 years) and the breadth (set at 50%) of IPR protec-
tion. A further structural element, defined as “match-making” is intrinsic to both, the venture
capital variable and the clustering elements in the model; when venture capital is present in the
model, these two effects encourage investment in either sector (R or D) when either displays
both low financial resources and a high payback probability (as measured by its debt/income
ratio), or suggest the existence of a “common objective” that encourages intra-sector collabora-
tion at any given time. A last switch within the model represents the presence of a fixed amount
of funds coming from the government for R&D. However, due to the fact that both Spain and
Mexico have such a fixed amount of resources per period this switch remains always“on” in
every model’s version and run.
5It is important to point out that when a particular treatment is applied to the general model,
the resulting model is considered to have become a different or “new” model. Therefore, the
terms ‘treatment,’ ‘model,’ and —later in the chapter— ‘policy’ all refer to the same concept in
this chapter and throughout this study.
6The initial conditions considered in this general model are: Yearly interest rate at 3%; price
of knowledge units, 10; labor hand levels at 10,000 (with a research-to-development ratio of 3:1);
level of existing research infrastructure at 10 million (requiring 1,000 units per research worker);
level of existing infrastructure for development at 2 million (requiring 2,000 units per develop-
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allows ranking of the effectiveness of each treatment as measured by variable
response over time.7 Due to the substantial number of treatments that can be
generated through combinations of controlled factors, five with two levels and
two with three for a total of 288 (2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 x 3 = 288), a subset of
34 treatments is used to study the relationship between these and the response
variables’ behavior. The random component at the heart of the general model
requires it to be run 100 times under each of the treatments to produce substan-
tial enough data to capture the behavior of each assessed variable. For every re-
sponse variable the arithmetic mean of 100 observations per simulation period
(50 periods in total representing 25 semi-annual measurements) is obtained and
used to define a single general observation per treatment per period. Such data
serve to run time series regressions used to obtain the trend lines that reflect
the effects that each treatment has on each response variable over time. The
equations for these trend lines offer enough information to make comparisons
between treatments (models, policies) and between the behavior of each of the
response variables in each model. In other words, these allow measurement of
the effectiveness of each of the different model versions and provide more ele-
ments to help conclude if —in fact— Spain’s MBTS as modeled is more efficient
ment worker); government resources, 10 million, with fixed funds to R&D at 0; net financial
resources to research, 5 million; net financial resources to development, 5 million; venture capi-
tal funds 10 million; international venture capital available at 10 million (with 100,000 entering
the fund each cycle and 1% of the total fund gong to investment, when available); savings and
spending both at 0; patents at 0; public knowledge at 100; IPR length at 25 years and breadth at
50%; the levels of natural resources and genetic resources at 10 million; biosafety at 10 million,
with an inspection level of 100,000; and health safety all at 10 million, with an inspection level
of 200,000; and new research and new development set both to a level of 1 to avoid divisions by
zero. These conditions were estimated to guarantee an overall stable performance of the model.
7As suggested, when a treatment is applied to the general model the resulting structural
and parametrical composition is considered itself to be a new model. Thus, two particular
treatments allow to define the general model as either one representing the system operating
in Spain (all structural factors on and parametrical factors constant) or as one representing the
system operating in Mexico (all structural factors off and parametrical factors constant).
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than that modeled as operating in Mexico.8
Using the equation parameters obtained through time series analysis for
each variable, the results are reviewed at 10, 20, and 50 periods (5, 10, and 25
years, respectively) and contrasted with those obtained for each at 2 periods
(first year). This allows one to understand how the response variables behave
over time (short, mid, long term) when the model is under each of the treat-
ments. It further allows one to determine the degree of response that each treat-
ment induces on the variables in each term as well as the percentage change that
each of these responses have compared to their initial level at year 1. These re-
sults —defined as consistency and performance, respectively— are then ranked
at each time period with respect to the results produced by the neutral treat-
ment or model for Mexico (all structural factors off and parametrical factors
constant or “All Off”). Finally, based on these performance and consistency
levels, each treatment’s overall effectiveness is ranked among “best,” “moder-
ate,” or “unsatisfactory” treatments. This initial experiment allows sorting out
the best response-inducing treatments from those with less positive effects on
the selected variables. It also allows determination of where the treatments for
Spain and Mexico rank among this list. Also, by not introducing initial condi-
tions from either Spain or Mexico into the general model the process removes
any possible effects on the variables’ behavior that could be due to the induction
of these.
Due to the large quantity of information produced by this process (15 vari-
ables x 34 treatments = 510 total results), the results reported for each treatment
using the described methodology are exclusively those for the pivotal variable
“New Development.” This variable displays the number of new marketable
8The next section delves into the regression processes followed and the types of equations
used to assess each variable.
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products or services (new markets) in modern biotech that each modeled sys-
tem produces per term.
Second Experiment: Assessing Each Particular System
While providing a first approach to help conclude if the modeled system for
Spain in fact outperforms that for Mexico, the initial experiment also helps to
determine the effects that these two treatments have on the behavior of the vari-
ables before particular conditions from each country are introduced. The second
experiment consists precisely of introducing as much data from each country as
possible into each version of the model before assessing and contrasting their
results. New conditions are introduced by setting the initial rates and levels for
particular flows and stocks at amounts that reflect those displayed by the real
elements modeled within each of the MBTS analyzed.9
Although the absence of formal data and the fact that data collection pro-
cesses in the realm of modern biotech are still at primitive stages in both coun-
tries, various initial conditions can be gathered or defined and introduced in
each model. For the case of Spain the initial conditions were gathered from
three main sources: Relevance of Biotechnology in Spain 2009 (Geno´ma Espan˜a,
2009); OECD Biotechnology Statistics 2009 (van Beuzekom and Arundel, 2009);
and Informe Anual 2009 (ASEBIO, 2010).10 For Mexico’s model these conditions
9Though more initial conditions are available and can be introduced into the model repre-
senting Spain’s MBTS, the number of these has to concur with that of variables available for the
case when the general model describes Mexico’s system; a restriction that derives from the lim-
ited available data for the sector in that country. The agreement in the number of adjusted initial
conditions between model versions is also considered essential to provide more validity to the
response comparison procedure. Furthermore, the level at which some of these parameters are
set also allows for each transformed versions to keep some of its original initial conditions and
still function adequately.
10The initial conditions introduced to the model for Spain are: Interest rate at 3%; tax rate at
35%; price of knowledge units, 100 (one ”knowledge currency” token equals 100 ”knowledge
units”); labor hand levels at 18,000, with a level of 1,000 entering the sector per cycle (with
a research-to-development ratio of 3:1); level of existing research infrastructure at 400 million
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were either obtained or calculated using data produced by the National Institute
of Statistics and Geography, INEGI and by the Mexican Academy of Sciences,
AMC.11
(requiring 10,000 units per research worker per cycle); level of existing infrastructure for devel-
opment at 180 million (requiring 2,000 units per development worker per cycle); government
endowment to R&D at 507 million; net financial resources to research and net financial resources
to development, 0; venture capital funds 120 million; international venture capital available at
100 million (with 100,000 entering the fund each cycle and 1% of the total fund gong to invest-
ment, when the model suggests availability); savings and spendings both at 0; patents at 200;
public knowledge at 1,000; IPR length at 25 years and breadth at 50%; the levels of natural re-
sources and genetic resources at 10 million; biosafety at 10 million, with an inspection level of
100,000; and health safety all at 10 million, with an inspection level of 200,000; and new research
and new development set both to a level of 1 to avoid divisions by zero.
11These initial conditions are: Interest rate at 3%; tax rate at 35%; price per knowledge unit
100; sector’s labor hand at 14,500, with a level of 1,000 entering the sector per cycle and a
research-to-development ratio of 1:5; level of existing research infrastructure at 90 million (with
5,000 units per research worker every cycle); level of existing infrastructure for development at
32 million (requiring 2,000 units per development worker per cycle); government endowment
to R&D at 430 million; net financial resources to research and net financial resources to devel-
opment, 0; venture capital funds, 0; savings and spendings, 0; patents at 186; public knowledge
at 1,000; IPR length at 25 years and breadth at 50%; the levels of natural resources and genetic
resources at 10 million; biosafety at 10 million, with an inspection level of 100,000; and health
safety all at 10 million, with an inspection level of 200,000 (equal to Spain to suggest an “inter-
national standard”); and new research and new development set both to a level of 1 to avoid
divisions by zero. Mexico’s human resources in S&T are calculated using two tables developed
by INEGI: Recursos humanos: Poblacio´n que completo´ exitosamente el nivel de educacio´n ISCED 5 o
superior y esta´ ocupada en actividades de ciencia y tecnologı´a, por nivel de educacio´n y campo de la ciencia
segu´n ocupacio´n, 2008 and Recursos humanos: Miembros del sistema nacional de investigadores segu´n
a´rea de conocimiento, 1991-2010 (INEGI, 2008, 2011). More specifically, by adding the totals for
ciencias naturales y exactas (200,681), ingenierı´a y tecnologı´a (629,833), ciencias de la salud (502,389),
and ciencias agropecuarias (111,972) presented in the first table, a total of 1,444,875 is obtained as
Mexico’s available human resources in S&T. Determining that biotech accounts for about 1% of
all S&T human resources, the figure for the sector comes to be somewhere near 14,500. Then, by
adding the totals for biotecnologa y ciencias agropecuarias (1,711) plus a fraction (10%) of Biologı´a
y Quı´mica (244) and Medicina y Ciencias de la Salud (144), found in the second table’s data, an
approximation to the total number of researchers in biotech or areas related can be calculated
for the year 2008. This sum allows estimating a total of 2,100 as the number of researchers in
biotech and 12,400 as those engaged in development activities in this area. According to a study
on the sate of biotech in Mexico developed in 2010 by the AMC, there are nearly 45 mayor re-
search centers in the country (including professional associations, like the SBMM). Determining
that each can allocate 2 million in resources for human capital, the total infrastructure for hu-
man capital in basic research in Mexico is estimated at 90 million (a capacity of 18,000). For
development, the same source suggests that approximately 375 industries are engaged in pro-
ducing these technologies locally. Determining for these a budget for human capital of 85,000
for each, total infrastructure for human capital in development can then be estimated at 32 mil-
lion (a capacity of 16,000). The difference in costs in human capital personnel (5,000 for those in
research and 2,000 for those in development) is introduced in the model to capture the higher
sophistication (facilities, labs, and other research instruments) that research infrastructure re-
quires to accommodate its human capital. Development work force, on the other hand, requires
less resources as it focuses more on the sector’s managerial and production activities. Therefore,
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Analogous to the first experiment, to produce substantial enough data to
determine the behavior of the assessed variables under each model, each is run
100 times. Once again, for every response variable the arithmetic mean of 100
observations per simulation period is obtained and used to define a single gen-
eral observation per treatment per period. Such data are used to run time series
regressions to generate the trend lines that capture the behavior of each variable
over time. The equations for these lines are then used to make comparisons be-
tween the behavior of each response variable at different time periods within
each model and later to make these comparisons between the results obtained
for each model. Within models, the results obtained for each variable at 2 peri-
ods (1 year) are contrasted with those produced for each at 10, 20, and 50 periods
(5, 10, and 25 years, respectively). This helps to obtain more information about
the effects that these modeled systems have on the selected variables. Between
models, the results for every variable at each of these cycles (2, 10, 20 and 50 pe-
riods) are contrasted to determine which treatment induces a more significant
variable response in the short, mid, and long terms. This allows estimation of
what the areas and terms are in which each model performs more efficiently.
To validate the information produced by these models the variable Patentable
Knowledge —for which data are relatively available and which engulfs the be-
havior of multiple of the reviewed variables— is used as proxy. With the use of
statistical analysis software the distribution that best fits the forecasted data is
determined. Then, the average number of patents produced between 2000 and
2008 for each country is used as validation parameter; if this average falls within
the projected data’s distribution range (percentiles), then it can be inferred that
the data forecasted by both models behave similarly to the official data and,
such resources are mostly aimed at salaries and other types of compensation. Finally, the same
AMC study estimates the number of patents associated to modern biotech in Mexico at around
186 (AMC, 2010).
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thus, that both models reflect the performance of these systems.
Third Experiment: Testing Best Systems
To provide more insights on what policies Mexico can pursue to optimize the
effectiveness of its MBTS, this third experiment assesses the performance of the
model for Mexico while under the treatment that ranked as “best.” In other
words, it tests the variables’ response using a model with all structural elements
“on,” both parametric factors reduced,12 and the initial conditions for Mexico in
place. This process contrasts these results with both, those gathered using the
original model for Mexico and those obtained from the model for Spain. There-
fore, it determines which of these models can be considered a better ’variable
response-inducing policy.’
Again, the process to determine the response of the selected variables re-
lies on running the model 100 times, obtaining for every response variable the
arithmetic mean of 100 observations per simulation period, and using it to de-
fine a single general observation per treatment per period. These data help to
produce the time series regressions necessary to generate the trend lines that
capture the behavior of each variable over time. The equations for these lines
also serve to make the necessary comparisons between the behavior of each re-
sponse variable at different time periods within the “best” model and then to
make comparisons between these results and those previously obtained using
the original model for Mexico and that for Spain. Within this enhanced model,
the results obtained for each variable at 2 periods (1 year) are contrasted with
those produced for each variable at 10, 20, and 50 periods (5, 10, and 25 years,
respectively). This estimates the behavior of the variables over time under this
12In this case the length of intellectual property protection (IPRL) is reduced from 25 to 15
years, while the breadth of their protection (IPRB) is reduced from 0.50 to 0.25.
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policy. Between these three models, the results for every variable at each term
(2, 10, 20 and 50 periods) are contrasted to determine which induces a more
significant variable response in the short, mid, and long terms.
This last experiment rounds-up a series of tests that allow it to conclude if
Mexico’s current MBTS is underperforming as compared to that of Spain and
to help define concrete policy recommendations on how to make it operate
more efficiently and expand modern biotechnology locally. Overall, these ex-
periments also serve to define a number of theoretical considerations to help
expand the theory and methods behind these experiments and to open the door
for various research leads in areas related to modern biotechnology and inno-
vation in Mexico.
3.1.2 Discussion of Methods II: General Model’s Structure and
Key Components
The intricate networks and multiple dimensions in which the elements com-
posing these technological systems simultaneously operate made the design of
a general model quite a complex task. For instance, these systems can be mod-
eled to represent the dynamics of the private industry as it engages in the de-
velopment of new products (markets for innovation) and deals with the entry
of new competitors, giving public policy a secondary role. Conversely, these
systems can also be modeled to describe the dynamics of multiple sectors (in-
dustry, government, research, etc.) operating within a public policy framework
in which producing and transforming the results of research becomes a collec-
tive effort. These sectors would then be aiming at maximizing the potential
of R&D as a single system. This latter approach is, in essence, the one here
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presented. In other words, the perspective from which the general model is
sketched is that of the central planner who engages in the design of an optimal
policy framework; focusing mostly on those elements and interactions associ-
ated to the promotion of biotech and science that are directly influenced by or
considered within public policy decisions and aiming towards maximizing so-
cial benefit through the expansion of R&D potential and the creation of markets.
Yet, aspects of private endeavor and industrial organization —like investment
or technology transfer levels, licensing terms, or labor mobility— are also given
adequate weight within the model.
It is important to point out that, contrary to most economic growth theory
models, the focus of this model is not to determine and maximize a produc-
tion function for R&D with specific output elasticities between its inputs. More
specifically, the model centers on assessing the potential of the sector over time
from an evolutionary perspective, taking into account the interactions between
the stochastic nature of discovery and the continuous advancements in R&D
methods and available resources. This approach is consistent with that of Maier
(1998), Milling (2001, 1996), and Milling and Maier (1993, 1996, 2001), whose
premise suggests that any attempt to characterize a production function for
R&D the same way as those for material goods are could be quite an unprac-
tical and unproductive task. In their own words:
[R]esearch and development deals largely with intangible and at
least partly stochastic processes. The uncertain outcome of indus-
trial R&D is commonly observed. In literature many attempts are
described to define a production function for research and develop-
ment similar to that of material goods. These R&D production func-
tions use as input resources allocated like budget, number of people
assigned or laboratory equipment available. As output for exam-
ple the number of innovations or patents used. These approaches to
model R&D processes fail for several reasons; First, R&D is highly
stochastic, and the input-output relation mapping the R&D produc-
tion function must also be stochastic. Second, the output is extremely
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heterogeneous, which leads to measurement problems (see Schro¨der
(1973) for a discussion of production functions for R&D). Addition-
ally, these models are black box approaches; they are not successful
in describing how the various factors influencing the outcome of this
stage operate together and are not suitable to generate insights in
the development of technological innovations over time. [A] differ-
ent approach is suggested. Since the development of knowledge can
be seen as an evolutionary process, an analogy to biological evolu-
tion theory [can be used to define] how new concepts develop by the
variation and mutation of existing and known solutions. [R]esults
are evaluated on the basis of their viability. If they seem to be su-
perior to previous combinations, they are selected for further de-
velopment, and hence for future evolution; otherwise they are dis-
carded. (Milling and Maier, 2001)
The use of such an approach within the general model here presented allows
concentrating more on the overall performance of the sector as it changes over
time as well as on how specific variations to its structure alter its behavior. The
following section describes the elements, connectors and dynamics of each of
the modules composing the general model as well as a more detailed account of
the adapted biological evolutionary process of R&D found at its core.
A Detailed Description of the General Model
As mentioned in the methods introduction the general model is divided into
five sub-systems or modules: 1) Research; 2) Development; 3) Innovation Man-
agement; 4) Resource Management; and 5) R&D Policy (see figure 3.1). These
modules are linked together through a network of connectors, each displaying a
different polarity depending on the association these establish. The interconnec-
tions between modules create sub-network that either balance or reinforce the
relationship between these. Particularly, Research, Resource Management, and
Development form a reinforcing loop, while —at the same time— both Research
and Development establish a balancing one with Innovation Management. On
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Figure 3.1: Map Layer: Modern Biotech Systems Model
the one hand, this is due to the use of multiple resources in both knowledge cre-
ation (research) and innovation production (development) and to the feedback
that these provide as they expand the resource pool for future activities in both
sectors.
On the other hand, innovation management assists in setting the levels at
which these resources are depleted and looped-back into the resource pools. Si-
multaneously, Resource Management, Innovation Management, and R&D Pol-
icy create a balancing loop between them providing the model with stability as
these engage in a tacit negotiation to establish the optimal levels of depletion
and the rules for the access to basic inputs in order to maintain a sustainable
level of these for R&D activities.
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Research
This module focuses on the behavior of two central stocks: one describing the
system’s research potential and another measuring the level of new knowledge
created and transferred over time. These two stocks are defined by the following
equations:
RPt =
∫ t
0
(InputRt −OutputRt) dt+RPt−1 (3.1)
whereRPt is the overall system’s research potential level as measured by a stock
of inputs; InputRt is the sum of all inputs used in knowledge production at time
dt;OutputRt represents the total depletion of these inputs at time dt;13 andRPt−1
is the initial level of research capacity.
The variables in this first equation are:
InputRt = f(Krt, HCrt, OutGeneRt)
OutputRt = f(RPt)
Krt = f(OutGovtRFundt, OutV CtoRt)
HCt = f(PblKnowt, T eA1Rt, EffectiveLrt)
These equations are a function of other variables, most found within the rest
of the modules composing the model and explained in detail later in this section.
Where Krt represents the sum of all financial resources going to knowl-
edge production and is itself in function of government funding for research,
OutGovtRFundt and the levels of venture capital investment going to research,
13This flow is set in order to balance the levels of research potential, since these do not accu-
mulate over time. This meaning that the mix of inputs used at a specific dt is a unique combi-
nation that produces (or not) a particular level of knowledge or information.
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OutV CtoRt. The variable HCrt displays the levels of human capital avail-
able, which at the same time are in function of the available public knowl-
edge PblKnowt, the existing patented knowledge that has been transferred to
research activities TeA1Rt,14 and the effective labor hand working on research
that has access to such information within the existing research centers.15 The
last component within this set of variables is the level of genetic resources
OutGeneRt, which represents the level of these resources used by the sector
to discover information that can be transformed into new knowledge and later
into innovations.
The second equation explains the dynamics of new knowledge as it moves
from discovery to development (or further research) through technology trans-
fer processes:
NRKA1t =
∫ t
0
(SuccessfulRt − TechTranst) dt+NRKA1t−1 (3.2)
where NRKAt is the new knowledge produced by research activities;
SuccessfulRt is the total number of successful research findings; TechTranst
is the amount of new knowledge transferred through licensing at time dt; and
NRKA1t−1 is the initial stock of new knowledge.
The variables for this equation are:
SuccessfulRt = f(A1Probt, RPt)
TechTranst = f(NRKA1t)
14The nomenclature used for this variable states that its value represents real numbers and
not Ln levels.
15This suggests that the only labor hand that is accounted for in the sector is that which has a
spot within the capacity of the existing research centers at time dt. This “infrastructure capacity”
factor allows for the system to have a labor arbitrage mechanism, process that will be addressed
in later sections.
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where A1Probt represents research’s stochastic probability of success and all
other variables have been previously addressed.
The dynamics within this module are essential for the entire system’s per-
formance, since it is at this stage where knowledge is first produced and trans-
formed. Here a series of inputs are merged together into an easier to quantify
and exchange unit referred to as “knowledge unit.” Knowledge in this form
not only becomes the central input/output of the entire model but also its cur-
rency; once knowledge units become transformed through the model’s pricing
mechanism (found within the Resource Management module), these allow for
unit consistency throughout the entire system. Moreover, this transformation
permits exploring how these units find their way from discovery to application
and further up to becoming the primal inputs in the development processes of
marketable innovations. Figure 3.2 provides a schematic representation of this
first module.
These dynamics suggest that the financial resources encouraging research
activities are the sum of venture capital and government funding. Human capi-
tal, on the other hand, is the sum of the effective labor force operating within the
capacity of the existing research infrastructure having access to both the existing
free-access information (in the form of public knowledge) and the information
that becomes licensed back to research activities at any given time. Genetic
resources also play a key role as the fundamental natural inputs from which in-
formation is extracted to produce new knowledge. As such, these require a use
that balances their depletion and renewal rates. Although being a stock, Research
Potential does not accumulate over time due to the fact that knowledge cannot
be double per individual researcher. Meaning that, although knowledge has no
decreasing returns to scale, if any individual has acquired certain knowledge,
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Figure 3.2: Research Module
learning about it again would provide her no additional value. Additionally,
the module suggests that human capital adds value to the process only when
individuals working in the sector have access to the information available to
the sector at any given time. In other words, it requires that every individual
working to achieve scientific discovery has a spot within the existing research
infrastructure (which has limited capacity) or otherwise her value would be null
to the process. Further, if the available infrastructure could not accommodate
her, she would have to transfer to the development (production) process. As a
consequence, this also requires balancing the formation of existing labor hand
going to research and the growth in capacity of the existing infrastructure at any
given time, which —as mentioned— can only accommodate a limited number
of researchers at any given dt. This human capital mobility aspect of the model
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attempts to capture Lucas’ (1993) claim that the key to success of some newly
industrialized countries is their ability to move more skilled workers quickly
between activity sectors. In this case being research the fundamental sector and
development the secondary. It also allows internalizing aspects of the labor mo-
bility regulation existing within the EU framework.
It is also at this stage where the stochastic component of the model is first
introduced (see figure 3.3). This mechanism —which determines the success
or failure of research activities at any given dt inspired on Milling and Maier
(2001)— bases its behavior on evolutionary biology principles in the following
manner: the probability that Research Potential is successful changes as the levels
of HCr and Kr change over time. In other words, the probability that Research
Potential achieves a higher level of sophistication (evolves) and, thus becomes
successful in producing new knowledge is directly proportional to the levels
of change displayed by these two variables over time. More specifically, two
Monte Carlo functions (MTCK and MTCHC), each with a probability of success
defined by the existing levels16 of HCr and Kr, respectively, are introduced here
to produce a binary response (1 when successful, 0 when not) for each of these
two variables at each dt.
The results generated by the Monte Carlo functions for each of these vari-
16In the general model the probabilities within the Monte Carlo functions MTCK and MTCHC
were set to 40. At such level these distributions randomly generate either a 1 or a 0 with a
mean number of occurrences per unit time of 40/100. However, this does not mean that the
initial conditions for the variables HCr and Kr within the model are set at a level of 40; this
figure (40) only represents an arbitrary level of development selected to represent the degree of
sophistication of these variables in the analyzed systems. Furthermore, it has to be stated that
although the changes affecting these levels vary in the same proportion (the probabilty of the
Monte Carlo functions for each variable and the variables themselves), this does not mean that
the actual levels of change for these are also the same. For example: If the level of Kr at dt − 1
within the model is 1,000 and increases to 1,200 by dt, then the probability of success for the
Monte Carlo function for Kr within the stochastic mechanism of this module would increase in
the same proportion, going from 40 to 48. This means a proportional increase of 20% in each.
Yet, it does not mean that the level of change in both is the same, since for Kr it was 200 while
for MTCK only 8.
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Figure 3.3: Research’s Module Stochastic Component
ables at any given dt are then summed up and compared with the sum of these
same for dt− 1.17 When compared, if the sum of results produced by the Monte
Carlo functions for each variable at dt is higher than that at dt − 1, the process
is considered to have evolved into a higher “state-of-the-art” and thus, Research
Potential at dt is considered successful in its new research production capacity
and above that of the previous dt− 1.18
17These results can either be: a) 2 when the Monte Carlo functions for each variable produce
a successful outcome; b) 1 when only one of the Monte Carlo functions produces a successful
outcome; or c) 0 when both Monte Carlo functions produce failing outcomes.
18Research Potential also moves forward when the sum of outcomes for MTCK and MTCHC
at dt and those for these at dt − 1 are equal to 4. This suggests that Research Potential at dt dis-
plays the capacity to produce knowledge equal to that it had at dt − 1, therefore considering
it successful. This introduces in the model the Learning by Doing effect suggested by Aghion
and Howitt. By allowing the sector to move forward in cases when it displays equally as high
knowledge production capacity as that of an immediate previous period suggests that innova-
tion, in the second term, was achieved through secondary innovation. It is assumed, thus, that
fundamental innovation allowed it to achieve the exemplar quality research potential levels in
the initial term. In other words, both fundamental and secondary innovation activities allow
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This mechanism, however, does not leave the advancement of research
solely to chance, since —as mentioned— the Monte Carlo functions’ probabil-
ities of success also depend on the initial levels at which these are set. In later
model versions these are defined by taking into account historic levels of hu-
man and financial capital allocated for research in each of the systems under
scrutiny. Therefore, the pre-existing levels of these two variables also exert in-
fluence on the overall possibility of success. The degree of change that each of
these two variables expresses every dt is applied to each of these initial levels,
either increasing or reducing the subsequent probability of success for each of
the Monte Carlo stochastic functions and, consequently, that of creating what in
the model is defined as New R Knowledge A1. Therefore, in this model —like in
any evolutionary biological process (i.e. genetic variation)— both random and
non-random effects equally partake in defining the possibility of moving for-
ward to a more developed stage which here translates into a more sophisticated
knowledge finding process.
Development
This second module describes the process in which information obtained
through basic research —along with various other inputs— becomes trans-
formed into innovative products and services. It also shows the procedures
these outputs go through in order to successfully reach the market. Like the
knowledge and information creation mechanism, this module focuses on defin-
ing the levels of multiple stock: the overall system’s development potential,
the stock of new innovations created over time, and the degree of innovations
turned into products or services currently on the market (see figure 3.4).
The equations for these stocks are defined as follows:
Research Potential to evolve into a more sophisticated production level.
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DPt =
∫ t
0
(InputDt −OutputDt) dt+DPt−1 (3.3)
where DPt is the system’s overall development potential level as measured by
a stock of inputs; InputDt is the sum of all inputs used in producing new inno-
vation at time dt; OutputDt represents the depletion of these inputs at time dt;19
and DPt−1 is the existing development capacity.
The variables in this first equation:
InputDt = f(Kdt, HCdt, NatResDept)
OutputDt = f(DPt)
Kdt = f(InDReinvestt, OutGovtDFundt, OutV CtoDt)
HCt = f(PblKnowt, T eA1Dt, EffectiveLdt)
Like with research, these are mostly a function of other variables found
within the multiple modules of the model.
where Kdt represents the sum of all financial resources going to innova-
tion activities and is itself in function of the sector’s degree of reinvestment
InDReinvestt, government funding for development OutGovtDFundt, and
levels of venture capital investment going to development represented by
OutV CtoDt.
The variable HCdt captures the human capital in the sector, which is —
as well as that for research— in function of the available public knowledge
19Just as in the research module, this last flow is set in order to balance the levels of develop-
ment potential, since these also do not accumulate over time. In this case meaning that the mix
of inputs available at a specific dt is a unique combination that produces (or not) a particular
level of innovation.
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Figure 3.4: Development Module: First Two Stocks
PblKnowt, the existing patented knowledge that has been transferred to de-
velopment activities TeA1Dt,20 and the effective labor hand working on creat-
ing the latest innovations having access to such information within the existing
development centers and industries.21 Lastly the level of natural resources de-
pleted NatResDept is taken into account, which in the model represents the
level of resources used (depleted) by the sector in its quest to transform knowl-
edge and information into innovations. As opposed to research, the sector does
not directly deal with genetic resources (although it can be argued that these
are intrinsically accounted for within all natural resources). Instead, the use of
raw materials and the effect that these transformation processes have on the en-
vironment are captured by this variable and displayed as a natural resources’
20The nomenclature used for this variable also suggests that its value is in real numbers and
not Ln levels.
21Then again, this also suggests that the only labor hand accounted for in the sector by the
model is that which has a place within the capacity of the available development infrastructure
at time dt. As mentioned, this ‘infrastructure capacity’ element allows the system to have a labor
arbitrage mechanism.
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depletion rate.
The second equation in this module focuses on how the system’s develop-
ment potential is consolidated into new products and services:
NDi1t =
∫ t
0
(SuccessfulDt −Outi1t) dt+NDi1t−1 (3.4)
where NDi1t is the level of new innovations produced by development activ-
ities; SuccessfulDt is the total number of successful innovations; Outi1t repre-
sents all new innovations that have market potential at dt; and NDi1t−1 is the
initial stock of new innovation.
In particular, the variables in this equation are:
SuccessfulDt = f(i1Probt, DPt)
Outi1t = f(NDi1t)
where i1Probt represents the stochastic probability of successfully developing
innovations while NDi1t−1 has been previously explained.
The dynamics and composition of this module are quite analogous to those
of the Research module, especially when it comes to the evolutionary stochastic
element defining the possibility of successfully developing a series of innova-
tions with sufficient market potential (see figure 3.5). Echoing the dynamics of
that module, the probability of innovation bases its logic on evolutionary biol-
ogy principles; the chance that Development Potential is successful varies as the
levels of HCd and Kd change over time. Then again, the likelihood that De-
velopment Potential achieves a more evolved level (progresses) and, therefore,
becomes successful is directly proportional to the level of change that these two
variables show over time, as well as to the initial levels defined for both Monte
Carlo probabilities at t = 0.22
22Since the process is described in detail in the previous section I will not delve in its dynamics
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Figure 3.5: Development’s Module Stochastic Component
The third equation in the module captures the stock of innovations currently
on market at time dt (see figure 3.6). It is at this stage where those successful
innovations with market potential face the existing regulatory guidelines over-
seeing environmental safety and innocuousness. Based on a dynamic probabil-
ity that is in function of the level of resources allocated for biosafety and human
health review processes at time dt, these new innovations either become part of
the stock of new biotech products or services or become rejected. Particularly,
rejection of these derives from to the impossibility of inspection due to low lev-
els of resources required for either type of inspection.23 The actual InMarkett
here in order to avoid further descriptive redundancies.
23This mechanism is based on a double Monte Carlo probability, each defining the chance of
obtaining either a 1 (pass) or a zero (fail) for either of the regulatory processes. A bundle of suc-
cessful ‘innovations’ reaching this flow require having a positive outcome in both probabilities
in order to become part of the stock of In Market products. The degree at which these probabili-
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Figure 3.6: Development Module: In Market
stock works as a conveyor that holds these new products and services for a pe-
riod of 5 years (or 10 dt in model’s time) before allowing them to exit as these
become obsolete and replaced by new innovations.
The equation for this segment is:
InMarkett =
∫ t
0
(ToMarkett −OffMarkett) dt+ InMarkett−1 (3.5)
where InMarkett represents the stock of innovations in market at dt; ToMarkett
is the volume of new innovation produced by development activities entering
the market at dt; OffMarkett is the total of these that exit the market once
becoming obsolete also at dt; and InMarkett−1 is the initial stock of products
existing in the market.
Simultaneously, the variables:
ToMarkett = f(Outi1t,MktProbt)
ties are set is defined by the amount of resources that each oversight mechanism has at dt, either
increasing or reducing the chances of success. Both mechanisms are explained in more detail in
the upcoming sections addressing the Innovation Management and R&D Policy modules.
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OffMarkett = f(InMarkett)
are in function of other.
where MktProbt represents the new innovation’s stochastic probability of suc-
cessfully reaching the market after going through biosafety and human health
reviews, while all other variables have already been explained. In particular the
behavior of ToMarkett is represented by the following equation:
ToMarkett = (Outi1t ·MktProbt)
The variable MktProbt within this equation requires a deeper expla-
nation; this variable is in function of two other variables —BioMCProbt
and HSMCProbt— which, respectively, set the probabilities within the
Monte Carlo functions for biosafety and health inspection.24 These vari-
ables are —concurrently— in function of two other —BioProbRanget and
HSProbRanget— designed exclusively to establish a range between 0 and 100
for the probabilities at the core of the previous two.25 Lastly, these two vari-
ables setting the operational range are further in function of two more —
BioProbabilityt and HSProbabilityt— which ultimately define the levels (num-
bers) that are used as probabilities within the Monte Carlo functions established
by the BioProbabilityt and BioProbabilityt variables. These last two are defined
within the biosafety and health inspection mechanisms described in the upcom-
ing Innovation Management module. This whole set of interlinked variables is
24The Monte Carlo functions within both BioMCProbt and BioMCProbt randomly gen-
erate a series of zeros or ones, based on a probability ultimately defined by the lev-
els of BioProbabilityt and HSProbabilityt and within the range 0 and 100 established by
BioProbRanget and HSProbRanget. As explained previously, such levels represent the per-
centage probability of either passing (1) or failing (0) to comply with the biosafety or health
inspection requirements per unit of simulation time. In order for a bundle of innovations to
reach the market, the outcome of both Monte Carlo probabilities has to be 1.
25This is due to the fact that, when using STELLA, the probability of a Monte Carlo statistical
function that is evaluated to a number outside the 0 and 100 range, is automatically set to 0 by
the program.
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captured by the following functions:
MktProbt = f(HSMCProbt, BioMCProbt)
and:
HSMCProbt = f(HSProbRanget)
BioMCProbt = f(BioProbRanget)
HSProbRanget = f(HSProbabilityt)
BioMCProbt = f(BioProbabilityt)
whereMktProbt is the probability of new innovations reaching the market after
being assessed by biosafety and health inspection services; BioMCProbt and
HSMCProbt are the Monte Carlo functions defining the probability of success-
fully complying with the biosafety and health inspection requirements, respec-
tively; BioProbRanget and HSProbRanget are the logical functions setting the
range within which the probabilities for both Monte Carlo functions are differ-
ent from 026; and BioProbabilityt and HSProbabilityt are the probability levels
26The variables HSProbabilityt and BioProbabilityt are defined by the following logical al-
gorithmic commands:
if HSProbabilityt >100 then
HSProbabilityt ← 100
else
HSProbabilityt ← HSProbabilityt
and:
if BioProbabilityt >100 then
BioProbabilityt ← 100
else
BioProbabilityt ← BioProbabilityt
These last two variables assure that the probability range of the two Monte Carlo probabilities
controlling both biosafety and health inspection always remain between 0 and 100, a necessary
condition for the appropriate performance of this type of statistical function. This is due to the
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for each Monte Carlo function as defined within the model by the biosafety and
health inspection mechanisms, respectively.
Innovation Management
This module details how the system copes with the results of both R&D activ-
ities by describing the dynamics of novel processes and institutional arrange-
ments defined to bridge these two areas and to allow the results of innovation
to enter the market system. It also focuses on explaining how the available
infrastructure in both areas accommodates human capital engaged either in the
production of new information or that of goods and services derived from mod-
ern biotech. The three sub-systems at the center of this module target: 1) the
transferring and accessing of patented and public information; 2) the dynam-
ics of both biosafety review processes and health safety inspection mechanisms;
and 3) the behavior of existing R&D infrastructure as it harbors and allocates
the available human capital.
A pivotal segment of this module explains how information is managed and
how parts of it becomes either protected and privately exploited —through the
use of patents— or publicly available within open-access information pools.
This mechanism also explains how protected information is licensed by the re-
search sector that produced it either to public and private industrial develop-
ers (innovation centers and firms) or back to research centers. Further, it cap-
tures the dynamics and effects stemming from cooperative activities in which
organisms from either sector share information within physical or intangible
clusters. The stocks devoted to information management represented within
fact that the biosafety and health inspection probability level may well dwell beyond this range
and, thus, interfere with the appropriate functioning of the mechanism and that of the overall
model. In upcoming sections both components, their levels, and sources will be explained in
more detail.
145
this segment measure the level of patents, the level of these that —once their
patents expire— become free-access knowledge, and the overall stock of pub-
lic knowledge (see figure 3.7). These processes were developed and inspired
by the notions and measurement of creative destruction, knowledge obsolesce,
and knowledge spillovers in growth processes deeply studied by Caballero and
Jaffe (1993).
The equations for the first two stocks within this sub-system represent the
levels of patented knowledge and those of information becoming free-access as
follows:
PatentA1t =
∫ t
0
(InPatentA1t − ToFreeA1t)dt+ PatentA1t−1 (3.6)
and
FreeAccessA1t =
∫ t
0
(ToFreeA1t−ToPubKnowt)dt+FreeAccessA1t−1 (3.7)
where PatentA1t represents the stock of patented information at dt;
InPatentA1t is the flow of new information produced by research activities be-
ing transferred from Research and thus, patented at dt; ToFreeA1t is the flow
of free-access information moving into public knowledge pools once its patents
expire at dt; and PatentA1t−1 is the initial stock of patents existing in the system.
In the second equation FreeAccessA1t represents the stock of patented in-
formation that becomes public when the patent period ends at dt; ToFreeA1t
is explained above; ToPubKnowt is the flow going to the already existing
free-access information pools (in function of the levels of FreeAccessA1t); and
FreeAccessA1t−1 is the initial stock of information with expired patent protec-
tion available within the system.
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Figure 3.7: Innovation Module: Information Management Stocks
The variables in these flows are a function of:
InPatentA1t = f(R2DTechTransfert)
ToFreeA1t = f(Lenghtt)
and
ToPubKnowt = f(FreeAccessA1t)
Where R2DTechTransfert represents the true levels of information (knowl-
edge) transferred from research to development and is in function of both
IPREffectt, which shows the average level of protection that IPR regulation
displays at dt27, and TTet, which shows the degree of technology transfer in
27The level of this variable represents a compound average composed by the breadth and
length levels of IPR in the model at dt. Its detailed composition is addressed in the R&D Policy
module.
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real numbers. This last variable (TTet) serves as a temporary “translator” for
ToTechTransfert, which provides the levels of technology transfer in Ln. This
is due to the fact that the degree of technology transfer from research is multi-
plied by the level of protection that IPR regulation displays at dt to obtain the
percentage of information that can subject to IPR regulation from that which
cannot. Thus, establishing what percentage of this falls directly into public
knowledge.28 Lenghtt displays the length of the patent as established by the
IPR system within the R&D Policy module. Finally, ToPubKnowt is in function
of the stock of existing free-access information (once patented information) go-
ing into the already existing open-access information pools.
The stock explaining the degree of public knowledge available in the system
is expressed by the following equation:
PublicKnowt =
∫ t
0
(InPubKnowt−OutPubKnowt)dt+PublicKnowt−1 (3.8)
Where PublicKnowt is the stock of public information (knowledge) available
at at dt; InPublicKnowt represents the inflow of free information becoming
public and is itself in function of multiple variables; OutPublicKnowt is the
flow balancing the levels of public information stock, which set a deprecia-
tion rate at which information becomes available and, therefore, less novel; and
PublicKnowt−1 is the level of free access information at dt− 1.
In particular, the flows InPublicKnowt and OutPublicKnowt display the fol-
lowing functions:
InPublicKnowt = f(ToPubKnowt, TTet, R2DTechTransfert, ClusteringEffectt)
28Later, within the R2DTechTransfert converter, the result of this operation is transformed
back into Ln levels to be consistent with the flows going into the PatentA1 stock.
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and
OutPublicKnowt = f(PKDepreciationt)
Where ToPubKnowt, R2DTechTransfert, and TTet have been previously ex-
plained and ClusteringEffectt is a decision mechanism which defines the in-
formation sharing rate within clustering initiatives when these are present in
the model. This effect measures how a fraction of private information that
is shared within these processes achieves an almost “quasi-public” degree in-
ducing knowledge spillovers. Therefore, becoming part of the stock of public
knowledge (see figure 3.8). In particular, this clustering trait is introduced in
the model inspired on the views of representatives from Barcelona’s bioregion
BioCat and those provided by researchers within the PRBB describing the effec-
tiveness at the regional level of these collaborative initiatives.29
The process describes the logical functions accounting for these spillovers
when either research or development (or both) clusterings are available in the
model as follows: The spillover levels in either research or development are de-
fined by the variables SpillRClustt and SpillDClustt, respectively. Since these
variables are expressed in Ln terms, the levels of these are translated into natu-
ral numbers by the variables eSRCt and eSDCt which then become part of the
logical functions that define the total spillover effects. Being both RClusteringt
and DClusteringt two of the effects that can be induced in this model (later de-
fined as ‘treatments’ in the experiment design section) these can be either “on”
(1) or “off” (0) to display when these are present. In the case where both are off,
29A clear example is captured in the opinion of an expert in bioinformatics and genomics
form Catalun˜a who mentioned that “breaking away for traditional structures, these new config-
urations facilitate accessing funding and issuing more expedited decisions on hiring and going
about research projects.” Other experts in Spain stated that clustering also induced the “cre-
ation of multiple public-private [research] initiatives as well as the establishment of ‘friendly’
competition.” This, in addition to “fostering collaboration between scientific parks and research
centers among which the formation of highly skilled research groups happens.”
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Figure 3.8: Clustering Effect Decision Process
the level of the variable NoClustert within this process is set to be 0. The cen-
tral variable in this process, SpillEffectt, expresses the flow of spillovers that
will be added to the information flow depending on a combination of the above
mentioned factors and is in function of five variables —V 0t, V 1t, V 2t, V 3t, and
V 4t— each expressing a logical function.
The thread of logical functions these variables establish is the following:30
SpillEffectt:
if V 1t = 1 then
V 1t← 0
30The first two logical functions are defined to avoid calculating spillovers when the level of
these is actually 0. This is due to the fact that any Ln term equal to 0 would be translated into 1
when transformed back to natural numbers. In other words, if the sum of eSRCt and eSDCt is
2 —when both clustering effects are present— or 1 —when only one of these is present— it can
be inferred that the spillover effect for that dt is 0.
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else
V 1t← V 0t
V 0t:
if V 1t = 2 then
V 1t← 0
else
V 1t← V 1t
V 1t:
if RClusteringt = 1 and
DClusteringt =1 then
V 1t← (eSRCt + eSDCt)
else
V 1t← V 2t
V 2t:
if RClusteringt = 1 and
DClusteringt =0 then
V 2t← (eSRCt)
else
V 2t← V 3t
V 3t:
if RClusteringt = 0 and
DClusteringt =1 then
V 3t← (eSDCt)
else
V 3t← V 4t
and:
V 4t:
if RClusteringt = 0 and
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DClusteringt =0 then
V 4t← NoClustert
else
V 4t← 0
Lastly for this segment, the variable PKDepreciationt represents the rate at
which the stock of free-access information loses novelty and is defined as:
PKDepreciationt = e
−0.02·t
This depreciation rate, however, does not imply diminishing returns in the
utility of information in a pure neoclassical sense, instead it tries to capture a
reduction in novelty once it becomes public.
The second part within this section details the information transferring pro-
cess as well as the actual levels of clustering when these scenarios are present.
There are two pairs of stock at the center of this mechanism, depending on
whether clustering is available or not in the model (see figure 3.9). In the case
when clustering is not available these are: the level of information licensed to
development and that licensed back to research. The equations for these two
central stocks are:
LicensedRt =
∫ t
0
(InLicRt −OutA1Rt)dt+ LicensedRt−1 (3.9)
and
LicensedDt =
∫ t
0
(InLicDt −OutA1Dt)dt+ LicensedDt−1 (3.10)
Where LincensedRt is the stock of available information (knowledge) protected
through IPR schemes licensed for research activities at dt; InLicRt represents
the inflow of protected information coming from Research into the stock of li-
censed knowledge going to research, which is itself in function of the fraction
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Figure 3.9: Information Transferring and Clustering Process
of the stock of available information that has not been licensed to development
(more on this later); OutA1Rt is the actual outflow of protected information that
loops back to research activities and balances the stock of protected information
for these; and LicensedRt−1 is the level of protected information for research
at dt − 1. For the second equation, LincensedDt is the stock of IPR protected
information licensed to development and innovation industries at dt; InLicDt
represents the inflow of protected information coming from Research into the
stock of licensed knowledge going to development, which is itself in function of
other variables (that will also be explained in short); OutA1Dt is the outflow of
protected information going to development activities and balancing the levels
of available stock transferred to innovation; and LicensedDt−1 is the quantity of
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available protected information for development at dt− 1.
The mechanism setting the levels at which information within the model
is transferred either to research or development is inspired by the “match-
making” processes provided by particular agents within Spain’s MBTS. As de-
scribed by various interviewed actors, these serve —among other things— as
’knowledge brokers’ for specific productive or research sectors and thus, play a
key role in bridging the gap between basic and applied endeavors. Institutions
like Genoma Espan˜a at the national level, BioCat and Madrid Bio at the regional,
and particular offices within the PRBB and PCB are examples of institutions
offering these types of services. The design of this mechanism also took into
account other views provided by representatives of the Catalun˜a biomedical
research park and the EBF on the limitations that these systems have so far dis-
played. In particular, it considers those relative to the effects of development’s
reduced demand for new knowledge and low commercial value patents.
In this process a set of logical functions allows for any available information
produced by the research sector that can be protected through IPRs to be imme-
diately allocated within development activities when the latter sector’s innova-
tion stock displays low levels. This also allows for any residual information to
be allocated within research whenever it is not directly supplied to development
activities. The process happens within the two inflows going either to research
or development, which are explained by the following set of functions:
InLicDt = f(InPatentA1t, IPRTransfer%t,MatchType1t)
InLicRt = f(LeftoverIPt)
and
MatchType1t = f(NDi1t)
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MatchType2t = f(MatchType1t)
LeftoverIPt = f(InPatentA1t,MatchType2t)
Where InLicRt and InLicDt represent the inflows going to LicensedRt and
LicensedDt stocks and are represented by the following algebraic and logical
functions, respectively:
InLicRt = LeftoverIPt
and
InLicDt:
if MatchType1t = 1 then
MatchType1t← InPatentA1t
else
MatchType1t← (IPRTransfer%t) x (InPatentA1t)
While InPatentt has been previously explained, the variable IPRTransfer%t
represents a fixed fraction at which new knowledge is commonly transferred
from research to development. Yet, since it is practically impossible to estab-
lish such “transfer degree” the value of this variable is set to 0, suggesting that
when there is no match-making process, the connection between research and
development is equally impossible to define.31
Further, MatchType1t defines the fraction of patented new knowledge that
goes to development and operates through the following logical function:
MatchType1t:
if NDi1t <1 and ToTechTransfert >0 then
31This last notion is introduced in the model to capture the notion that, by its very definition,
scientific activity is a risky process which output cannot be predicted perfectly from its inputs
suggested by Arrow (1959). Thus, justifying all match-making endeavors (and the inclusion
of these in the general model). However, in the general model this fraction can be arbitrarily
defined in the absence of the match-making process. Future research could assist in defining
proxies of this fraction for different R&D areas.
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MatchType1t← 1
else
MatchType1t← 0
This process allows for the results of research activities —when available—
to be transferred to development when the stock of new innovations within
that module are low (meaning that when the system’s development potential
has not been able to successfully produce new innovations, due in part to its
stochastic component, its demand for new knowledge increases). Conversely,
MatchType2t and LeftoverIPt set a mechanism that allows for new knowledge
that was not allocated to development —because the sector successfully pro-
duced innovations at dt— to loop back into research for its use through the
following logical functions:
MatchType2t:
if MatchType1t = 1 then
MatchType2t← 0
else
MatchType2t← 1
and
LeftoverIPt:
if MatchType2t = 1 then
LeftoverIPt← InPatentA1t
else
LeftoverIPt← IPRTransfer%t
Last, both outflows OutA1Rt and OutA1Dt coming from the main
LicensedRt and LicensedDt stocks connect to two converters: A1Rt and A1Dt.
These converters, which capture the total level of new knowledge transferred to
either research or development, are explained in detail in the next segment.
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For the case when clustering is available, the equations defining the pair of
stocks at the center of the process are:
LicRClustt =
∫ t
0
(InLicRCltt−OutLicRCltt−SpillRClustt)dt+LicRClustt−1
(3.11)
and
LicDClustt =
∫ t
0
(InLicDCltt−OutLicDCltt−SpillDClustt)dt+LicDClustt−1
(3.12)
Where LicRClustt and LicDClustt are the stock of information available when
clustering is present; InLicRCltt and InLicDCltt are the flows of informa-
tion coming into the clustering conveyors at dt and are equal to InLicRt and
InLicDt, respectively; OutLicRCltt and OutLicDCltt are each the contents of
outflow slats of information exiting each conveyor every 3 dt; LicRClustt−1 and
LicDClustt−1 are the initial levels of each conveyor at dt − 1; and SpillRClustt
and SpillDClustt represent the fraction of information “leaking” every dt from
either conveyor and are both set to be 40% of the available stock. As suggested,
these stocks work as conveyors that, instead of holding information for one pe-
riod, hold new information for a period of 3 years (or 6 dt in model’s time) before
allowing it to flow out of the system. The logic behind this process is that infor-
mation —when shared— displays a “multiplicative effect” quite similar to that
of free-access information, allowing whatever sector that incurs in clustering to
add such level of information to its stock for a longer period of time (beyond the
conventional one period benefit when no clustering is present). Furthermore,
when patented new information becomes shared within a cluster it produces a
series of spillovers that are added to the stock of public-access information for
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as long as the information remains within these conveyors. This process further
introduces in the general model the quasi-public good nature of information
suggested in Arrow (1959); Romer (1990); Jones and Romer (2009).
Finally for this segment, just as in the previous no-clustering case, the two
outflows coming from these conveyors OutLicRCltt and OutLicDCltt connect
to the A1Rt and A1Dt converters. Also connecting to these converters are other
two, RClusteringt and DClusteringt, which hold the commands that signal if
the model’s clustering capacity for either sector is turned on or off. Following a
series of logical commands, the former converters display the appropriate level
of new knowledge transferred to either sector depending on what the latter con-
verters express about clustering. These commands are:
A1Rt:
if RClusteringt = 1 then
RClusteringt← OutLicRCltt
else
RClusteringt← OutA1Rt
and
A1Dt:
if DClusteringt = 1 then
DClusteringt← OutLicDCltt
else
DClusteringt← OutA1Dt
The third and fourth subsystems, respectively, explain how biosafety and
health safety are introduced into the general model and managed within this
module. The first of these subsystems captures commonalities found between
the processes described within the biosafety regulatory frameworks of Spain
(EU Directives 2009/41/EC and 2000/54/EC and Ley 9/2003; Real Decreto
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178/2004) and Mexico (Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms Law and its
Reglamento). Therefore, it considers the important role that these newly minted
commissions on biosafety have played in the advancement of modern biotech
in both nations, as suggested by the various actors operating in these systems.32
However, more than describing the operation of a central biosafety commis-
sion, this mechanism depicts the dynamics behind the network of institutions
engaged in this type of review processes hired by this agency (see figure 3.10).
In particular, the biosafety process is defined by two stocks with equations:
BioIndRest =
∫ t
0
(InBioIndt − BioIndtoGovtt)dt+BioIndRest−1 (3.13)
and
BioProbt =
∫ t
0
(InProbt −OutProbt)dt+BioProbt−1 (3.14)
Where BioIndRest represent the stock of resources available for biosafety re-
view processes at dt; InBioIndt is the flow of resources coming to biosafety
from the industry at dt; BioIndtoGovtt is the outflow of resources coming from
the available stock at dt and defined by a logical function. This last flow is
considered a tax paid by the innovation sector to achieve certification for new
products and services and, as so, goes to the stock of government resources
within the Resource Management module; BioIndRest−1 is the stock of biosafety
32This becomes clear in the views of a representative of the bio-pharma industry in Spain
who declared that “since the European Council adopted its first directives on marketing high-
technology medical products —specially those deriving from modern biotech— made evident
the need for a centralized authorization procedure that is compulsory for these types of prod-
ucts. Furthermore, this now centralized evaluation procedure is helping establish higher levels
of scientific evaluation for these new products within the EU, especially at a time when the
perception and confidence in the evaluation process of patients and medical professionals is
key for their success and prompt approval.” The relevance of these institutions is also captured
in the opinion of a representative of Mexico’s biosafety commission, who declared that “even
before having judicial character, the commission helped promote the enacting of the current
biosafety of GMOs regulation. Serving also as model for other developing nations pursuing the
advancement of these technologies.”
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Figure 3.10: Biosafety Process
resources at dt− 1. For the second equation BioProbt represents the probability
of the Monte Carlo statistical function that defines whether a batch of new in-
novations comply with biosafety levels at dt. Its initial stock level is set to be 80;
InProbt defines how the probability of success defined by the BioProbt stock
changes overtime. This flow is in function of a set of logical functions which de-
fine the actual degree of change (explained later); OutProbt is the outflow that
balances the probability levels each dt; and BioProbt−1 is the probability level at
dt− 1.
The variables InBioIndt and BioIndtoGovtt display the functions:
InBioIndt = f(NDevPayt)
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and
BioIndtoGovtt = f(BiosafetyReviewCostst, SuccessfulDt)
Where InBioIndt is equal to NDevPayt; NDevPayt represents no payment
from the innovation industry to biosafety and is part of a logical function
scheme that sets the degree at which the inflow of resources coming to biosafety
activities varies over time. This variable is itself in function of: Y DevPayt,
BiosafetyLevelt, and CapitalDt. More specifically, the process these variables
engage in is composed as follows:
NDevPayt:
if CapitalDt = 0 then
NDevPayt← (0 x BiosafetyLevelt) x CapitalDt
else
NDevPayt← Y DevPayt
and
Y DevPayt:
if not CapitalDt = 0 and CapitalDt <1,000 then
Y DevPayt← (0.5 x BiosafetyLevelt) x CapitalDt
else
Y DevPayt← (BiosafetyLevelt x CapitalDt)
The two propositions at the center of this process suggest that the amount
the industry pays for biosafety services depends on the amount of capital that
the sector generates every dt; the enforceable burden percentage —set at 10% of
CapitalDt— is required by law when the sector’s earnings are above a certain
level (in this case when CapitalDt >1000). Conversely, only half of this tax is
required when earnings are below the threshold and no payment is due if at
any given dt the industry produces no capital. The Presence of capital earnings
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(or lack of these) implies that the sector was successful (or not) in producing
new biotech innovations and thus, requiring biosafety review for these before
they can enter the market.
The variable BioIndtoGovtt is in function of, BiosafetyReviewCostst which
represents the costs of biosafety review per batch of new innovation produced
at dt, set in the model at a price of 10,000,33 while SuccessfulDt has been
previously explained within the Development module. Using these variables
BioIndtoGovtt defines the following logical function also suggesting that the
industry incurs in biosafety expenses only when new biotech innovations with
market potential are developed:
BioIndtoGovtt:
if SuccessfulDt >0 then
BioIndtoGovtt← BiosafetyReviewCostst
else
BioIndtoGovtt← 0
The variables in the flows and converters to and from BioProbt, on the other
hand, display the functions:
InProbt = f(IfChanget, IfNoChanget, BioProbt)
and
OutProbt = f(BioProbt)
Where InProbt is the degree at which BioProbt changes each dt and is de-
fined through a logical function which uses the values characterized by the
IfChanget and IfNoChanget converters as well as the level of the stock
33The knowledge-units-to-price process is later explained within the Resource Management
module.
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BioProbt to do so; IfChanget is the last echelon of a thread of logical func-
tions defining the actual fraction of change; IfNoChanget is a constant fraction
of change set at 0.5; andOutProbt balancesBioProbt allowing it to change every
dt.
The logical command defined by InProbt is:
InProbt:
if IfChanget >0 then
InProbt← (BioProbt + IfChanget)
else
InProbt← (BioProbt - IfNoChanget)
As mentioned, the variable IfChanget is atop of a thread of logical func-
tions, which associates six converters —BioEffectt, BioEffect1t, BioEffect2t,
BioEffect3t, BioEffect4t, and BioEffect5t—, the stock BioIndRest, and the
constant (set at 1) defined by the converter BioProbChange. This logical func-
tions thread is:
IfChanget:
if BioEffectt >0 then
IfChanget← BioEffectt
else
IfChanget← 0
BioEffectt:
if BioIndRest = 0 then
BioEffectt← (BioProbChaget x BioIndRest)
else
BioEffectt← BioEffect1t
BioEffect1t:
if BioIndRest >10,000,000 then
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BioEffect1t← BioProbChaget
else
BioEffect1t← BioEffect2t
BioEffect2t:
if not BioIndRest >10,000,000 or BioIndRest = 0 and
BioIndRest >5,000,000 then
BioEffect2t← (0.5 x BioProbChaget)
else
BioEffect2t← BioEffect3t
BioEffect3t:
if not BioIndRest >5,000,000 and BioIndRest >2,500,000
then
BioEffect3t← (0.25 x BioProbChaget)
else
BioEffect3t← BioEffect4t
BioEffect4t:
if not BioIndRest >2,500,000 and BioIndRest >1,000,000
then
BioEffect4t← (0.1 x BioProbChaget)
else
BioEffect4t← BioEffect5t
BioEffect5t:
if not BioIndRest >1,000,000 and BioIndRest >100,000
then
BioEffect5t← (0.05 x BioProbChaget)
else
BioEffect5t← 0
Each of these ”effects” displays a level of change affecting the overall prob-
ability of passing biosafety inspection. The degree of these, concurrently, is in
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function of the potential value (in price levels) that a series of successful inno-
vations has at any given dt.34
Lastly within this biosafety process, the converter BioProbRanget defines
the probability set by the stock BioProbt in order to keep it within the 0 to 100
range required for the Monte Carlo stochastic process BioMCProbt within the
Development module to operate. This is achieved through the following logical
function:
BioProbRanget:
if BioProbt >100 then
BioProbRanget← 100
else
BioProbRanget← BioProbt
The subsystem defining health inspection services operates in an analo-
gous way to that of biosafety. This mechanism is also inspired on the pro-
cesses described within the multiple health inspection regulations operating in
Spain (Regulation (EC) 726/2004; Ley 29/2006; Decretos Reales 1345/2007; and
1201/2005) and Mexico (General Health Law and its multiple Reglamentos). It
also captures the relevance of the role that central agencies in charge of health
inspection services have, as pointed out by both representatives of the EFB,
Spain’s bio-pharma industry and Mexico’s agriculture ministry, CIBIOGEM,
and CONACyT.35 However, this segment of the model depicts the dynamics
34The levels of potential value displayed for BioIndRest as well as the proportions by which
BioProbChaget is multiplied within each converter are those used later on to assess the behav-
ior of both the models representing the cases of Mexico and Spain. These are set at equal levels
due to the fact that both countries abide to practically the same international biosafety norms,
and because their local regulatory frameworks are mostly based on these norms.
35This is captured perfectly in the words of a representative of Spain’s bio-pharma sector who
stated that “the [recently created] European Medicines Agency can now supervise the operation
of the pharmaceuticals sector more effectively, as it is becoming the motor behind new gene and
cell therapies throughout Europe.”
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behind the network of institutions engaged in these type of review processes
and not on that of the specific central agencies themselves (see figure 3.11).
In this case the two equations at the center of the process are:
HealthSFundt =
∫ t
0
(InHSFundt−OutHSFundt)dt+HealthSFundt−1 (3.15)
and
HSProbt =
∫ t
0
(InHSProbt −OutHSProbt)dt+HSProbt−1 (3.16)
Where HealthSafeFundt represents the stock of resources available for health
inspection services processes at dt; InHSFundt is the flow of resources com-
ing to health inspection services from the industry at dt; OutHSFundt is the
outflow of resources coming from the available stock when health inspection is
required at dt, defined by a logical function. This last flow, instead of being con-
sidered a tax (like biosafety is) is framed by a payment made by the innovation
sector to independent safety review service providers (such as laboratories) to
achieve a quality standard required for new products and services for human or
animal use; HealthSFundt−1 is the stock of health inspection service resources
at dt − 1. The second equation HSProbt is the probability of the Monte Carlo
statistical function that defines whether a cluster of new innovations comply
with the health inspection levels at dt. The initial level for this stock is set to 75;
InHSProbt defines how the probability of success, given by the HSProbt stock,
changes overtime. This flow is also in function of a set of logical functions which
define the actual degree of change (explained later); OutHSProbt is the outflow
that balances the probability levels each dt; and HSProbt−1 is the probability
level at dt− 1.
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Figure 3.11: Health Inspection Process
The variables InHSFundt and OutHSFundt display the functions:
InHSFundt = f(NDevHSPayt)
and
OutHSFundt = f(HSInspectLevelt, SuccessfulDt)
Where InHSFundt is equal to NDevHSPayt; NDevHSPayt represents no pay-
ment from the innovation industry to health services and is part of a logical
function scheme that sets the degree at which the inflow of resources coming
to health inspection activities vary over time. This variable is itself in function
of: Y DevHSPayt, HealthSafeRatet, and CapitalDt. The process described by
these variables is composed as:
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NDevHSPayt:
if CapitalDt = 0 then
NDevHSPayt← (0 xHealthSafeRatet) xCapitalDt
else
NDevHSPayt← Y DevHSPayt
and
Y DevHSPayt:
if not CapitalDt = 0 and CapitalDt <1,000 then
Y DevHSPayt ← (0.5 x HealthSafeRatet) x
CapitalDt
else
Y DevHSPayt← (HealthSafeRatet x CapitalDt)
The two propositions in this process suggest as well that the amount the
industry pays for health services depends on the amount of capital generated
every dt; the enforceable percentage of income devoted to these services is set
at 15% of CapitalDt and is also required by law when the sector’s earnings
are above a determinate level (in this case when CapitalDt >1,000). So as for
biosafety, the required income percentage when earnings are below this thresh-
old is half (7.5%) and no payment is required if there are no innovations to re-
view at dt, meaning that the industry generated no capital. Analogous to the
biosafety process, the presence of capital earnings (or lack of these) also implies
that the sector was successful (or not) in producing new biotech innovations
and, thus, requiring health safety review for these before these can enter the
market.
The flow OutHSFundt, in function of HSInspectLevelt, represents the costs
of these review procedures per output of new innovation produced at dt. Being
more specific than those required by biosafety, these are set at a price of 200,000.
SuccessfulDt has been addressed earlier. Using these variables, OutHsFundt
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defines the following logical function explaining how the industry invests in
health safety when it produces new biotech innovations with market potential:
OutHSFundt:
if SuccessfulDt >0 then
OutHSFundt← HSInspectLevelt
else
OutHSFundt← 0
Alternatively, the variables in the flows and converters to and fromHSProbt
have the functions:
InHSProbt = f(IfHSChanget, IfHSNoChanget, BioProbt)
and
OutProbt = f(HSProbt)
Where InHSProbt is the degree at which HSProbt changes each dt and is also
defined through a logical function that uses the values expressed by the con-
verters IfHSChanget and IfHSNoChanget, as well as the level of the stock
HSProbt, to do so; IfHSChanget is the last link of a thread of logical functions
defining the fraction of change; IfHSNoChanget is again a fraction of change
set at a constant 0.5; and OutHSProbt balances HSProbt allowing it to produce
a different level every dt. The logical command defined by InHSProbt is:
InHSProbt:
if IfHSChanget >0 then
InHSProbt← (HSProbt + IfHSChanget)
else
InHSProbt← (HSProbt - IfHSNoChanget)
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The thread of logical functions headed by the variable IfHSChanget also as-
sociates six converters —HSEffectt, HSEffect1t, HSEffect2t, HSEffect3t,
HSEffect4t,HSEffect5t—, the stockHealthSFundt, and the constant (fixed at
1) defined by the converter HSProbChange. This set of logical functions thread
is:
IfHSChanget:
if HSEffectt >0 then
IfHSChanget← HSEffectt
else
IfHSChanget← 0
HSEffectt:
if HealthSFundt = 0 then
HSEffectt← (HSProbChaget x HealthSFundt)
else
HSEffectt← HSEffect1t
HSEffect1t:
if HealthSFundt >10,000,000 then
HSEffect1t← HSProbChaget
else
HSEffect1t← HSEffect2t
HSEffect2t:
if notHealthSFundt >10,000,000 orHealthSFundt = 0 and
HealthSFundt >9,000,000 then
HSEffect2t← (0.75 x HSProbChaget)
else
HSEffect2t← HSEffect3t
HSEffect3t:
if notHealthSFundt >9,000,000 andBioIndRest >8,000,000
then
170
HSEffect3t← (0.5 x HSProbChaget)
else
HSEffect3t← HSEffect4t
HSEffect4t:
if notHealthSFundt>8,000,000 andHealthSFundt>7,000,000
then
HSEffect4t← (0.25 x HSProbChaget)
else
HSEffect4t← HSEffect5t
HSEffect5t:
if notHealthSFundt>7,000,000 andHealthSFundt>6,000,000
then
HSEffect5t← (0.05 x HSProbChaget)
else
HSEffect5t← 0
Once again, each of these effects shows a degree of change affecting the over-
all probability of obtaining positive health safety inspection certification. The
degree of these is also in function of the potential value in price levels that a
series of successful innovations has at any given dt.36
Also in this subsystem a converter HSProbRanget defines the probability
set by the stock HSProbt so it remains within the 0 to 100 range required by the
Monte Carlo stochastic process BioMCProbt found in the Development module.
The following logical function sets this range:
HSProbRanget:
if HSProbt >100 then
HSProbRanget← 100
36Also here the levels of potential value displayed for HealthSFundt as well as the propor-
tions by which HSProbChaget is multiplied within each converter, are those used later on to
assess the behavior of both the model representing the cases of Mexico and that of Spain.
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else
HSProbRanget← HSProbt
The last segment within this module focuses on the system’s infrastructure,
describing how it fluctuates, captures investment, and allocates the existing re-
search and development human capital over time. This mechanism points out
the pivotal role that the public and private research centers mentioned by the
multiple interviewed actors (like those ascribed to CONACyT, UNAM, and the
National Polytechnic Institute-IPN in Mexico and those part of the National Re-
search Council, CSIC, in Spain) have had in the development of this technology
(see figure 3.12).
The two central stocks in this segment display the levels of existing infras-
tructure in each sector and are defined by the equations:
RInfrat =
∫ t
0
(InRInfrat −OutRInfrat)dt+RInfrat−1 (3.17)
and
DInfrat =
∫ t
0
(InDInfrat −OutDInfrat)dt+DInfrat−1 (3.18)
Where RInfrat is the level of existing research infrastructure measured in hu-
man capital levels; InRInfrat is the inflow of resources going to research infras-
tructure; OutRInfrat is the depletion level at which research infrastructure is
used, depreciates, or becomes obsolete balancing the stock; andRInfrat−1 is the
available stock of research infrastructure available at dt−1. Conversely,DInfrat
is the level of existing development infrastructure measured in human capital
levels; InDInfrat is the inflow of resources flowing into development infras-
tructure;OutDInfrat is the depletion level at which development infrastructure
is used, depreciates, or becomes obsolete balancing the stock; and DInfrat−1 is
the available stock of development infrastructure available at dt− 1.
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Figure 3.12: Infrastructure Mechanism
The variables InRInfrat and OutRInfrat as well as InDInfrat and
OutDInfrat are a function of other variables as expressed by the following func-
tions:
InRInfrat = f(BRInfraResourcest)
OutRInfrat = f(RInfraDept, RInfrat)
and
InDInfrat = f(ToDInfrat)
OutRInfrat = f(RInfraDept, DInfrat)
Where BRInfraResourcest is the stock of resources going to basic research
from technology transfer activities and government funding (explained in more
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detail within the Resource Management module); RInfraDept is the depreciation
rate of basic and applied research infrastructure; andRInfrat —as mentioned—
is the available research infrastructure stock measured in human capital levels at
dt; ToDInfrat is the fraction of resources generated by development activities
that are allocated for infrastructure; and RInfraDept and Dinfrat have been
previously addressed.
The mathematical association between these variables is expressed by the
equations:
InRInfrat = BRInfraResourcest
OutRInfrat = RInfraDept ·RInfrat
InDInfrat = ToDInfrat
and
OutDInfrat = RInfraDept ·DInfrat
The actual infrastructure capacities measured in labor (human capital) are
given within the RInfraLCapacityt and the DInfraLCapacityt converters,
where:
RInfraLCapacityt =
RInfrat
InfraUnitsPerLrt
and
DInfraLCapacityt =
DInfrat
InfraUnitsPerLdt
define the actual number of individuals each sector can allocate at any given dt.
Finally, the converter TotalR&DInfrat defines the sum of infrastructure
available for both research and development within the system at any given
time as:
TotalR&DInfrat = RInfrat +DInfrat
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Resource Management
This module focuses on explaining the management of the essential inputs used
in R&D processes like the accumulation and flow of human, financial, and nat-
ural resources. The behavior of exogenous variables associated to these —like
population growth and the actual level of existing natural resources — is also
considered. Further, the networks linked to the formation of new infrastruc-
ture and the variables affecting the degree and pace at which these cope with
and incorporate labor hand into scientific and innovation activities is explored
as well. The subsystems found in this module are allocated into six areas: 1)
financial resources; 2) R&D savings and spending; 3) investment; 4) resources
for infrastructure; 5) human capital; and 6) natural resources.
The financial resources area focuses on the net income accumulation going
and flowing from three areas: a) research; b) development; and c) government.
The first of these segments, addressing research, explains the levels of three
stock through the following main equations:
TechTRtoDt =
∫ t
0
(InTTfromDt−OutTTfromDt)dt+TechTRtoDt−1 (3.19)
TechTRtoRt =
∫ t
0
(InTTfromRt−OutTTfromRt)dt+TechTRtoRt−1 (3.20)
and
NetF inRest =
∫ t
0
(InResRt −OutNetF inRt)dt+NetF inRest−1 (3.21)
Where for the first equation TechTRtoDt is the total stock of financial re-
sources obtained by research as a sector from licensing new research (patented
information) for development activities; InTTfromDt is the actual inflow of
these resources coming from development as this sector pays for license usage;
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OutTTfromDt is the balancing outflow of these resources going to either rein-
vestment in research activities, research infrastructure, or as taxes to the govern-
ment (explained in detail later); and TechTRtoDt is the initial stock of financial
resources obtained by the research sector from licensing new research for devel-
opment activities. In the second equation TechTRtoRt represents the stock of
financial resources obtained by research as a sector from licensing new research
to other research activities; InTTfromRt is the inflow of resources coming from
other research areas as these pay for the licensing fees; OutTTfromDt is the
balancing outflow of these resources going to either reinvestment in research
activities or research infrastructure. Since the benefits obtained from licens-
ing back to research are considered as a redistributing research funding, these
are considered tax exempt (this process is also explained in detail later); and
TechTRtoRt is the initial stock of financial resources obtained from licensing
back to research. In the final equation NetF inRest is the total stock of financial
resources going back to research either from licensing to development or back to
research; InResRt is the inflow of these resources, coming as a fraction of both
OutTTfromDt and OutTTfromRt; the outflow of these resources considered
as net income for research is given by OutNetF inRt; and NetF inRest−1 is the
initial stock of these resources (see figure 3.13).
Within the first main equation relative to resources coming from tech
transfer to development, the level of InTTfromDt is given by the converter
FromLicensingDt which ultimately defines the amount of financial resources
coming from development into research every dt. The level of this variable is
composed by the licensing rate plus the present value of the annual royalty
charged from licensing. This value is then multiplied by MktProbt, which rep-
resents the probability that innovations resulting from transferred knowledge
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Figure 3.13: Financial Resources to Research
(A1) pass both biosafety and health inspection reviews (as explained in the pre-
vious Development segment). This last step assures that research collects royal-
ties only when technology transfer produces innovations that reach the market.
Further, since new knowledge (A1) is defined in “knowledge units” it has to be
transformed (multiplied) by a demand Price DPricet —set here at 100— before
any financial valuation process is performed. It is assumed in the model that if
new knowledge successfully becomes transformed into innovations and passes
inspection, the market is willing to pay 100 times its original pre-transformation
value. Thus, suggesting that the total market potential value of knowledge (A1)
at any dt is one-hundred times that of its displayed untransformed level. Fur-
thermore, since this market value is also given in terms of “knowledge units,”
unit consistency is assured throughout the model. The process captured by this
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converter is given by the equation:
AnnDPVt = MktProbt ·
[
AnnDt ·
(
1− ((1 + rt)−Lenghtt)
rt
)]
Where AnnDPVt is total annual fee coming from tech transfer licensing to de-
velopment, composed by the present value of the annual royalty charged for
licensing multiplied by MktProbt, which is the probability that the innovation
passes both biosafety and health inspection; AnnDt is the initial licensing fee;
rt is the interest rate at which financial resources are discounted, set at 3%; and
Lenghtt represents the length of the patent as established by the IPR system
within the R&D Policy module and is attached to a slider input device which
allows changing its level at the model’s interface.
The variable AnnDt plays a key role in this process by defining the amount
of royalty as a fraction of the overall potential market value of transferred new
knowledge (A1). This variable sets the equation:
AnnDt = (TeA1Dt ·DPricet) ·RoyaltyLevelt
Where TeA1Dt is the last echelon of a series of converters that translate the level
of transferred new knowledge (A1) from Ln into real numbers before it can un-
dergo a series of mathematical operations; DPricet is the per “knowledge unit”
demand price; andRoyaltyLevelt is the fraction of transformed knowledge units
that is charged as royalties for the use of new knowledge (A1), set at 4% of the
total potential value of new knowledge (A1) at dt. As suggested, the level of
A1Dt is translated from Ln to natural numbers within a series of converters.
The converter eA1Dt begins the process through the following antilog transfor-
mation:
eA1Dt = e
A1Dt
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Lastly, the converter TeA1Dt sets a logical function that assures that when
such transformation displays a value of 1, it becomes transformed into 0 (zero).
This is due to the fact that when this transformation displays a level of 1 it is in
fact capturing zero A1 production (an A1Dt of 0) in the model at that particular
dt. This function is:
TeA1Dt:
if eA1Dt = 1 then
TeA1Dt← 0
else
TeA1Dt← eA1Dt
On the other end of this first main equation defining the total stock of fi-
nancial resources obtained by research from licensing new research for de-
velopment activities, the outflow OutTTfromDt —which is in function of
TechTRtoDt— helps delimit three flows: TTRtoGovtt, TTRtoRInfrat, and
TTRtoRt. These represent the fraction of this income going into the govern-
ment as tax, to finance research infrastructure, or to fund further research, re-
spectively. The level of each is defined by the converter TTDfract, set at an even
33.33%. Affecting this particular allocation level is the converter RoyaltyRulet
which represents whether or not a royalty rule is established, making the model
emulate the royalty sharing rule set within Spain’s Real Decreto 55/2002 which
establishes how the rights over inventions discovered within public research
entities are designated and how capital returns emanating from these are dis-
tributed among these centers and the actual inventors. Again, this converter is
controlled by a switch within the model’s interface that either allows for this
rule to be available or not. In particular, the behavior of each of the above men-
tioned flows is defined by a logical function which translates whether the pro-
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portion of OutTTfromDt going into it is set by TTDfract or by RoyaltyRulet.
The thread of functions is:
TTRtoGovtt:
if RoyatyRulet = 1 then
TTRtoGovtt← (OutTTfromDt x TTDfract)
else
TTRtoGovtt← 0
TTRtoRInfrat:
if RoyatyRulet = 1 then
TTRtoRInfrat← (OutTTfromDt x TTDfract)
else
TTRtoRInfrat← (OutTTfromDt x 0.20)
TTRtoRt:
if RoyatyRulet = 1 then
TTRtoRt← (OutTTfromDt x TTDfract)
else
TTRtoRt← (OutTTfromDt x 0.80)
Each of these flows become part of the total inflow of financial resources go-
ing to specific stocks (net financial resources to government and basic research
resources for infrastructure, for the case of the first two). However, TTRtoRt is
the only one that becomes a fraction of the inflow going to research’s net stock
of financial resources defined by NetF inRest.
Like in the first main equation, the flow InTTfromRt is given —in this
case— by the converter FromLicensingRt which defines the amount of finan-
cial resources coming from research back to research every dt. In a similar way,
the level of this variable is composed by the licensing rate plus the present value
of the annual royalty charged from licensing. The value here is multiplied by
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MatchType2t, which, as explained in the Development module, represents the
probability that newly produced knowledge is not allocated within the devel-
opment sector and thus, becomes available for transfer back to research. The
rest of the process is completely analogous to that followed by the pricing and
valuation processes explained for new knowledge (A1) when it becomes trans-
ferred to development. The equation for the case of research royalty valuation
is:
AnnRPVt = MatchType2t ·
[
AnnRt ·
(
1− ((1 + rt)−Lenghtt)
rt
)]
Where AnnRPVt is total annual fee coming from tech transfer licensing to re-
search, composed by the present value of the annual royalty charged for licens-
ing multiplied by MatchType2t, which is the probability that the innovation is
allocated back to research activities; AnnRt is the initial licensing fee; rt is the
interest rate (3%); and Lenghtt is the length of the patent as established by the
IPR system and ultimately defined by the slider input device at the model’s
interface.
Again, the variable AnnRt defines the amount of royalty as a fraction of the
overall potential market value of transferred new knowledge (A1) with equa-
tion:
AnnRt = (TeA1Rt ·DPricet) ·RoyaltyLevelt
Where TeA1Rt is the last converter translating the level of transferred new
knowledge (A1) from Ln into real numbers; DPricet is the per knowledge unit
demand price and, since it is set by the market, it is at the same level as that for
A1 transferred to development; andRoyaltyLevelt is the fraction of transformed
knowledge units that is charged as royalties (4% of A1’s total potential value at
dt). Here eA1Rt begins the Ln-to-natural number process using the transforma-
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tion:
eA1Rt = e
A1Rt
Finally, the converter TeA1Rt also sets a logical function assuring that when
such transformation encounters a value equal to 1 in Ln terms, it translates it to
0 in natural numbers. The function is:
TeA1Rt:
if eA1Rt = 1 then
TeA1Rt← 0
else
TeA1Rt← eA1Rt
In this case the outflow of this second main equation OutTTfromRt —here
in function of TechTRtoRt— helps explain only two flows: TTRtoRInfrat, and
TTRtoRt, to which resources coming from this stock go. As opposed to the out-
flow coming from the stock of resources produced from licensing to develop-
ment, there is no percentage of this serving as taxes, due mainly to the assump-
tion that most resources going into research activities originally stem from the
various levels of government. The fraction going to each is defined by the con-
verter TTRfract, here set at 95%, suggesting that such percentage goes back to
funding research activities and 5% of these resources are allocated to infrastruc-
ture. The functions defining the two flows are:
TTRtoRt = OutTTfromRt · TTRfract
and
TTRtoRInfrat = [OutTTfromRt · (1− TTRfract)]
In the third of the above mentioned main equations, the income coming to
research as a sector is the sum of the portions coming from both licensed to
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research and that from licensing to development. The flow is defined by the
expression:
InResRt = TTRDtoRt + TTRRtoRt
While the outflow OutNetF inRt, is in function of the total stock of financial
resources NetF inResRt and defines the sector’s total income that reaches the
financial market as savings or various types of investment.
The segment explaining the amount of financial income going into devel-
opment is defined by the stock of resources coming from capital gains deriv-
ing from new innovations reaching the market. Two stocks define this level:
TotalDRest, which is the general amount of resources coming into develop-
ment, and NetF inResDt, which is the amount allocated for the sector’s savings
and spending. These stocks are defined by the equations:
TotalResDt =
∫ t
0
(InTotalResDt−OutTotalResDt)dt+TotalResDt−1 (3.22)
and
NetF inResDt =
∫ t
0
(InNetF inDt−OutNetF inDt)dt+NetF inResDt−1 (3.23)
Where in the first equation InTotalResDt is the incoming flow of resources to
development as a sector; OutTotalResDt is the total outflow of these resources
going to either the stock of net resources or to infrastructure investment; and
InTotalResDt−1 is the initial stock of these resources. In the second equation
InNetF inDt is the inflow of total financial resources coming to development
that is allocated to either savings or spending; OutNetF inDt is the balancing
outflow of these that is either spent or saved; andNetTotalResDt−1 is the initial
level of net financial resources for development (see figure 3.14).
In particular, the inflow InTotalResDt displays the function:
InTotalResDt = [PreTaxKdt − (PreTaxKdt · TaxRatet)]
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Figure 3.14: Financial Resources to Development
Where PreTaxKdt is the pre-tax amount of financial resources flowing into de-
velopment as a sector and TaxRatet is the percentage of this income that goes
to the government in the form of tax.
Here, PreTaxKdt serves as a conveyor which defines the pre-tax income for
development from the total capital gains coming from innovation minus the
expenses required for these to reach the market. The equation for this process
is:
PreTaxKdt = [((CapitalDt−FromLicensingDt)−InBioIndt)−InHSFundt]
Where both InBioIndt and InHSFundt are the levels of resources coming
from development into biosafety and health inspection services, respectively,
as defined in the Innovation Management module; FromLicensingDt defines the
amount of financial resources coming from development into research every dt;
and CapitalDt is the total “knowledge units” translated by market price coming
to development from new innovations reaching the market.
The degree of CapitalDt flowing into development is defined by a process of
valuation that depends on various variables including ToMarkett, which ulti-
mately defines the level of initial income InitialIncomet; the interest rate rt; and
184
the market price DPricet. More specifically, CapitalDt is defined as:
CapitalDt = InitialIncomet + FI1t + FI2t + FI3t
Where InitialIncomet is the last link of a chain of conveyors that translate the
levels of ToMarkett from Ln to natural numbers and represents the rate of in-
novation produced at dt − 1 in market prices;37 and FI1t, FI2t, and FI3t are
a series of conveyors which define the present value of future financial flows
coming to development from innovations reaching the market today.
The first of these two processes defines the degree of initial income by trans-
lating the levels of ToMarkett. In this case eD2Mt begins the Ln-to-natural num-
ber process using the transformation:
eD2Mt = e
ToMarkett
Then, the converter TeD2Mt also sets a logical function assuring that when
such transformation encounters a value equal to 1 in Ln terms, it becomes trans-
lated to 0 in natural numbers. This function is:
TeD2Mt:
if eD2Mt = 1 then
TeD2Mt← 0
else
TeD2Mt← eD2Mt
As suggested, the variable InitialIncomet itself is defined as the ToMarkett
amount delayed by one period. This, in order to capture the fact that financial
returns gained once an innovation reaches the market are felt by the sector a
period later.
In the second process, the initial capital going to development represented
by InitialIncomet is complemented by the expected capital flows produced by
37In order to avoid a higher degree of complexity in the model, prices are assumed constant.
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such market-reaching innovations in the following three complete periods, be-
fore their innovation’s market value reaches zero. The previously mentioned
conveyors define these values as:
FI1t = 0.5 · InitialIncomet
(1 + rt)1
FI2 = 0.25 · FI1t
(1 + rt)2
and
FI3 = 0.1 · FI2t
(1 + r)3
Basically, what these conveyors suggest is that the value of a bundle of in-
novations defined by ToMarkett at any given dt keep producing returns —
although at a lesser level— at dt + 1, dt + 2, and dt + 3. This also concurs with
both depreciation and obsolescence principles while also capturing the effects
of “creative destruction.”
On the other hand, the decision of what proportion of output coming from
the stock of total resources to development OutTotalResDt goes either to net
financial resources or infrastructure is set by the conveyor DIncomeFract. This
parameter is defined at 80%, where 80% goes to net financial resources and 20%
of becomes allocated to infrastructure. The functions defining these two flows
are:
InNetF inDt = OutTotalResDt ·DIncomeFract
and
ToDInfrat = [OutTotalResDt · (1−DIncomeFract)]
Finally, for development income, the outflow OutNetF inDt is in function
of the total stock of financial resources NetF inResDt and defines the sector’s
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total income that reaches the financial market as savings or various types of
investment.
The third and last segment in the financial resources area focuses on the
amount of these going into government from either research or development
sectors. The stock here defined are the government’s net financial resources
NetResGovtt; the level of resources going to researchGovtRt and those going to
development GovtDt; and resources assigned to funding basic research infras-
tructure GovtInfrat. These are defined by the equations:
NetResGovtt =
∫ t
0
(InResGovtt −OutResGovtt)dt+NetResGovtt−1 (3.24)
GovtRt =
∫ t
0
(InGovtRt −OutGovtRt)dt+GovtRt−1 (3.25)
GovtDFundt =
∫ t
0
(InGovtDt −OutGovtDt)dt+GovtDt−1 (3.26)
and
GovtInfrat =
∫ t
0
(InGovtInfrat−OutGovtInfrat)dt+GovtInfrat−1 (3.27)
Where InResGovtt in the first equation is the multiple source inflow going into
the government’s stock of available funding for biotech-related R&D activities;
OutResGovtt is the outflow going from this stock to either research, develop-
ment, or infrastructure for biotech R&D; and NetResGovtt−1 is the initial stock
of these resources. In the second equation, InGovtRt is the incoming fraction of
net government resources for biotech research; OutResGovtt is the actual flow
of resources used in the production of new knowledge (A1), part of the pro-
cess described within the Research module; and InGovtRt−1 is the initial stock
of government resources going to these type of research activities. In the third
equation, InGovtDt is the fraction of all government resources allotted to devel-
opment;OutGovtDt gives the resource flow going to development activities also
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as described within the Development module; and InGovtDt−1 is the initial level
of these at dt − 1. For the last equation, InGovtInfrat is the percentage of gov-
ernment resources used for basic research infrastructure; OutGovtInfrat is the
total flow of resources going to funding and upgrading research infrastructure;
and InGovtInfrat−1 is this stock’s initial level (see figure 3.15).
As mentioned, the degree of inflow to InResGovtt is composed by various
outflows, other converter-defined parameters, and a switch, all which are ei-
ther defined within this or other modules. Further, the level at which financial
resources flow into government depends on a logical argument defined within
this flow as:
InResGovtt:
if FixR&DFundSwitcht = 1 then
InResGovtt ← (FixGovtFundt + [FiscalInDt +
TTRDtoGovtt + BioIndtoGovtt + OutRSavingst +
RiskFreeCompt])
else
InResGovtt ← FiscalInDt + TTRDtoGovtt +
BioIndtoGovtt + OutRSavingst+RiskFreeCompt
Where FixR&DFundSwitcht represents the level (1 or 0) of a switch that con-
trols within the model whether the government is allocating or not a fixed
amount of funding for biotech R&D every dt; FixGovtFundt is the fixed amount
of resources the government allots (in case it does) to biotech R&D every dt
(which happens in both Spain and Mexico); FiscalInDt is the amount of re-
sources coming into government from taxes paid by development as a sector;
TTRDtoGovtt is the proportion of resources going into government from licens-
ing new knowledge (A1) to development when the “royalty rule” is switched
on; BioIndtoGovtt is the outflow of resources coming to the government from
the biosafety industry; and OutRSavingst and RiskFreeCompt is the amount
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Figure 3.15: Financial Resources to Government
of resources looping back into the government from research through savings
and investment in government papers.38 Here, FiscalInDt is in function of
TaxRatet, variable set within the R&D Policy module, and PreTaxKdt, ex-
plained in the previous segment, and is defined by the logical function:
FiscalInDt:
if PreTaxKdt <0 then
FiscalInDt← 0
else
FiscalInDt← PreTaxKdt x TaxRatet
The outflow of the first and central equation OutResGovtt is in function of
the government’s net stock of financial resources, NetResGovtt, and eventually
defines the proportion of the inflows InGovtRt, InGovtDt, and InGovtInfrat,
going into the stock of resources the government allocates for research, devel-
opment, or R&D infrastructure, respectively. The actual level going from this
central outflow to each of these inflows is given by two rates: R&DRatet and
38For these two levels it is assumed that research’s savings as a sector and both research and
development’s total stock of risk-free investment is used to buy government risk-free bonds
and bills, and that the government loops the resources gained from selling these back into the
system via direct investment.
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InfraRatet, scales detailed within the R&D Policy module and initlally set at
84% and 10% each. The functions for each of these flows are:
InGovtRt = OutResGovtt ·R&DRatet
InGovtDt = OutResGovtt · [(1−R&DRatet)− InfraRatet]
and
InGovtInfrat = OutResGovtt · InfraRatet
Finally for this segment, all three outflows OutGovtRt, OutGovtDt, and
OutGovtInfrat are in direct function of the available stock level for research,
development, and infrastructure each dt.
The second area within this module explains the dynamics of each of the two
central sectors within the model as these accommodate their earnings between
savings and spendings. Here, the level of eleven stocks define how income is
allocated into savings, spent in products and services outside the biotech R&D
system, or used to ease venture capital investors’ concerns about payback ca-
pacity (see figure 3.16). The two stock representing the behavior of research as
a sector and are defined by the equations:
RIncomet =
∫ t
0
(InRInct −OutRInct)dt+RIncomet−1 (3.28)
and
V CRFundt =
∫ t
0
(InV CRFundt−OutV CRFundt)dt+V CRFundt−1 (3.29)
Where RIncomet is the total income going into research; InRInct is the inflow
of financial resources coming into this stock; the total resource outflow going
either to spendings or savings is OutRInct; and RIncomet−1 is the initial level
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Figure 3.16: R&D Investment, Saving and Spending
of this stock. In the second equation, V CRFundt represents the stock of avail-
able funding necessary to back up any venture capital investment initiative in
the sector; InV CRFundt is the actual level of these resources coming into the
fund composed by the leftover balance generated once venture capitalists re-
cover their investments, plus a nominal fraction of the available income com-
ing into research every dt, which serves as proof for the sector’s payback ca-
pacity.39 This flow is defined by the interaction of two variables: RDebtRatet,
which sets the maximum level of income that can be allocated for debt pay-
39Although a fraction of InRInct is considered part of the resource inflow going to
V CRFundt, it is not discounted from this flow due to the fact that such fraction is only ac-
counted for in this stock nominally to provide more arguments to support the sector’s solvency.
In fact, what this fraction represents is the maximum leverage capacity of the sector; in other
words, the DebtRatet parameter defines the maximum level of income that can be allocated to
debt paying and the fraction of income it represents is used in the venture capital subsystem
later in this module as reference of the sector’s payback ability.
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ment, and FromV CRFBalt representing the inflow of leftover balance gener-
ated once venture capitalists recover their investments in knowledge produc-
tion. OutV CRFundt is the balancing outflow for this stock; and V CRFundt−1
is the fund’s initial level.
In particular, the flow InRInct is equal to OutNetF inRt while OutRInct de-
fines the levels of income flowing either into the sector’s spending and savings.
These are given depending on the parameter SavingsRatet set in the model at
25%. The equations for these two stock are defined as:
RSpendt =
∫ t
0
(InRSpendt −OutRSpendt)dt+RSpendt−1 (3.30)
and
RSavet =
∫ t
0
(InRSavet −OutRSavet)dt+RSavet−1 (3.31)
Where RSpendt is the stock of income going towards expenditures; InRSpendt
is the fraction of total income that is allocated to spending (as mentioned 25%
of the total); OutRSpendt is the balancing outflow of income used for spending
that becomes part of the total stock of resources that eventually exit the system;
and RSpendt−1 is the initial stock of spendings. In the second equation, RSavet
represents the stock of income going towards savings; InRSavet is the resid-
ual fraction of total income (75%) going to savings after discounting that going
to spending; OutRSavet is the balancing outflow going into the general R&D
savings stock; and RSavet−1 is the initial level of these resources.
The behavior of development as a sector can be represented in quite an anal-
ogous way to that of research. Yet, this segment adds a third equation to those
two previously explored introducing the possibility of further reinvestment in
the sector. The sector’s three equations are:
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DIncomet =
∫ t
0
(InDInct −OutDInct)dt+DIncomet−1 (3.32)
V CDFundt =
∫ t
0
(InV CDFundt−OutV CDFundt)dt+V CDFundt−1 (3.33)
and
DReinvestt =
∫ t
0
(InDReinvt −OutDReinvt)dt+DReinvestt−1 (3.34)
Where the variables within the first and second equations behave practically
the same way as those for research with a few variations; DIncomet is the total
income going into development; InDInct is the inflow of resources coming into
the income stock; also here the total resource outflow going either to spendings
or savings by the sector is OutDInct; and DIncomet−1 is the stock’s initial level.
The second equation, V CDFundt displays the stock of available funding neces-
sary to intice any venture capital initiative in the development; InV CDFundt
is the level of these resources coming into such fund also composed by the left-
over balance generated once venture capitalists recover their investments in de-
velopment, plus a nominal fraction of the available income coming into devel-
opment every dt. Again, this serves as proof for the sector’s payback capacity.
This flow is also defined by the interaction of two variables: DDebtRatet, set-
ting the limit to the amount of income that can be used for debt payment, and
FromV CDFBalt displaying the inflow of leftover balance generated once ven-
ture capitalists recover their investments in innovation. OutV CDFundt is the
balancing outflow for this stock; and V CDFundt−1 is its initial level. In the
third equation DReinvestt represents the stock of income that is reinvested into
development; InDReinvt is the inflow of reinvestment as a percentage of the
net financial resources going to development; OutDReinvt is the stock’s balanc-
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ing outflow; and DReinvestt−1 is the initial stock of income being reinvested in
development.
In this case, the flows InDInct and InDReinvestt are fractions of
OutNetF inDt defined by the conveyor D2DReinvt, which defines the level of
reinvestment at 15% and, consequently, that of the total income to development
at 85%. On the other hand, OutDInct defines the volume of income flowing
either into the sector’s spending and savings. These volumes are also given by
the parameter SavingsRatet at 25% and 75%, respectively. The equations for
these two stock are:
DSpendt =
∫ t
0
(InDSpendt −OutDSpendt)dt+DSpendt−1 (3.35)
and
DSavet =
∫ t
0
(InDSavet −OutDSavet)dt+DSavet−1 (3.36)
Where DSpendt is the stock of spent income; InDSpendt is the fraction of to-
tal income going to spending (25% of the total); OutDSpendt is the balancing
outflow of income used for spending that goes into the total stock of income ex-
iting the system; and DSpendt−1 is the initial stock of spendings. For the second
equation, DSavet is the stock of income going to savings; InDSavet is the resid-
ual fraction of total income (75%) going to savings; OutDSavet is the balancing
outflow going into the total R&D savings stock; and DSavet−1 is this stock’s
initial level.
The last two stocks defined in this segment capture the level of total savings
and spending levels for both sectors. The equations for these are:
AllSavet =
∫ t
0
(InSavet − ToInvestt)dt+ AllSavet−1 (3.37)
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and
AllSpendt =
∫ t
0
(InSpendt −OutSpendt)dt+ AllSpendt−1 (3.38)
WhereAllSavet represents the total stock of savings for both research and devel-
opment; InSavet is the flow of these resources coming into savings, composed
by the sum of the flows OutRSavet and OutDSavet; ToInvestt is the outflow of
these resources flowing into the stock representing the various types of invest-
ment in the model; and AllSavet−1 is the initial savings stock for both sectors.
For the second equation AllSpendt is the total level of resources used in spend-
ing by both sectors, InSpendt is the inflow of income from going into spending,
in this case composed by the sum of OutRSpendt and OutDSpendt; OutSpendt
is the flow of resources going out of the system as these are spent on products
and services beyond the realm of the model; and AllSpendt−1 is the initial stock
of spendings.
The third area in this module explains how the segment of income devoted
to investment is allocated into multiple options, ranging from outside R&D risk-
free investments to biotech venture capital endeavors. This section is divided
into three parts: a) the behavior of the core venture capital resource stock and
the decision processes behind investment activities in either sector; b) the debt
to earnings process for each sector engaged in venture capital; and c) the in-
ternational venture capital process. This segment introduces in the model the
notion that private investments flowing into modern biotech come mostly from
corporate groups who put together specialized funds and then search for spe-
cific projects in which to invest these resources. It also addresses the fact that
some venture funding is as well made available through funds set at various
levels of government throughout the EU. This comes from the views offered
by representatives of the EFB, who mentioned the importance of the multiple
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venture capital funds available in Europe, such as those emanating from the
EU Commission, Genoma Espan˜a, the EFB itself, or other international private
initiatives.
The first section of this area focuses on five central stocks describing the
tangible levels of venture capital investment, while also delineating the deci-
sion process followed to allocate investment either on research, development,
or both. Also as part of the investment decision making process, the levels of
six stocks representing the solvency of each sector are addressed. The equations
for the first five stocks are:
V CTotalt =
∫ t
0
(ToV Ct −OutV Ct)dt+ V CTotalt−1 (3.39)
RiskFreeInvt =
∫ t
0
(ToRFt − ToCompt)dt+RiskFreeInvt−1 (3.40)
RiskFreeCompt =
∫ t
0
(ToCompt)dt+RiskFreeTotalt−1 (3.41)
V CtoRt =
∫ t
0
(InV CtoRt −OutV CtoRt)dt+ V CtoRt−1 (3.42)
and
V CtoDt =
∫ t
0
(InV CtoDt −OutV CtoDt)dt+ V CtoDt−1 (3.43)
Where V CTotalt is the total stock of investment allotted to venture capital;
ToV Ct is the inflow of these resources coming from the AllSavet stock; OutV Ct
is the balancing outflow of resources going either to research or development
(process explained later in detail); and V CTotalt−1 is the initial level of this
stock. In the second equation V CtoRt is the amount of venture capital re-
sources going to research activities; InV CtoRT is the actual flow of these re-
sources coming into the stock; OutV CtoRt is the balancing outflow streaming
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later into the stock of debt; and V CtoRt is the initial level of these. Similarly,
in the third equation V CtoDt is the amount of venture capital resources used
in development activities; InV CtoDt is the inflow level coming into the stock
from AllSavet; OutV CtoDt is the balancing outflow coming from this stock and
turning into debt; and V CtoDt−1. The fourth and fifth equations are part of a
single set of flows and stocks, where RiskFreeInvt is the stock of risk-free in-
vestment; ToRFt is the actual portion of AllSavet that goes into risk free invest-
ment; ToCompt is the flow going to the total stock of resources compounded by
the investment rate; and RiskFreeInvt−1 is the initial stock of risk free invest-
ments. In the last segment, RiskFreeCompt is stock of compounded risk-free
resources; and RiskFreeTotalt−1 is the initial stock of these (see figure 3.17).
Within the first three equations, the degree of inflow ToV Ct is set by the con-
veyor V CInvestt; the level of this conveyor is given by the proportion V C%t
defined jointly by a logical function, the outflows of venture capital going to
research and to development (OutV CtoRt and OutV CtoDt, respectively), and a
range of change set by V CChanget. Consequently, this mechanism also helps
to define the level of resources flowing into risk-free investment ToRiskFreet.
This process introduces in the model another aspect of the “match-making” pro-
cess that assists matching projects in need of resources with available funding,
mentioned by multiple interviewed actors from Spain.
The function defining V CInvestt and the logical function for V C%t are:
V CInvestt = V C%t
and
V C%t:
if OutV CtoRt >0 or OutV CtoDt >0 then
V C%t← (V C%t + 0.01)
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Figure 3.17: Risk-Free Investment and Venture Capital to R&D
else
V C%t← (V C%t - 0.01)
In addition to this mechanism, the flows going into the stock of venture
capital and risk-free investment depend on the levels of the switch V CSwitcht,
which suggests the presence (when displaying a level of 1) or absence (a level
of 0) of venture capital investment in the model. The last two elements help-
ing set the logical functions defining these inflows are InvestRuleY V Ct and
InvestRuleNV Ct. These —although both being technically equal to ToInvestt,
are necessarily different for the model to be able to differentiate the degree
of these flows when venture capital investment is either present or not in the
model. The logical functions for each of these inflows are:
ToV Ct:
if V CSwitcht = 1 then
ToV Ct← (InvestRuleY V Ct x V CInvestt)
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else
ToV Ct← 0
and
ToRiskFreet:
if V CSwithct = 1 then
ToRiskFreet← (InvestRuleY V Ct - ToV Ct)
else
ToRiskFreet← InvestRuleNV Ct
Conversely for these first three equations, the outflows ToCompt and
OutV Ct are also defined by multiple variables; the former is defined by the
interest rate used throughout the model rt, the stock of risk-free investment
RiskFreeInvt, and the compound stock of risk free investmentRiskFreeCompt.
Since this last stock has no outflow, its balance becomes compounded by the
interest rate every dt and such increment is added to the inflow of resources
defined by ToCompt. The function for this process is:
ToCompt = [RiskFreeInvt + (RiskFreeCompt · rt)]
The latter, on the other hand, has a more complex composition; the total
venture capital stock TotalV Ct, the conveyor V CInvestRatet, which sets the
percentage of the total available venture capital stock that gets invested every dt
at 25%, the function V C1t which defines an investment decision-making process
to select which sector is more viable for venture capital investment each dt, and
the V CSwitcht, all partake in its definition. Further, the level for this flow is
defined by the logical function:
OutV Ct:
if (V C1t = 4 or V C1t = 3 or V C1t = 2) and V CSwithct = 1
then
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OutV Ct← (V CTotalt x V CInvestRatet)
else
OutV Ct← 0
The conveyor V C1t is the last echelon of a chain of decision-making func-
tions that ultimately define how and where the model —if it does— allocates
venture capital. In this process, the net resources going to research and devel-
opment, NetF inResRt and NetF inResDt; the levels of capital going to either
research or development,Krt andKdt with a delay equal to dt−1 (each defined
within their respective module); and the interest rate rt, partake in this process.
Two central conveyors —V CRt and V CDt— introduce the logical functions be-
hind the decision-making rules V C1t, V C2t, V C3t, and V C4t, pivotal in this
process. More specifically, the functions these conveyors define are:
V CRt:
if NetF inResRt >(Krt−1 x rt) then
V CRt← 1
else
V CRt← 0
and
V CDt:
if NetF inResDt >(Kdt−1 x rt) then
V CDt← 1
else
V CRt← 0
What these logical functions suggest is that venture capital investors will
risk their resources in either research or development only if the return on in-
vestment (ROI) levels displayed by either sector after one dt are above those
these would have obtained if their resources where invested in risk-free options.
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In other words, if the process provides sufficient information to verify that the
rate of return (ROR) generated by either sector is indeed above rt, venture capi-
tal becomes an option. This captures the views expressed by representatives of
the EFB and the local bio-pharma industry in Spain regarding venture capital
investment decision making. In the words of a representative of the EFB “com-
panies taking too long to consolidate or not engaging in mergers with other
start-ups at the precise time often appear unattractive for venture capital in-
vestors.” Stated differently, in the model only the sector that presents results in
the short term has access to these resources.
The set of decision rules given by the conveyors V C1t to V C4t eventually
helps decide whether research or development meet the requirement sought by
venture capital investors. Depending on the levels of V CRt and V CDt these
define if these resources go to either, both, or none of these sectors. The chain of
logical functions for these converters is:
V C1t:
if V CRt =1 and V CDt = 1 then
V C1t← 4
else
V C1t← V C2t
V C2t:
if V CRt = 0 and V CDt = 1 then
V C2t← 3
else
V C2t← V C3t
V C3t:
if V CRt = 1 and V CDt = 0 then
V C3t← 2
else
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V C3t← V C4t
and
V C4t:
if V CRt = 0 and V CDt = 0 then
V C4t← 1
else
V C4t← 0
These logical functions define which is the best option for allocating venture
capital investment by number into the four possible scenarios: when both sec-
tors are viable V C1t gets a level of 4; if development is the only viable option
V C1t is 3; when research is the viable option V C1t is 2; and when none of the
two are viable V C1t displays a level of 1. These are also essential within yet
another decision process defining the actual venture capital flow going into re-
search and development described in the last two equations dealt with in this
section (see figure 3.18).
In addition to OutV Ct and V C1t, the inflows InV CtoR and InV CtoDt go-
ing to the stock of venture capital of either research or development, respec-
tively, are also in function of a series of conveyors; three of these,V CIRt, V CIDt,
and V CISplitt, assist setting the level of international venture capital going to
each sector when available in the model, while the last two, SplitV CRt and
SplitV CDt, define the logical functions that help allocate these resources (in-
cluding international venture capital) depending on the viability defined by
V C1t and the availability of international venture capital funding. The logical
functions defining the two main inflows are:
InV CtoRt:
if V C1t = 2 then
InV CtoRt← (OutV Ct) + V CIRt]
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Figure 3.18: Venture Capital Investment Decision Mechanism
else
InV CtoRt← SplitV CRt
and
InV CtoDt:
if V C1t = 3 then
InV CtoDt← V CI1t
else
InV CtoDt← SplitV CDt
The logical functions for the three conveyors assisting with international
venture capital allocation are:
V CIRt:
if IntlV CSwitcht = 1 then
V CIRt← V CI3t
else
V CIRt← 0
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V CIDt:
if IntlV CSwitcht = 1 then
V CIDt← V CI2t
else
V CIDt← 0
and
V CISplitt:
if IntlV CSwitcht = 1 then
V CISplitt← V CI1t
else
V CISplitt← 0
And, the functions for the two conveyors helping allocate venture capital
resources based on the viability of these sectors are:
SplitV CRt:
if not (V C1 = 2) and V C1t = 4 then
SplitV CRt← [(0.5 x OutV Ct) + V CISplitt]
else
SplitV CRt← 0
and
SplitV CDt:
if not (V C1 = 3) and V C1t = 4 then
SplitV CDt← [(0.5 x OutV Ct) + V CISplitt]
else
SplitV CDt← 0
The conveyor V CISplitt is in function of the chance that international
venture capital is available in the model. This is defined by the conveyor
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IntlV CSwitcht using a 0 (off) or 1 (on) process controlled at the model’s in-
terface level. The variable V CI1t is the last conveyor in a series within a mech-
anism that assigns venture capital resources to either sector also depending on
the V C1t levels.
Lastly, the outflows coming from research and development’s venture cap-
ital stocks, OutV CtoRt and OutV CtoDt, are equal to the levels of these stocks
every dt. Furthermore, these are part of the inputs within the total capital (Krt
and Kdt) going to either sector as defined within the Research and Development
modules, respectively. Moreover, these define the inflows going to the stock of
debt resulting from the use of venture capital.
The second section in this area deals with the venture capital debt-to-
earnings valuation for both research and development sectors and explains how
the level of these flows influence the investors’ overall decision-making process
in the model. At the center of this process are a total of six stocks represent-
ing the degree of debt and funding that each sector has either incurred on or
produced, respectively, from engaging in venture capital endeavors. Here, the
stock of debt acquired by each sector —V CtoRDebtt and V CtoDDebtt— is de-
fined and contrasted with the levels of the previously described resources back-
ing venture capital, V CRFundt and V CDFundt, analyzed in this module’s area
dedicated to savings and spending. The outcome of these differences provide
each sector either a higher probability of gaining access to venture capital fund-
ing —due to the chance of displaying higher solvency to pay returns on invest-
ment as these accumulate over time— or a negative note, if the level of these
cannot cover a marginal gain spread beyond that offered by risk-free invest-
ment.
The two flows describing the debt stock for each sector are represented by
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the equations:
V CtoRDebtt =
∫ t
0
(InV CRDebtt−OutV CRDebtt)dt+V CtoRDebtt−1 (3.44)
and
V CtoDDebtt =
∫ t
0
(InV CDDebtt−OutV CDDebtt)dt+V CtoDDebtt−1 (3.45)
Where V CtoRDebtt is the total stock of venture capital invested in research ex-
pressed in debt terms; InV CRDebtt is the inflow of venture capital invested in
research expressed in debt terms; OutV CRDebtt is the balancing outflow keep-
ing this stock from accumulating; and V CtoRDebtt−1 is the stock initial level.
For the second equation, V CtoDDebtt is the total stock of venture capital going
to development; InV CDDebtt is the inflow of venture capital invested in de-
velopment in debt terms, following an analogous process to that of its research
counterpart; OutV CDDebtt is the stock’s balancing outflow; and V CtoDDebtt−1
is the development’s debt stock initial level (see figure 3.19).
In particular, the inflows InV CtoRDebtt and InV CDDebtt define the sum of
total inflow and are represented by the equations:
V CtoRDebtt = OutV CtoRt + FromV CRDBalt
and
V CtoDDebtt = OutV CtoDt + FromV CDDBalt
Where OutV CtoRt and OutV CtoDt are the previously explained total stock of
venture capital flows going into research and development, respectively, every
dt; FromV CRDBalt and FromV CDDBalt respectively represent the inflows
going to each sector’s stock of debt from venture capital.
206
Figure 3.19: Venture Capital Funds and Debt Balance Stock
The actual difference between the levels of debt and earnings in either sector
are given by the conveyors DifV CRRest and DifV CDRest through the equa-
tions:
DifV CRRest = V CRFundt − V CtoRDebtt
and
DifV CDRest = V CDFundt − V CtoDDebtt
The resulting products of these last two equations define the degree of re-
sources flowing into the last four stocks dealt in this section, which describe
the debt and earnings associated to venture capital as a stock for each of the
two sectors. These also provide the level of the above described conveyors
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FromV CRDBalt and FromV CDDBalt, essential also in the previously de-
scribed savings and spendings segment of this module. The equations for the
research sector are:
V CRDBalt =
∫ t
0
(InV CRDBalt−OutV CRDBalt)dt+V CRDBalt−1 (3.46)
V CRFBalt =
∫ t
0
(InV CRFBalt−OutV CRFBalt)dt+ V CRFBalt−1 (3.47)
and those for development are:
V CDDBalt =
∫ t
0
(InV CDDBalt−OutV CDDBalt)dt+V CDDBalt−1 (3.48)
V CDFBalt =
∫ t
0
(InV CDFBalt−OutV CDFBalt)dt+V CDFBalt−1 (3.49)
Where V CRDBalt represents the balance of the debt incurred by research de-
rived from venture capital being allocated in the sector in the form of a stock;
InV CRDBalt is the inflow of debt coming into the stock stemming from a neg-
ative difference between V CRFundt and V CtoRDebtt (the level of this inflow
also defines that of FromV CRDBalt); OutV CRDBalt is the balancing outflow;
and V CRDBalt−1 is the initial debts balance stock. In the second equation for
research V CRFBalt is the balance of funding generated by the sector from ven-
ture capital investment; InV CRFBalt is the inflow of resources coming into
the stock, in this case stemming from a positive difference between V CRFundt
and V CtoRDebtt (the level of this inflow defines that of FromV CRFBalt);
OutV CRFBalt is the balancing outflow; and V CRFBalt−1 is the initial balance
of the funds stock. The variables in the two equations for development are anal-
ogous to those of research therefore requiring no detailing.
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The third and last part in this section centers its attention on explaining the
international venture capital process within the model. This process supple-
ments the overall venture capital mechanism by introducing a series of rules
that mimic the behavior of the various international venture capital resources
available within the EU to which Spain has access to. Although this mechanism
has its own on\off switch at the interface level, it can only be introduced in the
model when the model itself allows for venture capital. In other words, when
the overall venture capital switch at the interface level is on.
The process describes how international venture capital is allocated within
the system partially relying on the outcome provided by the previously de-
scribed venture capital investment decision mechanism. Just as the overall ven-
ture investment allocation, resources are made available either for research or
development depending on both the returns on investment that these display
and the total amount of “local” venture capital resources available within the
model at dt. The central principle behind this process is that international, funds
such as those provided by continental agencies —like the European Federation
of Biotechnology— or other private or public fund sources emanating from the
EU government initiatives mentioned in the previous chapter, supplement the
local venture initiatives by increasing the already allotted mounts of funding
that the local investors provide.
There is only one central stock in this process describing the level of interna-
tional investment resources as they become assigned between the two sectors.
The equation for this stock is:
IntlV CFundt =
∫ t
0
(InIntlV Ct −OutIntlV Ct)dt+ IntlV CFundt−1 (3.50)
Where IntlV CFundt is the total stock of international venture capital at dt;
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InIntlV Ct is the flow of these resources coming into the stock; OutIntlV Ct is
the balancing outflow coming from the stock; and IntlV CFundt−1 is the initial
level of this stock (see figure 3.20).
In particular, the inflow InIntlV Ct is equal to the international resources
coming into the fund given by the converter IntlV CInvestt, set at 100,000. What
this flow tries to describe is the constant flow of resources that venture capital
investors allocate to modern biotech as part of their international investment
portfolios. The outflow, OutIntlV Ct, more than balancing the stock, actually
determines the maximum amount of resources —as a percentage of the total
available stock— can be allotted to either of the sectors. Two converters —
IntlV CInvestRatet and OutRestrictiont— and the total available stock of in-
ternational venture capital help determine this level. From these conveyors,
the former provides the percentage of the total stock available for international
venture capital investment that can be invested every dt and is set at 10%; while
the latter relies on the previously mentioned V C1t converter to define whether
there will be venture capital investment or not each period. The logical function
allowing this process set by this conveyor is:
OutRestrictiont:
if not (V C1 = 2 or V C1t = 3 or V C1t = 4) then
OutRestrictiont← 0
else
OutRestrictiont← 1
Ultimately, the equation for the outflow of venture capital injected into the
system is given by:
OutIntlV Ct = (IntlV CFundt · IntlV CInvestRatet) ·OutRestrictiont
Following this, two sets of converters help define which sector —if any—
receives the resources given by this outflow. Again, the level expressed by the
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Figure 3.20: International Venture Capital Mechanism
conveyor V C1t, along with the total stock of (local) venture capital, V CTotalt,
and the process’ on or off switch, partake in this process. The first set of con-
verters —V CI1, V CI2, and V CI3— define what sector receives these resources
and the logical functions for these are:
V CI1t:
if V CTotalt <10,000,000 and V C1 = 2 then
V CI1t← OutIntlV Ct
else
V CI1t← 0
V CI2t:
if V CTotalt <10,000,000 and V C1t = 3 then
V CI2t← OutIntlV Ct
else
V CI2t← 0
and V CI3t:
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if V CTotalt <10,000,000 and not (V C1 = 2 or V C1t = 3)
and V C3t = 4 then
V CI1t← (0.5 x OutIntlV Ct)
else
V CI3t← 0
Here, the conveyors V CI1t and V CI2t suggest that if the local venture cap-
ital funding available is less than ten million, international venture resources
will be allocated to either research or development, respectively. The last con-
verter V CI3t suggest that when both sectors appear viable for investment, the
total available international funding should be split by these evenly.
The last set of converter operating in this part —V CIRt, V CIDt, and
V CISplitt— allow for the resource allocation previously defined to take place
only when the international venture capital switch is turned on. The logical
functions for each of these are:
V CIRt:
if IntlV CSwitcht = 1then
V CIRt← V CI1t
else
V CIRt← 0
V CIDt:
if IntlV CSwitcht = 1then
V CIDt← V CI2t
else
V CIDt← 0
and
V CISplitt:
if IntlV CSwitcht = 1then
V CISplitt← V CI3t
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else
V CISplitt← 0
The fourth area in this module explains the dynamics behind the accumula-
tion of resources used for creating or updating basic research infrastructure. A
single stock, capturing the multiple inflows going to the research sector defines
the level of these (see figure 3.21). The equation representing the stock of these
resources is:
BRInfraRest =
∫ t
0
(InBRInfrat−OutBrInfrat)dt+BRInfraRest−1 (3.51)
Where BRInfraRest is the total available stock of resources for basic re-
search infrastructure; InBRInfrat is the inflow of these coming into the stock;
OutBRInfrat is the balancing outflow of these resources; and BRInfraRest−1
is the initial stock of these.
Here, the inflow InBRInfrat is composed by the sum of three variables de-
fined by the conveyors TTRDtoRInfrat, TTRRtoRInfrat, and OutGovtInfrat
previously explained in the financial resources area of this module. Each of
these inflows stems either from technology transfer to development or research
or from the government. On the other hand, OutBRInfrat is defined by the
total level of stock each dt.
The fifth area in this module provides account of the stock of human cap-
ital resources in the model. This process explains how these shape into new
biotech labor hand as well as the mobility these have between research and de-
velopment activities when there is limited projection in either. As mentioned
in previous sections, labor hand is expressed in terms of both individuals and
the system’s capacity to provide them with the environment where these can
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Figure 3.21: Resources for Basic Research Infrastructure
engage in either research or development activities (measured by the infras-
tructure resources available).
The first segment focuses on five stocks, including the overall labor hand
in biotech an those for each of the two sectors, to detail the process by which
human resources become available within the model. The first equation in this
process is:
BiotechLabort =
∫ t
0
(InBioLabt −OutBioLabt)dt+BiotechLabort−1 (3.52)
Where BiotechLabort is the total stock of labor hand in biotech; InBioLabt is the
inflow of of labor hand going into biotech; OutBioLabt is the balancing outflow
of these; and BiotechLabort−1 is the initial level of this stock40 (see figure 3.22).
40It is important to mention that what both the inflow going and the outflow coming from
the stock BiotechLabort help define in the model is how the number of individuals wanting to
become part of the biotech sector varies per period (i.e. how the number of students enrolling
in biotech related degrees changes every dt). As in all areas of study, the level of students varies
each period, therefore the need for these flows. The actual labor hand in research or devel-
opment —as represented by the number of students enrolled in new biotech degrees leading
towards these areas—- is defined each period later in this process also using the level of the
stock BiotechLabort to do so.
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Figure 3.22: Available Human Capital for Biotech R&D
In particular, InBioLabt is an inflow equal to 2% of the total stock every dt
as defined by the conveyor GRate. The equation for this flow is:
InBioLabt = BiotechLabort ·GRatet
On the other hand, the outflow OutBioLabt, which displays a level equal to
0.01987% of the total stock of labor hand every dt, is defined by the conveyor
DRatet. The level of this outflow is give by the equation:
OutBioLabt = BiotechLabort ·DRatet
The difference between these flows —although quite small— suggests that
in the model labor going into biotech is increasing over time.
The next segment explains the stock of labor hand pursuing either research
or development tracks as well as the total available for each sector every dt.
Since human capital formation in these areas demands time, the stock for these
is initially represented in the model as a conveyor which preserves its inflow
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for the time necessary for it to fully mature and thus, enter the stock of available
labor hand. The equations for these stock are:
RLabort =
∫ t
0
(InRLabt − ToRLabt)dt+RLabort−1 (3.53)
AvailableLrt =
∫ t
0
ToRLabt · dt+ AvailableLrt−1 (3.54)
DLabort =
∫ t
0
(InDLabt − ToDLabt)dt+DLabort−1 (3.55)
and
AvailableLdt =
∫ t
0
ToDLabt · dt+ AvailableLdt−1 (3.56)
Where RLabort is the stock operating as a conveyor keeping the portion of la-
bor hand pursuing a research track for the average time it takes to fully de-
velop human capital; InRLabt is the inflow coming into this conveyor from the
total stock of biotech labor hand; ToRLabt is the outflow of fully developed
human capital going into the stock of available labor hand for research; and
RLabort−1 is the initial level of labor within this conveyor. For the second equa-
tion, AvailableLrt is stock of fully developed human capital in research; and
AvailableLrt−1 is the initial level of stock. The last two equations behave in
quite an analogous way and thus, need not further detailing.
The levels of InRLabt and InDLabt are defined by a decision-making pro-
cess which prescribes whether these are fixed —given by RtoDRatet, set at 85%
for research— or are variable and, therefore, in function of the mobility pro-
portion between sectors, given by OutRD%Mobt and ultimately defined by the
conveyor PropRtoDt. Assigning which of these processes is used is the switch
MobilityCapt which, through a binary mechanism controlled at the model’s in-
terface (1 for “on” and 0 for “off”), suggests the presence of inter-sector mobility.
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This process is introduced in the model to capture the effects of labor mobility
within the EU.
To define whether mobility is available, the conveyor PropRtoDt attends to
the following logical function:
PropRtoDt:
if MobilityCapt = 1 then
PropRtoDt← OutRD%Mobt
else
PropRtoDt← RtoDRatet
Lastly for this initial segment, the stock AvailableLrt and AvailableLdt also
partake in a series of logical functions that help define the effective labor hand
levels for each sector. These levels —EffectiveLrt and EffectiveLdt— ulti-
mately establish the occupied labor hand within the respective existing research
and development infrastructure. The process also involves the infrastructure ca-
pacities measured in labor (human capital) as given by RInfraLCapacityt and
DInfraLCapacityt. These last two parameters provide the actual number of in-
dividuals that each sector can allocate at any given dt, as previously explained in
the Innovation Management module. Two final converters —ELr1t and ELd1t—
set each sector’s labor hand limit to that of their respective infrastructure capac-
ity.
The logical functions set by the converters EffectiveLrt and EffectiveLdt
are:
EffectiveLrt:
if RInfraLCapacityt ≥ AvailableLrt then
EffectiveLrt← AvailableLrt
else
EffectiveLrt← ELr1t
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and
EffectiveLdt:
if DInfraLCapacityt ≥ AvailableLdt then
EffectiveLdt← AvailableLdt
else
EffectiveLdt← ELd1t
The last two converters, suggesting that each sector cannot accommodate
more labor hand than its respective infrastructure can manage every dt, display
the logical functions:
ELr1t:
if RInfraLCapacityt < AvailableLrt then
ELr1t← RInfraLCapacityt
else
ELr1t← 0
and
ELd1t:
if DInfraLCapacityt < AvailableLdt then
ELd1t← DInfraLCapacityt
else
ELd1t← 0
The second segment in this area defines how the stock that captures the per-
centage of inter-sector labor hand mobility changes when the infrastructure’s
capacity is not sufficient to accommodate the flow of labor hand coming from
the conveyors RLabort and DLabort. This process sets off a decision-making
process involving the stock of available labor hand for research AvailableLrt;
the parameter RInfraLCapacityt providing the actual number of individuals
that research as a sector can allocate at any given dt; and a series of converters
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defining the proportion of change that each of the possible scenarios can pro-
duce on the stock RtoD%Mobilityt. The equation for this stock is:
RtoD%Mobt =
∫ t
0
(InRtoD%Mobt−OutRtoD%Mobt)dt+RtoD%Mobt−1 (3.57)
Where RtoD%Mobt is the the level of research-to-development intra-sector mo-
bility represented as a stock; InRtoD%Mob is the inflow to this stock, composed
by the sum of the stock’s dt−1 level plus the percentage of change estimated by
the decision-making mechanism defined in this process given by RtoDArbitt;
OutRtoD%Mob is the balancing outflow equal to the level of the stock each dtt;
and RtoD%Mobt−1 is the initial level of this stock (see figure 3.23).
The converter RtoDArbitt, along with three additional converters —RtoD1t,
RtoD2t, and Change%LRt— ultimately defines if the newly formed research
human capital needs to move to development because research offers no ap-
pointment. The logical functions for these converters are:
RtoDArbitt:
if AvailableLrt = RInfraLCapacityt then
RtoDArbitt← 0
else
RtoDArbitt← RtoD1t
RtoD1t:
if AvailableLrt > RInfraLCapacityt then
RtoD1t← (-1 x Change%LRt)
else
RtoD1t← RtoD2t
and
RtoD2t:
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Figure 3.23: Research-to-Development Labor Mobility Process
if AvailableLrt < RInfraLCapacityt then
RtoD2t← (+1 x Change%LRt)
else
RtoD2t← 0
The last area in this module discusses the role that natural and genetic re-
sources play in both the discovery of new knowledge and in the processes of
innovation production. Being these two areas of great concern for interviewed
actors from both nations, the dynamics of each is introduced into the model in
particular segments.
The first of these segments explains how the stock of genetic resources varies
as researchers engage in bio-prospection activities in a quest to identify and iso-
late the genes and genetic sequences within specific organism’s DNA structures
that help express particular traits.41
41Although neither Spain nor Mexico have explicit access to genetic resources for biotech
regulation, this mechanism gathers from others set within plant variety and seeds production
regulation and norms available in both countries for the access of these resources for food pro-
duction and agriculture. These —in the opinion of some interviewed actors in Mexico— could
serve as reference for the future design of such regulation locally.
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The obtained information can then become new knowledge and perhaps
serve as the basis for the creation of new innovations. Two stocks define the
bio-prospection process in the model through the equations:
GeneDepRatet =
∫ t
0
(InGRDept−OutGRDept)dt+GeneDepRatet−1 (3.58)
and
GeneRest =
∫ t
0
(InGeneRest −OutGeneRest)dt+GeneRest−1 (3.59)
Where GeneDepRatet is the stock whose level represents the rate at which ge-
netic resources are being accessed and, therefore, protected; InGRDept is the
inflow into this stock representing the degree of change in the access to these
resources; OutGResDept is the balancing output of this stock that allows it to
represent the level of change every dt; and GeneDepRatet−1 is the initial rate
at which genetic resources are accessed, set here at 2. In the second equation,
GeneRest represents the level of existing genetic resources already prospected;
InGeneRest is the inflow representing the level of new prospected genes, or suc-
cessful finding of new genes; OutGeneRest is the outflow of genetic resources
that cannot become protected under IPR law and, therefore, its access does not
require licensing; and GeneRest−1 is the initial level of this stock, set here at 10
million (see figure 3.24).
In the first equation, the inflow level for InGRDept is defined by a log-
ical function that determines whether the bio-prospection rate increases —
suggesting a higher level of information finding and, therefore, a reduction in
the free-access genetic information available in natural state— or decreases —
reflecting a lack of success in research activities searching for novel information
within these bio-prospected resources and thus, increasing the free-access ge-
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Figure 3.24: Genetic Resources Bio-Prospecting Process
netic information in nature— in the model. The function defined within this
flow is:
InGRDept:
if IfRChanget > 0 then
InGRDept← (GeneDepRatet - IfRChanget)
else
InGRDept← (GeneDepRatet + IfNoRChanget)
In this function, IfRChanget represents the degree of change at which the
rate of bio-prospection varies, if research is indeed successful, each dt; while
IfNoRChanget displays the alternative fixed level of genetic resource growth,
used by the process when research does not manage to successfully discover
useful information with potential to become protected by IPR at dt and thus, al-
lowing the stock of raw genetic information to marginally increase. The former,
accordingly, is the last link of a process defining the degree at which the rate
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of genetic resources being accessed and, therefore, protected by IPR, changes.
This process —composed by the converters REffect0t through REffect5t—
also relies on research’s degree of success given by SuccessRt, originally de-
fined within the Research module and represented here in natural numbers by
the converter eSuccessRt42; the IPR breadth factor BreadthFactt, described in
the R&D Policy module; AccessGenRest as the estimated percentage of all ge-
netic resources accessed, set in the model at 10%; and the absolute amount of
information obtained from genetic resources, GeneEffectChanget, defined by
the product of AccessGenRest and BreadthFactt. The logical functions within
the converters defining this mechanism are:
REffect0t:
if eSuccessRt = 0 then
REffect0t← (GeneEffectChanget x eSuccessRt)
else
REffect0t← REffect1t
REffect1t:
if eSuccessRt >10,000,000 then
REffect1t← GeneEffectChanget
else
REffect1t← REffect2t
REffect2t:
if not (eSuccessRt >10,000,000 or eSuccessRt = 0) and
eSuccessRt >5,000,000 then
REffect2t← (0.5 x GeneEffectChanget)
else
42Like in previous processes, eSuccessRt begins the Ln-to-natural number process using the
transformation:
eSuccessRt = e
SuccessRt (3.60)
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REffect2t← REffect3t
REffect3t:
if not (eSuccessRt >5,000,000) and eSuccessRt >2,000,000
then
REffect3t← (0.25 x GeneEffectChanget)
else
REffect3t← REffect4t
REffect4t:
if not (eSuccessRt >2,000,000) and eSuccessRt >1,000,000
then
REffect4t← (0.1 x GeneEffectChanget)
else
REffect4t← REffect5t
and
REffect5t:
if not (eSuccessRt >1,000,000) and eSuccessRt >1 then
REffect5t← (0.01 x GeneEffectChanget)
else
REffect5t← 0
In the second equation, the level of InGeneRest is given by the product of
GeneProspectt, which defines how growth in bio-prospection techniques in-
crease the genetic resources available for research, and the stock of genetic re-
sources available GeneRest; while OutGeneRest is given also by the product of
GeneDepRatet —as given in percent terms by the variable GRDep%t— and the
stock of genetic resource available set by GeneRest.
Finally, both the stock of genetic resource available,GeneRest, andGRDep%t
compose the converted Spreadt, which provides the difference (spread) be-
tween the bio-prospection capacity rate and the actual rate of success in bio-
prospecting, used as a policy decision-making parameter within the IPR policy
process in the R&D Policy module.
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The second segment in this area, and last for this module, explains the gen-
eral behavior of natural resources. Within this frame, natural resources display
a duality that makes them not only be considered the necessary inputs within
development endeavors, but also bearers of the effects of new biological dis-
coveries and products. Ergo, reliant on the biosafety protection available to
guarantee their sustainable balance. The main equations in this process are:
DepletionRatet =
∫ t
0
(InDRt −OutDRt)dt+DepleteRatet−1 (3.61)
and
NatResDevt =
∫ t
0
(NatResRegt −NatResDept)dt+NatResDevt−1 (3.62)
Where DepletionRatet is the rate at which natural resources are depleted by
their use in development; InDRt is the inflow of change that the depletion rate
incurs in every dt; OutDRt is the balancing outflow that allows measuring natu-
ral resources’ depletion rate each dt; and DepletionRatet is the natural resource
depletion rate’s initial level, set in the model at 2 (see figure 3.25).
In the first equation, InDRt is also given by a logical function that deter-
mines whether the natural resource depletion rate varies, increasing when the
levels of biosafety —defined by the stock of industrial biosafety resources— in-
crease, and reduces when the opposite happens. The function defined within
this flow is:
InDRt:
if IfChanget > 0 then
InDRt← (DepletionRatet - IfChanget)
else
InDRDt← (GeneDepRatet + IfNoChanget)
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Figure 3.25: Natural Resources Balance Process
Here, IfChanget depends on the outcome of a mechanism that defines the
degree of change at which the depletion rate of natural resources varies every
dt. If this mechanism assesses a high level of biosafety resources, BioIndRest,
as specified within the Innovation Management module, then the overall deple-
tion rate reduces itself by a fraction defined by the converter IfNoChanget, set
in the process at 2%. In cases when the opposite happens, the depletion rate
increases by a level determined by this mechanism. A series of logical func-
tions —set by the converters DevEffect0t to DevEffect5t— along with the pa-
rameter BioEffectChanget —set at 5%— and the level of biosafety resources,
BioIndRest, provide the degree of change at which the depletion rate of natural
resources increases each dt. The logical functions within these converters are:
DevEffect0t:
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if BioIndRest > 10,000,000 then
DevEffect1t← BioEffectChanget
else
Devffect1t← DevEffect2t
DevEffect1t:
if BioIndRest = 0 then
DevEffect0t← (BioEffectChanget xBioIndRest)
else
Devffect0t← DevEffect1t
DevEffect2t:
if not (BioIndRest > 10,000,000 or BioIndRest = 0) and
BioIndRest > 9,000,000 then
DevEffect2t← (0.5 x BioEffectChanget)
else
Devffect2t← DevEffect3t
DevEffect3t:
if not (BioIndRest > 9,000,000) and BioIndRest >
8,500,000 then
DevEffect3t← (0.25 x BioEffectChanget)
else
Devffect3t← DevEffect4t
DevEffect4t:
if not (BioIndRest > 8,500,000) and BioIndRest >
5,000,000 then
DevEffect4t← (0.1 x BioEffectChanget)
else
Devffect4t← DevEffect5t
and
DevEffect5t:
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if not (BioIndRest > 5,000,000) and BioIndRest >
1,000,000 then
DevEffect5t← (0.01 x BioEffectChanget)
else
Devffect5t← 0
To conclude, in the second equation, the level of NatResRegt is given by
the product of RegRatet, which defines the natural resources regeneration rate
and the stock of natural resource available NatResDt; while NatResRept is the
result of the product of DepletionRatet —given in percent terms by the variable
NRDep%t— and the stock of total natural resource available NatResDt.
R&D Policy
The last module in this general model explains the role of policy and regulation
in the promotion of research and innovation in biotech. Here, the government
emerges as the facilitator and policing entity in charge of setting the limits and
reaches of the existing regulatory frames in a quest to induce advancement in
the sector. Within the various segments of this module, variables capturing the
adapting capacity of these policy frameworks are analyzed to estimate the dy-
namics followed by these when coping with the fast-paced changes induced by
discovery and innovation in modern biotech. The influence of and the need for
abiding to regional and international standards are also considered here as piv-
otal factors defining these policies and their shaping dynamics. The module is
divided into four areas: 1) IPR policy; 2) biosafety policy; 3) health inspection
and protection policy; and 4) R&D promotion.
In the first area, rules defining intellectual property rights are explored as
these help define breadth and length, the two central components of patent law
within IPR regulation. These two traits are introduced in the model due to the
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fact that these are considered essential for the study of patent dynamics (O’
Donoghue 1996; O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1995; Green and Scotch-
mer, 1995).
The two central stock in this segment explain how the breadth —defined as
the amount of information within genetic resources over which a patent can be
claimed— and the overall effect of patent protection within the IPR system —
as defined by a factor composed by the breadth level and length of protection
these rights are provided for— behave over time. The equations for these are:
BreadthFactt =
∫ t
0
(InBFactt −OutBFactt)dt+BreadthFactt−1 (3.63)
and
IPREffectt =
∫ t
0
(InIPRt −OutIPRt)dt+ IPREffectt−1 (3.64)
Where BreadthFactt is the breadth level expressed as a stock; InBFactt is the
degree of change at which the breadth level changes every dt; OutBFactt is the
balancing outflow for the stock; and BreadthFactt−1 is the initial breadth level.
In the second equation, IPREffectt is the factor composed by the degree of
both breadth and length defined as a stock; InIPRt is the inflow defining the
stock’s degree of change every dt;OutIPRt is the stock’s balancing outflow; and
BreadthFactt−1 is the initial level of this stock (see figure 3.26).
In the first equation, the inflow InBFactt is in function of the effective ap-
propriation rate, EffectiveAppRatet, and the slider input device,BreadthFactt,
which defines the degree of breadth at the model’s interface level.
The inflow is defined by the function:
InBFactt = Breadtht + EffectiveAppRatet
229
Figure 3.26: IPR Policy Process
Further, EffectiveAppRatet is given by a logical function that sets the
amount the effective appropriation rate changes as a function of the spread
between the genetic resources’ depletion and prospection rates, Spreadt, de-
fined within the Resource Management module, and a fixed appropriation rate of
change, APPRateChanget, set in the model at -1%. The logical function within
this converter is:
EffectiveAppRatet:
if Spreadt > 0.25 then
EffectiveAppRatet← APPRateChanget
else
EffectiveAppRatet← 0
On the other hand, the outflow OutBFactt is defined by total stock of
BreadthFactt every dt.
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In the second equation, the inflow InIPRt is in function of the degree at
which the breadth level changes every dt, InBFactt, and the patent lifetime
length, LengthFactt, and is given by the logical function:
InIPRt:
if (InBFactt x LengthFactt) < 1 then
InIPRt← (InBFactt x LengthFactt)
else
InIPRt← 1
Here, the length factor, LengthFactt, is also in function of the slider input
device, Lengtht, which sets the patent’s length at the model’s interface level.
The general patent’s lifetime length is —on average— 25 years, so in order to
calculate the proportion of change, the length given by the model is divided by
this number. This inflow is defined by the function:
LengthFactt =
Lengtht
25
Finally, the outflow OutIPRt is also defined by total stock of IPREffectt
every dt.
The second area in this module explains how the minimum levels of
biosafety are set by the government as it simultaneously aims at reducing the
depletion of natural resources, easing public worry, and complying with inter-
national standards. The single stock defined here sets the levels of biosafety
within the model and shows how these change as natural resources or public
perception vary.43
The equation for this stock is:
43The notion of public perception is introduced in this model to capture the relevance it has
in shaping the limits of the regulation and oversight rules that the processes and outcomes of
this technology have to abide to. As reported by actors from both Spain and Mexico, these can
either allow processes to move forward more rapidly (case of medicine approval in Spain) or
doom particular products (case of GM papaya in southeast Mexico).
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BiosafetyLevelt =
∫ t
0
(InBLevt −OutBLevt) + BiosafetyLevelt−1 (3.65)
Where BiosafetyLevelt is the minimum level of biosafety the industry needs
to subject its innovation production activities to; InBLevt is the the degree of
inflow changing the level of this stock every dt; OutBlevt is the stock balancing
outflow; and BiosafetyLevelt−1 is the stock’s initial level (see figure 3.27).
The inflow InBLevt is in function of international biosafety standards, given
by IntlBioStandadt (set in the general model at 2.15); the levels of the vari-
able capturing the effects of public perception, PPEffectt; and the degree of
biosafety represented as a stock, BiosafetyLevelt. This is defined by the logical
function:
InBLevt:
if (BiosafetyLevt + PPEffectt) > IntlBioStandadt then
InBLevt← [(BiosafetyLevt + PPEffectt)-1]
else
InBLevt← (BiosafetyLevt + PPEffectt)
In this process, public perception PublicPerceptiont is in function of the dif-
ference between the public depletion threshold, PubDepThrest —which is equal
to the international biosafety standard, IntlBioStandadt— and the natural re-
sources depletion rate, DepletionRatet, defined within the Resource Management
module. The equation for this function is:
PublicPerceptiont = DepletionRatet − PubDepThrest
On the other hand, public perception as an effect, PPEffectt, is in function
of PublicPerceptiont and its level is defined by a logical function:
PPEffectt:
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Figure 3.27: Biosafety Policy Process
if PublicPerceptiont >0 then
IPPEffectt← 0.01
else
PPEffectt← 0
This process guarantees that the biosafety level increases whenever the stock
of natural resources becomes affected beyond the limits of public acceptance.
Finally for this section, OutBlevt is defined by total BiosafetyLevelt every dt.
The third area in this module focuses on health inspection and protection
policy, displaying how the health safety rate in the model varies and thus, alters
the cost of health inspection procedures performed by the government’s net of
health safety inspection services. The first stock in this process captures how
the rate of health inspection services varies or, in other words, how the propor-
tion of capital earnings the development industry (i.e. biopharmaceuticals, food
developers, animal use, etc.) has to pay to get their products approved before
reaching the market varies.
The single stock in this process is:
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HealthSafetyRatet =
∫ t
0
(InHSRt−OutHSRt)+HealthSafetyRatet−1 (3.66)
Where HealthSafetyRatet is a stock that represents health safety rate as a pro-
portion of development’s income; InHSRt is the inflow defined as a rate of
change for this stock every dt; OutHSRt is the balancing flow that allows know-
ing the stocks level every dt; and HealthSafetyRatet−1 is the stock’s initial rate.
The inflow InHSRt is equal to the international health safety rate standard, to-
wards which the initial stock moves as it seeks global standardization for local
processes. The balancing outflow, OutHSRt, in this process is equal to the level
of the stock represented by HealthSafetyRatet every dt (see figure 3.28).
The second segment in this area explains how the actual amount of capital
resources required by the industry to undergo health inspection —given in the
model’s knowledge units currency— varies every dt. The lone stock in this pro-
cess explains the dynamics of this amount as it varies over time. The equation
of this stock is:
HSInspectLevelt =
∫ t
0
(InHSILt−OutHSILt)+HSInspectionLevelt−1 (3.67)
Where HSInspectLevelt is the cost of health inspection for innovation activ-
ities, represented as a stock; InHSILt is the inflow of resources changing
this stock every dt; OutHSILt is the balancing outflow for this stock; and
HSInspectLevelt−1 is the initial cost of health inspection.
The inflow InHSILt is equal to the parameters HSChanget, which is the
last link of a brief logical function mechanism. Within this mechanism, this last
parameter together with HSChange1t define how much the amount required
for health inspection varies every dt. These parameters are both in function
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Figure 3.28: Health Safety Policy Process
of health inspection costs, HSInspectLevelt; the level of health inspection re-
sources, HealthSFundt, defined within the Innovation Management module; and
a fixed change proportion, given by HSDegree, and set in the model at 5,000.
The logical functions defining this process are:
HSChanget:
if HealthSFundt <10,000,000 then
HSChanget← (HSInspectLevelt + HSDegree)
else
HSChanget← HSChange1t
and
HSChange1t:
if not (HealthSFundt <10,000,000) then
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HSChange1t← (HSInspectLevelt - HSDegree)
else
HSChange1t← 0
This mechanism helps define the degree and sign of the inflow InHSILt
going into the cost of health inspection for innovation activities. Also in this
segment, the balancing outflow, OutHSILt, is equal to the level of the stock
represented by HSInspectLevelt every dt (also see figure 3.28).
Finally, the last area in this module focuses on R&D promotion as expressed
through direct investment in these two areas and in research infrastructure. The
three stock composing this area explain the tax rate as income government; the
amount of these resources going to government-funded R&D activities; and the
amount of these invested in research infrastructure. The equations for these
stock are:
TaxRatet =
∫ t
0
(InTaxChanget −OutTaxChanget) + TaxRatet−1 (3.68)
R&DRatet =
∫ t
0
(InR&DRatet −OutR&DRatet) +R&DRatet−1 (3.69)
and
InfraRatet =
∫ t
0
(InInfraRatet −OutInfraRatet) + InfraRatet−1 (3.70)
Where TaxRatet is the official government tax rate, defined as a stock;
InTaxChanget is the inflow as degree of change going into this stock;
OutTaxChanget is the stock’s balancing outflow; and TaxRatet−1 is the ini-
tial tax rate, set in the model at 35% (similar in both Spain and Mexico). In
the second equation R&DRatet is the percentage of government resources al-
located for research and development in biotech activities; InR&DRatet is the
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inflow as level of change that this percentage varies each dt; OutR&DRatet is
the stock’s balancing outflow; and R&DRatet−1 is the initial percentage of re-
sources going to R&D, set in the model at 84%. For the last equation, InfraRatet
is the percentage of government resources allotted to renewing or creating re-
search infrastructure; InInfraRatet is the inflow as degree of change that this
percentage varies each dt; OutInfraRatet is the stock’s balancing outflow; and
InfraRatet−1 is the initial percentage of government resources going to infras-
tructure (see figure 3.29).
In the initial equation, the inflow InTaxChanget is given by the sum:
InTaxChanget = TaxRatet + T1t
The parameter T1t, along with its counterpart T2t; a degree of change given
by TaxRateChanget (set in the model at 1%); and NetResGovtt, previously de-
fined within the Resource Management module, provide a fraction of change that
taxes face each dt through a succinct logical function mechanism. The logical
functions for this process are:
T1t:
if NetResGovtt >1,000,000 then
T1t← TaxRateChanget
else
T1t← T2t
and
T2t:
if NetResGovtt <10,000 then
T2t← (-1 x TaxRateChanget)
else
T2t← 0
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Figure 3.29: R&D Promotion Policy Process
Lastly, the balancing outflow, OutTaxChanget, is also equal to the level of
the stock represented by TaxRatet every dt.
In the second equation, the inflow InR&DRatet is given by the sum:
InR&DRatet = R&DRatet +R&D1t
In quite an analogous way to the previously explained process, through a
logical function mechanism composed by the parameters R&D1t and R&D2t;
a degree of change given by RInvestChanget (set in the model at 0.1%); along
with the previously defined TaxRatet, provide a fraction of change that R&D
expresses each dt. The logical functions for this process are:
R&D1t:
if TaxRatet >35% then
R&D1t← RInvestChanget
else
R&D1t← R&D2t
and
R&D2t:
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if TaxRatet <35% then
R&D2t← (-1 x RInvestChanget)
else
R&D2t← 0
The balancing outflow, OutR&DRatet, is as well equal to the level of the
stock represented by R&DRatet every dt (also see figure 3.29).
Finally, in the last equation, the inflow InInfraRatet is given by the sum:
InInfraRatet = InfraRatet + Infra1t
Just as the previous two process, through a logical function mechanism com-
prised by the parameters Infra1t and Infra2t; a degree of change given by
RInfraChanget (set in the model also at 0.1%); as well as with the previously
defined TR&DRatet, give description to the fraction of change that research
infrastructure expresses each dt. The logical functions for this process are:
Infra1t:
if R&Dt >84% then
Infra1t← InfraInvestChanget
else
Infra1t← Infra2t
and
Infra2t:
if R&DRatet <60% then
Infra2t← (-1 x InfraInvestChanget)
else
Infra2t← 0
To finalize this section, the balancing outflow, OutInfraRatet, is as well
equal to the level of the stock represented by InfraRatet every dt (also see figure
3.29).
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3.2 System Performance Assessment
The complex task of analyzing and comparing the results of each set of changes
that could be introduced to the general model called for a more sophisticated as-
sessment process. This entailed the design of a methodology that could measure
the effects of structural and parametric changes (or combinations of these) on
the model’s performance while also taking into account its intrinsic stochastic
character. This step would mainly focus on providing sufficient information to
determine which of these changes induce significantly enough effects to modify
the performance of specific key variables within the system. This section details
the design of such an experiment.
3.2.1 Experiment Design
The initial modeling exercise per se provides a first glimpse of the existing struc-
tural differences between the two countries’ systems of innovation by defining
each as a variation of the designed general model. Yet, another central objective
of this study is to estimate the effects that such differences —as single structural
or parametric changes or combinations of these— have on the performance of
the basic model once initial conditions for Spain and Mexico are introduced. To
achieve this, an experiment that allows measuring and comparing the effects
that these ‘treatments’ have on this system —as well as a comparison between
its performance once a treatment is applied— was defined.44 Such an experi-
44The initial conditions for the general model were set as follows: Interest rate at 3%; price of
knowledge units, 10; labor hand levels at 10,000 (with a research-to-development ratio of 3:1);
level of existing research infrastructure at 10 million (requiring 1,000 units per research worker);
level of existing infrastructure for development at 2 million (requiring 2,000 units per develop-
ment worker); government resources, 10 million, with fixed funds to R&D at 0; net financial
resources to research, 5 million; net financial resources to development, 5 million; venture capi-
tal funds 10 million; international venture capital available at 10 million (with 100,000 entering
the fund each cycle and 1% of the total fund gong to investment, when available); savings and
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ment allowed observation and measurement of the effects that changes to spe-
cific structural and parametrical controlled factors45 had on particular response
variables of the system before specific initial conditions representing each coun-
try’s MBTS were introduced.46 However, due to the fact that treatments are
formed by combinations of factors —in this case seven; five with two levels
each and two with three, for a total of 288 possible treatments— a subset of
34 treatments was selected to study the relationship between these and the be-
havior of a sample of response variables (see table 3.1). Thus, the exercise was
designed as a fractional factorial experiment. Furthermore, since the model has
a stochastic component allowing it to yield different results every time —not
withstanding constant initial conditions— the experiment also samples results
for each response variable from multiple runs.
spending both at 0; patents at 0; public knowledge at 100; IPR length at 25 years and breadth at
50%; the levels of natural resources and genetic resources at 10 million; biosafety at 10 million,
with an inspection level of 100,000; and health safety all at 10 million, with an inspection level
of 200,000; and new research and new development set both to a level of 1 to avoid divisions by
zero.
45These structural elements are: 1) the presence of venture capital investment (including in-
ternational venture capital); 2) research clustering; 3) development clustering; 4) labor mobility
between research and development; and 5) a “royalty-sharing” rule that establishes how the
results of publicly funded research are to be allocated. The two parametric factors also working
as control variables affect the behavior of IPRs by extending, reducing, or keeping constant the
length (25 years) and the breadth (set at 50%) of IPR protection. A further structural element,
defined as “match-making” is intrinsic to both, the venture capital variable and the clustering
elements in the model. When venture capital is present in the model, these two effects encour-
age investment in either sector (R or D) when either displays both low financial resources and
a high payback probability (as measured by its debt/income ratio), or suggest the existence of
a “common objective” that encourages intra-sector collaboration at any given dt. Yet another
switch within the model represents the presence of a fixed amount of funds for R&D. However,
due to the fact that both Spain and Mexico have such a fixed amount of resources per period
this switch remains “on” in every model’s version and run.
46The set of selected response variables are: 1) new research (new knowledge); 2) research
potential; 3) new development (new innovations); 4) development potential; 5) to market (new
marketable products); 6) patented knowledge; 7) open access knowledge; 8) research infras-
tructure capacity; 9) development infrastructure capacity; 10) government income; 11) venture
capital to research; 12) venture capital to development; 13) level of existing genetic resources;
14) biosafety level; and 15) health safety inspection level. Although the model displays other
response variables, these were not assessed in this process. Among these are: resources to re-
search coming from tech transfer to research; resources to research coming from tech transfer
to development; R&D’s savings and expenditure level; and labor hand going to research and
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Table 3.1: Selected Treatment Subset
Structural Elements1 Parametric Factors2
RC DC LM VC RR IPRL3 IPRB4
All Off - - - - - = =
All On + + + + + = =
DC - + - - - = =
LM - - + - - = =
Off+IPRB - - - - - = +
Off+IPRL - - - - - + =
Off+IPRL+IPRB - - - - - + +
Off+IPRL-IPRB - - - - - + -
Off+IPRL-IPRB+LM - - + - - + -
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC + - - - - + -
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC+LM + - + - - + -
Off-IPRB - - - - - = -
Off-IPRL - - - - - - =
Off-IPRL+IPRB - - - - - - +
Off-IPRL-IPRB - - - - - - -
Off-IPRL-IPRB+LM - - + - - - -
Off-IPRL-IPRB+RC + - - - - - -
On+IPRB + + + + + = +
On+IPRL + + + + + + =
On+IPRL+IPRB + + + + + + +
On+IPRL-IPRB + + + + + + -
On-IPRB + + + + + = -
On-IPRL + + + + + - =
On-IPRL+IPRB + + + + + - +
On-IPRL-IPRB + + + + + - -
On-LM + + - + + = =
RC + - - - - = =
RD+DC + + - - - = =
RD+DC+LM + + + - - = =
RD+DC+VC + + - + - = =
RR - - - - + = =
RR+LM - - + - + = =
VC - - - + - = =
VC+RR - - - + + = =
1 The structural elements are: Research Clustering (RC), Development
Clustering (DC), Labor Mobility (LM), Venture Capital (VC) including international VC,
and Research Royalty Rule (RR)
2 The parametric factors are: IPR Length (IPRL), and IPR Breadth (IPRB)
3 Changes to this parametric factor are: Increase (IPRL+10),decrease (IPRL-10)
4 Changes to this parametric factor are: Increase (IPRB+0.25),decrease (IPRB-0.25).
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To obtain observations of significant statistical value the model was run 100
times per treatment, recording and analyzing the behavior of the selected re-
sponse variable for each time period.47 The mean for each time period of sim-
ulation (meaning the arithmetic mean of 100 observations per dt) was obtained
and used to define a single general observation per dt for each response vari-
able per treatment. Later, these more manageable data were used to run time
series regressions to obtain the trend lines that describe the effects that each of
the treatments have on the response variables over time (see table 3.2).48 The
equations for these trend lines provided necessary and sufficient information
to allow making a direct comparison between treatments and, thus, between
the results (effect on response variables) provided by different versions of the
model. Furthermore, these allowed estimating which of the selected 34 treat-
ments where indeed those with the most significant effects. Consequently, this
also allowed testing the probability of obtaining a series of responses that
are likely or more likely to allow rejecting the H0 (null hypothesis) which
suggests that the presence of five structural elements and specific changes to
parametric variables in the general model does not increase the response of
specific variables.
development.
47All versions of the model were ran using the Euler’s integration method with a simulation
length going from 0 to 25 and a dt equal to 0.5. This means that every time the model was run,
it provided two levels per time for each response variable, a total of 50 per run.
48With the use of statistical analysis software (MINITAB) the fitted trend lines were set to be
quadratic trend of the form:
Yt = β0 + β1 · t+ (β2 · t2) + et
based on the better-fit information provided by the Measures of Accuracy. These measures are:
Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), which expresses the accuracy as a percentage of the
error; Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), which expresses the accuracy in the same units as the
data; and the Mean Squared Deviation (MSD), a commonly-used measure of accuracy for fitted
series values.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 General (or Non-Parametric) Model
This first stage of the experiment design allows testing the response of multiple
variables within the general model when its initial conditions are set the clos-
est to neutral. This facilitated sorting out which of the applied treatments may
be more effective from those which may not, while also reducing any possible
effects induced by more specific initial conditions. To better grasp how these
response variables behave over time when the model is being subjected to each
treatment, the results were evaluated at four different times: a) 1 year or 2dt
(reference); b) 5 years or 10 dt (short term); c) 10 years or 20 dt (mid term); and
d) 25 years or 50 dt (long term), using the parameters of the equations obtained
through time series analysis for each variable to do so (see table 3.3). These re-
sults were then assessed to determine: a) consistency as the degree of response
that each treatment induced on the variables at each time period; and b) perfor-
mance as the percentage change that each of these responses had as compared
to that of their level at year 1. The results obtained in each of these processes
(consistency and performance) were ranked at each time period with respect to
the neutral treatment (All Off). Lastly, a general rank to define each treatment’s
overall effectiveness was developed based on these performance and consis-
tency levels.
As suggested, due to the large quantity of output generated by these initial
testing procedures, presenting all obtained results deem to be quite an unprac-
tical task. Tables 3.2 to 3.5 show the results of the described analytical approach
for the key “New Development” (or new innovation, i1 variable) found within
the Development module and considered as one of the model’s most significant
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Table 3.3: Effect of Selected Treatments on “New De-
velopment” Response Variable: Response Per Term
Treatment Response1
Term
Initial Short Mid Long
All Off 2.644 3.170 3.597 3.342
All On 2.910 3.336 3.671 3.354
DC 2.615 3.232 3.711 3.203
LM 2.478 3.104 3.632 3.516
Off+IPRB 2.696 3.300 3.769 3.258
Off+IPRL 2.839 3.322 3.693 3.247
Off+IPRL+IPRB 2.779 3.347 3.804 3.473
Off+IPRL-IPRB 2.543 3.276 3.841 3.196
Off+IPRL-IPRB+LM 2.663 3.217 3.655 3.266
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC 2.724 3.291 3.735 3.306
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC+LM 2.635 3.238 3.713 3.278
Off-IPRB 2.520 3.269 3.840 3.120
Off-IPRL 2.725 3.215 3.630 3.558
Off-IPRL+IPRB 2.915 3.290 3.604 3.514
Off-IPRL-IPRB 2.456 3.249 3.861 3.174
Off-IPRL-IPRB+LM 2.510 3.119 3.628 3.478
Off-IPRL-IPRB+RC 2.402 3.052 3.592 3.392
On+IPRB 2.609 3.226 3.707 3.226
On+IPRL 2.657 3.141 3.534 3.301
Continued . . .
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Table 3.3: (continued)
Treatment Response1
Term
Initial Short Mid Long
On+IPRL+IPRB 2.579 3.227 3.747 3.375
On+IPRL-IPRB 2.793 3.318 3.731 3.340
On-IPRB 2.572 3.323 3.902 3.242
On-IPRL 2.657 3.231 3.697 3.426
On-IPRL+IPRB 2.728 3.271 3.717 3.510
On-IPRL-IPRB 3.026 3.457 3.792 3.431
On-LM 2.818 3.229 3.561 3.353
RC 2.494 3.183 3.720 3.179
RC+DC 2.464 3.187 3.760 3.269
RC+DC+LM 2.830 3.315 3.686 3.227
RC+DC+VC 2.767 3.304 3.707 3.126
RR 2.688 3.130 3.512 3.519
RR+LM 2.756 3.346 3.787 3.134
VC 2.779 3.218 3.589 3.517
VC+RR 2.702 3.205 3.605 3.284
1 Parameters obtained through the use of quadratic trend line models.
End
variables. This variable —which displays the number of new marketable prod-
ucts or services created through the use of modern biotech per dt— serves as a
suitable illustration of the behavior of all analyzed response variables49
49The results gathered from the Spain and Mexico versions of the model presented in subse-
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As for all other response variables, when contrasting the effect of each treat-
ment to that induced by the neutral treatment (All Off) at three time periods (5,
10, and 25 years) it was possible to estimate the difference in effect that each of
these induced with respect to that of the reference policy.50 By ranking these
response levels at each term, it became possible to identify their degree as well
as the fact that their behavior was not always consistent over time (see table
3.4). In some cases, these treatments promoted an unfavorable response in the
short and mid runs as compared to that of the neutral treatment, only to better
their performance drastically in the long run. A case displaying this tendency
is that of the treatment suggesting no structural elements plus a reduction in
the IPR length (Off-IPRL), which went from 25th in the short and mid terms, to
the highest ranking in the long run. Other examples that started slow but later
prompted higher responses are the research royalty rule (RR), which reached
the second position from previously being the 31st and 34rth, respectively, and
venture capital (VC) and labor mobility (LM), which came back from 23rd and
33rd in the short term to 3rd and 4rth, respectively, in the long term.
Other treatments showed the opposite behavior, like the conjunction of re-
search royalty rule and labor mobility (RR+LM), which went from being the 3rd
with the most response in the short run to the 32nd in the long run. Among
those treatments inducing this response pattern is the treatment that suggests
the presence of all structural elements (All On), having the 4th largest effect in
the short run and decreasing to the 13th in the long run. Further treatments
behaving like this are all structural elements present plus a reduction in IPR
breadth (On+IPRB), which —in the mid-run— proved to induce the highest ef-
quent sections delve into the response and behavior of a wider range of variables (a total of 15,
including the one reviewed in this section).
50As mentioned earlier, in this and subsequent sections the terms model, treatment, and pol-
icy will be used indistinctly to refer to any of the treatments under scrutiny.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Selected Treatments on “New De-
velopment” Response Variable: Rank and Change
Treatment Rank % Change1
Short Mid Long Short Mid Long
All Off 29 29 15 0.000 0.000 0.000
All On 4 22 13 5.233 2.046 0.344
DC 18 16 28 1.950 3.175 -4.159
LM 33 24 4 -2.073 0.979 5.192
Off+IPRB 10 8 23 4.114 4.771 -2.513
Off+IPRL 6 20 24 4.801 2.663 -2.843
Off+IPRL+IPRB 2 5 8 5.596 5.744 3.920
Off+IPRL-IPRB 13 3 29 3.344 6.783 -4.369
Off+IPRL-IPRB+LM 24 23 22 1.489 1.607 -2.274
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC 11 11 17 3.820 3.848 -1.092
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC+LM 17 15 20 2.145 3.225 -1.915
Off-IPRB 15 4 34 3.126 6.767 -6.658
Off-IPRL 25 25 1 1.423 0.929 6.448
Off-IPRL+IPRB 12 28 5 3.785 0.195 5.147
Off-IPRL-IPRB 16 2 31 2.483 7.334 -5.042
Off-IPRL-IPRB+LM 32 26 7 -1.606 0.873 4.054
Off-IPRL-IPRB+RC 34 30 11 -3.713 -0.133 1.481
On+IPRB 22 17 27 1.751 3.058 -3.486
On+IPRL 30 33 18 -0.905 -1.746 -1.242
On+IPRL+IPRB 21 10 12 1.798 4.170 0.987
Continued . . .
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Table 3.4: (continued)
Treatment Rank % Change1
Short Mid Long Short Mid Long
On+IPRL-IPRB 7 12 16 4.681 3.714 -0.060
On-IPRB 5 1 25 4.830 8.490 -3.007
On-IPRL 19 19 10 1.918 2.786 2.513
On-IPRL+IPRB 14 14 6 3.189 3.347 5.012
On-IPRL-IPRB 1 6 9 9.066 5.410 2.663
On-LM 20 32 14 1.845 -1.001 0.314
RC 28 13 30 0.394 3.420 -4.892
RC+DC 27 9 21 0.533 4.520 -2.199
RC+DC+LM 8 21 26 4.574 2.474 -3.441
RC+DC+VC 9 18 33 4.224 3.047 -6.478
RR 31 34 2 -1.256 -2.369 5.296
RR+LM 3 7 32 5.562 5.288 -6.239
VC 23 31 3 1.517 -0.211 5.221
VC+RR 26 27 19 1.107 0.234 -1.750
1As compared to the neutral treatment (All Off) at each period.
End
fect on the response variable, yet, in the long-run fell to the 25th spot.
The effects that these two cases produce —particularly the immediate posi-
tive effect and future reduction— may shed additional light on why some im-
plemented policies applied in the real world to promote innovation fail to show
results beyond the short term. This may even more so be the case due to the
fact that some of these treatments may appear quite attractive from a political
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stance.
More surprising is the fact that some of the treatments anticipated to pro-
duce a positive impact on this (and all) response variables performed quite neg-
atively. Among these is research clustering (RC), which in the short term had
virtually no effect above that of the neutral treatment, in the mid run reached
13th and in the long ended as the 30th effect-inducing treatment. The response
induced by development clustering (DC) —expected as well to elicit positive
effects— also displayed a similar behavior, going up from 18th to 16th and then
down to 28th at each respective term. Not even combining these two cluster-
ing treatments produced a better response; the treatment RC+DC reached per
term the 27th, 9nth, and 21st response levels, respectively. Furthermore, when
this last treatment was supplemented with either labor mobility (RC+DC+LM)
or venture capital (RC+DC+VC), the outcome displayed for each showed a clear
downward tendency, making these pass in the short run from 8th and 9th most
effect-inducing down to 26th and to 33th in the long term, respectively. The re-
sponse that these particular treatments generate may appear counter-intuitive
to the effect of clustering suggested within mainstream regional planning lit-
erature, yet, this may be suggesting that the full impact of research and devel-
opment clustering may not be felt unless it works in conjunction with a series
of elements (in this case the presence of venture capital, labor mobility, royalty
sharing rules plus changes to the IPR regime) that go beyond spatial and com-
munication linkage.
Overall, eight of the top-ten treatments with the greater positive response
averages in all three time ranges suggest changes to at least one of the IPR pa-
rameters (length or breadth). Two examples of this are the pair of treatments
with highest response in all time ranges; the top one, suggesting all structural
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elements on and a reduction in both IPR parameters (On-IPRL-IPRB), produced
a response 9% higher than that of the neutral policy in the short run and a 5.4%
and 2.66% positive difference in the mid and long run, respectively. The second,
suggesting none of the structural element present and an increment in both IPR
parameters (Off+IPRL+IPRB) displayed, on average, a 5.1% larger effect than
that produced by the reference treatment in all three terms. Although these two
treatments appear as being diametrically opposed, the fact that both propose
the above mentioned changes to IPR parameters give more elements to imply
that these (IPRs) play an equally —or even more— important role than that of
the structural elements considered when it comes to educing higher responses
from the model’s variables.
The response of this variable to the neutral treatment (All Off) was much
more negative than initially estimated, being among the bottom-five in the first
two terms and reaching a mediocre 15th rank in the long run. Further, the re-
sponse this treatment induced was always below that of its alternative (All On),
providing more evidence to propose that the null hypotheses earlier presented
can be rejected.
To further understand the effects induced by these treatments on the re-
sponse variable, the results obtained at each time period (5, 10 and 25 years)
were contrasted to those obtained for each at year 1 (2 dt) to determine the av-
erage change in response that each reflected over time. These levels of change
were then contrasted with those of the neutral treatment at each period (see
table 3.5). This process allows estimating which treatment induces a higher
change in response range than that given by the reference treatment over time
and, thus, which can be considered more effectual. However, more than con-
trasting the nominal levels of change (displayed in table 3.4) the importance of
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this analysis is based on knowing which of these treatments showed a more
noticeable change level over time. In order to fall in this category, a treatment
had to display a change in the levels of response above those of the neutral
treatment, which showed a 19.89% growth in the short term, and a 36.04% and
26.4% in the mid and long terms, respectively.51 Although these levels appear
to be somewhat significant, when compared to the behavior of the rest of the
treatments, these can be considered quite average. A clear case to support this
statement is the fact that the nearly twenty percent growth in response shown
in the short run by the neutral treatment was only above that of 15 treatments.
In the other two terms, the change in the effects of the neutral treatment were
also quite ordinary, being above those of 13 other treatments in the mid term
and 21 in the long run.
The most significant change in response in the short term was that of no
structural elements plus a reduction in both IPR parameters (Off-IPRL-IPRB),
which increased 32.3% over a period of five years, a 62.2% above that reflected
by the neutral treatment. The second and third larger changes in this time-span
were those displayed by the treatments proposing no structural elements and a
reduction in IPR breadth (Off-IPRB), which displayed 49.5% more growth than
that of the reference, and that suggesting both clustering of research and devel-
opment (RC+DC), which had 47.6% above the mark. It then becomes easy to
see why some of these treatments are selected as policies in the short run (like
proposing clustering between research institutions and development industries
or a reduction in the property rights schemes) instead of developing new incen-
tives for invention or to allure private capital into these areas.
51These growth figures represent the change in the response of the response variable from
a level of 2.644 in year 1 to levels of 3.270, 3.597, and 3.342 for each of the three time ranges,
respectively. Other treatments might display lower change averages, yet might have higher
nominal levels of response than those of the neutral policy.
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On the other hand, among the treatments with the lowest change range in
this time bracket was that suggesting no structural changes plus a reduction
in the IPR length and an increase in their breadth (Off-IPRL+IPRB), which in-
creased 12.87% in five years, representing 35.32% less than that of the neutral
treatment. Other treatments with slower changes as compared to the base treat-
ment were On-IPRL-IPRB (14.24% change and 28.4% less than the norm) and
On-LM (with 14.58% change being -26.72% below the mark). Then again, al-
though the policy suggesting all structural elements on plus a reduction in IPR
parameters (On-IPRL-IPRB) ranked as the most effective in terms of response, it
had a lower change degree than that of the neutral treatment, making it fall be-
low it in this type of analysis. This can also help explain why such an elaborate
policy —requiring the presence of multiple structural elements and changes to
the current IPR regime— might elicit a less evident change in the short run.
The treatments with the largest change rates in the short run displayed some
consistency in the mid run. Again, Off-IPRL-IPRB showed changes at levels
above those of the reference variable. Here, the degree of growth shown by
these results revolved around the 57% level, meaning that these had a growth
in response close to 60% above that of the neutral treatment. Just as the top
response-inducing treatments, the least effective also showed some consistency,
being in this list the two of the previously mentioned (Off-IPRL+IPRB and On-
LM), along with All On which produced effects 27.4% less than the norm. The
negative growth those treatments below the norm reflected ranged from 34.6%
(that of Off-IPRL+IPRB) to 5.7% (produced by RC+DC+VC) below par. How-
ever, it needs to be stated that the actual change range these treatments showed,
although less than that of “All Off,” was by no means small; for example, the
treatment suggesting all structural elements on plus a reduction in the IPR
260
length and breadth (On-IPRL-IPRB), which displayed one of the largest neg-
ative growths in this term (29.8%), actually had a 25.28% change with respect
to its level at year 1. Yet, that seems to be not good enough when compared to
that of the above mentioned treatment suggesting no structural change and the
same reduction in IPR levels (Off-IPRL-IPRB), which growth from year 1 to year
10 is estimated to be nearly 58%. From this approach it becomes more evident
that even those policies showing levels of change below those of the reference
treatment in fact are displaying positive changes over time. None of the treat-
ments analyzed at any time period showed a growth level below 14%, let alone
a negative one.
Analyzing the treatment’s behavior in the long run brought to the picture
other treatments not previously ranked at the top. Here, the effect response
variables had above research clustering as a treatment reached more than 42%
(case of Off-IPRL-IPRB+RC). This growth would entail a 56% above that of the
neutral treatment. Other treatments that displayed a substantial growth are Off-
IPRL-IPRB+LM (38.5%), and LM (41.2%), each 46% and 58.6% above the neutral
treatment’s level. Among the least effective treatments is again that suggesting
all structural changes on plus a reduction in both IPR parameters (On-IPRL-
IPRB), which showed a change of nearly 50% below the reference level. Others
at the bottom of this list are the two combinations of clustering plus labor mo-
bility (RC+DC+LM) and venture capital (RC+DC+VC), which respectively pro-
duced growths 46.8% and 50.9% below the standard. This behavior once again
concurs with the notion that policies suggesting clustering may result counter-
productive if not applied with other structural and parametrical changes.
Lastly, ranking and assigning the effects of each of these treatments to one of
three categories describing their status as policies (best, moderate, or unsatisfac-
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tory), based on their overall performance in all three periods, closes the analysis
of the general model. (see table 3.6).
Here, ten treatments ranked as best policies when compared to their change
over time and to that of the neutral treatment (which ranked among the least
effective, as later explained). Within the top-tier the treatment proposing all
structural elements on plus a reduction in IPR levels (On-IPRL-IPRB) proved to
be the most positive in both consistency and performance. As pointed out ear-
lier, the second most effective treatment proved to be its almost diametrically
opposite, suggesting no structural elements and an increase in both IPR length
and breadth (Off+IPRL+IPRB). Of the following eight treatments only two more
suggested all structural changes present, being the third most effective that sug-
gesting all structural treatments on (All On).
A combination of changes to IPR parameters appear in eight of the ten top
policies, again giving more weight to these parametric elements than originally
expected. Examples of these treatments are those treatments recommending all
structural changes on (or off), plus an increase in IPR length and a reduction in
their breadth (On+IPRL-IPRB and Off+IPRL-IPRB, respectively), and all struc-
tural changes off, with the exception of research clustering, an increase in IPR
length and a reduction of their breadth (Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC), which shares the
7th spot with the treatment suggesting a combination of research clustering and
labor mobility (RR+LM).
The previous analysis showed venture capital as producing a response above
that of the neutral treatment in all terms with the only exception of the mid-
run, and was the only structural element that, operating individually as treat-
ment, produced the highest response. Venture capital as policy combined with
the two treatments promoting sector clustering also ranked among the mod-
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Table 3.6: Response to Treatment: Overall Rank
Treatment Rank1
On-IPRL-IPRB 1
Off+IPRL+IPRB 2
All On 3
B On+IPRL-IPRB 4
E On-IPRL+IPRB 5
S Off-IPRL+IPRB 6
T Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC 7
RR+LM 7
Off+IPRL 9
Off+IPRB 10
On-IPRB 11
M RC+DC+LM 12
O Off-IPRL 13
D VC 14
E On+IPRL+IPRB 15
R On-IPRL 16
A RC+DC+VC 17
T Off+IPRL-IPRB 17
E On-LM 19
Off+IPRL-IPRB+RC+LM 20
U Off-IPRB 21
N Off-IPRL-IPRB 22
S RR 23
A DC 24
T Off+IPRL-IPRB+LM 25
I VC+RR 26
S RC+DC 27
F On+IPRB 28
A LM 29
C All Off 30
T Off-IPRL-IPRB+LM 31
O On+IPRL 32
R RC 33
Y Off-IPRL-IPRB+RC 34
1Based on overall performance ranking.
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erate effect-inducing treatments, reaching, along with the policy proposing no
structural elements, a reduction in IPR length plus a reduction in their breath
(Off+IPRL-IPRB), the17th spot. It is important to point out that the effects these
treatments display are not necessarily additive, in fact, the response that each re-
sulting combination of treatments may end up producing on the response vari-
able is quite unpredictable; a clear example of this is that of the top performing
treatment combined with the unsatisfactory research clustering (33th), which re-
sulted in the bottom treatment (Off-IPRL-IPRB+RC). The neutral treatment (All
Off) ranked as the 30th with respect to both performance and consistency, rank-
ing within the bottom group and, thus, considered unsatisfactory.
Overall, 15 of the 22 treatments proposing changes to the IPR parametric
factors concentrated in both the best and moderate ranks, being all but two
those within the highest echelon (as opposed to 7 within the 13 at the bot-
tom division). Therefore, the model indicates that —on average— altering the
rules of intellectual property rights produces a higher response from particular
variables than a combination of structural elements does. Furthermore, these
findings could further assist rejecting the hypothesis that various treatments —
composed from five structural elements as well as specific changes to two para-
metric variables— do not induce a response in specific variables larger than that
induced by a particular ’neutral’ treatment. Yet, the effects of these changes in
the levels of new innovation and other selected response variables when the
model’s initial conditions are set to reflect those of each of the two countries un-
der scrutiny will provide further data to estimate the degree and sign of these,
as well as to corroborate if some of these indeed encourage larger effects than
the reference policy. The analysis of these results for each of the adapted models
is presented in the following section.
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3.3.2 Adapted Model for Spain
In addition to setting all of the general model’s structural elements to the “All
On” treatment position the process to simulate the performance of Spain’s
MBTS requires that the value of some of its components —or initial conditions—
be also adjusted. This procedure allows the model to “mimic” more closely the
initial levels expressed by particular areas within the system’s reality before its
performance assessment begins. The model’s initial conditions for Spain’s rep-
resentation are: interest rate at 3%; tax rate at 35%; price of knowledge units,
100; labor hand levels at 18,000, with a level of 1,000 entering the sector per
cycle (with a research-to-development ratio of 3:1); level of existing research in-
frastructure at 400 million (requiring 10,000 units per research worker per cycle);
level of existing infrastructure for development at 180 million (requiring 2,000
units per development worker per cycle); government endowment to R&D at
507 million; net financial resources to research and net financial resources to de-
velopment, 0; venture capital funds 120 million; international venture capital
available at 100 million (with 100,000 entering the fund each cycle and 1% of the
total fund going to investment, when the model suggests availability); savings
and spendings both at 0; patents at 200; public knowledge at 1,000; IPR length
at 25 years and breadth at 50%; the levels of natural resources and genetic re-
sources at 10 million; biosafety at 10 million, with an inspection level of 100,000;
and health safety all at 10 million, with an inspection level of 200,000; and new
research and new development set both to a level of 1 to avoid divisions by
zero.52 More specifically, these conditions are introduced by setting the initial
rates and levels of particular flows and stocks at amounts that emulate the de-
52The levels for variables that defer from those of the non-parametric model were obtained
from three main sources: Relevance of Biotechnology in Spain 2009 (Geno´ma Espan˜a, 2009);
OECD Biotechnology Statistics 2009 (van Beuzekom and Arundel, 2009); and Informe Anual
2009 (ASEBIO, 2010).
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gree currently displayed by the actual segments within Spain’s MBTS that these
specific sections of the model are designed to represent. Further, these are ex-
pressed in terms of the model’s inputs, outputs, and nomenclature. Moreover,
the degree at which these parameters are set also respects the general model’s
proportions allowing its transformed version to maintain the rest of its original
initial conditions and —most important— its functionality. However, although
more initial conditions were available and could have been introduced into the
general model’s portrayal of Spain’s MBTS, the number of these had to agree
with those of variables that could be identified for the case when the general
model is set to describe Mexico’s system. This restriction derives from the lim-
ited available data on the sector in the latter country. The agreement in the
number of adjusted initial conditions between model versions is also essential
to provide more validity to the response comparison process presented later in
the study.
As previously mentioned, the overall performance of the model53 is assessed
based on the response of 15 selected variables to the treatment representing
Spain (“All On” plus initial conditions). The response expressed by these is
evaluated using a similar methodology to the one used in the previous section
to estimate the effects of multiple treatments on specific variables. Here, the re-
sponse for each variable is obtained by: 1) running the altered model 100 times
and recording and analyzing their behavior (results) at each time period; 2) the
mean for each time period of simulation (meaning the arithmetic mean of 100
observations per dt) is obtained and used to define a single general observation
per dt for each response variable; and 3) these points are then used as input
to run a time series regression that helps obtain the specific trend line that de-
53In this and forthcoming sections, the general model’s adapted version for Spain is equally
referred to as treatment, adapted model (or simply as model), or policy. This also applies for the
case when the general model is set to represent Mexico’s MBTS.
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scribes the effects of the treatment on the response variable over time (see table
3.7).54 Using these trend lines the projected behavior of all response variables
in the short (5 years), mid (10 years), and long (25 years) terms can then be
estimated. Depending on the variable, each response is measured either in: a)
”knowledge units,” which are the result of all research or development activities
(case of New Research, Research Potential, New Development, Development Poten-
tial, To Market, Patented Knowledge, and Open Access Knowledge); b) ”knowledge
currency” which are knowledge units multiplied by price (Government Income,
VC to Research, and VC to Development); or c) ”human capital units” defined by
the value of a single human capital element expressed in knowledge currency
terms (Research Infrastructure Cap. and Development Infrastructure Cap.). The level
of Genetic Resources is also measured in ”knowledge units” due to the fact that
the level of these varies with respect to research’s success rate (which is mea-
sured in these units). Lastly, both Biosafety and Health Safety are measured in
”knowledge currency” since the levels of these depend on those of their partic-
ular funds given in these units. The results of this simulation are found both in
table 3.7 and 3.8.
The results obtained from this simulation55 suggest that the variables To Mar-
54Also using MINITAB the fitted trend lines were set to be S-Curve (Pearl-Reed Logistic) of
the form:
Yt = (10
a)/(β0 + β1 · (β2)t)
or quadratic trend model of the form:
Yt = β0 + β1 · t+ (β2 · t2) + et
depending on the better-fit information provided by the statistical Measures of Accuracy. In
cases when a Pearl-Reed Logistic trend line model is used the asymptote was also considered
as relevant parameter.
55Variations are estimated by comparing each variable’s response at a particular term —as
obtained with the use of each variable’s trend line equation— with those obtained for the initial
term. For example: if a variable displayed an initial response value (at t = 1) of 25 and one of 50
in the mid term (t = 10), its variation in response in the mid term will be of 100%. Variations for
the short term are calculated by contrasting the variable’s response at t = 1 (initial value) with
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ket, New Research, New Development, and VC to Development display a consistent
growth tendency throughout terms. Overall, To Market displayed the steepest
change showing an 87.42% growth in the short term, 230.4% in the mid, and
446.12% in the long run. This change suggested an increase of 0.45 products
going to the market to 1.31 in the long term56 This variable’s response shows
that the system —as modeled— is being successful at creating new marketable
products derived from biotech.
Both New Research and New Development displayed constant growth allowing
their response level to nearly triplicate in the long run, reaching levels of 5.40
and 5.84, a 156.67% and 141.75% growth from its initial value, respectively. The
response of these variables captures the system’s actual new information and
new products or services production proficiency (the system’s potential in these
two areas is addressed later).
The degree of venture capital going to development showed a positive ex-
pansion of 31.36% in the short term, reaching 1,043 units; a 64.43% in the mid
to 1,345.79; and a 136% in the long term for a level of 1,876.14, reflecting the
constant flow of these resources into the system. This response suggests that
the avenues designed to promote the access to such funds —as defined by the
model— operate successfully.
Finally, venture capital to research —which for the initial two terms showed
a pronounced negative change—- displayed the highest variation in response of
any variable in the long term, increasing from -16.98 to 128.55, a 505.19% from
its initial value. In the model the behavior of this last variable concurs with
Arrow’s proposition that investment in basic scientific activity is risky due to
that at t = 5 (short term value).
56It is key to mention that the response of this variable as defined by the time series regression
expresses an averaged output and not a concrete number of products reaching the market per
cycle (as the model does). This average, however, properly reflects the system’s innovation
creation capacity as well as its direction.
270
Ta
bl
e
3.
8:
A
da
pt
ed
M
od
el
fo
r
Sp
ai
n:
R
es
po
ns
e
fr
om
Se
le
ct
ed
V
ar
ia
bl
es
R
es
po
ns
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
R
es
po
ns
e
In
iti
al
Sh
or
t
%
C
ha
ng
e
M
id
%
C
ha
ng
e
Lo
ng
%
C
ha
ng
e
N
ew
R
es
ea
rc
h
(k
no
w
le
dg
e)
2.
11
3.
51
66
.8
3
4.
74
12
5.
09
5.
40
15
6.
67
R
es
ea
rc
h
Po
te
nt
ia
l
18
.9
2
19
.8
8
5.
11
20
.8
9
10
.4
2
22
.7
7
20
.3
8
N
ew
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t(
in
no
va
tio
n)
2.
42
3.
83
58
.3
6
5.
08
11
0.
06
5.
84
14
1.
75
D
ev
el
op
m
en
tP
ot
en
tia
l
16
.7
6
17
.9
1
6.
85
19
.0
3
13
.5
2
20
.8
0
24
.1
3
To
M
ar
ke
t
0.
24
0.
45
87
.4
2
0.
79
23
0.
45
1.
31
44
6.
12
Pa
te
nt
ed
K
no
w
le
dg
e
19
5.
88
17
9.
63
-8
.3
0
16
0.
47
-1
8.
08
11
1.
39
-4
3.
14
O
pe
n
A
cc
es
s
K
no
w
le
dg
e
3.
79
4.
49
18
.5
9
5.
37
41
.7
8
7.
47
97
.3
8
R
es
ea
rc
h
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
C
ap
.
8.
57
8.
68
1.
37
8.
80
2.
79
9.
04
5.
55
D
ev
el
op
m
en
tI
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e
C
ap
.
8.
26
8.
20
-0
.7
4
8.
16
-1
.2
9
8.
11
-1
.8
8
G
ov
er
nm
en
tI
nc
om
e
8.
66
8.
66
0.
00
8.
66
0.
01
8.
70
0.
44
V
C
to
R
es
ea
rc
h
21
.2
4
-7
.3
7
-1
34
.7
0
-1
6.
98
-1
79
.9
4
12
8.
55
50
5.
19
C
on
ti
nu
ed
..
.
2 7 1
Ta
bl
e
3.
8:
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
R
es
po
ns
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
R
es
po
ns
e
In
iti
al
Sh
or
t
%
C
ha
ng
e
M
id
%
C
ha
ng
e
Lo
ng
%
C
ha
ng
e
V
C
to
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
79
4.
31
10
43
.4
1
31
.3
6
13
45
.7
9
69
.4
3
18
76
.1
4
13
6.
20
G
en
et
ic
R
es
ou
rc
es
7.
00
7.
00
0.
00
7.
00
-0
.0
1
7.
00
-0
.0
6
Bi
os
af
et
y
6.
92
7.
01
1.
37
7.
15
3.
42
7.
82
13
.0
8
H
ea
lth
Sa
fe
ty
6.
98
6.
99
0.
16
7.
02
0.
51
7.
29
4.
45
En
d
2 7 2
the fact that outputs (or their value) cannot be predicted perfectly from inputs;
reason why there is virtually no growth in this variable’s response in the short
and mid terms. This also agrees with the notion that private profit-maximizing
entities initially discriminate against investing in such research-intensive pro-
cesses until these can efficiently shift such risks away from them. The model
captures a reduction of these risks, as more marketable products become avail-
able, which happens when To Market expresses growth, increasing investor’s
trust and ultimately inciting more venture capital investment in basic research.
Conversely, five variables —Government Income, Patented Knowledge, Research
Infrastructure Cap., and Development Infrastructure Cap., as well as VC to Research
in the first two terms— compose the set of those with the least response vari-
ation in all periods. From these, the variable defining patented knowledge
showed the most negative change; going from a 179.63 in the short, to 160.47
in the mid and finally down to 111.39 in the long run. This tendency represents
an initial 8.3% reduction followed by an 18.08% decrease in the mid and a fi-
nal contraction of 43.14% in the long. The behavior of this variable’s response
as determined by the model may derive from the fact that, as more informa-
tion becomes privatized and more difficult to access (due to licensing costs), the
success of basic research becomes less probable. Therefore, suggesting that suc-
cessful research —although desirable— might have a negative impact on the
overall volume of patent filings.
In general, the variation expressed by government resources remained be-
low 1% throughout all three periods (0.0%, 0.01%, and 0.44%, respectively).
However, the model also takes into account that most of government’s income
allotted to R&D every period is fixed (generally as a fraction of the GDP). This
way, the estimated changes in response determine only variations departing
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from such fixed funds level. Further, since government resources in the model
are expressed in large ”knowledge currency” amounts (and the results here pre-
sented have been transformed using Log10), these changes —when available—
can be considered significant.57
Although marginal (always less than 2%), the negative response change
in development’s infrastructure capacity may also be associated to patented
knowledge’s behavior. This tendency may suggest that a reduction in the vol-
ume of patents over time could come along with a private sector’s investment
reduction in infrastructure; as the development industry finds it more difficult
to appropriate knowledge, less resources are allocated to expand the infrastruc-
ture where innovations are produced. Nevertheless, the change is so small that
it does not seem to affect neither the system’s overall development potential nor
its capacity to produce marketable products.58 Research’s infrastructure capac-
ity, on the other hand, shows growth in all three terms; 1.37% in the short (from
8.57 to 8.68), 2.79% in the mid (8.68 to 8.80), and 5.55% in the long (from 8.80
to 9.04). Although small, this positive tendency captures the effects of govern-
ment’s investment in basic research. Being government’s investment the main
source of funding for research infrastructure, this marginal-yet-positive incre-
ment may be due to the expansion of government resources over time.
Concluding this segment, VC to Research’s negative response change in the
first two terms, going from an initial 21.24 to -7.37, and further down to -16.98
(a -134.70% and -179.94% reduction, respectively) may be a consequence of in-
vestor’s inability to shift risks away from them in the short and mid terms, as
57For example, a change in response of 0.01%, going from 8.66 to 8.70 is in fact a change of
approximately 43 million, in real terms. This is due to the fact that 8.66 transformed into real
numbers is over 457 million, while 8.7 is slightly over 501 million.
58So as Government Income, it is useful keeping in mind that this variable’s response is also
provided in Log10 terms. This meaning that, although its levels of change appear small, these
are in fact more significant when expressed in non-Log10 terms.
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previously suggested.
The variables Research Potential and Development Potential, which serve in the
model as benchmarks for the system’s knowledge discovery capacity and ability
to transform new information into marketable products and services, expressed
positive response expansions. The former showed a variation of 5.11% in the
short, 10.42% in the mid, and 20.38% in the long while the latter displayed
a change of 6.85%, 13.52%, and 24.13%, respectively. This behavior suggests
that —overall— Spain’s MBTS can be considered a healthy system capable of
expanding its knowledge discovery as well as of applying new knowledge to
create new marketable products and services.
Most of the variables that capture the response of those resources neces-
sary for research and development activities, Genetic Resources, Biosafety, Health
Safety, and Open Access Knowledge, had —with one exception— a positive be-
havior. In particular, the level of open access knowledge displayed the most
notable growth going from an 18.59% increase in the short, a 41.78% in the mid,
to a 97.38% in the long run. Once again, the changes in response displayed here
appear to be connected with those of parented knowledge; having a somewhat
inverse relation, every time that newly discovered knowledge is determined as
non-appropriable within the model, the positive response of this variable tends
to increase. Conversely, that of patented knowledge tends to decrease when this
happens. Furthermore, as the temporary monopoly provided by patents expires
and the once-private information becomes public, the change in response of this
variable increases and —unless patents are produced at a rate that compensates
for such expiration— the change in the level of patented information becomes
affected negatively.
Both biosafety and health safety capture the system’s ability to assess the
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safety of new products and services before these reach the market. The capacity
to conduct these reviews is based on the level of resources that each area has
to do so, which level is captured by these variables. The former presented a
positive variation, going from 1.37% in the short, 3.43% in the mid, to a 13.08%
increase in the long term. The more modest increase shown by health inspection
services captured a 0.16% growth in the short, a 0.51% in the mid, and a final
4.45% increment in the long term. What these results express is that, as more
marketable products are developed (as suggested by the significant response
in change of To Market), the demand for these review procedures also expands.
Furthermore, as these services are performed, each of these sectors increases its
resources which, in time, allow for more (in number) review processes.
Finally, the prime element of all basic research activity in the sector, the level
of Genetic Resources showed a minor decrease over time. In the short term, how-
ever, the model captured no change in the level of these resources. Variations
in response, although quite insignificant, where only expressed in the mid and
long terms, being these of -0.01% and -0.06%, respectively. These results may
suggest that —although basic research is being successfully conducted— the
rules for the access and depletion of genetic resources are somewhat effective as
captured by the model.
3.3.3 Adapted Model for Mexico
Assessing the model’s adapted version for Mexico requires setting all of its
structural elements to the “All Off” treatment position as well as adjusting the
initial conditions necessary to further emulate the country’s MBTS behavior.
These initial conditions for Mexico are: interest rate at 3%; tax rate at 35%; price
per knowledge unit 100 (one ”knowledge currency” token equals 100 ”knowl-
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edge units”); sector’s labor hand at 14,500, with a level of 1,000 entering the
sector per cycle and a research-to-development ratio of 1:5; level of existing
research infrastructure at 90 million (with 5,000 units per research worker ev-
ery cycle); level of existing infrastructure for development at 32 million (requir-
ing 2,000 units per development worker per cycle); government endowment
to R&D at 430 million; net financial resources to research and net financial re-
sources to development, 0; venture capital funds, 0; savings and spendings, 0;
patents at 186; public knowledge at 1,000; IPR length at 25 years and breadth at
50%; the levels of natural resources and genetic resources at 10 million; biosafety
at 10 million, with an inspection level of 100,000; and health safety all at 10 mil-
lion, with an inspection level of 200,000 (equal to Spain to suggest an “interna-
tional standard”); and new research and new development set both to a level
of 1 to avoid divisions by zero.59 As suggested, the number of these conditions
59These figures were either obtained or calculated using data produced by the National In-
stitute of Statistics and Geography, INEGI and by the Mexican Academy of Sciences, AMC.
Mexico’s human resources in S&T are calculated using two tables developed by INEGI: Recur-
sos humanos: Poblacio´n que completo´ exitosamente el nivel de educacio´n ISCED 5 o superior y esta´
ocupada en actividades de ciencia y tecnologı´a, por nivel de educacio´n y campo de la ciencia segu´n ocu-
pacio´n, 2008 and Recursos humanos: Miembros del sistema nacional de investigadores segu´n a´rea de
conocimiento, 1991-2010 (INEGI, 2008, 2011). More specifically, by adding the totals for ciencias
naturales y exactas (200,681), ingenierı´a y tecnologı´a (629,833), ciencias de la salud (502,389), and cien-
cias agropecuarias (111,972) presented in the first table, a total of 1,444,875 is obtained as Mexico’s
available human resources in S&T. Determining that biotech accounts for about 1% of all S&T
human resources, the figure for the sector comes to be somewhere near 14,500. Then, by adding
the totals for biotecnologa y ciencias agropecuarias (1,711) plus a fraction (10%) of Biologı´a y Quı´mica
(244) and Medicina y Ciencias de la Salud (144), found in the second table’s data, an approximation
to the total number of researchers in biotech or areas related can be calculated for the year 2008.
This sum allows estimating a total of 2,100 as the number of researchers in biotech and 12,400 as
those engaged in development activities in this area. According to a study on the sate of biotech
in Mexico developed in 2010 by the AMC, there are nearly 45 mayor research centers in the
country (including professional associations, like the SBMM). Determining that each can allo-
cate 2 million in resources for human capital, the total infrastructure for human capital in basic
research in Mexico is estimated at 90 million (a capacity of 18,000). For development, the same
source suggests that approximately 375 industries are engaged in producing these technologies
locally. Determining for these a budget for human capital of 85,000 for each, total infrastructure
for human capital in development can then be estimated at 32 million (a capacity of 16,000). The
difference in costs in human capital personnel (5,000 for those in research and 2,000 for those in
development) are introduced in the model to capture the higher sophistication (facilities, labs,
and other research instruments) that research infrastructure requires to accommodate its hu-
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agrees with that of those used for modeling Spain. The results of this simulation
are found in tables 3.9 and 3.10.
The model’s simulation shows three variables, New Research, New Develop-
ment, and To Market as having the largest positive response variations through-
out all three periods. In particular, the response of New Research displays a
17.77% growth in the short term and a 32.91% in mid, going from producing
3.55 new projects to 4.72. Although still increasing, the long run change with
respect to its initial level was only 31.17%, closing at an estimated capacity of
4.66 successful projects. These results present a system healthy enough to gen-
erate new research near or above the levels displayed by the adapted model for
Spain. The variable New Development, on the other hand, expressed a 48.49%
and a 88.02% response increase in the short and mid terms, respectively, and a
significantly higher 111.65% growth in the long run. The model suggests the
system boosts the production of new developments with market potential al-
most twofold from an initial 2.59 up to 5.48 in the long run.
The widest and steepest change rate, however, was displayed by To Mar-
ket. This variable’s response increased 24.8% in the short, 60.73% in the mid,
and achieved a 184.34% increment in the long run, the most significant of all
assessed variables for this model in all terms. Although this variable’s response
is somewhat similar in every term to that displayed in the Spain’s model, the
overall growth showed here is less abrupt, especially in the last two terms. This
difference may be a result of the absence in this model of structural elements
aiming at promoting the creation of more marketable products (venture capital
investment in both R&D, clustering, labor mobility, etc.) otherwise available in
man capital. Development work force, on the other hand, requires less resources as it focuses
more on the sector’s managerial and production activities. Therefore, such resources are mostly
aimed at salaries and other types of compensation. Finally, the same AMC study estimates the
number of patents associated to modern biotech in Mexico at around 186 (AMC, 2010).
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the model’s version for Spain.
The variables expressing less response in this model were Patented Knowl-
edge, Development Infrastructure Cap., Research Infrastructure Cap., and Government
Income. The level of patents followed a decreasing tendency almost identical to
that assessed in the model for Spain. In this case the number of patents de-
creased from an initial level of approximately 180 down to 102 in the long term,
an overall 43.29% reduction. This similarity in behavior may also find explana-
tion in the “privatizing information” effect suggested in the previous section to
support this variable’s behavior in the model representing Spain.
Although among those variables with negative response, the minimal
change displayed by Development Infrastructure Cap. (less than 1% in all terms)
allowed it to maintain, on average, a level of 7.47 throughout all terms. Such
marginal fluctuation may be associated to less private investment in develop-
ment activities locally, as captured by the absence of venture capital to develop-
ment in this model’s version, ultimately impacting investment in infrastructure.
The reduction of available patents over time could also be helping induce such
negative effects. Conversely, Research Infrastructure Cap. showed limited but
positive growth in all three terms (4.24%, 7.87%, and 12.47%, respectively), go-
ing from 7.92 up to 8.91 in the long run. This variation displays the effectiveness
of local funding as captured by the model. Lastly, Government Income expresses
no growth in the short and mid terms, and only a minor 0.23% increase for the
long run, change that represents an increase of slightly over 19 million units
when expressed in real numbers. Then again, government resources to R&D in
the model are fixed every term, therefore, any surplus going into these suggests
the government benefits from the system’s current structure.
The overall model’s potential, as captured by the response of the variables
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Research Potential and Development Potential, also presents Mexico’s system as
capable of both discovering new knowledge and producing marketable innova-
tions. In particular, the system’s research inherent capacity suggests an overall
22.11% growth over the total time period analyzed, going from an initial 17.5
capacity up to a 21.37. The system’s ability to innovate also shows a steady
growth, expanding from 15.78 to 18.44 in the long run, a total 16.81% increase.
These results suggest the system’s potential —as modeled— does not seem to be
as ineffectual as initially estimated. However, both research and development’s
real capacity is ultimately determined by the output of marketable products, as
measured by To Market’s response, reviewed later in this section.
The behavior of the variables measuring the resources necessary for R&D
biotech processes is also quite analogous to that displayed by the model’s coun-
terpart for Spain. Here the level of Genetic Resources remains unchanged in the
short term and marginally altered in the mid and long terms (-0.01% and -0.07%,
respectively). This echoing behavior, however, may be due to the fact that both
models are set at the same initial value and access rate for genetic resources. Yet,
by keeping these parameters equal in both models, this variable’s response can
help determine which genetic resources are more sensible. Therefore, exposing
the need for more substantial rules to control access to these. Based on this, it
can be inferred that in this model’s version the access to these resources is less
protected.
The response provided by Biosafety shows a moderate 1.04% and 2.42% in-
crease in the short and mid terms, respectively, and an overall 7.06% in the long
run, promoting a variation from an initial 6.97 level to a final 7.46. Likewise,
Health Safety’s response in both initial terms was positive (0.09% and 0.23%,
respectively), while the level and overall long-term change was considerably
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below that of biosafety, varying only 1.17% from an initial 6.99 to a 7.07. This
shows the positive impact that regulations aiming at reducing risks have on the
creation of new services (both biosafety and health inspection services are repre-
sented as private enterprises in the model). The behavior of these variables, as it
happens in the alternative model for Spain, may be due to the fact that as more
marketable products emerge, more biosafety and health inspection reviews are
required and more growth is induced to both sectors.
Lastly, Open Access Knowledge presents the most salient expansion in this
model, going from an initial 3.48 level up to a final 6.17 in the long run, an over-
all 77.33% increment. As suggested previously, this variable’s response displays
an inverse relation with that of patented knowledge. In this particular case, it
presents constant increments with respect to its initial level in all terms, 26.5%,
51.28%, and the above mentioned 77.33%, respectively. Although these changes
are all considerable, the overall variation is less abrupt than that produced by
the model for Spain. This can be due to the fact that, although the fundamentals
of IPR regulation are the same in both models, the absence of mechanisms aim-
ing at establishing more “open information” environments (such as clustering
and collaborative projects promoted throughout Europe and captured by the
model’s version for Spain) in Mexico are impeding the system from reaping the
full benefits of open access information.
Model Validation
Establishing if the behavior of these models reasonably reflects that of the sys-
tems operating in both countries requires reviewing the data produced by these
in more detail. Yet, since the initial values for most of the variables assessed
by these models had to be calculated through the merger of multiple sources
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of data or through other estimation procedures, validating the results that each
produced for every variable through direct contrast with official systematically
produced data (time-series) is an unattainable task. However, formal informa-
tion for modern biotech patents is (partially) available in such form for both
countries and can be used to contrast the behavior of the outcome of the key
variable Patentable Knowledge produced by both models with real data. By bring-
ing together facts on how research and development efforts successfully consol-
idate into transferable information, this pivotal variable can be used to substan-
tially validate the results of both models through direct contrast with existing
data and thus, used to provide more robustness to this study.
To assess if the information for patents produced by the models and that
from official sources behave similarly requires first to identify the native dis-
tribution expressed by this variable in each model. With the use of statistical
software a series of parameters are calculated to help identify what distribution
fits each data set best.60 Once a distribution for this variable is identified for
each model, it can be used to determine if the official data for patents from each
country fall within its percentiles. If these data fall within the projected distri-
bution range, then it can be established that both behave similarly and that the
formal data validate those produced by the model.
For the case of Spain the variable capturing the behavior of patented knowl-
edge displays a Lognormal distribution.61 Information produced by the Fun-
dacio´n Geno´ma Espan˜a shows that between the years 2000 and 2008 the av-
erage number of modern biotech patents filed in Spain was 125. It further sug-
gests that the number of patents ranged from 81 in 2000 to 200 by 2008 (Geno´ma
60The parameters assessed are the Anderson-Darling (AD) statistic value, the p-value, and for
cases with 3-parameter distributions, the Likelihood-ratio test p-value (LRT P).
61These data display an AD of 0.524 and a p-value of 0.174. This information also provided a
location of 5.00321, a scale of 0.17496, and threshold of 0.0
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Figure 3.30: Spain: Probability Plot for Patented Knowledge
Espan˜a, 2009). Using these figures and the probability plot for patents produced
by Spain’s model, it can be established that such average falls almost within the
16th percentile. Although this percentile appears to be a low one, the actual me-
dian of 149 patents (50th percentile) is not too far off from this level. Doing the
same to determine the percentile for a level of 200 patents, which represents the
number of patents for the year 2008, suggests that such quantity corresponds to
the 95th percentile.
With information for both points it can then be inferred that nearly 80% of
all the estimations for patent production using this model fall within the 125
and 200 range and, thus concur with the behavior of the existing formal facts.
Although the models calculate future levels of patents, the similarity expressed
by the actual and projected data provide enough information to validate their
performance (see figure 3.30).
In Mexico data for modern biotech patents are not as systematically pro-
duced as in Spain. As mentioned previously, the information used in this
research to determine the number of modern biotech patents in Mexico was
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mainly compiled from the AMC’s study on the state of modern biotech in Mex-
ico (AMC, 2010).62 In its appendix on patents, this study suggests that a total
of 186 patents were produced in this area in 2008. Although partial, this infor-
mation can still be used to validate the results produced by the adapted model
for Mexico following the same methodology used to validate the data for Spain.
In this case the data produced by the model follow a normal distribution and
the probability plot for these determine that the level of 186 corresponds to the
96.5th percentile.63 Being this level that of the last year within the 2000 to 2008
continuum, this percentile does not appear to be too extreme. Furthermore, it
almost matches that available for Spain in that same year. Although the number
of modern biotech patents for the year 2000 in Mexico is not available to deter-
mine how well the official information for patent match that produced by the
model, it is not too far fetched to conclude that the number of patents for that
year was lower than that estimated for 2008. Furthermore, this fact does not
impede inferring that the behavior of the data for patents available in Mexico
agrees as well with that of the information produced by the model representing
its MBTS (see figure 3.31).
Contrasting Mexico and Spain
The results obtained for each of these two adapted models provide more in-
sights about their strengths and weaknesses as well as initial hints of their over-
all differences. However, a more detailed analysis contrasting the response of all
15 variables at each of the three time periods reviewed offers additional data to
62Another consulted source was the OCDE’s biotechnology statistics 2009 (van Beuzekom
and Arundel, 2009). However, the number of patents that this compendium provides for each
country offers only fractional counts on Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filings at international
phase (EPO designations). The AMC compendium includes all local filings for Mexico and thus,
can be considered more complete for the purpose of this research.
63These data show an AD of 0.481, a p-value of 0.223, and display a location (mean) of 141.351
and scale (standard deviation) of 24.4854.
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Figure 3.31: Mexico: Probability Plot for Patented Knowledge
help establish if any of these systems —as represented by the model— is in fact
more efficient than the other. The outcome of this process (presented in table
3.11) shows that, in the short term, Mexico’s MBTS performance (as measured
by variable response) is below that of Spain’s in 8 of the 15 assessed variables.
In particular, the response of those variables measuring R&D potential,
patented and open access knowledge production, R&D infrastructure, venture
capital going to both activities,64 and government income are below those for
Spain. Yet, with the exception of patented knowledge and venture capital for
development, most variations are below the single-unit difference mark (be-
tween 0.05 and 0.89). Furthermore, the response of those variables measuring
the levels of new knowledge and new innovations, as well as that assessing
the degree of new marketable products and services created by the system —
considered as the most relevant to the study— demonstrated to be above those
estimated for Spain in this term. These facts suggests that —in the short term—
64Although the model for Mexico does not include either type of venture capital, these vari-
ables are considered among those contrasted to clearly expose the effects of the virtual absence
of these type of resources in that country’s system.
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Table 3.11: Contrasting Mexico Current and Spain
Response Variable Years1
1 5 10 25
New Research 1.45 0.67 -0.02 -0.75
Research Potential -1.41 -0.89 -0.72 -1.40
New Development 0.17 0.01 -0.21 -0.37
Development Potential -0.98 -0.63 -0.97 -2.37
To Market 0.19 0.09 -0.10 -0.09
Patented Knowledge -15.06 -11.82 -9.32 -8.84
Open Access Knowledge -0.31 -0.09 -0.11 -1.31
Research Infrastructure -0.65 -0.43 -0.26 -0.13
Development Infrastructure -0.78 -0.73 -0.70 -0.63
Government Income -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07
VC to Research -21.24 0.00 0.00 -128.55
VC to Development -794.31 -1043.41 -1345.79 -1876.14
Genetic Resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Biosafety 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.37
Health Safety 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.22
1Difference in response taking Mexico as base.
Mexico’s model appears as being more efficient than Spain’s in the promotion
of both research and development in modern biotech and in setting the neces-
sary environment for new products and services derived from this technology
to arise. Nevertheless, further analysis shows that —in later terms— these ad-
vantages dissipate.
Contrasting the variable’s response in the mid term, the number of these
performing below Spain’s model increases from 8 to 13. Among these are now
the three assessing the levels of new knowledge, new innovations, and mar-
ketable products as well as both measuring the system’s risk safety mechanisms
biosafety and health safety. Here, development potential joins patented knowl-
edge and venture capital to development as one of the variables with most
evident difference in response, almost going beyond the single-unit difference
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mark.
In the long run, with the addition of venture capital going to research, the
number of variables showing a response below that obtained for Spain further
increases to 14. Concurrently, the difference in response between those variables
already below becomes more acute, favoring Spain’s treatment as more capable
of eliciting a positive response from most key variables in this and the previous
term.
These initial findings allow reaching the partial conclusion that —at least
in the mid and long terms— the modeled version of Spain’s MBTS not only
displays a stronger potential to generate new knowledge and innovation, but
also a more solid capacity to create markets for new technologies derived from
modern biotech than that of Mexico. Based on these findings it can also be
inferred that there is a high probability that Mexico’s MBTS would outperform
its current modeled structure —as measured by the response of a number of
selected variables—- if it were to include those structural differences defining
the model for Spain. These conclusions, however, do not allow to fully falsify
the earlier proposed null hypothesis suggesting that Spain’s MBTS outperforms
that of Mexico.
3.3.4 Mexico Adapted to Best Treatment
The conclusions obtained in the previous section put forward the notion that
tweaking Mexico’s model enough to resemble that of Spain can allow it to dis-
play a more significant variable response than the one it currently exhibits. In
other words, applying the “All On” treatment to Mexico’s model could make it
perform more efficiently. Yet, earlier findings also show that —if initial condi-
tions are kept constant— a treatment proposing all structural elements charac-
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terizing Spain’s model plus variations to the IPR framework in the form of both
less breath and length for patents is an even better variable response-inducing
option. Following this prescription, when the “All On-IPRL-IPRB” treatment
is applied to this model, the response of most of its variables increases, corrob-
orating that such resulting system is more efficient than that initially modeled
for Mexico and possibly more than one solely including Spain’s traits. More-
over, these results assist producing additional policy recommendations on how
to make Mexico’s actual MBTS operate in a more efficient manner. This section
presents the outcome of these contrasts. As for the previous models this re-
quired 1) running the altered model 100 times and recording and analyzing its
effect over each variable at every time period; 2) using the mean for each time
period of simulation (meaning the arithmetic mean of 100 observations per dt)
to define a single general observation per dt for each response variable; and 3)
using these points as input to run time series regressions to obtain the specific
trend lines that describe the effects of the treatment has on the response variable
over time (see table 3.12).
Being information less appropriable and free-access in less time in this re-
sulting model, it can be initially assumed that private investment —generally
more intensive in development activities— would decrease. Yet, contrary to
this, VC to Development becomes a pivotal variable displaying the largest degree
of change throughout all three periods analyzed, ranging from an initial 244.86
level up to 1,405.7 in the long run, an overall 474.06% growth in investment for
the sector.
The response of variables capturing the performance of both research and
development also shows a system with both an increased potential and capac-
ity to produce new knowledge and innovations. In particular, New Research
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displays more growth in the mid than in both the short and long terms (21.78%,
38.76%, and 21.19%, respectively), moving form an initial production capacity
of 3.97 up to 5.51 in the mid, and later down to 4.81 in the long run. Although
Research Potential’s response maintained an increasing tendency, it also showed
less growth in the long term than in both the short and mid (41.82%, 50.66%,
and 51.48%, respectively). This variable went from an initial 14.83 level up to
22.35 in the mid, and later further up to 22.47 in the long run. New Development
and Development Potential showed a similar behavior to that of these variables,
both expressing growth at decreasing rates (see table 3.13).
As the central variable measuring the system’s performance, the response of
To Market expressed a considerable overall 157.87% expansion, increasing from
an initial 0.58 new product per cycle capacity up to 1.49 in the long run. The
collective improved performance of these variables, particularly of To Market,
allows to suggest that —in conjunction to an investment expansion in develop-
ment activities— a reduction in both the breadth and length of IPRs may have
sufficient positive leverage on the overall system’s performance. Although this
assertion requires further empirical testing, it is plausible to infer that —like in
this model— amplifying information and knowledge’s rate of flow may result
in a more efficient market creation system for biotech.
As a result of these changes the variable Patented Knowledge displays a re-
duction much steeper than that seen in the original model, going from initially
producing 306.78 patents down to 56 in the long run, an almost 82% overall
reduction. In this setting VC to Research also performs among those less respon-
sive variables, displaying zero growth in all terms. This last variable’s behavior
may be due to the fact that —in all model versions— the main incentive for pri-
vate investment in research derives from the degree of returns obtained from
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licensing patents to development or back to research, which in this case are de-
creasing. Thus, making investment in development more attractive for venture
capital investors, due to the increased returns generated by products and ser-
vices reaching the market.
Although not necessarily performing inefficiently, the variables measuring
the levels of available infrastructure for both research and development show a
more conservative response than that of most variables associated to these sec-
tors. In particular, Research Infrastructure’s response grows slightly above that
of Development Infrastructure, going from 7.92 to 8.93, and overall 12.73%, while
the latter increases its capacity from 7.38 to 8.06, a 9.16% variation. In this model
Government Resources also shows a moderate growth, increasing 1.15% to change
from 8.60 up to 8.69. The response of these three variables in all three periods,
however, is above that obtained using the original model’s configuration, fur-
ther corroborating this model’s superior performance.
Among the resource-assessing variables, Open Access Knowledge presented
the most evident response increment. Benefitting from the reduction in both IPR
length and breadth introduced by this treatment, it achieved a constant growth
in all three terms (51.25%, 84.85%, and 98.48%, respectively). However, this
variable’s higher response is not as substantial as expected when contrasted to
that previously obtained using the original model’s configuration. Therefore,
suggesting that the theoretical changes in the way property over knowledge is
managed in this model are in fact less radical than they appear. Conversely,
Genetic Resources’s long-term decrease in response in this model hints on the
existence of some adverse effects deriving from a more rapid new knowledge
production pace, which may also stem from the proposed reduction in IPR pro-
tection.
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Lastly, the response of both Biosafety and Health Safety increases in all three
periods (an overall 21.07% and 9.28% expansion, respectively), capturing a rise
in the demand for these services. This behavior is associated to an expansion
in the production of marketable products requiring these reviews and further
supports a better performance of this alternative system.
Contrasting Mexico with Best and Spain
When the response of all 15 variables are contrasted, the superior performance
of this alternative system becomes evident (see table 3.4). In the short and mid
terms only one variable, Patented Knowledge, displays a change inferior to that
obtained by the original model, in this case a steeper reduction in the level of ex-
isting patents. Under this treatment all other variables showed in both of these
terms a higher response, especially VC to Development, which was originally ab-
sent in the first model.
Contrasting these results with those obtained for Spain, however, offers a
less clear outlook of this model’s efficiency (see table 3.5). In the short and mid
term only 5 variables (Patented Knowledge, Research Infrastructure, Development
Infrastructure, Government Income, and VC to Development) display a less efficient
response. Yet, further contrasting shows that, in the long run, the number in-
creases to 11. Despite the more than twofold increase in variables with less
response, (almost up to 14 obtained in this period when contrasting Spain and
Mexico’s original treatment), the outcome for the pivotal To Market in all three
terms is above that of Spain, suggesting that this model is in fact better suited
for producing more products and services derived from this technology than
either of the two previously analyzed.
These results and a deeper analysis of all previous findings serve as the ba-
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Table 3.14: Mexico: Contrasting Current and Best Treatment
Response Variable1 Years
1 5 10 25
New Research 0.42 0.65 0.79 0.15
Research Potential -2.67 2.05 2.18 1.10
New Development 0.80 0.93 1.00 -0.60
Development Potential 0.34 1.31 2.49 0.55
To Market 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.26
Patented Knowledge 125.95 -34.64 -63.96 -46.54
Open Access Knowledge -0.02 0.82 1.12 0.69
Research Infrastructure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Development Infrastructure -0.11 0.02 0.17 0.58
Government Income -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07
VC to Research 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VC to Development 244.87 936.90 1521.50 1405.70
Genetic Resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Biosafety -0.24 0.07 0.35 0.69
Health Safety -0.09 0.02 0.15 0.47
1Difference in response taking Best Treatment as base.
sis for a number of policy recommendations for the consideration of decision
makers working within Mexico’s MBTS framework presented in the following
section.
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Table 3.15: Mexico: Contrasting Best with Spain
Response Variable 1 Years
1 5 10 25
New Research 1.86 1.32 0.77 -0.59
Research Potential -4.08 1.15 1.46 -0.30
New Development 0.97 0.94 0.79 -0.97
Development Potential -0.63 0.68 1.52 -1.82
To Market 0.34 0.22 0.01 0.18
Patented Knowledge 110.90 -46.46 -73.28 -55.38
Open Access Knowledge -0.33 0.73 1.02 -0.62
Research Infrastructure -0.64 -0.43 -0.26 -0.11
Development Infrastructure -0.88 -0.71 -0.53 -0.05
Government Income -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.00
VC to Research -21.24 7.37 16.98 -128.55
VC to Development -549.45 -106.51 175.71 -470.44
Genetic Resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Biosafety -0.19 0.09 0.33 0.32
Health Safety -0.08 0.02 0.14 0.25
1Difference in response taking Best Treatment as base.
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CHAPTER 4
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, RESEARCH PROSPECTS, AND
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 Lessons Learned
Throughout its brief history, modern biotech has been associated with —and
sometimes overshadowed by— a series of issues rather than to a complex and
wavering network of innovation systems with paramount development and
welfare implications. Due to their salient nature, these issues often eclipse the
socio-economic importance of the outcomes of such systems for health, agri-
culture, and food production. As a result, policymakers working for the ad-
vancement of R&D concentrate more on the design of rules for addressing these
issues rather than on promotional policies that could further foster the estab-
lishment of connections between basic and applied research institutions, firms
transforming discoveries into innovations, and the many geo-political entities
that collectively weave the networks in which knowledge of modern biotech-
nology develops. Furthermore, the sources of these issues are oftentimes not
fully appreciated by many a decision maker. As suggested by this study, this
has partially encouraged regional differences in the level of sophistication and
efficiency of these systems.
From a theoretical analysis perspective, the research of modern biotech has
encountered limitations as well. With few exceptions, the study of its reaches,
ramifications, and implications in the production, distribution, and consump-
tion of goods and services has been pursued using tools from mainstream eco-
nomics as if it were yet another conventional industrial sector. However, the
profound changes in the mechanisms of knowledge production it so far has in-
302
duced (entirely new knowledge bases, human capital, methods for accessing
resources, and infrastructure), combined with the nature of knowledge itself
and that of some of its resulting innovations —both displaying intangible quasi-
public good traits— call for alternative analytical approaches for its study. Some
that can capture more accurately the economic growth effects that this technol-
ogy brings about. More specifically, the design of methods for the study of the
dynamics of the multiple public and private agent networks engaged in both
knowledge production and transformation, how these come to be, and the ways
knowledge itself —as a resource—- behaves within these.
This closing chapter presents a list of recommendations for policy makers
in Mexico on how to promote modern biotech locally. These are based on the
findings obtained from the various alternative thought experiments performed
here to assess and contrast the behavior of Spain and Mexico’s MBTS. It also
offers a section with research suggestions and theoretical questions encourag-
ing academics and professionals to engage in the design of alternative thought
experiments to achieve both a deeper understanding of the role that this ap-
proach plays in knowledge production activities and in the advancement of
modern biotech in Mexico. Overall, these conclusions and recommendations
aim at helping develop new theoretical approaches for the study of the eco-
nomics of technological change and innovation. In doing so these also aim at
adding to the ongoing conversations on how to bridge the ‘Systems of Innova-
tion’ approach for explaining regional knowledge-based economic performance
with the methodology and mathematical modeling technique for framing, un-
derstanding, and discussing complex issues put forward by ‘Systems Dynam-
ics.’
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4.2 Policy Recommendations and Research Prospects
Over half a decade has passed since the enactment of the Biosafety of Genetically
Modified Organisms Law, the last considerable effort by Mexican policymakers
to advance modern biotech locally. Although its by-laws were enacted in 2008,
which remain in continuous evolution, no endeavor of this caliber has been or-
chestrated by the local governments to further promote the use and expansion
of this technology since. In addition, the lack of noticeable and tangible out-
comes, beyond those seldom heard from being developed in public research
centers, in the form of new start-ups, products, or services emanating from the
application of this technology further suggest that solely addressing biosafety
has not been sufficient an effort to achieve a full launch of this sector locally.
Overall, the conclusions obtained in this study allow: 1) presenting modern
biotech from a systems of innovation perspective; 2) producing a concise list of
recommendations that can serve as reference for the design of policies to revamp
the current MBTS operating in Mexico; and 3) uncovering new research avenues
associated to this methodology —and technology— both locally and globally. In
general, these findings suggest that:
• Mexico’s system as modeled is, in the short term, more efficient than that
modeled for Spain, especially in the creation of new marketable products
and services deriving from this technology.
• Further analysis, however, determines that the system is deprived from
this advantage in the later mid and long terms and becomes considerably
less efficient than that modeled for Spain in various other areas.
• When Mexico’s system is supplemented with specific institutional and
regulatory elements —most which are present in Spain’s MBTS— its per-
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formance improves above that of its current state and beyond that of Spain
in particular key areas, including market creation.
• There are some limitations to the use of this approach deriving mostly
from a lack of qualitative and quantitative data, especially for the case of
Mexico. Such absence, however, generates a series of research opportuni-
ties both locally and globally that —if explored— can assist to better assess
the behavior of these systems and, thus, of modern biotech.
These conclusions serve as the basis for the following policy recommenda-
tions and research prospects.
Structural, Regulatory, and Political Recommendations
1. Mexico should take note of the elements making Spain’s system work
more efficiently but avoid trying to replicate these verbatim locally. As
much as these appear to be working for Spain, the geo-political and id-
iosyncratic differences between the various regions of these two countries
suggest the need for the design of more “tropicalized” versions that ad-
dress the local needs and wants. Instead, policymakers should consider
their central traits and aim at:
• Developing more tangible channels between regional and national
research centers;
• Making the sector more attractive for local and international venture
capital investors;
• Collaborating with states and regions to develop incentives that pro-
mote R&D clustering;
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• Working on the design of rules that allow regional labor mobility
(within the framework of NAFTA);
• Pursuing the establishment of public investment funds for research
projects;
• Setting the environment for public-private projects to foster; and
• Establishing rules to induce the formation of connectors between the
results of research and the demands of the innovation sector.
This last element suggests providing the means for the private sector to
articulate a fully-operational financial system for new technologies, es-
pecially for those deriving from the NLS. Furthermore, the instruments
traded in it should be promoted at the local and regional levels, with the
federal government serving exclusively as coordinating entity, in order to
diversify the risks of particular national interest projects.
2. Local policymakers should engage in a thorough analysis of the impli-
cations that changes to the IPR system could have and how these could
affect private investment in the sector. This study suggests a policy that
merges particular key components of Spain’s MBTS and changes to IPRs
as the most promising for advancing Mexico’s modern biotech sector. Yet,
since the private sector, as engine behind the development of marketable
innovations, is sensitive to changes in the rules governing private property
protection, this recommendation requires taking particular considerations
before being implemented. Information and new knowledge being the
most valuable assets emanating from this technology’s research activities,
it is extremely important to maintain a balance between the resulting pos-
itive effects for the sector of reducing IPR protection over discoveries —as
suggested in this study— and the incentives these as instruments provide
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for current and future private entrepreneurs. If this path is to be pursued,
the Mexican government should consider the design and coordination of
participatory mechanisms in which IPR experts, private sector investors,
researchers, and other key actors operating within these networks become
informed of the possible trade-offs derived from changes to the IPR sys-
tem while, simultaneously, allowing these to provide their insights and
expertise on how these might affect future R&D practices.
3. Review its international regulatory frameworks on trade and foreign in-
vestment. With the rise of China as the world’s manufacturing power,
Mexico has been working much harder to attract investment from the US
and other economic regions. Drug-related violence aside, Mexico’s econ-
omy has remained relatively stable throughout the last decade and has
kept a free-market economy mentality promoted by the political party cur-
rently in power. Its closeness to the US and Canada allows it to further
compete with China by making it tentatively more attractive for indus-
tries and research centers that look forward to moving large enterprises to
more cost-efficient areas to migrate there. First and foremost because mov-
ing these across the border would be less costly and time consuming than
transferring them across the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, the development
of a fair regulatory framework controlling the access to the abundant local
genetic resources can serve as further incentive for the establishment of
such research initiatives in particular regions of Mexico. The richness and
accessibility of yet unexplored animal, vegetable, insect, fungi, and bacte-
rial genetic material found in areas like Mexico’s southeast Altos or in its
central Bajı´o valley, plus the readability of these regions to house such clus-
ters is almost unparalleled. Also, the relatively increasing number of local
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researchers in modern biotech (nearly 2,100 according to INEGI statistics)
—most of them educated and trained in the best laboratories and research
centers in the planet— help to offer high quality human capital locally at
competitive costs. This effort, however, would require the Mexican gov-
ernment to update rules on international investment in national territory
and policies behind the local funding allocation for public R&D infrastruc-
ture.
4. Local authorities should look forward to working together with the US
and Canada on the design and establishment of more effective mobility
options for human capital operating in modern biotech-related areas.
The current system offers a limited number of options within NAFTA’s
framework, and most are exclusively business and trade related. To some
extent, this is something that can be adopted from the EU, where the
free flow of professionals, investors, and other individuals participating
in modern biotech-related R&D processes (and in other associated devel-
opment areas) is completely unrestricted. This would allow researchers,
investors, and business agents to move more freely between research and
industrial centers from either country without having to change their mi-
gratory or visa status and, thus in less time. It can also help homologate
salaries and fast-track the transferring of research or innovation projects
from one specialized facilty to another, allowing these to continue punc-
tually.
5. Engage in efforts to explain the connections between modern biotech
and intellectual property rights. Although not exclusive to Mexico, there
still is a general lack of understanding of the links existing between intel-
lectual property and genetic engineering. This gap has especially worked
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in detriment of this technology by fostering the rise of a series of misin-
formed arguments, like those suggesting that full property can be claimed
over individual genes. This also induces perverse incentives for private
investors who —likewise— can be inclined to believe that the only way
they can benefit from investing in basic research activities is by obtaining
unlimited property over discovered genes. Both distorted views exert a
considerable toll on the development potential of this technology; the for-
mer stigmatizing biotech and its outputs among the general publics, the
latter inhibiting investment in the sector. Particular recommendations to
help reduce this information gap can be:
• Organize on-site and on-line seminars (coordinated by the local Mex-
ican Industrial Property Institute, along with CIBIOGEM and CONA-
CyT), with the objective of informing individuals with particular in-
terest in the sector and a desire for acquiring a deeper understand-
ing of modern biotech about the connections between these two ar-
eas. Echoing the international professional certification process, all
successful participants could obtain a ‘certification’ in industrial
biotech valid within the NAFTA and EUFTA frameworks. Forums
could be divided into various modules, each taught by experts repre-
senting different areas (research, development, investment, etc.) and
selected through inclusive participatory procedures. These processes
would not only allow a reduction in the breach in understanding, but
also help level the playing field in which discussions regarding IP
and modern biotech take place.
• Engage the various local governments in the design and dissemina-
tion of properly orchestrated information campaigns (Internet, tv, ra-
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dio, printed means, etc.) aimed at particular audiences, in a quest to
further explain the industrial relevance of modern biotech. Although
similar schemes have been tried before, decision makers should make
efforts to make sure the design and message of these is completely
unbiased.
• Define more specific provisions for modern biotech within the Indus-
trial Property Law. Policymakers should at least target working in the
development of a particular chapter within this legislation dedicated
exclusively to modern biotech. Also, they should make an effort not
to addresses biosafety issues in this tentative chapter.
These informative, certification, and regulatory processes could help turn
modern biotech into a more approachable technology not only for repre-
sentatives of particular productive sectors (health, agriculture, food pro-
duction) but also for representatives of other sectors —like those in the
liberal arts— as well as for the general public.
6. Look for processes to differentiate modern biotech from biosafety. Quite
often the meaning, reaches, and scope of modern biotech is mistakenly be-
lieved to be that of biosafety, and vice-versa. While the former can be con-
sidered as a dynamic network of technological systems of innovation in
which R&D processes take place for the discovery and application of new
knowledge, the latter can be defined as a series of procedures to reduce
the risks deriving from these (and other) processes that can pose threats
to human life and to the balance of living ecosystems of the planet. Al-
though clearly different areas, the symbiosis existing between these two
seems to encourage this ongoing confusion. As modern biotech advances,
the demand for more precise and sophisticated biosafety processes will
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help create new markets for services. As the design of new policies will
be required due to this, making sure that the various publics associated to
both sectors —policymakers included— understand their difference is of
the utmost importance for the advancement of this technology locally.
7. Produce as many “biotech businesspersons” as “biotech researchers.”
Most entrepreneurial initiatives emanate from business-trained individu-
als than from highly technical human capital (researchers), as some Span-
ish experts suggest. With very few exceptions, the majority of gradu-
ate programs associated to modern biotech in Mexico are exclusively re-
search oriented. Trying to either transform a researcher into a business en-
trepreneur, or the opposite scenario, is quite difficult —if not impossible—
a task (as implied in various views presented in chapter 2). If, instead,
programs focusing exclusively on the business of modern biotech were
tailored in the many private universities and colleges offering MBA pro-
grams in Mexico, an entirely new sector of entrepreneurs could be fos-
tered locally. These would not only understand the intricacies of business
creation but would be knowledgeable of the “language” spoken by hard-
core researchers and technically trained personnel. This, in time, could in-
duce the formation of channels between business and research, some that
could end up in the establishment of many a new start-up. Moreover, it
could also induce the rise of local biotech venture capital fund managers,
as MBA programs specialize in the finance of biotech, further helping cre-
ate the market system suggested earlier in point 1.
8. Take advantage of the IT Revolution to create a national network of
biotech research centers. Establishing virtual connections between re-
search centers using the Internet is as important as developing physical
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clusters for production processes. Being most of the new knowledge and
information obtained from genetic engineering research activities in elec-
tronic format, its flow within these networks can almost be instantaneous.
Moreover, it can be simultaneously shared between multiple centers. Re-
searchers can take advantage of the various Internet programs that vir-
tually allow face-to-face interaction, as these can facilitate collaborative
initiatives and other participatory processes among colleagues physically
working in different research centers. These centers could even look for-
ward to contracting local software and IT network developers for the de-
sign of specialized and more secure networks and the management and
storage of information, further encouraging the creation of new markets
for services linked to this technology. In addition, to promote the establish-
ment of these connectors, the federal government should aim at advancing
the rules for the protection and sharing of electronic data.
9. Foster the creation of “connectors” and “match-making” institutions.
More than a step-by-step prescription, this can be accomplished by setting
the ‘appropriate environments’ for such connections to rise by themselves.
With few exceptions, like establishing regional research clusters that assist
creating connections between the multiple stakeholders and their initia-
tives, facilitate technology transfer, and induce entrepreneurial business
activities —echoing the Bio Regions operating in Spain—, the government
should only aim at enacting the necessary regulations and designing the
appropriate policies that allow these institutions to rise. Such regulations
and policies could consider, among other principles, the points previously
expressed here.
10. Define a clear and pragmatic government position regarding modern
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biotech. There is no clearer message to tentative investors than the stance
a central government takes with respect to a particular technology. If the
Mexican government manages to display clear and unambiguous support
for modern biotech, the design of numerous promotional policies in this
area will follow. This can help include modern biotech processes in the
production of basic products and services that the federal government de-
mands in areas like health, agriculture, food production, materials, biorre-
mediation, etc. As the demand for these products and services rise from
government procurement, the establishment of more public funding for
R&D activities, the development of competitive human capital, a rise in
local and regional industrial transformation, and an expansion in public-
private ventures, among many others with profound implications for local
development and economic growth, will also follow.
Research Opportunities
This dissertation has opened up several opportunities for further investigation
of the questions addressed herein, including the following four.
1. Producing formal data for modern biotech. Although a number of in-
ternational organizations regularly produce data on modern biotech for
various countries, including Mexico (OECD, WTO, FAO, etc.), few are the
sources that produce such information locally (AMC, CONACyT, Agro-
Bio, etc.). The scarce local data available are neither systematically com-
piled nor structured enough to be used in regional or international eco-
nomic development studies without having to go through substantial ma-
nipulation beforehand. Studies like this one required merging informa-
tion from multiple sources to generate comparable data and statistics to
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those available in Spain. The absence of such information in standard
form not only handicaps the systems of innovation/systems dynamics ap-
proach but also curtails the success of mainstream methods also followed
to understand the economic development effects of modern biotech. Mex-
ico needs to invest time and resources in research that helps develop this
type of structured information in a manner similar to that seen in other
economies. Yet, such data will have to go beyond exclusively capturing
statistics for agricultural and pharmaceutical modern biotech; requiring
further examination of areas like human capital, infrastructure, intellec-
tual and industrial property, genetic resources, and many others of eco-
nomic relevance for the sector. International organizations —-like the
OECD— have already developed guidelines to “standardize” these types
of aggregate statistics1 and there are plenty of other references worldwide
to obtain guidance from. A starting point could be to supplement the eco-
nomic census to be produced by Mexico’s National Institute for Statistics
and Geography, INEGI in 2014 with questionnaires and surveys that cap-
ture exclusively the performance and economic impact of modern biotech-
related areas.
2. Fine-tunning research design and information gathering methods for
the study of modern biotech. When engaged in research design for a
project to assess the economic implications of a sector —whether using
this approach or not— it is difficult to estimate before hand how and what
information has to be collected. This process becomes even more com-
plex when trying to define what methods and instruments are optimal to
obtain the type of information that can be both qualitatively and quan-
1These are presented in the document: “A Framework for Biotechnology Statistics.” OCDE
2005.
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titatively relevant as well as useful to establish connections and associa-
tions within a network of systems. Even more so when the sector being
reviewed is still at developing stages. Both expertise in research design
and information collection methods, however, can generally only be ac-
quired through hands-on experience. Therefore, a refinement in both the
way research methods are taught and data gathering is practiced for mod-
ern biotech-related studies should be explored in more detail in Mexico.
Creating courses where both the theory and practice of these areas is fos-
tered —especially for studies based exclusively on the systems of inno-
vation/systems dynamics approach— is pivotal for the advancement of
research in this area locally.
3. Refining elicitation. Having the capacity to double-check if the results
of a particular research indeed capture what happens in the “real world”
is something of great value for any researcher. Post facto elicitation helps
validate outcomes and thus, consolidate any approach or methodology
followed to obtain these. The design of particular instruments —like cycli-
cal surveys and questionnaires— can be tailored to guarantee a future
reassessment of research outcomes with those actors from whom infor-
mation was initially elicited from. Research on survey and questionnaire
design as well as on ways to define more institutionalized approaches to
promote post facto elicitation —perhaps through the establishment of as-
sociations of “collaborative actors” whose members agree to be accessible
for a particular period of time— is a research opportunity that can be ex-
plored in Mexico. This research avenue, supplemented with the previous
two recommendations, can help produce higher quality information about
the behavior and landscape of the local systems of innovation associated
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to modern biotech.
4. Defining a cartography for systems. For the particular case of the sys-
tems of innovation/systems dynamics approach, in order to discern how
and what needs to be measured within a system, there is first the need
to define “maps” of the system about to be examined. Thus, establish-
ing mapping methodologies is essential for this approach to consolidate
as a solid counterpart to neoclassical and other mainstream frameworks
followed to understand innovation. Having a more detailed systems car-
tography would allow pinpointing of standard components and links be-
tween these as well as defining of specific measurable parameters in a
more direct manner. In Mexico, promoting the development of such a
cartography is key for the overall advancement of this approach and for
the study of modern biotech using these methods. A way to approach this
is for universities and research centers to offer courses that merge meth-
ods of systems dynamics, systems of innovation theory, and geographic
information systems as part of their economic and industrial organization
core course rosters.
4.3 Theoretical Considerations
The following are a series of future tasks to pursue for academics, researchers,
and professionals in the study of scientific development to consider that also
emanate from this research.
1. Explore alternative methodologies for the study of knowledge accumu-
lation and exchange. The approach here allows for the design of dynamic
models that can capture the behavior of multiple actors and institutions
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composing the networks in which technological change occurs. It also
permits determining which elements and networks of these play the most
relevant roles and facilitates measuring their sensitivity to structural and
policy changes. In doing so, it also allows determining what alternative
institutional arrangements could induce a better overall performance of
the system. By considering knowledge —the central factor in innovation
processes— as a quasi-public good, this methodology presents itself as
an alternative to partial equilibrium and endogenous growth modeling
techniques in which the behavior of innovation systems is subject to pro-
duction functions with factors displaying diminishing returns. Being this
the first attempt to explicitly merge the study of regional innovation sys-
tems with systems dynamics modeling techniques —and certainly its first
application for the analysis of modern biotech— it would therefore be in-
teresting to witness further studies using this (or a similar) technique to
continue assessing the behavior of this or other technological systems, like
IT or nanotech. It would also be interesting to see similar methods applied
for the study of artistic expression systems, as these (art, literature, music,
etc.) also engage in information and idea-exchange processes for the pro-
duction of objects with artistic and market value.
2. Promote a deeper understanding of the limits of intellectual property
and how these limits relate to the study of modern biotech. As men-
tioned in earlier sections, while challenges deriving from the quasi-public
good nature of knowledge and information equally affect all areas of sci-
entific endeavor, modern biotech seems to be more susceptible to these for
multiple reasons:
• Access to DNA is virtually as boundless as it is widespread, turning
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most efforts in the direction of claiming exclusive rights over its phys-
ical parts or the information expressed and contained in it or in any
of its parts complex.
• Although some artificially-induced biological alterations and pro-
cesses may create new organisms or processes not occurring in na-
ture, it is both, the methods followed to produce such changes and
the information obtained through them that may be partially pro-
tected by IPR regulation. In most cases, however, this is the only
subject matter over which IPRs can be filled for, often more than over
the resulting GMOs or parts of these. Therefore, this information,
more often than not, becomes the single proprietary part of the pro-
cess displaying the highest commercial value.
• Living GMOs or parts of these, carrying within the results of long
and rigorous scientific endeavor, may still display replicating or re-
producing capacities and thus, a potential to pass-on such informa-
tion to their offspring without depleting it and with barely no effort.
This capacity reduces further more the likelihood of full appropriabil-
ity and containment, especially within open environments or natural
ecosystems.
Further study of the interactions between IPRs and technological change,
from a systems perspective, would continue shedding more light on the
transformation of existing and the rise of new legal institutions, and about
the incentives behind the actors aiming at altering the limits of what is
appropriable in this and other areas.
3. Frame scientific development processes as systems of innovation in
which knowledge and information is discovered and shared. As op-
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posed to most productive sectors, the knowledge production sector is not
one which can be elicited for particular outcomes. This makes determining
the economic impact of the sector a difficult task when using conventional
economic analysis tools. A systems approach, however, allows to estimate
the behavior of the sector and its parts over time. It can help supplement
existing estimations or assist in defining associations between actors that
can facilitate the design of econometric or other types of economic analy-
sis models. But besides determining the behavior of the sector, the most
important aftermath from applying this approach comes from obtaining
a deeper understanding of the connections and interactions existing be-
tween the multiple actors engaged in innovation processes. In a sense,
this approach helps frame knowledge production and dissemination as a
network in which the interconnection of creativity, entrepreneurship, tan-
gible and intangible resources, art, design, and —most of all— patience,
intersect.
4.4 Final Thoughts
The importance of modern biotech for the development of emerging economies
such as Mexico is not even quantifiable. The concise list of recommendations
provided helps expose only the tip of the iceberg of the gargantuan adjustments
that need to take place in that country for this technology to thrive at some point
during this century.
In particular, this research presents just a few considerations stemming from
a highly abstract and theoretical project from which many more considerations
can be obtained. For some, this methodology as well as some results may even
appear to be too far off from those found within mainstream economics of scien-
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tific development papers. Yet, one central objective of this study is precisely to
present alternative methods and to explore new “theoretical paths” that allow to
tackle the analysis of topics that have been identified as difficult to schematize
and evaluate using mainstream approaches. I hope the conclusions, the model
at its core, and the unorthodox approach of this research provide enough stim-
ulus for others to engage in the design of alternative methods for the study of
scientific development in years to come.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is the final version used in all interviews conducted in the
summer of 2008 in Spain and those in Mexico during the summers of 2009 and
2010.
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
NAME
AREA
DATE
Time
PART I: OPEN-END QUESTIONS
1. In your view how is science promoted in Spain?
⇒ Probe: How is Modern Biotechnology promoted?
2. Could you point out some channels linking science and technology with
the local productive sectors?
3. What institutions participate in these processes?
⇒ Probe: How do non-experts participate in these processes?
4. What is your overall view of the current linkage process?
5. What external policies (say, those established by the EU) have promoted
the advancement of these technologies in Spain?
PART II: OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
STEP I: STRUCTURE
• What institutions compose the Spanish Biotech Policy Network?
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– At the central government level?
– At the state/regional levels?
• What areas of these institutions participate in policy setting?
• What areas of other institutions you deal with the most on these topics?
• Who do you consider as “main actors” (institutional and individual) par-
ticipating in such policy setting?
• Can you identify other actors participating in the biotech and genomics
policy setting protocol beyond these institutions and actors?
STEP II: PERFORMANCE
• In your view what is the overall performance of the current linkage frame-
work?
• What particular areas/elements in your institution you perceive as per-
forming adequately in this sense?
– That could perform more adequately?
• In your view are there any areas/elements generating delays in the sys-
tem?
– Probe: Are there any markets being prevented from existing?
STEP III: FEATURES
• Can you provide what in your view are positive aspects of the current
policy framework?
– Probe: How efficient is it in its goal of advancing these technologies?
• What could be seen as weak aspects of the current framework?
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– Probe: What is not being considered within the protocol’s frame-
work? [Organizational, lack/excess elements (institutions)].
• Are there any particular aspects the current framework does not manage
you can think of?
– Probe: How can these aspects be internalized within these guiding
principles?
Do you have additional observations or recommendations?
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX: MODEL’S EQUATION (MEXICO)
{ VERSION 9.1.4}
{ INITIALIZATION EQUATIONS }
: c R&D POLICY.Length = 25
: l DEVELOPMENT.In Market = 5
TRANSIT TIME = 5
INFLOW LIMIT = INF
CAPACITY = INF
: l RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Labor = 0
TRANSIT TIME = 6
INFLOW LIMIT = INF
CAPACITY = INF
: l RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Labor = 0
TRANSIT TIME = 4
INFLOW LIMIT = INF
CAPACITY = INF
: l INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Patent A1 = 186
TRANSIT TIME = varies
INFLOW LIMIT = INF
CAPACITY = INF
DOCUMENT: It is assumed that there is an initial endowment of 65 units within the patent pipeline before t0.
: l INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.LicR Clust = 0
TRANSIT TIME = 3
INFLOW LIMIT = INF
CAPACITY = INF
: l INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.LicD Clust = 0
TRANSIT TIME = 3
INFLOW LIMIT = INF
CAPACITY = INF
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know = 1000
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 1
DOCUMENT: If clustering happens, then information is spilled back to both research and development in the form of
“Free Access Info.” This effect can be analogous to a relaxing of the IPRs.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillRClust = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW
LEAKAGE FRACTION = 0.4
NO-LEAK ZONE = 0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out LicRClt = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed R = 0
: s DEVELOPMENT.NDi1 = 1
: s RESEARCH.New R Knowledge A1 = 1
: f RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer = RESEARCH.New R Knowledge A1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 1 =
IF DEVELOPMENT.NDi1 <1 AND RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer >0 THEN 1 ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 2 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 1 =1 THEN 0 ELSE 1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.TTe = EXP(RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer)
: s R&D POLICY.IPR Effect = 0.8
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R2DTech Transfer = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.TTe*R&D POLICY.IPR Effect
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1 = LOGN(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R2DTech Transfer)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.IPRs Transfer % = 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Leftover IP = IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 2 = 1 THEN INNO-
VATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1 ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.IPRs Transfer %
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DOCUMENT: This can work to suggest a “Clustering Effect” if returned to A1 in addition to “Public Knowledge.” Its
degree can also be tuned depending on the clustering degree (If 1 then the full “Leftover IP” loops back to A1. Lower
levels will refer to less percentage of flow, and so on. This should be allocated with the “Innovation Management”
sector.
In the case that there is no Match type 2 then 15% of Patents goes to Research (assuming that if there is no real demand
only about 30% of patents are licensed between R&D.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicR = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Leftover IP
DOCUMENT: Since the financial resources to pay for the IPRs licenses are produced by “Research” and ”Research” is
getting these resources as payment, these are balanced out (out=In=0).
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 R = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed R
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 R =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out LicRClt
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 R
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 R)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1R =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R = 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra = 90000000
DOCUMENT: The volume of resources in terms of infrastructure in basic research reaches the 250M and each researcher
requires a level of 10,000 per period to produce research. There are 126 research centers and 145 affiliated research units
in Spain. It is assumed that each has an approximate budget of 2m and 1m, respectively, per period.
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Infra Units per Lr = 10000
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra/INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Infra Units per Lr
DOCUMENT: Each Lr requires 1000 R Inrfa L units to allow for Lr to turn into Human Capital (HC) by multiplying
each matching 1 unit of Lr / 100 units of R Infra to A1 or A2. in the Research and Development modules.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr = 2100
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELr1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity < RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
ELSE 0
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt = 430000000
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FixR&D Fund Switch = 1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FixedGovt Fund = 400000000
DOCUMENT: This is the amount of resources the goverment allots to R&D from other sources of government income.
It is estimated that when adding the resources produced by the system and going to these activities, the figure reaches
the official levels (for Spain around 500m and for Mexico 400m).
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 1
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillDClust = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW
LEAKAGE FRACTION = 0.4
NO-LEAK ZONE = 0
DOCUMENT: The spillover fraction is 0.4
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Lic D Clt = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed D = 0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicD =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 1 = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1
ELSE (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.IPRs Transfer %*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1)
DOCUMENT: This logic suggests that the demand for research patents is full (highy, complete stock is demanded) when
development’s technological stock is dry (equal to zero). Otherwise the average of licened patents is just a fraction (if
”Match Making” mechanism exists) or zero (if no ”Match Making” mechanism exists) of the total of patented A1.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 D = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed D
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 D =
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IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Lic D Clt
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 D
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 D)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1D =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D=1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D=0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D
DOCUMENT: It is Total because the zeros where eliminated
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra = 32000000
DOCUMENT: There are approximately 275 biotech industries in Spain (with 107 only in Cataluna and Madrid). These
have at least 15 individuals working at them in development activities. The total resources these had in 2008 were
slightly above 180M.
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Infra Units Per Ld = 20000
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra/INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Infra Units Per Ld
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld = 12400
DOCUMENT: I assume that the labor hand does not reduce itself due to the short period of time this analysis extends.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELd1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity < RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Effective Ld =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity >= RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELd1
: c DEVELOPMENT.HCd =
1+(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1D)*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Effective Ld
DOCUMENT: There is a need to include a +1 to this equation in order to be able to run the scenario where there is labor
trade-off. Otherwise, since at points there is no change on human capital due to this variability, there is a division by
zero when running the model using Euler’s method.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt D = 0
DOCUMENT: This comes from p.32 GE and represents approximately 14% of the total public subvention to R&D, as
suggested. It includes both the local and community resources.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt D
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD = 0
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR = 0
DOCUMENT: This comes from the total sales reported by public biotech entities (747m). Source: p.69 GE, 2009.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD = 0
DOCUMENT: This comes from the total sales presented by the biotech industry in Spain for the year 2008 (684M)
Source: p.69 GE, 2009.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income Frac = 0.80
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Total ResD = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Total ResD
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Net Fin D =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income Frac*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D2D Reinv = 0.15
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D2D Reinv
: c DEVELOPMENT.Kd = 1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt D+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D = 10000000
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DOCUMENT: Natural Resources are decreasing at a rate that will deplete these to half its current stock in 100 years.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate = 2
DOCUMENT: Natural Resources are being depleted by many factors exogenous to biotech R&D. These resources are
being depleted at around 0.3% yearly and it is estimated that 1/3 of these will be gone in a century. However, these
biotech activities account for around 20% of the depleted resources yearly. Yet, thorugh the application of biosafety
measures, the depletion rate accounted to R&D can be reduced overtime.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NRDep% = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate/100
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Reg Rate = 0.016
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Reg =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Reg Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Dep =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NRDep%
: f DEVELOPMENT.Input D =
LOGN(DEVELOPMENT.HCd+DEVELOPMENT.Kd+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Dep)
: s DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential = DEVELOPMENT.Input D
: c DEVELOPMENT.Degree HC = 60
: c DEVELOPMENT.HCt0 = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.HCd,1)
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC =
1+(DEVELOPMENT.Degree HC+(DEVELOPMENT.Degree HC*((DEVELOPMENT.HCd/DEVELOPMENT.HCt0)-1)))
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC Range =
IF DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC>100
THEN 100
ELSE DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC
: c DEVELOPMENT.MTCHC = MONTECARLO(DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC Range)
: c DEVELOPMENT.Degree K = 60
: c DEVELOPMENT.Kt0 = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.Kd,1)
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbK =
DEVELOPMENT.Degree K+(DEVELOPMENT.Degree K*((DEVELOPMENT.Kd/DEVELOPMENT.Kt0)-1))
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbK Range =
IF DEVELOPMENT.ProbK>100
THEN 100
ELSE DEVELOPMENT.ProbK
: c DEVELOPMENT.MTCK = MONTECARLO(DEVELOPMENT.ProbK Range)
: c DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1 = DEVELOPMENT.MTCHC+DEVELOPMENT.MTCK
: c DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt0 = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1,1)
: c DEVELOPMENT.Tech Advances = 1
: c DEVELOPMENT.i1Probability =
IF (DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt0<DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1) OR (DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt0+DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1=4)
THEN (DEVELOPMENT.Tech Advances)
ELSE(0)
: f DEVELOPMENT.Successful D = DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential*DEVELOPMENT.i1Probability
: f DEVELOPMENT.Out i1 = DEVELOPMENT.NDi1
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob = 80
DOCUMENT: This is a Montecarlo probability that increases as the biosafety fund increases. The larger the probability,
the more probable a biotech product will reach the market.
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Range =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob > 100
THEN 100
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob
: c DEVELOPMENT.Bio MCProb = MONTECARLO(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Range)
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob = 75
DOCUMENT: This is a Montecarlo probability that increases as the biosafety fund increases. The larger the probability,
the more probable a biotech product will reach the market.
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Range =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob > 100
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THEN 100
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob
: c DEVELOPMENT.HS MCProb = MONTECARLO(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Range)
: c DEVELOPMENT.Mkt Prob =
IF (DEVELOPMENT.Bio MCProb+DEVELOPMENT.HS MCProb)=2
THEN 1
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Studies have found that only around 40% of the products developed reach the market level due to strin-
gent regulatory requirements, which can be translated into an almost 40% chance per period that the developed product
creates a new market. In this case biosafety and innocuous review procedures required by the government will create
an indirect ”tax” to the industry. Yet, this tax does not come back to the government but instead stays as a fund that
increases (or decrease) the probability of apporval as it changes.
One way of doing this is that in the case of the biosafety factor use the same procedure used for the change in the
”Bio Effect” so that the Montecarlo probability changes overtime as the industry either pays more or less for biosafety
requirements. This way the chance of being approved increases as a biosafety culture increases.
This also works for the Govt since the more production, the more the biosafety pay, and the less the natural resources
are depleted (win-win situation).
: f DEVELOPMENT.To Market = DEVELOPMENT.Out i1*DEVELOPMENT.Mkt Prob
DOCUMENT: Being this analysis from the POV of the central planner it is assumed that competing markets/developers
are constantly developing new innovations not withstanding those already in the market. The innovator/follower ap-
proach presented in the business management literature is overviewed.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eD2M = EXP(DEVELOPMENT.To Market)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eTD2M =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eD2M = 1
THEN 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eD2M
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price = 100
DOCUMENT: Assuming the transformed Knowledge is “x” as valuable the price of knowledge once it reaches the mar-
ket as a product is “x.” However, the PV of the income from these marketable products decreases at a fast pace since
these become obsolete in a period of four years (suggested by the “Novelty Loss Rate”) as these are replaced by new
technologies. This also suggests that these are not completely worthless (zero value) whenever their is a new marketable
product, based on the assumption that these still preserve some value at throughout the next three periods after their
creation. Additionally, the price does not change over time since what changes is the demand for the actual innovation
(again, it decreases linearly in a period of four years until it reaches a value of zero).
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Inital Income =
(DELAY(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eTD2M,1))*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r = 0.03
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI1 =
(0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Inital Income*((1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)ˆ(-1)))
DOCUMENT: This process means that whenever a product reaches the market, the developer gets three years of in-
come. Yet, the level of this income decreases over time.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI2 =
(0.25*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI1)*((1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)ˆ(-2))
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI3 =
(0.1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI2)*((1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)ˆ(-3))
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Inital Income+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI2+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI3
DOCUMENT: In this case the capital that development produces is generated by the principal innovation (the rate that
“To Market” produces at time “n”) multiplied by the price, plus the present value of the returns that this principal will
bring to the sector in the following three years before the innovation’s market value reaches zero (the value loss is as-
sumed to be 50% of the initial value after a year, 25% of that value at year two, 10% percent of that value are year three,
and zero at year four). These figures are then summed at time “n.”
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Level = 0.04
DOCUMENT: This level is considered a “running royalty” or percentage of the sale.
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: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnD =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price)*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Level
DOCUMENT: In the model, as happens in the information sector, there is no possible way of knowing beforehand if
the use of the licensed IP will produce returns beforehand. The option considered here is an annuity of informa-
tion/knowledge at current prices for the time the IPRs are enforceable. This is then brought to present value to produce
the income to R from licensing.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnDPV =
DEVELOPMENT.Mkt Prob*PV(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r,R&D POLICY.Length, -RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnD,
0)
DOCUMENT: This is the PV of an annuity of 0.04% of the principal (the figure found at time ”n”) for a period of 20
years if the product reaches the market (it has a probability of doing so of “Prob”).That figure is added to the principal
(the previous total Licensing Rate) at the time when it was found and brought to present value at time zero.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licencing D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnDPV
DOCUMENT: The amount of financial resources going back to research per period is composed by the actual licensing
rate level at time ”n” (which is valuate in Knowledge Units, A1) plus the present value (PV) of the annual royalty an-
nuity from licensing at time ”n” if the innovation reaches the market (this is why it is multiplied by “Prob”).
: s R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level = 0.10
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev Pay =
IF NOT( RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D<1000
THEN ((0.5*R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level)*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev Pay =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0
THEN (0*R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev Pay
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Bio Ind = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev Pay
: s R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate = 0.15
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev HS Pay =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D<1000
THEN (0.5*R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D*R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev HS Pay =
IF (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0)
THEN (0*R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev HS Pay
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Fund = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev HS Pay
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd =
(((RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licencing D)-
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Bio Ind)-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Fund)
: s R&D POLICY.Tax Rate = 0.35
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Fiscal InD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd <0
THEN 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd*R&D POLICY.Tax Rate
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule = 1
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoD = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In TT from D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licencing D
DOCUMENT: TTF= Technology transfer funds from development to research derived from licensing.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoD
DOCUMENT: This fraction is due to the patent regulation existing in Spain operating in a similar way to the Bayh-Dole
act requiring this allocation of resources between these three elements. It is assumed that this income division only
affects the licensing of patents to research, since these are mostly funded by government and the information neces-
sary for these is developed within public research centers. The “Royalty Rule” switch is introduced to differentiate the
model’s approach for Mexico -which does not have such rule- from that of Spain.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac = 0.333
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DOCUMENT: See the Document in “Out TTF From D” for an explanation to this fraction.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to Govt =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule =1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac)
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Biosafety Review Costs = 100000
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt =
IF DEVELOPMENT.Successful D>0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Biosafety Review Costs
ELSE 0
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Save = 0
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Income = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule = 1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*0.8
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoR = 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnR =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1R*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price)*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Level
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnRPV =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 2*
PV(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r, R&D POLICY.Length, -RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnR, 0)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licensing R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnRPV
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In TT from R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licensing R
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoR
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTF R Fraction = 0.95
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTF R Fraction
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In ResR =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out NetFinR =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Inc =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out NetFinR
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Income
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Save Rate = 0.25
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Save =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Save Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Save
DOCUMENT: These are assumed to be resources going back to the government that originally provide them.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp = 1
DOCUMENT: This means these funds are invested in government bonds, thus, going back to the government resources.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Res Govt =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FixR&D Fund Switch = 1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FixedGovt Fund+
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Fiscal InD+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to Govt+
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp))
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Fiscal InD+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to Govt+
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt
: s R&D POLICY.R&D Rate = 0.84
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DOCUMENT: This rate comes from p.32 in the 2009 GE report.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt*R&D POLICY.R&D Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt R
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR
: c RESEARCH.Kr = 1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt R+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR
DOCUMENT: K is multiplied by a fraction of A1 (information) because information is capital. In this example each unit
of capital is worth two units of information.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res = 10000000
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate = 2
DOCUMENT: Genetic Resources are being depleted by biotech R&D. In the model these resources are being prospected
at around 0.3% yearly and it is estimated that 1/3 of these will be protected by IPRs in a century. Biotech activities
account for the entire genetic resource erosion. Yet, through less secluding IPR measures, access to the information
generated by these resources can be increased overtime.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GRDep% = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate/100
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Prospect = 0.02
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Gene Res = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Prospect
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Gene Res = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GRDep%
: f RESEARCH.Input R = LOGN(RESEARCH.HCr+RESEARCH.Kr+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Gene Res)
: s RESEARCH.Research Potential = RESEARCH.Input R
: f RESEARCH.Output R = RESEARCH.Research Potential
: f DEVELOPMENT.Output D = DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor = 1000
DOCUMENT: 100
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Rate = 0.01987
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.G Rate = 0.02
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In BioLab = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.G Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out BioLab = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Rate
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res = 10000000
DOCUMENT: Biosafety pertains to preserving the balance of natural resources. In the model it focuses on prevent-
ing over depleting natural resources. The access to genetic resources, as related to the access and management of
information derived from genetic resources, is considered within its own subsystem. In this sense, development deals
exclusively with biosafety, while research deals exclusively with the access to genetic resources.
It is only in the realm of development because it deals with the protection of natural resources from the effects of devel-
oped technologies, like LGMOs freed to the environment for experimental, trail, or commercial reasons. Research, on
the other hand, deals with extracting basic information from a particular natural resource type in the form of genes or
genetic resources.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change = 0.05
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect5 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>5000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 1000000
THEN 0.01*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect4 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>8500000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 5000000
THEN 0.1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect5
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect3 =
IF NOT (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>9000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 8500000
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THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change*0.25
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect4
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect2 =
IF NOT( INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>10000000 OR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res=0)
AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>9000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change*0.5
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect3
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res >10000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect2
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect0 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res =0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If Change =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect0 >0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect0
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If No Change = 0.02
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In DR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If Change>0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If No Change
DOCUMENT: If there are no “Biosafety Industry Resources” then depletion “Factor” increases 0.05, if “BIR” is positive
within a range then “Factor” decreases (depending on the level: 0<BIR<1000 then the “Bio Effect Change” (0.5) is al-
tered by either a factor of 50%, 25%, 10%, or 0).
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out DR = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res = 0
DOCUMENT: Public Infrastructure is endowed with a 100,000 monetary units at t0. It is assumed that there is an initial
infrastructure of 10 research centers each worth 10,000 monetary units. Public infrastructure, however, depreciates at a
linear rate of 0.025 per period.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R Infra =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*0.20
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R Infra =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R*(1-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTF R Fraction)
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt Infra = 0
DOCUMENT: See the documents in the other two funds.
: s R&D POLICY.Infra Rate = 0.1
DOCUMENT: This rate comes from an approximation from p. 32 of the GE 2009 report.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt*R&D POLICY.Infra Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt Infra
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In BR Infra = (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R Infra+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R Infra+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt Infra)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out BR Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Inc = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D-
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Reinvest = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Reinv = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Reinvest
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRD Bal = 0
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund = 0
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DOCUMENT: This fund is composed by the surplus generated when there is a surplus after paying investors the
amount these allocated for VC. It can also be negative when either R or D are not successful.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt = 0
DOCUMENT: There is a need to coordinate the payment of this VC debt with the funds set to do so.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRD Bal =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res<0
THEN (-1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res)
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCRD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRD Bal
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRF Bal = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCRF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRF Bal
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Spend = 0
DOCUMENT: This should be connected to the “To Market” level in order to buy out all products at the price level. Once
there are no more “X Spending” resources the income ends. Check is this can be done. Remember, this will set the price
level and the success of the product in the market.
Figure a way to measure that every individual consumes the product.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Save =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Save Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Spend =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Save
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Spend = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Spend
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Save = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Save = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Save
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Spend = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Spend =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Save
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Spend = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Spend
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Spend = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Spend =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Spend+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Spend
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Spend = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Spend
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Save = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Save =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Save
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Save
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob = 0.77
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Change %LR = 0.01
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr < INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
THEN (+1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Change %LR)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr > INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
THEN (-1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Change %LR)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD2
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Arbit =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
THEN 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD1
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In RD%Mob =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Arbit+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out RD%Mob = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob
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: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Inv = 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch = 1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule YVC = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC% = 0.15
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Change =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR>0 OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD>0
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC%+0.01)
ELSE (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC%-0.001)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Change
DOCUMENT: This is the percentage of the total To Investment rate that goes to VC instead of Risk Free Investment.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To VC =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule YVC*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule NVC = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Risk Free =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule YVC-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To VC)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule NVC
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Compound =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Inv+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp*
CGROWTH((100*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r))
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kr Delay = DELAY(RESEARCH.Kr,1)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR>(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kr Delay*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)
THEN 1
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Here, VC investors will risk their resources if the levels of income display by the sector are above those
that the natural interest rate would offer, meaning they will be able to collect at least as much as they would if they
were investing on risk free options (instead of having “IF Net Financial Resources (R,D) > Kr Delay (5) THEN 1 ELSE
0, comparing the net returns today with investment levels five years ago).
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kd Delay = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.Kd,1)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD>(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kd Delay*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)
THEN 1
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC4 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR=0 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD=0
THEN 1
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC3 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD=0 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR=1
THEN 2
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC4
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR=0 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD = 1
THEN 3
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC3
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD = 1
THEN 4
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC2
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total = 90000000
DOCUMENT: Venture Capital is a fraction of all savings from both research and development activities. This fraction
changes over time depending on its performance. It becomes invested in either research or development depending on
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the performance of capital spending in either sector (when VC1 = 2, it goes to R; when VC1 = 3, it goes to D; when VC1 =
4, it is spread evenly between the two; when VC1=1, it remains stocked); to decide this, capital investment (Kr or Kd) is
compared to the Net Financial Resources of each sector. Whenever the NFR(r,d) of either sector is larger than the capital
investment K (r,d) at any time, investors decide to invest in the sector. In the case when capital investment of either
sector is less than its NFR venture capital is stocked until either sector displays larger NFR than K. The model, however,
does not allow for both sectors to perform successfully simultaneously, meaning that NFRR>Kr and NFRD>Kd can
not simultaneously exist. Original level 120m.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest Rate = 0.25
DOCUMENT: This is the amount (%) of the VC Total stock that gets invested each time.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC =
IF (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=2) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest Rate)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRD Bal
DOCUMENT: This parameter represents the amount of the following:
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCR Debt =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCR Debt = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt = 0
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund = 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDD Bal =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res<0
THEN (-1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCD Debt =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCD Debt = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Debt Rate = 0.05
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDF Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCD Fund =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Inc*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Debt Rate)+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDF Bal
DOCUMENT: The figure represented by the debt rate times the Income represents the amount of financial resources
available to support VC investment, it is not an actual capital flow (reason why these are not actually discounted from
the inflow of income coming to either R or D). The actual physical resources are those coming from the VCR and VCD
funds balance.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCD Fund = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Debt Rate = 0.15
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRF Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCR Fund =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Debt Rate*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Inc)+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRF Bal
DOCUMENT: Debt rate is the maximum amount of income allowed to be allocated towards paying debt. In other
words is the maximum leverage level that the sector can leverage its income.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCR Fund = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDD Bal = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCDD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDD Bal
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDF Bal = 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCDF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDF Bal
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: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Fund = 100000000
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Invest Rate = 0.1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Restriction =
IF NOT (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=2
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4)
THEN 0
ELSE 1
DOCUMENT: This restriction allows the flow of VC into projects only when the matching mechanism is available. In
other words, only when VC1 is equal to 2, 3 or 4 and not when there is no match, as in VC1=1.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Invest = 100000
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Intl VC = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Invest
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Fund*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Invest Rate)*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Restriction
: c RESEARCH.Degree HC = 40
: c RESEARCH.HCt0 = DELAY(RESEARCH.HCr,1)
: c RESEARCH.ProbHC =
(RESEARCH.Degree HC+(RESEARCH.Degree HC*((RESEARCH.HCr/RESEARCH.HCt0)-1)))
: c RESEARCH.ProbHC Range =
IF RESEARCH.ProbHC>100
THEN 100
ELSE RESEARCH.ProbHC
: c RESEARCH.MTCHCr = MONTECARLO(RESEARCH.ProbHC Range)
: c RESEARCH.Degree K = 40
: c RESEARCH.Kt0 = DELAY(RESEARCH.Kr,1)
: c RESEARCH.ProbK =
(RESEARCH.Degree K+(RESEARCH.Degree K*((RESEARCH.Kr/RESEARCH.Kt0)-1)))
: c RESEARCH.ProbK Range =
IF RESEARCH.ProbK>100
THEN 100
ELSE RESEARCH.ProbK
DOCUMENT: This step is to maintain the 0 to 100 change range within the Montecarlo probability. Some of the values
are beyond 100 and, thus, have to be standardized within the range.
: c RESEARCH.MTCKr = MONTECARLO(RESEARCH.ProbK Range)
: c RESEARCH.SUMAt1 = RESEARCH.MTCHCr+RESEARCH.MTCKr
: c RESEARCH.SUMAt0 = DELAY(RESEARCH.SUMAt1,1)
: c RESEARCH.Tech Advances = 1
: c RESEARCH.A1Probability =
IF (RESEARCH.SUMAt0<RESEARCH.SUMAt1)
OR (RESEARCH.SUMAt0+RESEARCH.SUMAt1=4)
THEN (RESEARCH.Tech Advances)
ELSE 0
: f RESEARCH.Successful R = RESEARCH.Research Potential*RESEARCH.A1Probability
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R = EXP(RESEARCH.Successful R)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Access Gene Res = 0.1
: s R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact = 0.5
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Access Gene Res*R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect5 =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>1000000) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R > 1
THEN 0.01*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect4 =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>2000000) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R> 1000000
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THEN 0.1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect5
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect3 =
IF NOT (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>5000000) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R >
2000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change*0.25
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect4
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect2 =
IF NOT( RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>10000000
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R=0) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>5000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change*0.5
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect3
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R >10000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect2
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect0 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R =0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If R Change =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect0 >0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect0
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If No R Change = 0.02
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In GR Dep =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If R Change>0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If R Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If No R Change
DOCUMENT: If there are no “Biosafety Industry Resources” then depletion “Factor” increases 0.05, if “BIR” is positive
within a range then “Factor” decreases (depending on the level: 0<BIR<1000 then the “Bio Effect Change” (0.5) is al-
tered by either a factor of 50%, 25%, 10%, or 0).
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out GR Dep = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate
: c R&D POLICY.Intl Bio Standard = 2.15
: c R&D POLICY.PubDep Thres = R&D POLICY.Intl Bio Standard
: c R&D POLICY.Public Perception = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate-R&D POLICY.PubDep Thres
: c R&D POLICY.PP Effect =
IF R&D POLICY.Public Perception>0
THEN 0.01
ELSE 0
: f R&D POLICY.In BLev =
IF (R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level+R&D POLICY.PP Effect) > R&D POLICY.Intl Bio Standard
THEN ((R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level+R&D POLICY.PP Effect)-1)
ELSE (R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level+R&D POLICY.PP Effect)
: f R&D POLICY.Out BLev = R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level
: c R&D POLICY.Tax Rater Change = 0.01
: c R&D POLICY.T2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt<10000
THEN (-1*R&D POLICY.Tax Rater Change)
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.T1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt> 1000000
THEN (R&D POLICY.Tax Rater Change)
ELSE R&D POLICY.T2
: f R&D POLICY.In Tax Change = R&D POLICY.Tax Rate+R&D POLICY.T1
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: f R&D POLICY.Out Tax Change = R&D POLICY.Tax Rate
: c R&D POLICY.R Invest Change = 0.001
: c R&D POLICY.R&D2 =
IF R&D POLICY.Tax Rate < 0.35
THEN -1*R&D POLICY.R Invest Change
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.R&D1 =
IF R&D POLICY.Tax Rate > 0.35
THEN R&D POLICY.R Invest Change
ELSE R&D POLICY.R&D2
: f R&D POLICY.In R&D Rate = R&D POLICY.R&D Rate+R&D POLICY.R&D1
: f R&D POLICY.Out R&D Rate = R&D POLICY.R&D Rate
: c R&D POLICY.Intl HS Rate = 0.02
: f R&D POLICY.In HSR = R&D POLICY.Intl HS Rate
: f R&D POLICY.Out HSR = R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate
: c R&D POLICY.Infra Invest Change = 0.001
: c R&D POLICY.Infra2 =
IF R&D POLICY.R&D Rate < 0.6
THEN -1*R&D POLICY.Infra Invest Change
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.Infra1 =
IF R&D POLICY.R&D Rate > 0.84
THEN R&D POLICY.Infra Invest Change
ELSE R&D POLICY.Infra2
: f R&D POLICY.In Infra Rate = R&D POLICY.Infra Rate+R&D POLICY.Infra1
: f R&D POLICY.Out Infra Rate = R&D POLICY.Infra Rate
: c R&D POLICY.Breadth = 0.5
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Spread =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GRDep%-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Prospect)*100
: c R&D POLICY.APP Rate Change = -0.01
: c R&D POLICY.Effective App Rate =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Spread > 0.25
THEN R&D POLICY.APP Rate Change
ELSE 0
: f R&D POLICY.In BFact = R&D POLICY.Breadth+R&D POLICY.Effective App Rate
: f R&D POLICY.Out BFact = R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact
: c R&D POLICY.Length Fact = R&D POLICY.Length/25
DOCUMENT: One in this converter means that the length of a patent protection is 25 years without extension. Any
changes to the length will alter the level.
: f R&D POLICY.In IPR =
IF (R&D POLICY.In BFact*R&D POLICY.Length Fact) <1
THEN (R&D POLICY.In BFact*R&D POLICY.Length Fact)
ELSE 1
: f R&D POLICY.Out IPR = R&D POLICY.IPR Effect
: s R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level = 200000
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund = 10000000
: c R&D POLICY.HS Degree = 5000
: c R&D POLICY.HS Change1 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund<10000000)
THEN (R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level-R&D POLICY.HS Degree)
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.HS Change =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund<10000000
THEN (R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level+R&D POLICY.HS Degree)
ELSE R&D POLICY.HS Change1
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: f R&D POLICY.In HSIL = R&D POLICY.HS Change
: f R&D POLICY.Out HSIL = R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Free Access A1 = 0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To FreeA1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To PubKnow = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Free Access A1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change = 1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect5 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>1000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 100000
THEN 0.05*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect4 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>2500000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 1000000
THEN 0.1*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect5
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect3 =
IF NOT (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>5000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 2500000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change*0.25
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect4
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect2 =
IF NOT( INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>10000000
OR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res=0) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>5000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change*0.5
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect3
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res > 10000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect2
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res =0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If Change =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect >0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If No Change = 0.5
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Prob =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If Change > 0
THEN (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If Change)
ELSE (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If No Change)
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Prob = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra Dep = 0.025
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In R Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res
DOCUMENT: Each infrastructure unit (or research center, i.e. university) is valued in 50,000 units.
Each researcher (Lr) requires
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out R Infra =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra Dep
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.PK Dep = EXP(-0.02*TIME)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSDC = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillDClust)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSRC = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillRClust)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.No Cluster = 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V4 =
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IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 0 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.No Cluster
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V3 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 0 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSDC
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V4
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V2 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 1 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSRC
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V3
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering =1 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering =1
THEN (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSDC+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSRC)
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V2
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V0 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1 = 2
THEN 0
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Spillover Effect =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1= 1
THEN 0
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In PubKnowl =
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.TTe-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R2DTech Transfer)+
EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To PubKnow)+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Spillover Effect
DOCUMENT: Since “Patented A1 Rate” = LOGN(R2DTech Transfer and “Public Knowledge Rate” requires the non-
LOGN version of “PA1R,” “R2DTech Transfer” is used instead in this equation.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out PubKnow =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.PK Dep
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Infra =
(1-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income Frac)*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In D Infra =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Infra
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out D Infra =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra Dep
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out HS Fund =
IF DEVELOPMENT.Successful D > 0
THEN R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change = 1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect5 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>7000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
> 6000000
THEN 0.05*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect4 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>8000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
> 7000000
THEN 0.25*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect5
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect3 =
IF NOT (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>9000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
> 8000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change*0.5
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ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect4
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect2 =
IF NOT( INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>10000000
OR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund=0) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>9000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change*0.75
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect3
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund >10000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect2
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund =0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS Change =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect >0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS No Change = 0.5
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Prob =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS Change > 0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS No Change
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out HS Prob = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Mobility Cap = 1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Rate = 0.85
DOCUMENT: This changed from Spain’s 0.77 to Mexico’s 0.85
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Prop RtoD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Mobility Cap = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out RD%Mob
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Lab =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Prop RtoD
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Lab =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*(1-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Prop RtoD)
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Lic R Clt = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicR
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Lic D Clt = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicD
: f DEVELOPMENT.Off Market = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Total ResD =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd-(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd*R&D POLICY.Tax Rate)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt D =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt*((1-R&D POLICY.R&D Rate)-R&D POLICY.Infra Rate)
DOCUMENT: The net rate of investment the government allocates for development activities in biotech is so small
(1-R&D rate)-Infra rate, because it is assumed in the model that the vast majority of development activities take place
within the private sector, therefore not requiring governmental subsidy.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To R Lab = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Lab = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total < 10000000 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1= 2
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCIR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI1
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ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI3 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total<10000000 AND NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 =2
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 =4
THEN 0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI Splt =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI3
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCR =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=2) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4
THEN (0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI Splt)
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCtoR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 = 2
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCIR)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCR
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total < 10000000 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 = 3
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCID =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI2
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCD =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4
THEN (0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI Splt)
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCtoD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 = 3
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCID)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCD
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Total R&D Infra =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra
RUNTIME EQUATIONS
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know(t-dt)+
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In PubKnowl - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out PubKnow) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed R(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed R(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicR - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 R) * dt
: s DEVELOPMENT.NDi1(t) =
DEVELOPMENT.NDi1(t-dt) + (DEVELOPMENT.Successful D - DEVELOPMENT.Out i1) * dt
: s RESEARCH.New R Knowledge A1(t) =
RESEARCH.New R Knowledge A1(t-dt) + (RESEARCH.Successful R - RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer) * dt
: s R&D POLICY.IPR Effect(t) =
R&D POLICY.IPR Effect(t-dt) + (R&D POLICY.In IPR - R&D POLICY.Out IPR) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra(t) =
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INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In R Infra - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out R Infra) * dt
DOCUMENT: The volume of resources in terms of infrastructure in basic research reaches the 250M and each researcher
requires a level of 10,000 per period to produce research. There are 126 research centers and 145 affiliated research units
in Spain. It is assumed that each has an approximate budget of 2m and 1m, respectively, per period.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr(t-dt) + (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To R Lab) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt R(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt R(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt R - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt R) * dt
DOCUMENT: This is 80% of 507m which is the total public subvention to research (p.32 Genoma Espana) and adds
both Central and Community resources.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Res Govt - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed D(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed D(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicD - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 D) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In D Infra - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out D Infra) * dt
DOCUMENT: There are approximately 275 biotech industries in Spain (with 107 only in Cataluna and Madrid). These
have at least 15 individuals working at them in development activities. The total resources these had in 2008 were
slightly above 180M.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld(t-dt) + (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Lab) * dt
DOCUMENT: I assume that the labor hand does not reduce itself due to the short period of time this analysis extends.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt D(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt D(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt D - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt D) * dt
DOCUMENT: This comes from p.32 Genoma Espana and represents approximately 14% of the total public subvention
to R&D, as suggested. It includes both the local and community resources.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCtoD - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In ResR - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out NetFinR) * dt
DOCUMENT: This comes from the total sales reported by public biotech entities (747m). Source: p.69 Genoma Espana,
2009.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Net Fin D - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D) * dt
DOCUMENT: This comes from the total sales presented by the biotech industry in Spain for the year 2008 (684M)
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Source: p.69 Genoma Espana, 2009.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Total ResD(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Total ResD(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Total ResD - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Reg - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Dep) * dt
DOCUMENT: Natural Resources are decreasing at a rate that will deplete these to half of its current stock in 100 years.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In DR - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out DR) * dt
DOCUMENT: Natural Resources are being depleted by many factors exogenous to biotech R&D.These resources are
being depleted at around 0.3% yearly and it is estimated that 1/3 of these will be gone in a century. However, these
biotech activities account for around 20% of the depleted resources yearly. Yet, through the application of biosafety
measures, the depletion rate accounted to R&D can be reduced overtime.
: s DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential(t) =
DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential(t-dt) + (DEVELOPMENT.Input D - DEVELOPMENT.Output D) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Prob - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Prob) * dt
DOCUMENT: This is a Montecarlo probability that increases as the funding for biosafety increases. The larger the prob-
ability, the more probable a biotech product will reach the market.
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Prob - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out HS Prob) * dt
DOCUMENT: This is a Montecarlo probability that increases as the funding for biosafety increases. The larger the prob-
ability, the more probable a biotech product will reach the market.
: s R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level(t) =
R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level(t-dt) + (R&D POLICY.In BLev - R&D POLICY.Out BLev) * dt
: s R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate(t) =
R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate(t-dt) + (R&D POLICY.In HSR - R&D POLICY.Out HSR) * dt
: s R&D POLICY.Tax Rate(t) =
R&D POLICY.Tax Rate(t-dt) + (R&D POLICY.In Tax Change - R&D POLICY.Out Tax Change) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoD(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoD(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In TT from D - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Save(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Save(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Save - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Income(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Income(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Inc - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoR(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoR(t-dt) +
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(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In TT from R - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Compound) * dt
DOCUMENT: This means this funds are invested in government bonds, thus, these resources are going back to the
government.
: s R&D POLICY.R&D Rate(t) =
R&D POLICY.R&D Rate(t-dt) +
(R&D POLICY.In R&D Rate - R&D POLICY.Out R&D Rate) * dt
DOCUMENT: This rate comes from p.32 in the 2009 Genoma Espana report.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCtoR - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Gene Res - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Gene Res) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In GR Dep - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out GR Dep) * dt
DOCUMENT: Genetic Resources are being depleted by biotech R&D.In the model these resources are being prospected
at around 0.3% yearly and it is estimated that 1/3 of these will be protected by IPRs in a century. Biotech activities
account for the entire genetic resource erosion. Yet, through less secluding IPR measures, access to the information
generated by these resources can be increased overtime.
: s RESEARCH.Research Potential(t) =
RESEARCH.Research Potential(t-dt) + (RESEARCH.Input R - RESEARCH.Output R) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In BioLab - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out BioLab) * dt
DOCUMENT: 100
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Bio Ind - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt) * dt
DOCUMENT: Biosafety pertains to preserving the balance of natural resources. In the model it focuses on preventing
over depleting natural resources. The access to genetic resources, as realted to the access to and management of infor-
mation derived from genetic information, is considered within its own subsystem. In this sense, development deals
exclusively with biosafety while research deals exclusively with the access to genetic resources.
It is associated only to development because it deals with the protection of natural resources from the effects of devel-
oped technologies, like LGMOs freed to the environment for experimental, trail, or commercial reasons. Research, on
the other hand, deals with extracting basic information from a particular natural resource type in the form of genes or
genetic resources.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In BR Infra - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out BR Infra) * dt
DOCUMENT: Public Infrastructure is endowed with a 100,000 monetary units at t0. It is assumed that there is an initial
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infrastructure of 10 research centers each worth 10,000 monetary units. Public infrastructure, however, depreciates at a
linear rate of 0.025 per period.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt Infra(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt Infra(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt Infra - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt Infra) * dt
DOCUMENT: See the documents in the other two funds.
: s R&D POLICY.Infra Rate(t) =
R&D POLICY.Infra Rate(t-dt) + (R&D POLICY.In Infra Rate - R&D POLICY.Out Infra Rate) * dt
DOCUMENT: This rate comes from an approximation from p. 32 of the Genoma Espana 2009 report.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Inc - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Reinvest(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Reinvest(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Reinv) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRD Bal(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRD Bal(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRD Bal - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCRD Bal) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCR Fund - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCR Fund) * dt
DOCUMENT: This fund is composed by the surplus generated when one exists after paying investors the amount these
allocated for VC. It can also be negative when either R or D are not successful.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCR Debt - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCR Debt) * dt
DOCUMENT: There is the need to coordinate the payment of this VC debt with the funds set to do so.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRF Bal(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRF Bal(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRF Bal - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCRF Bal) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Spend(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Spend(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Spend - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Spend) * dt
DOCUMENT: This is connected to the “To Market” level in order to buy out all products at the price level. Once there
are no more “X Spending,” resources the income ends. This will set the price level and the success of the product in the
market.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Save(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Save(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Save - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Save) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Spend(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Spend(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Spend - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Spend) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Spend(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Spend(t-dt) +
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(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Spend - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Spend) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Save(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Save(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Save - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In RD%Mob - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out RD%Mob) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Inv(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Inv(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Risk Free - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Compound) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To VC - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC) * dt
DOCUMENT: Venture Capital is a fraction of all savings from both research and development activities. This fraction
changes over time depending on its performance. It becomes invested in either research or development depending
on the performance of capital spending in either sector (when VC1 = 2, it goes to R; when VC1 = 3, it goes to D; when
VC1 = 4, it is spread evenly between the two; when VC1=1, it remains stocked); to decide this, capital investment (Kr
or Kd) is compared to the “Net Financial Resources” of each sector. Whenever the NFR(r,d) of either sector is larger
than the capital investment K (r,d) at any time, investors decide to invest in the sector. In the case when capital invest-
ment of either sector is less than its NFR venture capital is stocked until either sector displays larger NFR than K. The
model, however, does not allow for both sectors to perform successfully simultaneously, meaning that NFRR>Kr and
NFRD>Kd can not simultaneously exist. Original level 120m.
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCD Debt - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCD Debt) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCD Fund - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCD Fund) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDD Bal(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDD Bal(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDD Bal - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCDD Bal) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDF Bal(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDF Bal(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDF Bal - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCDF Bal) * dt
: s RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Fund(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Fund(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Intl VC - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC) * dt
: s R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact(t) =
R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact(t-dt) + (R&D POLICY.In BFact - R&D POLICY.Out BFact) * dt
: s R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level(t) =
R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level(t-dt) +
(R&D POLICY.In HSIL - R&D POLICY.Out HSIL) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund(t-dt) +
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(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Fund - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out HS Fund) * dt
: s INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Free Access A1(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Free Access A1(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To FreeA1 - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To PubKnow) * dt
: l DEVELOPMENT.In Market(t) =
DEVELOPMENT.In Market(t-dt) +
(DEVELOPMENT.To Market - DEVELOPMENT.Off Market) * dt
: l RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Labor(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Labor(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Lab - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To R Lab) * dt
: l RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Labor(t) =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Labor(t-dt) +
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Lab - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Lab) * dt
: l INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Patent A1(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Patent A1(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1 - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To FreeA1) * dt
DOCUMENT: It is assumed that there is an initial endowment of 65 units within the patent pipeline before t0.
: l INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.LicR Clust(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.LicR Clust(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Lic R Clt -
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out LicRClt - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillRClust) * dt
: l INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.LicD Clust(t) =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.LicD Clust(t-dt) +
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Lic D Clt -
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Lic D Clt - INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillDClust) * dt
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillRClust = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out LicRClt = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer = RESEARCH.New R Knowledge A1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 1 =
IF DEVELOPMENT.NDi1 <1 AND RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer >0
THEN 1
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 2 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 1 =1
THEN 0
ELSE 1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.TTe = EXP(RESEARCH.To Tech Transfer)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R2DTech Transfer = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.TTe*R&D POLICY.IPR Effect
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1 = LOGN(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R2DTech Transfer)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Leftover IP =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 2 = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.IPRs Transfer %
DOCUMENT: This suggest a “Clustering Effect” if returned to A1 in addition to “Public Knowledge.” Its degree can
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also be tuned depending on the clustering degree (If 1 then the full “Leftover IP” loops back to A1. Lower levels will
refer to less percentage of flow, and so on. In the case that there is no Match type 2 then 15% of Patents goes to Research
(assuming that if there is no real demand only about 30% of patents are licensed between R&D.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicR = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Leftover IP
DOCUMENT: Since the financial resources to pay for the IPRs licenses are produced by “Research” and “Research” is
getting these resources as payment, these are balanced out (out=In=0).
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 R = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed R
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 R =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering =1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out LicRClt
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 R
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 R)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1R =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R =0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1R
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra/INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Infra Units per Lr
DOCUMENT: Each Lr requires 1000 R Inrfa L units to allow for Lr to turn into Human Capital (HC) by multiplying
each matching 1 unit of Lr / 100 units of R Infra to A1 or A2 in the Research and Development modules.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELr1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity < RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Effective Lr =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity >= RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELr1
: c RESEARCH.HCr =
1+(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1R)*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Effective Lr
DOCUMENT: Labor and information are multiplied to determine the human capital levels which can be measured in
information units (each individual has all knowledge and it does not get depleted due to the public good character of
information). The delay is introduced because it takes around five years for scientific personnel to become “knowl-
edgable in the art” and, thus, be considered “human capital.”
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillDClust = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW
DOCUMENT: The spillover fraction is 0.4
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Lic D Clt = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicD =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 1 = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1
ELSE (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.IPRs Transfer %*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Patent A1)
DOCUMENT: This logic suggests that the demand for research patents is full (highly, complete stock is demanded)
when development’s technological stock is dry (equal to zero). Otherwise the average of licensed patents is just a frac-
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tion (if “Match Making” mechanism exists) or zero (if no “Match Making” mechanism exists) of the total of patented
A1.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 D = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Licensed D
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 D =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Lic D Clt
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out A1 D
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.A1 D)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1D =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D=1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D=0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eA1D
DOCUMENT: It is Total because the zeros where eliminated
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra/INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Infra Units Per Ld
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELd1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity < RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Effective Ld =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra L Capacity >= RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Ld
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.ELd1
: c DEVELOPMENT.HCd =
1+(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1D)
*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Effective Ld
DOCUMENT: There is a need to include a +1 to this equation in order to be able to run the scenario where there is labor
trade-off. Otherwise, since at points there is no change on human capital due to this variability, there is a division by
zero when running the model using Euler’s method.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt D
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Total ResD
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Net Fin D =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income Frac*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D2D Reinv
: c DEVELOPMENT.Kd =
1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt D+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NRDep% = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate/100
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Reg =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Reg Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Dep =
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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Nat Res D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NRDep%
: f DEVELOPMENT.Input D =
LOGN(DEVELOPMENT.HCd+DEVELOPMENT.Kd+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NatRes Dep)
: c DEVELOPMENT.HCt0 = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.HCd,1)
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC =
1+(DEVELOPMENT.Degree HC+
(DEVELOPMENT.Degree HC*((DEVELOPMENT.HCd/DEVELOPMENT.HCt0)-1)))
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC Range =
IF DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC>100
THEN 100
ELSE DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC
: c DEVELOPMENT.MTCHC = MONTECARLO(DEVELOPMENT.ProbHC Range)
: c DEVELOPMENT.Kt0 = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.Kd,1)
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbK =
DEVELOPMENT.Degree K+(DEVELOPMENT.Degree K*((DEVELOPMENT.Kd/DEVELOPMENT.Kt0)-1))
: c DEVELOPMENT.ProbK Range =
IF DEVELOPMENT.ProbK>100
THEN 100
ELSE DEVELOPMENT.ProbK
: c DEVELOPMENT.MTCK = MONTECARLO(DEVELOPMENT.ProbK Range)
: c DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1 = DEVELOPMENT.MTCHC+DEVELOPMENT.MTCK
: c DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt0 = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1,1)
: c DEVELOPMENT.i1Probability =
IF (DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt0<DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1)
OR (DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt0+DEVELOPMENT.SUMAt1=4)
THEN (DEVELOPMENT.Tech Advances)
ELSE(0)
: f DEVELOPMENT.Successful D = DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential*DEVELOPMENT.i1Probability
: f DEVELOPMENT.Out i1 = DEVELOPMENT.NDi1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Range =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob > 100
THEN 100
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob
: c DEVELOPMENT.Bio MCProb = MONTECARLO(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Range)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Range =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob > 100
THEN 100
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob
: c DEVELOPMENT.HS MCProb = MONTECARLO(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Range)
: c DEVELOPMENT.Mkt Prob =
IF (DEVELOPMENT.Bio MCProb+DEVELOPMENT.HS MCProb)=2
THEN 1
ELSE 0
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DOCUMENT: Studies have found that only around 40% of the products developed reach the market level due to strin-
gent regulatory requirements, which can be translated into an almost 40% chance per period that the developed product
creates a new market. In this case biosafety and innocuous review procedures required by the government will create
an indirect “tax” on the industry. Yet, this tax does not come back to the government but instead stays as a fund that
increases (or decrease) the probability of approval as it changes. The biosafety factor then use the same procedure
followed for the change in the ”Bio Effect” so that the Montecarlo probability changes overtime as the industry either
pays more or less for biosafety requirements. This way the chance of being approved increases as a biosafety culture
increases. This also works for the Govt, since the more production the greater the biosafety pay and the less the natural
resources depleted (win-win situation).
: f DEVELOPMENT.To Market = DEVELOPMENT.Out i1*DEVELOPMENT.Mkt Prob
DOCUMENT: Being this an analysis from the POV of the central planner it is assumed that competing mar-
kets/developers are constantly developing new innovations not withstanding those already in the market. The in-
novator/follower approach presented in the business management literature is overviewed.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eD2M = EXP(DEVELOPMENT.To Market)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eTD2M =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eD2M = 1
THEN 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eD2M
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Inital Income =
(DELAY(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eTD2M,1))*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI1 =
(0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Inital Income*((1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)ˆ(-1)))
DOCUMENT: This process means that whenever a product reaches the market, the developer gets three years of in-
come. Yet, the level of this income decreases over time.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI2 =
(0.25*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI1)*((1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)ˆ(-2))
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI3 =
(0.1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI2)*((1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)ˆ(-3))
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Inital Income+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI1+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI2+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FI3
DOCUMENT: In this case the capital that development produces is generated by the principal innovation (the rate that
“To Market” produces at time “n”) multiplied by the price, plus the present value of the returns that this principal
will bring to the sector in the following three years before the innovation’s market value reaches zero (the value loss is
assumed to be 50% of the initial value after a year, 25% of that value at year two, 10% percent of that value at year three,
and zero at year four). These figures are then summed at time “n.”
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnD =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price)*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Level
DOCUMENT: In the model, as happens in the information sector, there is no possible way of knowing beforehand
if the use of the licensed IP will produce returns beforehand. The option considered here is an annuity for informa-
tion/knowledge at current prices for the time the IPRs are enforceable. This is then brought to present value to produce
the income for R coming from licensing.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnDPV =
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DEVELOPMENT.Mkt Prob*
PV(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r,R&D POLICY.Length, -RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnD, 0)
DOCUMENT: This is the PV of an annuity of 0.04% of the principal (the figure found at time “n”) for a period of 20
years if the product reaches the market (it has a probability of doing so of “Prob”).That figure is added to the principal
(the previous total “Licensing Rate”) at the time when it was found and brought to present value at time zero.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licencing D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnDPV
DOCUMENT: The amount of financial resources going back to research per period is composed by the actual licensing
rate level at time “n” (which is vaulted in Knowledge Units, A1), plus the present value (PV) of the annual royalty
annuity from licensing at time “n,” if the innovation reaches the market (this is why it is multiplied by “Prob”).
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev Pay =
IF NOT( RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D<1000
THEN ((0.5*R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level)*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev Pay =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0
THEN (0*R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev Pay
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Bio Ind = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev Pay
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev HS Pay =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D<1000
THEN (0.5*R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D*R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev HS Pay =
IF (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D=0)
THEN (0*R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D)
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Y Dev HS Pay
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Fund = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.N Dev HS Pay
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd =
(((RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Capital D-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licencing D)-
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Bio Ind)-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Fund)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Fiscal InD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd <0
THEN 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd*R&D POLICY.Tax Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In TT from D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licencing D
DOCUMENT: TTF= Technology transfer funds from development to research derived from licensing.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoD
DOCUMENT: This fraction is due to the patent regulation existing in Spain operating in a similar way to the Bayh-Dole
act requiring this allocation of resources between these three elements. It is assumed that this income division only
affects the licensing of patents to research, since these are mostly funded by government funding and the information
necessary for these is developed within public research centers. The “Royalty Rule” switch is introduced to differentiate
the model’s approach for Mexico -which does not have such rule- from that of Spain.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to Govt =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule =1
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THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac)
ELSE 0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt =
IF DEVELOPMENT.Successful D>0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Biosafety Review Costs
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule = 1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*0.8
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnR =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TeA1R*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Price)*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Level
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnRPV =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Match Type 2*
PV(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r, R&D POLICY.Length, -RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnR, 0)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licensing R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.AnnRPV
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In TT from R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From Licensing R
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TechT RtoR
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTF R Fraction
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In ResR =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out NetFinR = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Inc = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out NetFinR
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Income
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Save =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Save Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Save
DOCUMENT: These are assumed to be resources going back to the government, who originally provided them.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Res Govt =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FixR&D Fund Switch = 1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.FixedGovt Fund+
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Fiscal InD+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to Govt+
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp))
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Fiscal InD+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to Govt+
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind to Govt+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt
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: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt R =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt*R&D POLICY.R&D Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt R = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt R
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR
: c RESEARCH.Kr = 1+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt R+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR
DOCUMENT: K is multiplied by a fraction of A1 (information) because information is capital. In this model each unit
of capital is worth two units of information.
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GRDep% = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate/100
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Gene Res =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Prospect
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Gene Res =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Res*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GRDep%
: f RESEARCH.Input R = LOGN(RESEARCH.HCr+RESEARCH.Kr+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Gene Res)
: f RESEARCH.Output R = RESEARCH.Research Potential
: f DEVELOPMENT.Output D = DEVELOPMENT.Development Potential
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In BioLab =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.G Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out BioLab =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Rate
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect5 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>5000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 1000000
THEN 0.01*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect4 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>8500000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 5000000
THEN 0.1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect5
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect3 =
IF NOT (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>9000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 8500000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change*0.25
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect4
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect2 =
IF NOT( INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>10000000 OR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res=0)
AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>9000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change*0.5
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect3
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res >10000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect2
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect0 =
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IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res =0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect Change*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If Change =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect0 >0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dev Effect0
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In DR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If Change>0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If No Change
DOCUMENT: If there are no “Biosafety Industry Resources” then depletion “Factor” increases 0.05, if “BIR” is positive
within a range then “Factor” decreases (depending on the level: 0<BIR<1000 then the “Bio Effect Change” (0.5) is al-
tered by either a factor of 50%, 25%, 10%, or 0).
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out DR = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R Infra =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Royalty Rule=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTD Frac)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From D*0.20
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R Infra =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out TT From R*(1-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTF R Fraction)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt*R&D POLICY.Infra Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Govt Infra
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In BR Infra =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRD to R Infra+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.TTRR To R Infra+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Govt Infra)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out BR Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Inc =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Net FIn D-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Reinv
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Reinv = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Reinvest
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRD Bal =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res<0
THEN (-1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res)
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCRD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCR Res
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCRF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCRF Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Save =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Save Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Spend =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Inc-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Save
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: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Spend = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Spend
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Save = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Save
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Spend =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Inc-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Save
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Spend = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Spend
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Spend =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Spend+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Spend
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Spend = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Spend
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Save =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out R Save+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out D Save
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.All Save
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr < INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
THEN (+1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Change %LR)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr > INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
THEN (-1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Change %LR)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD2
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Arbit =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Available Lr = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra L Capacity
THEN 0
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD1
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In RD%Mob =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Arbit+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out RD%Mob = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD %Mob
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule YVC = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Change =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR>0
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD>0
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC%+0.01)
ELSE (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC%-0.001)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Change
DOCUMENT: This is the percentage of the total “To Investment” rate that goes to VC instead of “Risk Free Investment.”
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To VC =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule YVC*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule NVC = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Invest
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Risk Free =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule YVC-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To VC)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Invest Rule NVC
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To Compound =
357
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Inv+
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Risk Free Comp*CGROWTH((100*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r))
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kr Delay = DELAY(RESEARCH.Kr,1)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResR>(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kr Delay*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)
THEN 1
ELSE 0
DOCUMENT: Here, VC investors will risk their resources if the levels of income displayed by the sector are above those
that the natural interest rate would offer, meaning they will be able to collect at least as much as they would if they
were investing on risk free options. (instead of having “IF Net Financial Reources (R,D) > Kr Delay (5) THEN 1 ELSE
0, comparing the net returns today with investment levels five years ago).
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kd Delay = DELAY(DEVELOPMENT.Kd,1)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.NetFin ResD>(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Kd Delay*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.r)
THEN 1
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC4 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR=0 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD=0
THEN 1
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC3 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD=0 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR=1
THEN 2
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC4
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR=0 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD = 1
THEN 3
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC3
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD = 1
THEN 4
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC2
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC =
IF (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4 OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3 OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=2)
AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Switch=1
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Invest Rate)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRD Bal
DOCUMENT: This parameter represents the following amount:
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCR Debt =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoR+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCR Debt = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoR Debt
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt
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: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDD Bal =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res<0
THEN (-1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res)
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCD Debt =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCtoD+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCD Debt = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCtoD Debt
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Dif VCD Res
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCDF Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCD Fund =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Inc*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Debt Rate)
+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCDF Bal
DOCUMENT: The parameter that captures the debt rate times the Income represents the amount of financial resources
available to support VC investment, it is not an actual capital flow (reason why these are not actually discounted from
the inflow of income coming to either R or D). The actual physical resources are those coming from the VCR and VCD
funds balance.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCD Fund = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCD Fund
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCRF Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCR Fund =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Debt Rate*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Inc)
+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.From VCRF Bal
DOCUMENT: Debt rate is the maximum amount of income allowed to be allocated towards paying debt. In other
words, it is the maximum leverage level that a sector can leverage its own income.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCR Fund = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCR Fund
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCDD Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDD Bal
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VCDF Bal = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCDF Bal
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Restriction =
IF NOT (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=2 OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3
OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4)
THEN 0
ELSE 1
DOCUMENT: This restriction allows the flow of VC into projects only when the matching mechanism is available. In
other words, only when VC1 is equal to 2, 3 or 4, and not when there is no match, as in VC1=1.
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Intl VC = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Invest
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Fund*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Invest Rate)*
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Restriction
: c RESEARCH.HCt0 = DELAY(RESEARCH.HCr,1)
: c RESEARCH.ProbHC =
(RESEARCH.Degree HC+(RESEARCH.Degree HC*((RESEARCH.HCr/RESEARCH.HCt0)-1)))
: c RESEARCH.ProbHC Range = IF RESEARCH.ProbHC>100 THEN 100 ELSE RESEARCH.ProbHC
: c RESEARCH.MTCHCr = MONTECARLO(RESEARCH.ProbHC Range)
: c RESEARCH.Kt0 = DELAY(RESEARCH.Kr,1)
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: c RESEARCH.ProbK = (RESEARCH.Degree K+(RESEARCH.Degree K*((RESEARCH.Kr/RESEARCH.Kt0)-1)))
: c RESEARCH.ProbK Range = IF RESEARCH.ProbK>100 THEN 100 ELSE RESEARCH.ProbK
DOCUMENT: This step is to keep the change within the Montecarlo 0 to 100 range. Some of the values are beyond 100
and thus have to be standarized to the range.
: c RESEARCH.MTCKr = MONTECARLO(RESEARCH.ProbK Range)
: c RESEARCH.SUMAt1 = RESEARCH.MTCHCr+RESEARCH.MTCKr
: c RESEARCH.SUMAt0 = DELAY(RESEARCH.SUMAt1,1)
: c RESEARCH.A1Probability =
IF (RESEARCH.SUMAt0<RESEARCH.SUMAt1)
OR (RESEARCH.SUMAt0+RESEARCH.SUMAt1=4)
THEN (RESEARCH.Tech Advances)
ELSE 0
: f RESEARCH.Successful R = RESEARCH.Research Potential*RESEARCH.A1Probability
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R = EXP(RESEARCH.Successful R)
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Access Gene Res*R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect5 =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>1000000) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R > 1
THEN 0.01*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect4 =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>2000000) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R> 1000000
THEN 0.1*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect5
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect3 =
IF NOT (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>5000000) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R >
2000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change*0.25
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect4
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect2 =
IF NOT( RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>10000000 OR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R=0) AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R>5000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change*0.5
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect3
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R >10000000
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect2
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect0 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R =0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Effect Change*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.eSuccess R
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect1
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If R Change =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect0 >0
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THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.R Effect0
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In GR Dep =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If R Change>0
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If R Change
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.If No R Change
DOCUMENT: If there are no “Biosafety Industry Resources” then depletion “Factor” increases 0.05, if “BIR” is positive
within a range then “Factor” decreases (depending on the level: 0<BIR<1000 then the ”Bio Effect Change” (0.5) is al-
tered by either a factor of 50%, 25%, 10%, or 0).
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out GR Dep = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GeneDep Rate
: c R&D POLICY.PubDep Thres = R&D POLICY.Intl Bio Standard
: c R&D POLICY.Public Perception = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Depletion Rate-R&D POLICY.PubDep Thres
: c R&D POLICY.PP Effect =
IF R&D POLICY.Public Perception>0
THEN 0.01
ELSE 0
: f R&D POLICY.In BLev =
IF (R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level+R&D POLICY.PP Effect) > R&D POLICY.Intl Bio Standard
THEN ((R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level+R&D POLICY.PP Effect)-1)
ELSE (R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level+R&D POLICY.PP Effect)
: f R&D POLICY.Out BLev = R&D POLICY.Biosafety Level
: c R&D POLICY.T2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt<10000
THEN (-1*R&D POLICY.Tax Rater Change)
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.T1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Net Res Govt> 1000000
THEN (R&D POLICY.Tax Rater Change)
ELSE R&D POLICY.T2
: f R&D POLICY.In Tax Change = R&D POLICY.Tax Rate+R&D POLICY.T1
: f R&D POLICY.Out Tax Change = R&D POLICY.Tax Rate
: c R&D POLICY.R&D2 =
IF R&D POLICY.Tax Rate < 0.35
THEN -1*R&D POLICY.R Invest Change
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.R&D1 =
IF R&D POLICY.Tax Rate > 0.35
THEN R&D POLICY.R Invest Change
ELSE R&D POLICY.R&D2
: f R&D POLICY.In R&D Rate = R&D POLICY.R&D Rate+R&D POLICY.R&D1
: f R&D POLICY.Out R&D Rate = R&D POLICY.R&D Rate
: f R&D POLICY.In HSR = R&D POLICY.Intl HS Rate
: f R&D POLICY.Out HSR = R&D POLICY.Health Safe Rate
: c R&D POLICY.Infra2 =
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IF R&D POLICY.R&D Rate < 0.6
THEN -1*R&D POLICY.Infra Invest Change
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.Infra1 =
IF R&D POLICY.R&D Rate > 0.84
THEN R&D POLICY.Infra Invest Change
ELSE R&D POLICY.Infra2
: f R&D POLICY.In Infra Rate = R&D POLICY.Infra Rate+R&D POLICY.Infra1
: f R&D POLICY.Out Infra Rate = R&D POLICY.Infra Rate
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Spread =
(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.GRDep%-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Gene Prospect)*100
: c R&D POLICY.Effective App Rate =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Spread > 0.25
THEN R&D POLICY.APP Rate Change
ELSE 0
: f R&D POLICY.In BFact = R&D POLICY.Breadth+R&D POLICY.Effective App Rate
: f R&D POLICY.Out BFact = R&D POLICY.Breadth Fact
: c R&D POLICY.Length Fact = R&D POLICY.Length/25
DOCUMENT: One in this converter means that the length of a patent protection is 25years. Any changes to the length
will alter the level.
: f R&D POLICY.In IPR =
IF (R&D POLICY.In BFact*R&D POLICY.Length Fact) <1
THEN (R&D POLICY.In BFact*R&D POLICY.Length Fact)
ELSE 1
: f R&D POLICY.Out IPR = R&D POLICY.IPR Effect
: c R&D POLICY.HS Change1 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund<10000000)
THEN (R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level-R&D POLICY.HS Degree)
ELSE 0
: c R&D POLICY.HS Change =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund<10000000
THEN (R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level+R&D POLICY.HS Degree)
ELSE R&D POLICY.HS Change1
: f R&D POLICY.In HSIL = R&D POLICY.HS Change
: f R&D POLICY.Out HSIL = R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To FreeA1 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To PubKnow = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Free Access A1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect5 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>1000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 100000
THEN 0.05*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect4 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>2500000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
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> 1000000
THEN 0.1*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect5
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect3 =
IF NOT (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>5000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
> 2500000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change*0.25
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect4
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect2 =
IF NOT( INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>10000000 OR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res=0)
AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res>5000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change*0.5
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect3
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res > 10000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect2
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res =0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob Change*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Ind Res
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If Change =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect >0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Effect
ELSE 0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Prob =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If Change > 0
THEN (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If Change)
ELSE (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If No Change)
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out Prob = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Bio Prob
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In R Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.BR Infra Res
DOCUMENT: Each infrastructure unit (or research center, i.e. university) is valued in 50,000 units.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out R Infra =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra Dep
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.PK Dep = EXP(-0.02*TIME)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSDC = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillDClust)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSRC = EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.SpillRClust)
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V4 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 0 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.No Cluster
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V3 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 0 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 1
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSDC
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ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V4
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V2 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering = 1 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering = 0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSRC
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V3
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Clustering =1 AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Clustering =1
THEN (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSDC+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.eSRC)
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V2
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V0 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1 = 2
THEN 0
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Spillover Effect =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V1= 1
THEN 0
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.V0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In PubKnowl =
(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.TTe-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R2DTech Transfer)+
EXP(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.To PubKnow)+
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Spillover Effect
DOCUMENT: Since “Patented A1 Rate” = LOGN(R2DTech Transfer and “Public Knowledge Rate” requires the non-
LOGN version of “PA1R,” “R2DTech Transfer” is used instead in this equation.
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out PubKnow =
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Public Know*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.PK Dep
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Infra =
(1-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.D Income Frac)*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Total ResD
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In D Infra = RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Infra
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out D Infra = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra Dep
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out HS Fund =
IF DEVELOPMENT.Successful D > 0
THEN R&D POLICY.HS Inspect Level
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect5 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>7000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
> 6000000
THEN 0.05*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change
ELSE 0
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect4 =
IF NOT(INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>8000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
> 7000000
THEN 0.25*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect5
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect3 =
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IF NOT (INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>9000000) AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
> 8000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change*0.5
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect4
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect2 =
IF NOT( INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>10000000 OR INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund=0)
AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund>9000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change*0.75
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect3
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect1 =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund >10000000
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect2
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund =0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob Change*INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Health S Fund
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect1
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS Change =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect >0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Effect
ELSE 0
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In HS Prob =
IF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS Change > 0
THEN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS Change
ELSE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob-INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.If HS No Change
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Out HS Prob = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.HS Prob
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Prop RtoD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Mobility Cap = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out RD%Mob
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.RtoD Rate
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In R Lab =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Prop RtoD
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In D Lab =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Biotech Labor*(1-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Prop RtoD)
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Lic R Clt = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicR
: f INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In Lic D Clt = INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.In LicD
: f DEVELOPMENT.Off Market = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Total ResD =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd-(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.PreTax Kd*R&D POLICY.Tax Rate)
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In Govt D =
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Res Govt*((1-R&D POLICY.R&D Rate)-R&D POLICY.Infra Rate)
DOCUMENT: The net rate of investment the government allocates for development activities in biotech is so small
(1-R&D rate)-Infra rate, because it is assumed in the model that the vast majority of development activities take place
within the private sector, therefore not requiring governmental subsidy.
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: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To R Lab = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.To D Lab = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI1 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total < 10000000 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1= 2
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCIR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI1
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI3 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total<10000000 AND NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 =2 OR RE-
SOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 =4
THEN 0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI Splt =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI3
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCR =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=2) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4
THEN (0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI Splt)
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCtoR =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 = 2
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCIR)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCR
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI2 =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC Total < 10000000 AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 = 3
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out Inlt VC
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCID =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Intl VC Switch = 1
THEN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI2
ELSE 0
: c RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCD =
IF NOT(RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=3) AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1=4
THEN (0.5*RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCI Splt)
ELSE 0
: f RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.In VCtoD =
IF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VC1 = 3
THEN (RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.Out VC+RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.VCID)
ELSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.SpltVCD
: c INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.Total R&D Infra =
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INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.D Infra+INNOVATION MANAGEMENT.R Infra
TIME SPECS
STARTTIME=0
STOPTIME=25
DT=0.5
INTEGRATION=EULER
RUNMODE=NORMAL
PAUSEINTERVAL=INF
Software package: iSee Systems’ STELLA v9.1.
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